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30127682632TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013TABLEOFCONTENTS4BoldDragon20126BoldDragon12SuccessfullyCompletedInterviewwithLieutenantGeneralRichardG.Tieskens8SmartIntelligenceBeyondJointtoCoalitionIntelligenceCollaboration10ChallengesofIn-TheatreTraining12ConceptualApproachtoMissionSpecificTraining26JFTCexpandsCAXexpertiseportfolioatSEESIM1230MultinationalSpecialForcesExercisePuma1231PUMA12ShowcaseoftheConnectedForcesInitiativeInterviewwithBrigadierGeneralPiotrPatalong33GreenonBlueAttacksThreatenISAFMissionSuccess40TheFrenchTrainingCentresCommand42JackalsandDronesAlQaedasChrysalistheMetamorphosisofTerrorismResearch50TransformationinLightofKnowledgeDevelopment-FromMountainBattaliontoMountainRegiment58SecurityChallengesinSouthEasternEurope63NATOEODDemonstrationsTrials201266PoliticalEffectsofGlobalWarmingintheMediterraneanSeaIstheweathertheonlyfactorbehindtheeasternMediterraneanheat70EnglishStudiesintheTerritoryoftheCzechRepublicandtheHeritageoftheDefenseLanguageInstitute76BulgarianCHODDiscoverstheJFTCfortheSecondTime77TheDutyTourinaNATOCentre793rdNATOSignalBattalion82LifeattheJFTC-2012inRetrospect2664 TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March20133PublishingInstitutionJointForceTrainingCentreBydgoszczJFTCManagingdirectorBrigadierGeneralIng.JaromrZNAMSc.Ph.D.JFTCChiefofStaffAssistantEditorsLtC.ChristianvonPLATENJFTCPublicAffairsOfficerEditorialBoardProf.Dr.MarjanMALESICUniversityofLjubljanaSloveniaAssoc.Prof.Dipl.Eng.PavelBUKACSc.ArmedForcesAcademyofGeneralRastislavStefanikSlovakiaDr.KamilaSIERZPUTOWSKAKazimierzWielkiUniversityPolandLtC.Ing.BohuslavPERNICAPh.D.MinistryofDefenseoftheCzechRepublicLtC.ChristopheLeCERFJFTCPlansandAnalysisBranchAdvisoryCommitteeLtC.Ing.JaroslavBARILLAJFTCSpecialStaffMaj.JacekLASHMANNJFTCInformationManagerMs.RadosawaKUBICZEKPublicAffairsSpecialistMr.TomaszOCISKIJFTCLanguageSpecialistEditorialContactInformationPublicAffairsOfficeJointForceTrainingCentreul.Szubiska2Bydgoszcz85-915Poland.E-mailpaojftc.nato.intJFTC2012ISSN2084-8358TransformationThroughTrainingTheaimofthismagazineistoprovideaforumforexchangeofinformationandexpertiseamongtrain-ingandeducationalinstitutionsacrossNATOintheareaoftrainingmilitaryprofessionaleducationandrelatedtechnologicalsupport.InthecontextofTheNATOSmartDefenseapproachthereisgrow-ingimportanceforcooperationwithpartnerstatesandinternationalorganizationssuchastheUnitedNationstheEuropeanUniontheOrganizationforSecurityandCooperationinEuropeandothers.WiththeaboveinmindtheJFTCinvitesauthorsfromcountriesandinstitutionsbeyondtheNATOenvi-ronmenttopublishintheTransformationThroughTrainingmagazine.Themagazinewillfocusonthebestpracticesintheareasofcommandandstafftrain-ingprofessionalmilitaryeducationsimulationsandsimulationtechnologiesdistributedtrainingmili-tarytrainingdevelopmentandotherrelatedareas.TheJFTCalsowelcomesrecommendationsfortheapplicationofthemostrecentexperienceandlessonslearnedfromongoingoperationstrainingeventsandrecentinnovationsinthefieldofsimulationsandinformationtechnologies.ThemagazinewillalsobrieflycoverthelifeoftheinternationalcommunityattheJFTCwiththeaimofpromotingthecentrewithinNATOandamongthepartnernations.ThemagazinewillbepublishedtwiceayearduringthespringandfallbytheNATOJointForceTrainingCentreinBydgoszcz.ThearticlespublishedinthismagazinerepresentopinionsoftheirauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheofficialpolicyofNATO.ScantheQRcodewithyourmobiledevice.ThiswilltakeyoutothearchiveofTransformationThroughTrainingmagazine. 4TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Approximately200soldiersdeployedbytheAlliedJointForceCommandBrunssumJFCBStrainedattheJointForceTrainingCentrebetween17and29October2012.TheBydgoszczNATOTrainingCentreco-hostedtheBoldDragon2012BODN12ExercisewhichwasheldconcurrentlyattheJFTCandattheJFCBSHeadquarters.Thetwo-weekBODN12wastailoredfortheHQJFCBStoprovidepracticeindeploymentandoperational-levelcommandandcontrolC2procedures.BODN12isoneofthemilestonesoftheDeployableActionPlanDEPAPforJFCBSHQtoacquireFinalOperationalCapabilityFOCdeployabilityattheendof2014.ThisdeployabilityconceptisaconsequenceofthenewNATOCommandStructurestatingthatJFCBSHQ-aswellasJFCHQNaples-shouldbeabletomandeployandrunaDJHQDeployableJointHQ.SofarthiscapabilitywasownedbytheForceCommandFCHeidelbergandtheFCMadrid.TheoverallaimoftheexercisewastodevelopunderstandingofNATOsnewJointTaskForceHeadquarterConceptanditsimplicationsinparticulardeploymentoftheHQandstaffinanyfutureoperationsandalsotoinstilaspiritandcultureofdeploy-abilitywithintheHQ.TheexercisecreatedagreatopportunityfortheJFCBSleadershiptorecognizeshortfallswithinthedeploy-abilityconceptandtotestallaspectsofthisconcept.AsBODN12wasonlyoneofthefirststepsinthedeployabilitytrainingplanoftheJFCBSHQthefullC2structure500personnelwasnotintendedtobeplayedthemainobjectivewastodeployandruntheInitialCommandElement150personnel.TheBODN12wasaninternalexercisefortheHQJFCBSstaffbuttoachieveallthegoalstheyweresupportedbyexternalpersonnelfromtheNATOResponseForce2012ComponentCommands.SubjectMatterExpertsSMEfromFCHeidelbergNDCGreeceGermanJFACSTRIKEFORNATOandJALLChadbeenrequestedtoreinforceBoldDragon2012LTCBenoitLangrandJFTCTrainingDivisionStaffTrainingBranch TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March20135theExerciseControlEXCONstructure.Duringthetwo-weekexercisetheHQJFCBSmembersworkedonaficti-tiousNATO-ledcrisisresponseoperationwithhumanitarianassistanceunderUnitedNationsmandate.AllthesecreatedaverycomplextestbedfortheHQsabilitiesinsupportofthenewNATOconcept.ThescenariousedforBODN12wasbasedonCERASIAIIdevelopedbyJWCStavanger.TheexerciseanimationwasMELMILdriventheincidentdatabasewasdevelopedtotriggerspecificactionsfromtheTrainingAudienceTAinordertomeettheapprovedtrainingobjectives.EXCONwasthefirstpartytomovetotheJFTCon17thOctober2012itwascomprisedofJ7BranchfromJFCBSHQaugmentedwithSMEsfromNRFCompoundCommandsandtheJFTCpersonnel.TheScenariowasdevelopedsoastotrainJFCBSHQmountingpreparingandcheckingdifferentteamsandelementsbeforeallowingthemtobedeployedinthe-atre.TheOperationalLiaisonandLogisticsReconnaissanceTeamOLLRTdeployedon18October2012.IntheframeoftheExerciseSpecificationstheOLLRTsrolewastoreviewinternalSOPshavebasictrainingontheatreCISliaisonmeansandprepareinte-grationofthenextteam.Theteamconsistedof25JFCBSpersonnel.ThenextdaytheForwardCoordinationElementFCEarrivedinBydgoszcz.FCE-onceintegratedwiththeOLLRTwasresponsiblefordevelopingsituationaware-nessinordertohelpdecisionmakingformainHQinBrunssumandforcoordinatingthefirstdeploymentofforcesandsettingconditionsfortheestablishmentofinitialC2structure.Duringthisphasealotofrole-playingwasperformedastheFCEwassup-posedtoengageandcoordinatewiththeHostNationGOsandNGOssoastofacilitatethedeploymentofthenextteam.TheFCEcomprisedof35personnelfromJFCBSHQ.On23October2012theInitialCommandElementICEwasdeployedtotheJFTC.ThisteamintegrateswiththeFCEandthenstartsitsactivityduringa4-dayplayperiod.AsaninitialC2structureintheatretheICEtookovertheSituationAwarenessfunctionperformedcurrentoperationplan-ningandassessmentandcoordinatedjointactivitieswithinitsareaofresponsibility.Thiselementisalsothe1sttoengageandcoordinatedeploymentoftroopsintheatremaritimeairlandandlogisticentities.80personnelweredeployedintheJFTCaspartoftheICE.FinallyaRedeploymentCoordinationTeamRCTwasestablishedduringthelast2daysofBODN12.ItsrolewastoplanC2stepdownandhandover-takeovertotheHostNationandalsotoplantheredeploy-mentofforcesintheperspectiveoftheendofDJHQmandateintheatre.Thepeakofactivitywasreacheddur-ingthesecondweekoftheexercise24thto28thOctober2012whentheICEwasupandrunning.Mostoftheincidentsandinjectswerescheduledduringthisperiodsoastotriggeramaximumresponsefromthetrain-ingaudiencecells.AlmostallpersonnelEXCONandTrainingAudienceredeployedon29OctoberwithmilitaryflightfromtheBydgoszczair-port.BODN12wasaneventwithahighvisibilitynotonlywithinACObutalsowithinNATO.SeveralVIPvisitstookplaceduringthistimesuchasDSACEURs.TheExercisewassupportedbytheJFTCtheJFTCSupportUnitandtheNCIASquadronBydgoszczstaff.Theyassistedtheparticipantsduringthewholeeventprovidinghelpinvariousfields.TheJFTCSupportUnitpersonnelofferedassistanceinRealLifeSupportmattersfacilitatingthedeploymenttoBydgoszczofsucces-siveteamsfromHQJFCBSstaff.TheyalsoassistedtheTrainingAudienceduringtheir12-hourworkingdays.NCIASquadronBydgoszczNCBYwasresponsibleforimplementingtheCISlinkagewiththeJFCBSHeadquarterspersonnelwhostayedinBrunssummainlybecauseofahugenumberofVTCslotsnearly100in10days.InadditiontoNCBYtheJFTCTSDpersonnelwereinvolvedinthesetupoftheCISarchitectureandinmeetingJFCBSrequirementrelatedtotheCISissues.Personnelfromthe3rdNATOSignalBattalionperformedtrainingontheTacticalLiaisonKitintheatreencryptedmeansofcommunicationtotheOLLRTpersonnel.JFTCTDpersonnelassistedEXCONsharingexperienceregardingexerciseprep-arationscenarioeventsmanagementorexerciseexecutionprovidingwithadviceorrecommendationstoJFCBSDCOSJ7actingasBODN12ExerciseDirector.LieutenantGeneralRichardG.TieskenstheJFCBSChiefofStaffwhocommandedtheExerciseattheJFTCaskedforhisassessmentoftheCentressupportprovidedtotheBODN12saidIfIcoulduseonlyonewordIwouldsayoutstand-ing.IthinkGeneralMackowithhisteamaredoingafantasticjobIthinkyouwillseemoreofushereinthefuture. BoldDragon12SuccessfullyCompletedInterviewwithLieutenantGeneralRichardG.TieskenstheJointForceCommandBrunssumChiefofStaff6TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013SirastheChiefofStaffoftheJFCBSyoucommandedtheDeployableJointHeadquartersduringtheExerciseBoldDragon2012whichwasheldhereattheJFTC.CouldyoupleasetellusafewwordsabouttheexerciseWhatisitsaimandhowwastheexecutionconductedTheoverallaimoftheexerciseisinfactdevelopingacultureofdeployability.SincewevebeenastaticHeadquartersforthelastcoupleofyearswehavetoreinstillanexpeditionarymindsetinourpeople.Theyareusedtoworkinginacompletelydifferentenvironment.Wehavetobecomedeployablesowehavetogetoutofourofficesandthatrequiresamindadjust-mentofallthepeoplewhoworkintheHQ.Andthereforethistypeofexercisewascon-ductedfortheveryfirsttime.Ofcoursewehaveexercisedalotmoreinthepastaswellbutnowforthefirsttimewetookallourpeopleawayfromtheircomfortableofficesfromtheircomfortzonesandbroughtthemintoadifferentenvironmentwheretheyhadtobeabletoexecutetheirfunctionsandroles.WhatchallengesdidyoufacepreparingtheJFCforitsdeploymentandduringtheexerciseIthinkoneofthemajorchallengesisthatofcoursewelackexperienceindeploy-abilityasheadquarters.SincewehavebeenastaticHQforquiteawhileandnowbecomingadeployableHQnobodyhasalltheanswers.Sowehavetofindanswerstothequestionsofdeployabilitytogetherbasedupontheexperiencefromthisexercise.AnotherchallengeisthatwithinNATOwehavedevelopedaNewDeployabilityConceptforNATOHQsfortheNATOCommandStructure.Sincethisisanewcon-ceptcurrentlyunderdevelopmentsothereisonlyadraftoftheconceptavailablewearenowmoreorlesstestingitforthefirsttime.LisbonconductedtheexerciseearlierthisyearandaswespeakIthinkmaybethisorthenextweekNapleswillalsoconductanexercisebaseduponthisNewConcept.SoforallthethreecurrentlystillthreeJointForceCommandsitisanewworldtodiscover.Andthatisreallyachallenge.Thethirdchallengewehadinthisexercisewasthephaseofdeployment.NormallyinmostoftheexercisesIhaveseenyouexercisethefirstpartofadeployment-developaplanandthenoncedevelopedyougoandexecuteit.Thennormallyyoumakeatimeshiftandgosomewhereintheexecutionofthemissionandarenotionallyalreadytwoorthreemonthsdeployedsoyoubypasstheactualdeployment.Andinthisexercisewehavediscoveredthatthereisalottobelearnedofwhatchallengeswefaceintheactualdeploymentphase.HowlonghastheJFCBShadthetasktosetupaDeployableJointHeadquartersandhowisitsroleevolvingThenewstructuregoesbacktotheLisbon TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March20137Summit2010whereNATOaskedforanewNATOCommandStructure.Westartedplanningthinkingandeventuallythenewconceptwasagreedinthesum-mer2011.AtthattimeIwasntinvolvedmyselfbutthedecisionforthisNewDeployableHQConceptwastakenin2011.Inthefirstplaceofcourseyouhavetoreor-ganizeyourHQ.TheNewNATOCommandStructuregoesfromthreeJointForceCommandstoonlytwobecauseLisbonwillclosedown.Butontheotherhanditisnotthecasethatwejustcarryon.Wealsohavetochangeourownstructure.Wewillbeaugmentedbyabout200staffinthecomingyearsandwevehadtochangeourinternalstructure.WehadtheeffectbasedstructurewhichwasadoptedinNATOandnowwevegonebacktotheoldJstructurewhicheverybodyisstillfamiliarwithandwearecurrentlyintheprocessofchangingourHQ.Sothatkeepsusbusyofcourseandthisisachallengesincewehavetoconductthesekindsofexerciseswhileperformingourdailymission.ButIthinkaswhatIveseenduringthisexercisewearewellontheway.HowdoestheconceptofDJHQsfitintotheAlliancescoretaskswhydoesNATOneeditWecanimplementthisconceptbothforthecollectivedefenceroleandforthecrisisresponseoperations.InbothcasesNATOmayhavetodeployforces.AndthereforeitneedsadeployableHQtosupportandcommandtheoperations.Youneverknowwhenandwhereyouwillhavetodeployandthereforeyoushouldalwaysbepreparedfortheunpredictable.ThatmeansthatwemightconductoperationsfromBrunssumbutitmightalsobeneededtodeploysome-where.AndthereforethisisreallyabigchallengeforNATObecauseasyouknowthenewNATOCommandStructurehadadrawdownofstaffcapacityabout30intotal.Thelevelofambitionwasnotbroughtdownbuttheavailablestaffcapacitywasbroughtdownby30-thatmeanswearereallyinthemiddleofagreatchallenge.Comingbacktotheexercise-HowdoyouassesstheexerciseDoyouthinkitmetitsobjectivesLetmespeaknowformyself.Westillhavetoreviewourprogressandconduct.Butthegeneralassessmentfrommyper-sonalpointofviewisthatitwasagreatexercise.InthefirstplacewhilewetestedtheconceptIthinkwehavefoundsomeveryinterestingpointsthatneedfurtherdis-cussionsandfurtherdevelopmentandthatwasofcoursetheaimoftheexercise.TheaimthatwehavedefinedforourselvesasItoldyouatthebeginningofthisinter-viewwastodevelopthecultureofdeploy-ability.AndifIlooknowoverthelastcoupleofdaysIseemystaffworkingandIthinkwehavereallyachievedthatgoal.FromtheveryfirstminuteofthisexerciseuntilnowaswespeakpeopleareallenthusiastichavetherightattitudeandIthinktheyhavereallymadeastepforwardindevelopingtheirexpeditionarymindsets.Sothisisagreatsuc-cessasfarasIamconcernedandImreallyanxioustohearofcoursetheopinionsoftheothersandwewillsharetheminaminute.HowdoyouevaluatethesupporttheJFCBSgotfromtheJFTCIfIcouldonlyuseonewordIwouldsayoutstanding.Everythingfromcommunica-tionsupportthefacilitieswewereintheofficesthebuildingthediningfacilityIthinkwereallgreat.Theyareverywellkeptnewfacilities.IthinkGeneralMackoandhisteamaredoingafantasticjob.AndIalreadyspokeaboutitwithmyCommanderthatforusdeployingtoBydgoszczisagreatsuccesssinceitisfarawayfromourcomfortzone.Ontheotherhanditisnottoofarawayanditsagreatfacilitywherewecanachieveourgoalscompletelywithintheenvironmentofyourfacility.Ithinkyouwillseemoreofusinthefuture.QuestionsaskedbytheJFTCPAO. 8TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013ShrinkingnationalbudgetsisnotonlyaspecterhauntingtheUnitedStatesintel-ligencecommunitybutoneloomingacrossthoseofitsallianceandcoalitionpartners.War-wearinessoverAfghanistannaggingpublicskepticismovergovernmentsgoodstewardshipofpublicfundsandpersistentallegationsofintelligenceentitiesinfringingoncivillibertiesfurtherfuelpublicdemandsintheante-chambersandparliamentaryhallsacrossEuropeandAsiatoreducespend-ingonnationalsecurityprograms.HardlyaNATOmember-statemilitaryhasescapedunscathed.EvenGermanythefinancialcornerstoneofEuropehastrimmeddefense-spendinginitsrecentbudget.AllNATOmember-statesnowfacethechallengeofdoingmorewithless.Hoperemains.Intimesofausterenationalbudgetsthereisnobettertimethanthepres-enttocapitalizeontheuntappedopportuni-tiesavailablethroughincreasedmultinationalintelligencecollaborationespeciallyamongthemilitaryintelligencecommunitiesofNATOalliesandotherreliablecoalitionpart-ners.Asidefromcollectivedefenseanddem-onstratingbroad-basedinternationalpoliticalresolvethevalueofanallianceisburden-sharing.NATOsexperiencesintheBalkansAfghanistanandotherrecentendeavorshaveshownthevalueofmultinationaloperationsleveragingcoalitionsbestassetsforacom-monobjectiveinaformofRicardiancom-parativeadvantageatheoreticalkernelattheheartofNATOsSmartDefense.Althoughtheyhaveclearlyandsuccess-fullyleveragedoneanothersoperationalforcesNATOmember-stateshavenotyetrealizedthefruitsofmultinationalintelli-gencecollaboration.SmartDefenserequiresSmartIntelligence.Nonationhasasofyetrealizedthefullpotentialofmultina-tionalintelligencecollaboration.Efficientandeffectivecoalitionintelligencecollabo-rationrequiresalegitimateresponsiveflatcoalition-widenetworkrapidlyandreliablylinkingcollectorstoanalystsandanalyststodecision-makers.UndoubtedlyLTGFlynnsapproachtofixingintelligencecatapultedintelligencecollaborationwithinNATOlightyearsaheadofitsexperiencesinpreviouscontingencyenvironmentssuchasBosniaandKosovo.MostnotablythroughISAFNATOhasmadesignificantprogressespeciallyincre-atingtheAfghanMissionNetworkintoacoalition-wideknowledgemanagementenvi-ronmentonesupportingboththecoalitionwar-fighteraswellasinformingcoalitiondecision-makers.Theencouragingnewsthenisacoalitionwide-networkexistsatleastinarudimentaryform.Butitisonlyformallysanctionedinasingletheatreofoperation.IfallproceedsashopedtheMissionNetworkwillbeabaselinenetworkforcoalitionendeavorsinfuturecontingencyenvironments.Thetrulyinnovativecouldperhapsevenenvisionasimilarnetworktoenablepeace-timecollaboration.ThatsaidwhileitcanlikelysupportSmartDefensetheMissionNetworkisnotyetsupportedbySmartIntelligence.Eachcoalitionpartnerhasseveraltypesofcollec-tionplatformsrichwithdatawhichthoughvaluabletothecoalitionwar-fighteroftenremainsstove-pipedorworsecloggedupinnationalchannels.Anecdotesaboundofinformationcollectedinatheatreofopera-tionbeingtransmittedtoanationalcapitalremotefromthebattlefieldandthenre-trans-mittedbacktotheatreseveralhoursevenseveraldayslater.Orworseinatleastonecaseinformationcollectedatabrigadelevelandtransmittedtoadivisionheadquarterswasremovedfromthecoalitionnetworkplacedontoanationalnetworkandthenclas-sifiedasnationalsecretaseriesofactionswhichmadetheinformationunavailabletoothermembersofthecoalitionincludingthosewhocollecteditinthefirstplace.SmartIntelligenceinsupportofSmartDefenserequiresbetter.Incoalitioncon-tingencyenvironmentsnationalstovepipesifrequiredmustmeldseamlesslyandpushinformationfluidlyintoamissionnetworkwhereconsumersarecoordinatingandcon-ductingvitaloperations.SmartIntelligencerequireslinkingthecollectionplatformsintotheoperationalnetworkessentiallyflatten-ingthenetworkevenfurtherandtherebyincreasingresponsiveness.Responsivenessandflatnessaretwomutuallysupport-SmartIntelligenceBeyondJointtoCoalitionIntelligenceCollaboration1DrMarkA.Thomas TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March20139ive.IncreasingflatnesswillultimatelyimproveresponsivenessoftheintelligencecycleinsupportofSmartDefenseandcoali-tionoperations.Therearegenerallytwoschoolsofthoughtonhowtoflattenthecoalitionintelligencecommunity.Thefirstadvocatesfieldingacoalitionnetworkofcoalitionworkstationstoallusersandmandatealloperatorsrelyonlythatnetwork.SuchanoptionunderutilizesnationalcollectionplatformsandcountersthebenefitsofSmartDefense.Avariantwouldbefieldingofcoalitioncollectionplatformsascapableasthebestnationalcol-lectionplatformsanoptionwhichatbestisastraw-manandisrealisticallyapipedreamiffornootherreasonitcountermandsnationalintelligencecommunitiesprerogativeandobligationtoprotectsourcesandmethods.Furthercreatingcapablecoalitioncollectionplatformsinalltheintelligencedisciplineswouldberesourceprohibitiveinthecurrentbudgetenvironment.Thesecondschoolofthoughtistolinknationalcollectionplatformsthroughatrustedinterfacetothecoalitionnetworktheso-calledFutureMissionNetwork.Inthisscenarionationalteamsdeploywiththeirnationalworkstationsandpipethroughatrustedinterfaceintothecoalitionnetwork.Thatinterfacemustbebidirectionalpushingfromnationalsystemstothecoalitionnet-workandpullingfromthecoalitionnetworktothenationalnetworkstherebyalleviatingthecollectionburdenonalliancepartnersleveragingthebestcollectionplatformsandintheprocessincreasingthelegitimacyofthenetworkitself.IntheconceptofSmartDefensethisseemsthemorecost-effectiveoption.Anditisinthisdirectiontheknowl-edgemanagersareputtingtheirefforts.Athirdoptionahybridoftheothertwooptionsisalsopossiblebutrequiresthesameprescriptionsasthatproposedforthesecondschoolofthought.Thehybridoptionalsoeitherincreasesthenumberofworksta-tionsonausersdeskorputsacoalitionworkstationinaremotecorneroftheofficeclosetothecoffeemachine.CreatingasystemtosupportSmartIntelligencerequiresimprovedtechnologybutmorecriticallypoliticalwillandlead-ershipcommitment.Anonnegotiablepre-conditionforlinkingthestovepipesintothemissionnetworkisensuringcoalitionpart-nersareconfidentinthenetworkssecurity.Specificallyataminimumthesystemmustmeetorexceedtherequirementsofconfi-dentialityavailabilityintegrityandaccount-abilityofthedataasoutlinedinSP800-14GenerallyAcceptedPrinciplesandPracticesforSecuringInformationTechnologySystems.Secondthemembersofthecoali-tionintelligencecommunitymustbeconfi-dentthemeansofprovidingaresponsiveflatlinkintothemissionnetworkdoesnotcompromiseorendangerthesacredjewelsoftheirprofessionthesourcesandmethodsofnationalcollectionplatforms.Thereislittledoubtamongcoalitionpartnersinthevalueoftheintelligencetheygather.Whatremainsinquestioniswhetheratechnicalsolutionbeithardwareorsoftwareexistswhichcanensurenothingleaksthroughthesievesoftheinterfacewhichwouldcompromiseasensi-tivesourceorundermineacriticalnationalcollectioncapability.Thirdallcoalitionpartnersmustcon-siderthesolutionlegitimate.Inotherwordsallcoalitionpartnersmustviewcoalitionintelligenceasacommonenterpriseandacceptthetechnicalsolutionasthesolutiontoinformation-sharingacrossthecoalitionintelligencecommunity.SomemayargueNATOhasanintelligence-sharingnetworkinplace.Infactitdoes.ThereareatleastthreesuchsystemswhichvieatanygivenmomentforthehonorofbeingNATOsintelligencenetworkbackbone.NATOmustmandateasolutionandthatsolutionalongwiththeaccompanyingregulationsanddoc-trinemustbeapprovedthroughtheappropri-atemilitaryandpoliticalbodies.Onamorepracticallevelinanygiventheatreofoperationsthesmallercoalitionpartnersmusthaveconfidencethecoalition-partnerswhohavethelargerintelligencecollectionfootprintdeemitascriticaltopushactionableintelligencetothecoalitionasitistotheirnationalconsumers.Likewisethosewiththelargernationalfootprintmustbeconfidentinothersunerringcommitmenttothemissionanditssecurityandintheirabilitytosharetheburdenofmeetingthecommanderspriorityintelligencerequire-ments.InSmartIntelligencetherecanbenofree-ridersandnobullies.Mostimportantlythesolutionmustbecollector-friendlyinsofarasitiseitherreadilyaccessibletothecollectororitmustlinkthenationalcollectortransparentlytothecoalitioninterfacee.g.notforcingapersontotypeandre-typethesameinformationontwoseparatecomputersystems.Towardthatendthetechnicalsolutionshouldleverageexistingnationallyfieldednetworksandtheworkstationspredominantlyusedbyeachcoalition-partnersintelligencecommunity.Finallythetechnicalsolutionmustprovideareliableresponsiveandrapidfeedbackloopfromdecision-makertotheanalystsandcol-lectors.Thetechnicalsolutionmaybetheeasyendeavor.FarmorechallengingmaybeadoptingandadaptingnationalpoliciestorealizethebenefitsofSmartIntelligence.Eachcoalitionmembermustexamineitsnationalcaveatsonintelligencecollectionandinformation-sharingastheyrelatetotheirinvolvementincontingencyenvironments.Nationalcaveatshinderburden-sharingcon-strictinformation-sharingandundermineothersconfidenceinthecompetencyandorcommitmentofcoalitionpartnersintel-ligencecommunitiestomissionaccomplish-ment.Insomecasessomecoalitionpartnersmustfirstbreakdownstove-pipestointelli-gence-sharingbetweenmembersoftheirownnationalintelligencecommunity.Nextisthetaskofdevelopingthedirec-tivesanddoctrinenecessarytosupportSmartIntelligence.NATOsexperiencesinBosniaKosovoAfghanistanetc.havegeneratedtreasure-trovesoflessonslearnedandbestpracticesuponwhichtobaseNATOdoctrineinsupportofSmartDefense.Whilecollec-tionlikecounterintelligencewillalwaysbeanationalprerogativeothermattersarenot.Fromreportingformatstocollectionman-agementandintelligencefusionmethodstocoalitionintelligencestaffoperationsNATOitsmember-statesanditscoalitionpartnersmustbenchmarkthesuccessesandidentifyareasofimprovement.Furtherlikesoldiersintelligenceteamsfightastheyaretrained.OncedraftedNATOanditsmember-statemilitaryintel-ligencecommunitieshavetheobligationtointegrateNATOdoctrineintonationalmili-tarytrainingdoctrineatleastsomember-statemilitarymembersarrivecompetenttocollaborateandconfidentintheirnationscommitmenttothecoalitionintelligenceenterprise.ToofrequentlyindividualshavearrivedinNATOcontingencyenvironments 10TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013InductiontrainingisatraininggiventonewlyarrivedpersonnelinagivenAreaofOperationsAOO.InaccordancewiththeJFCBrunssumtrainingdirectivefortheISAFpre-deploymenttrainingitisusually12weeksoftrainingincludinghandoverleftseatrightseattrainingandselectedtrain-ingasappropriate.Itisaninitialpreparationupontakingupapostforacertainperiodoftime.Thissortoftrainingismeanttohelpnewlyarrivedservicememberstosettledownquicklyintotherespectivefieldofactivitythusbecomingfamiliarwiththeenvironmenttheparticularitiesoftasksandresponsibilitiescomradesandcolleagues.Itisimportanttoprovidethenewlyarrivedservicepersonnelwithagoodover-viewbeforetheirtourofdutyofficiallystarts.Theinductiontrainingthereforeshouldbebasedonasystematicapproachandcoverallthenecessarytopicsandfunctionalareasintheshortesttimenecessary.Whenproperlyconductedtheinductiontrain-ingoffersmanybenefitsforthesoldiersaswellasfortheunitHQ.Forexample-Asthemissioniscontinuouslychangingthemilitarypersonnelneedtoberegularlyupdatedaboutthemissionprogressandtrainedaccordingly.Regardlesshowrealisticthepre-deploymenttrainingistherearestillrealitieswhichneedtobepersonallysharedbetweenin-comingandout-goingpersonnelintheHQ.-Theinductiontrainingkeepssoldiersmotivated.Refreshedskillsandknowledgecanhelptoreducepotentialfuturerisks.AlsosuchtrainingpromotesthefeelingamongthenewlyarrivingsoldiersthattheyarevaluablemembersoftheunitHQwhichhasbeenwaitingfortheirarrivalwithgreatexpectationsandisdedicatedtotheirsupportandprofessionaldevelopment.-Itfacilitatesestablishmentofgoodworkingrelationshipstocreationofapositiveatmosphereamongtheservicemen.Theinductiontrainingfocusesonclarificationofthetacticstechniquesandproceduresusedinthemissionandhelpsthesoldierstounderstandwhatisexpectedfromthembytheirunitcommandandthenation.-Highqualityinductiontrainingsavesthemoneyandeffortbymakingthesoldiersmorecompetentandeffectiveinexecutionoftheirdutiesandfunctions.Itisanearcommonplacethatsuccessinanowadaysbattlefieldgreatlydependsontheappropriatenessoftrainingandthequalityofinformationavailable.InaccordancewithNATOregulationsthepre-deploymenttrainingtakesplaceinthreephases.PhaseIstandsforselectionandtrainingwhichisentirelyanationalresponsibility.PhaseIIisatrainingundertheauspicesofagivenNATOCommandandaccordswiththeoperationaldemandofaspecifictheatre.PhaseIIIstandsonlyseeingNATOdoctrineandformatsforthefirsttimeastheydisembarkfromtheaircraft.Iffightingincoalitionisadirec-tionwhichNATOsmember-statesconsideralikelycourseofactionfortheforeseeablefuturethendraftingpromulgatingandtrain-ingcommondoctrineisnotjustanoptionitisanimperativesoSmartIntelligencesup-portsSmartDefense.FinallySmartIntelligencerequiresexam-iningwhichtechnologiesandmethodsNATOmember-statescansharewitheachothertoimproveallianceevencoalitionintelligencecollaboration.Wherelaser-rangefindersandthermalimagingdeviceshavegivenUSinfantryteamsacombatovermatchsotoohavecertaintechnologiesforexamplethoseusedindocumentandmaterialexploitationincreasedthecombateffectivenessofUScollectionefforts.Hewiththebettertechnol-ogyhasboththeadvantagebuthemustalsobearalargerburden.Inacoalitiontheatreofoperationwhereinsurgentsandotheradversariesexploiteventheslightestchinkinthearmorthequestioniswhetherandhowtopromulgatetheintelligencecombatmulti-pliersmorebroadlytoalleviatetheburdenonthemoretechnologicallygiftedcoalitionpartners.ManyofthebasictechnologiesandconceptsforSmartIntelligencealreadyexist.Itisonlyamatterofsiftingthroughthechafetoidentifythebestpracticesdraftingthedoctrineandbuildingtheconsensusneces-sarytoimplementthechange.AndunliketheColdWaryearsthepost-ColdWaryearshavegivenNATOanditsmember-statesanarrayofopportunitiestoworkinmultina-tionalenvironmentswherethesuccessofthemissionrestsofsoldierswithdifferentnationalflagsontheiruniforms.Manyofthemknowbetterthebenefitsofalli-ancethanleadersintheirnationalcapitals.Budgetcriseslikeanysignificantemotionaleventoftenforcechangewhichleadersmayotherwisediscountoroverlook.Aswecol-lectivelyrunoutofmoneyitismoreurgenttoworksmarter.1Theviewsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthoraloneanddonotrepresenttheposi-tionoftheUSArmyortheUSDepartmentofDefense.ChallengesofIn TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201311forthein-theatretrainingwhichisconductedbytherespectiveoperationalcommandinaccordancewithrelevantStandingOperatingProceduresSOPs.Thisphaseusuallylaststhreetofivedays.Allthreephasescovertopicsandtrainingrequirementswhichareoftensimilarortheyoverlapwitheachother.Butitisdonethiswaybydesign.Ineachphaseofthepre-deploymenttrainingthescopecomplexityandlevelofdetailareincreasing.Thusateachstagethepre-deploymenttrainingpresentsnewchallengesforthetrainingaudienceandforcesthesoldierstocreativelyembracethemeffectivelyusingtheknowledgeandexpertisegainedduringthepreviousphase.SpecificityofthePhaseIIIin-theaterinductiontrainingrestsonthefactthatthesoldiersareoftenpartneredwithout-rotatingpersonnel.Thatenablespassingonthemostrecentinformationtoin-rotatingunitsfrompersontopersononproceduressuchasCivilianCasualtyCIVCASCounter-insurgencyCOINandCounterImprovisedExplosiveDevicesC-IED.Besidestheplusestherearealsochallenges.BasedonourexperiencewewouldliketosharefewexamplesrepresentingthemainproblemsweexperiencedduringtheInductiontrainingafterdeploymenttoAfghanistan-Thefirstproblemwasthatmostofthein-rotatingunitsandtheirpersonnelhadalreadyservedintheareaofoperations.Theythoughttheykneweverythingandtherewasnoneedforsuchtraining.Thisfeelingwasfurtherreinforcedbythefactthatindeedtheyoftendidnotseemuchhaschangedinthetheatreandthereforeanysortoffamiliarizationwasunnecessary.-Thesecondproblemwascausedbytheobviousoverlapofthetopicsaddressed.DuringtheC-IEDtrainingforexampleithappenedthatsoldierswhohadtakenpartintherespectiveTraintheTrainerprogramdidnotseeanyneedforparticipationinthepre-deploymenttrainingconsistingofthreephasesandpreferredspecificshortenedandintensivetraining.IthadtobeexplainedthatdespiterecognizingthefactthatthereareobviousdifferencesintermsoftheoreticalandpracticalcontentC-IEDtrainingiscompulsoryandnostepintheprocesscanbeomitted.Therearemanyreasonswhytheinductiontrainingneedstobetakenseri-ously.Firstimperativeisthesuccessfulexecutionofthemissionandprotectionofthetroops.SecondisavarietyofviewsandperceptionswithwhichthesoldiersarrivetoAfghanistan.Oftensomeover-motivatedservicemendeploytothetheaterwithstarsintheireyes.Alsotheremaybesoldierswithrosydreamsofagreatperformanceformidableachievementsandcomraderie.Thesoldiersmaybegintheirtourswithapositiveattitudeandheartsfullofnewideas.Theymaynotbemen-tallypreparedtofaceindifferenceambi-guityanddisinterest.Ontheotherhandsoldierswithpreviousexperiencefromthedeploymentalreadywithoutillusionsmayhaveanegativeoftencynicalatti-tude.TheymightscoffattheprogramsoftheInductiontrainingthusputtingtheircomradeslifedeliberatelyatrisk.TheinductiontrainingisthelastopportunitytoovercomeallthesedifferencesinstillpositiveattitudestrengthenthecohesionoftheunitsteamsandHQsandhaveallthepersonnelfocusedonthemission.DespiteagreatdealofknowledgeabouttheISAFmissionfromtheprevi-ousphasesofthepre-deploymenttrainingthereisalwaysacertaingapbetweenthelasttrainingeventanddeploymentitself.Thenewlyarrivedpersonnelthereforehavetobemadefamiliarwithallthechang-eswhichhaveimpactonthemissionexecu-tion.Theprogramoftheinductiontrainingcanalsobeseenasasortofspecifictrain-ingconducteduntilthesoldiersaretrulyimmersedintothemission.Theinductiontrainingisalsoimportantinmotivatingnewservicememberstoboosttheirambitionsforhigherperformance.Itisnotacoinci-dencethattheinductiontrainingbeginsonahighnoteandeverybodyinvolvedinitsexecutionmustlookatitaccordingly.TheatreTrainingLt.Col.Dr.ZoltanJobbagyLt.Col.LajosKomjathy 12TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Between26Novemberand13December2012theJFTCconducteditsalreadythirdISAFRegionalCommandNorthTrainingEvent13-01RC-N13-01oftheyear.ThetrainingeventitselfwasapartofalargertrainingeffortorganizedbyNATOfortheISAFmissionconnectingtheRC-N13-01withtheISAFInternationalJointStaffTrainingEvent12-02ISAFIJC12-02andU.S.ExerciseUNIFIEDENDEAVOUR13-1UE13-1Picture1.Byconnectingseveralpreviouslystandaloneexercisesinvariouslocationsandrepresent-ingdifferentlevelsofcommandNATOdemonstratedatrueextentofitscapabilitiesinthemanagementofcomplexmultilevelanddistributedexercises.NATOtogetherwithparticipatingnationaltrainingcentershasusedtheISAFpre-deploymenttrainingasoneofthemainwaysfordevelopmentofthedistributedtrainingcapabilitywhichisnowrevealingitsfullpotential.Yearsoffruitfulco-operationbetweenNATOtraininginstitutionsandnationaltrainingcentersleadtoimpressiveresultsfromwhichtheAlliancemaybenefitintheyearstocome.Thesebenefitspertaintoallthedomainswhichcon-stitutecomplexmultilevelandmultinationaltrainingorganizedundertheumbrellaofacomprehensiveapproach.ForthosewhostillmayhavesomedoubtsaboutthepracticalmeaningoftheConnectedForcesInitiativeCFItheNATOsdistributedtrainingcapa-bilitymayserveasagoodexamplethatthenewinitiativealreadyleansonrealconceptsstructuresandcapabilities.ThistrainingeventlikemanyotherexercisesorganizedinNATOhasshownthattheCFIhasthepotentialtobecometheframeworkwhichwillenableNATOtoretainandimproveourabilitytotrainandoperatetogetherandeffectivelycollaboratewiththepartners.PersonnelofthefutureRC-NHQwhichwastrainedattheJFTCmainlyderivedfromthe10thArmoredDivisionHQGE.ItwasfurtheraugmentedbysoldiersfromotheralliednationsparticipatingintheISAFmission.Theoverallsizeofthetrain-ingaudiencewas184personnelincludingfiveflagofficersandcommandedbyMajorGeneralJoergVollmerthefutureRC-Ncom-mander.Additionally315personnelpartici-patedinvariousExerciseControlEXCONpositionsandfunctionsincludingfourflagofficersand26representativesoftheAfghanNationalSecurityForcesANSF.Ofcourselikeinthecaseofothertrainingeventsorga-nizedattheJFTCthetrainingdrewatten-tionoftheNATOtopmilitaryleadershipaswellasofthenationallevels.ForexampleLieutenantGeneralReinhardKammererGECommanderFieldArmyandViceChiefoftheArmyandLieutenantGeneralRainerConceptualApproachtoMissionSpecificTrainingBrigadierGeneralJaromrZnaJFTCDeputyCommanderChiefofStaff TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201313GlatzCommanderBundeswehrJointForcesOperationsCommandBwJFOpsComvis-itedtheexercisetwice.ACTCOSViceAdmiralAnthonyJohnstone-BurtobservedthetrainingasapartofhisvisittotheJFTC.InadditiontheChiefofDefenseLieutenantGeneralPeterVojtekSVKpaidavisittoBydgoszcztoobtainafirsthandexperienceofthetrainingorganizedbytheJFTConeofthemostimportantNATOtraininginstitu-tions.UsingtheRC-N13-01TrainingEventasabackgroundtheintentofthisarticleistosharetheJFTCsconceptualizationoftheMissionSpecificTrainingMST.InaccordancewiththeNATOpre-deploymenttrainingconceptPhase2NATOTrainingconsistsoffollowingpartsMissionSpecificTrainingBattleStaffTrainingandMissionRehearsalExercisePicture2.WhileBattleStaffTrainingBSTandMissionRehearsalExerciseMREtheculminatingpartsinanypre-deploymenttrainingoftengainlotsofcov-erageinthemilitarycirclesthereisusuallynotthatmuchwhatexternalaudiencecanreadabouttheotherpartsofthetrain-ingincludingtheMST.TheNATOBi-SCExerciseDirective75-3providesonlydefini-tionsofFunctionalAreaSystemsTrainingandFunctionalServicesTraining.Butitisnotdwellingmuchintothedetailsandmeth-odologyoftheMST.Thereasonisthatthedirectiveisgenericinnatureandthereforedoesnotreflectthespecifictrainingrequire-mentsforongoingoperationssuchasISAF.AmongitstrainingresponsibilitiesfortheISAFmissionJFCHQBrunssumJFCBisobligedtoprovidefurthertrainingguidanceforexecutionofthepre-deploymenttrain-ingforRegionalCommandHeadquartersRCHQwhichshouldbeobservedbyboththetroopcontributingnationsandNATOtrainingcenters.ThereforeintheJFCHQBrunssumDirective75-8COMJFCBrunssumISAFTrainingDirective8May2012andsubsequenttrainingdirec-tivesandguidanceissuedbytheJFCBtheMSTrequirementsobjectivesandstructurearemoreclearlyarticulated.Butattheenditispredominantlyinthehandsofthetrain-inginstitutionsanddesignatedfutureRCcommandershowthegenericguidancewillbetranslatedintoarealistictrainingevent.WhilerecognizingtherequirementforcommonalityandstandardizationasamodusoperandiintheNATOtrainingenvi-ronmentduetoobjectivereasonsthetrain-inginstitutionsmayhaveslightlydifferentapproachtotheMST.AlmostcertainlywewouldnotfindtwoNATOornationaltrain-ingcenterswithanidenticaldesignandexecutionoftheMST.EventhetextoftheJFCBISAFTrainingDirectiverecognizesthatagenericguidancealwayshastobecreativelyadjustedtothecurrentsituationinAfghanistandifferencesinoperationalrolesbetweentheRCsanddesignatedRCcommanderstrainingpriorities.IneachofthetrainingcentersthequestionhowtheJFCBtrainingguidanceisapplieddependsoncountlessfactors.ThegoverningonesusuallyincludethecustomerrequirementssituationintheareaofresponsibilityoftherespectiveRCcommandersprioritiesexpe-rienceandcapabilitiesofthetrainingcentrewhichsupportstheexerciseandsourcesavailable.ThereforethefinalrealizationoftheMSTmirrorsthecircumstancesandexistingconditionsinthetraininginstitution.Whilediscussingtheconceptu-alapproachtotheMSTintheoryonecouldalwaysadheretotheofficialNATOdoctrine.ThecontentoftheJFCBISAFTrainingDirectivehasvisiblyimprovedovertheyears.ThatimpliesthattheLessonsLearnedprocessworksandthereisacon-stantexchangeoftheinformationbetweenallthepartiesinvolved.HighlypositivenewsisthatthetrainingdirectivealsoprovidessufficientroomforflexibleadjustmentofthetrainingrequirementstotheconcreteconditionsofaparticularRCanditstrain-ingpriorities.Likemostofotherroofing 14TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013documentstheJFCBISAFtrainingdirec-tiveisnotatextbook.ItrefersonlytothebasicframeworkandrequirementsforthetrainingandassuchwhenitcomestothedefinitioncontentandstructureoftheMSTandhierarchybetweenaffiliatedtermsthesearepracticallyintactandthereforetosomeextentitlackscohesion.ThewholePhase2NATOTrainingislabeledasMissionSpecificspage7.LaterinthetexttheMSTisstreamlinedtoMSTAcademics.AccordingtothispartofthedirectivetheMSTincludesonlyAcademicLectureswhileRoundtableDiscussionsandPanelDiscussionsarelistedasstandalonetrainingactivitiespage24.Thedirectivedoesnotdistinguishthatallthethreeactivitiesarenotseparatepartsofthetrainingeventbuttheyrepresentthreedifferenttrainingmethodsofcommunication.Thesemethodsareappliedforthesamepurposeinsupportoftheattainmentofthesametrainingobjectivesinordertocommunicatetheknowledgeandinformationaboutthesamesubject.Bythedefinitionthisdifferentiatestrainingmeth-odsfromorganizationalformsoftraining.Thismisconceptionwillbelaterexplainedinmoredepthduringthediscussionabouttheapplicationofthetrainingmethodsindif-ferentpartsoftheexercise.InadditiontheMSTislistedamongothertrainingactivitieswhichtogetherconstituteinitialpartofthetrainingeventRoundtableDiscussionsCGMediaTrainingMSTAcademicsFASTFATPANELDISCUSSIONSQApage24.Bereftofanydescriptionwhichwouldshedmorelightonhowallthesetermsformsandmethodsofthetrainingarerelatedtoeachother.Thiseclecticmixtureoftermsandfluidstructuresleavepracticallyevery-thingopentoasubjectiveinterpretation.TheJFTCdoesnthaveconceptualcapacitiesandalmosteverythingisdrivenbyempiricalapproaches.OverthetimetheJFTCadopteditsownsolutionandintegratedallthetrain-ingrequirementsunderoneumbrellaoftheMSTTrainingPlanPicture3.InordertoprovidecoherentinformationthisarticleisbasedonthestructureoftheMSTcurrentlyinuseattheJFTC.Althoughrecognizingthatsuchapproachmaynotbealwaysopti-malbutontheotherhanditistheclosestreflectionofthetruesenseoftheMST.TheJFTCisnotinanywaydifferentfromothertrainingcenters.Ithasitsstrongpointsaswellasareaswhereitlargelydependsontheexternalsupport.Whilehav-ingrelativelyasmallstaffforexampleisaconstantchallengetheyearsofexperiencewiththeISAFpre-deploymenttrainingistheJFTCsstrengthwhichmakesitunique.ManysimilarexamplesmaybegivenandhowtheyspecificallyaffectthewaytheJFTCapproachesitstrainingtasksandhowitorganizestheMST.ThustheJFTCsconceptionoftheMSTrepresentsonlyonevariantamongmanyotherswhicharelikelytoexistintheNATOandnationaltrainingenvironments.Neverthelesswhatwecansaywithconfidenceisthataftertheyearsoffirsthandexperiencewithorganizationofdifferentpre-deploymenttrainingeventstherehasalwaysbeenahighlevelofsat-isfactionamongthecommandersandtheirstaffswiththequalitycontentandorganiza-tionoftheMSTtheyreceivedattheJFTC.BuildingcapableconfidentandcohesivestaffPhase2-NATOTrainingaimsatpreparingthepersonnelfortheirmis-sionbyprovidingone-sourceknowledgeincreasingsituationalawarenessandensuringstandardization.Inthisframe-workthepurposeoftheMSTistwofold.Firstisthemissionscontext.TheMSTprovidestheconceptualfoundationfortheknowledgebasedapproachtothemissionexecutionandabilitytounderstandthecircumstancesinthetheatrewhichreachbeyondtherealmofmilitarysecuritypurelymilitarytasksandapplicationofthemilitaryforce.TheMSTshouldthereforefocusonthethemeswhichcantbemas-teredviaotherformsoftrainingandrequirein-depthknowledge.Itisimportanttocoverespeciallythoseareaswherethesituationisconstantlyevolvingandthusitisnecessarytoprovidethetrainingaudiencewiththemostrecentinformationfromthetheatre.Thestafftrainingingeneralisdesignedtoachieverequiredleveloforchestrationamongthestaffelementsandstaffmembersandtoobtainorretaincommonmilitarycommandandstaffcompetencies.Staffoffi-cersoftenconsideritasalthoughcreativebutstillaroutineprocess.ThepurposeoftheMSTistoovercomethisperceptionbyprovidingcomprehensiveinformationaboutthemissionitsdevelopmentrealitiesinthetheatreandinsuchawayaddingcomplexityanddepthtothestafftraining.InordertoachievethisaimtheSubjectMatterExpertsSMEwhoaresupportingtheexerciseneedtohavethemostrecentaswellasin-depthknowledgeaboutthesituationintheAreaofResponsibilityAORoftheRCHQthatconductsthepre-deploymenttraining.ThesecondpurposeoftheMSTistoallowthestaffmemberstogainthecapacitytounderstandtherelateddoctrineoperation-alplansfunctionalareaservicessupportingtoolsandsystemsTacticsTechniquesandProceduresTTPsandStandingOperatingProceduresSOPs.DuringtheMSTthestaffmembersintheirindividualandcol-lectivefunctionswillachievetherequiredlevelofknowledgeacquirementsandhab-itsinordertobuildcapableconfidentandcohesivestaffteamsthatsupporttheCommandersdecisionmakingprocess.AlltheserequirementshavetobeachievedinarelativelyshorttimebyamultinationalHQwherethestaffmembersoftenseeeachotherforthefirsttimeonlyatthebeginningofthetrainingevent.TheJFTCisNATOsdesignatedtrainingcentretoconducttheRCleveltraininginordertoensurepreparationofthecommandersandstaffsfortheISAFmissioninaccordancewiththeNATOstan-dards.InlinewiththisrequirementtheRC-N13-01trainingeventwasdesignedtomeetfourstandingNATOpre-deploy-menttrainingobjectiveswhichare-Promotecontinuityandcommonstandards-Establishmissionawarenessinindividuals-Ensurefunctionalareacompetence-Facilitatestaffintegrationandcoordinationandexercisethefulldecision-makingprocess.ToensurethatthemembersoftheRC-NHQpossesstherequiredlevelofunderstandingofthecurrentAfghanistanandISAFmission-relatedissuestheaforemen-tionedoverreachingtrainingobjectiveswerefurtherdividedinto45specifictrainingobjec-tivesencompassingthefollowingthemesAfghanistanOverviewISAFStrategyRegionalCommandOperationswithemphasisonRC-NMilitaryCo-Ordination TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201315Civil-MilitaryCo-OrdinationCIMICStrategicCommunicationSTRATCOMInformationOperationsINFOOPSandLegalFramework.Specifictrainingobjec-tivesarestandardizedforallRCHQtrain-ingandguidetheprocessofpreparationandexecutionofthetrainingeventassuch.NeverthelessforanytrainingeventthesespecifictrainingobjectivesareoftenadjustedtobetterreflectthecurrentdevelopmentinAfghanistanandspecificsituationintheAORoftherelevantRC.DuringthecourseofpreparationoftheRC-N13-01train-ingeventthetrainingobjectivesweredis-cussedwiththecurrentlydeployedRC-NHQBwJFOpsComwhichwasthemaincustomeranddesignatedfutureRC-Ncom-mander.Thisapproachensuredalignmentofviewsamongalltheparticipatingorga-nizationsandalsocreatedpreconditionsforsuccessfulexecutionoftheexercise.DuringtheMST39outof45specifictrainingobjec-tiveshadbeenaddressed.ThisreiteratestheimportanceoftheMSTamongtheotherpartsthatmadeouttheRC-N13-01trainingevent.Athingtoremember-successfulcompletionoftheMSTandmeetingofthespecifictrain-ingobjectivesshouldfacilitatethetrainingaudiencesperformanceintheBSTandMRE.TheMSTisacontinuousprocessencompassingallthethreephasesoftheNATOPre-deploymentTrainingNationalNATOTrainingandtheIn-theater.DuringtheNATOTrainingthetrainingaudi-enceshouldfurthercomplementthebasicknowledgeabouttheISAFmissiondevel-opedbytheindividualsduringthenation-altrainingandobligatoryJointAdvancedDistributedLearningJADL.JADLisaprerequisiteforattendinganyNATO-ledISAFtrainingevents.InthecaseoftheRC-N13-01therateofsuccessfulcomple-tionoftheJADLbythetrainingaudi-encewas96whichisaboutthestandardintrainingeventsorganizedattheJFTC.TheMSTlikenootherpartofthetrainingexpressestheideasofthecom-prehensiveapproachtothecrisismanage-ment.Leveragingexpertiseandknowl-edgeofthecivilianactorssuchasIOsNGOsGOsetc.iscrucialforsuccess-fulexecutionoftheMST.Theseorganiza-tionspossessauniqueskill-setexperienceandin-depthknowledgefromtheciviliandomainwhichcantbeadequatelyrepli-catedwithinthemilitaryenvironment.Forthatreasonsthetraininginstitutionsshouldhaveintheirdisposalformallyestablishedfunctionalrelationshipswithcivilianactorsfrommutuallysupportingsupportedorga-nizations.Whensuchaprerequisiteexiststhentheplanningpreparationandexecu-tionofthetrainingeventsbecomeseasier.StructuretrainingmethodsandcontentofthetrainingFortheRC-N13-01theJFTCdevelopedtheMSTTrainingPlanconsist-ingoftwomainparts-FunctionalAreaTrainingFATandFunctionalAreaServiceTrainingFASTcomplementedwiththeKeyLeaderspreparationandtheoreticalpreparation.TheRoundtableDiscussionsPanelDiscussionsandAcademicLecturesrepresenttrainingmethodswhichareusedastridetheconfinesbetweenindividualpartsofthetrainingeventaswellasareasofpreparation.ThesemethodsmaybeusedforexamplefortheKeyLeadersandHQStaffpreparationbutequallyforthetheo-reticalpreparationorFAT.MediaTrainingisaspecifictrainingrequirementPicture3.StavangerNOR-JointWarfareCentreJWCSuffolkVAUSA-JointCoalitionWarfightingJCWFortCampbellKYUSA-InfantryDivisionID-SustainmentBDE-JointCoalitionWarfighting-JointWarfareCentre-MissionCommandTrnPogram-JointForceTrainingCentreTARCEBydgoszczPOL-JointForceTrainingCentreTARCNHurlburtFieldAFBDestinFLUSA-505THCommandandControlWing505THCCWCampLejeuneNCUSA-MEF-MAGTFSupportTrainingProgramMSTPTARCSWGrafenwoehrDEU-JFCBrunssum-JointCoalitionWarfighting-JointWarfareCentre-MissionCommandTrnProgram-JointForceTrainingCentre-505THCommandandControlWing-USArmyEuropeU.S.Corps-ENBDETAISAFHQIJCHQFortHoodTXUSA-ExpeditionarySupportCommand-MissionCommandTrnProgramPicture1DistributedTrainingEventRC-N13-01ISAFIJC12-02UE13-1 16TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Oneneedstohaveapersonalexperi-encewiththeMSTinordertounderstandhowitallfitstogether.AllpartsoftheMSTrepresentaninterwoventrainingprocessratherthanseparatestepsofthetraining.Severaldifferentactivitiesmaysupportonetrainingrequirement.Fromtheorganiza-tionalpointofviewfortheRC-N13-01theMSTwasorganizedforthewholetrain-ingaudienceforexampletheAcademicLecturesandPanelDiscussionsfortheKeyLeadersandselectedpersonnelforexampletheRoundtableDiscussionsandforthestaffbranchesinthefollowingfunctionalareasCJ1-CJ9CommandGroupAdvisorsCIEDEODCCRPSECJMEDPECCCJENGPATGINFOOPSandCJOC.SpeakingabouttheFATFASTtrainingtopicstheseweredividedintothetwomaingroupstrainingtopicscommontoallthebranchescontentofthePanelDiscussionsAcademicLecturesVignetteBasedTrainingetc.andbranchspecifictrainingtopicslistoftopicsdevel-opedforeachbranch.ThentheMSTcanbepicturedasamatrixwiththefollowingcom-ponents-thestaffstructureKeyLeadersHQStaffStaffBranchesevenStaffFunctionsandProcessesthetrainingrequirementsISAFMissionFATFASTMediaTrainingcategorizedasCommontoallthebranchesandBranchspecificandtrainingmethodsRoundtableDiscussionsPanelDiscussionsAcademicLecturesVignetteBasedTrainingCaseStudiesSituationalTrainingPracticalTrainingusingthetoolsandsystemsinter-actionswiththeSMEsfacilitatorsNCIAinstructorsANSFandtheWhiteCellrepresentativesvideo-conferencesetc.Picture4.Inordertofacilitatethetrain-ingprocesseachstaffbranchfunctionalareawassupportedbyadesignatedsub-jectmatterexpertandfacilitatorpersonwithpreviousexperiencefromtheRC-NHQinthesamefunctionalarea.IntheRC-NtrainingdesigntheFATandFASTarestronglyconnectedwithfrequentintersec-tions.AfteraninitialtheoreticaltrainingprovidedbytheNCIAthestaffcommencesworkdedicatedtorespectivestaffbranch-esunderdirectassistancefromtheSMEsandfacilitators.DuringtheFATthebranchmembershavetodeliveranoperationaloverviewonhowandwhentouserespec-tiveFAStoolsintheirareaofexpertise.TheFATfocusesondevelopingtheindividualscompetencyinstafffunctionsandoperatingproceduresinhisorherfunc-tionalareaofexpertiseandmaybeorganizedinindividualorcollectiveformsoftrain-ing.ThetrainingaudiencemembershavetobecomefamiliarwiththestaffpracticesTTPsSOPsandotherrequirementsassoci-atedwiththeirownbranchorsectionwithintheRCHQ.InformationobtainedduringtheacademicsessionsisfurtherexpandedandclarifiedduringtheworkwithinthestaffbranchesundertheleadofthekeyleadersandsupportedbySMEsandfacili-tators.Oneofthemosteffectivemethodsusedtotriggerthedecisionmakingpro-cesswithinthebranchesistheCaseStudy.TheFASTisorganizedfortheperson-nelwhorequirespecificfunctionalservicesskillstoperformtheirfunctionsintheRCHQ.FunctionalAreaServicesFASareSoftwareBasedSystemsthatprovidesup-porttoaspecificstafffunctionprocessormissionarea.InanutshellbytheFASswemeancommandandcontrolsupporttoolsandknowledgeofrelateddoctrineTTPsandSOPsusedinISAF.PeopleoftenthinkthattheoverallpurposeoftheFAStrainingistolearnhowtoutilizethesystemsandbecamefamiliarwiththehardwareandsoftware.InrealitytheFAStrainingdealsmainlywiththeprocesseswhichthosesystemsandtoolssupport.Thesystemsmayexperiencefailureormaynotalwaysbeavailablebutthemilitaryoperationsandalltheprocesseswhichsupporttheirexecutionhavetobecontinued.ThereisalargenumberofthemcurrentlydeployedinISAF.SomeoftheFASsarepurelynationalassetswhileothershavebeendevelopedforNATOorspecifi-callyfortheISAFmission.ThatiswhyonlythosewhicharerequestedbythetrainedRCHQareincludedinthetrainingplan.AsmentionedbeforetheFASsaredesignedtosupportthestafffunctionsandexpeditethedecisionmakingprocessandstaffworkingeneral.Intheorythenationalphaseofthepre-deploymenttrainingshouldbringtheRCHQalmostreadytodeploy.Therealityisobviouslydifferentandstemsfromthenatureofmultinationaloperationsandacoalitionenvironment.ThesesystemsareoftennotontheinventoryoftheISAFtroopscontributingnationsandthereforethistrainingrequirementcantbealwaysfulfilledduringthenationalphaseofthepre-deploymenttraining.ThatexplainsthereasonwhyitisanindispensablepartofthePhase2-NATOTraining.AbilitytofullyutilizethesesystemsisaprerequisiteforoccupationofthestaffpositionsbutalsoitispreconditionforadvancementintothenextpartsofthetrainingsuchastheBSTMRE.DuringtheRC-N13-01thetrainingaudiencerequestedtrainingforthefollowingFASs-NATOIntelToolbox-AnalystNotebook-CIDNE-CombinedInformationDataNetworkExchange-ICC-IntegratedCommandandControl-JOCWATCH-JointOperationalCentreWatch-JCHAT-JointTacticalChat-IGEOSIT-InterimGeoSpatialIntelligenceTool-FueInfoSysSK-C2SystemRC-N-LOGFASEVECORSOM-BICES-BattlefieldInformationCollectionandExploitationSystem-SharePointRC-NSharePointIJCPortal-HQISAFAMNEnterprisePortal-LotusNotesAdobeConnectSimultaneousTranslationSystem.Thestaffpersonnelaretrainedforutiliza-tionoftheFASsattheuserlevel.TheJFTCpossessonlylimitedinternalexpertisetoprovidesuchtraining.ThereforeitcontractstrainersfromtheNATOCommunicationandInformationAgencyNCIAandreceivestrainingsupportfromtheNCIAServiceOperationsSquadronBydgoszczwhichiscollocatedwiththeJFTC.Thetrainingisverypracticalusingrealsystemsandtools.BytheendoftheFASTportionoftheMSTallthepersonnelhavetobecompetentinuti-lizationoftheirassignedfunctionalservicesapplicationsandcomfortableinworkingasbranchmembersoftheRCHQ.Onethingistomastertherequirementsindividuallyintheclassenvironment.TheotherispracticaldemonstrationoftheexpertiseduringtheBSTMREwhenthetraineesareencounter-ingnearlyrealsituationsandhavetoworkundertheduressofthesituationaldevelop-mentdrivenbytheexercisescenario.ItiscommonpracticethatevenduringtheBSTMREpartsofthetrainingtheSMEscontractorsandfacilitatorshavetoprovideadditionalassistancetothestaffmembers. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201317TheRoundtableDiscussionisthemainmethodforpreparationofthecom-mandersandotherKeyLeaders.Thepurposeoftheroundtablediscussionsistoelevatethelevelofdetailanddepthofknowledgeaboutspecifictopicswhichhavebeeniden-tifiedasmissioncritical.BecausethefocusisonthespecificpartoftheRCHQfrommethodologicalviewpointitcouldbealsoconsideredasapartoftheFAT.NeverthelessasIsaidearliertheapplicationofthismethodmaynotbelimitedjusttotheRCHQcommandgroup.Itisunderdesignatedcommandersdiscretionwhatpartofhisstaffwillbeincludedinthediscussionsandforwhichtopics.Thecommandercanmakeindi-vidualroundtablediscussionsstrictlyfocusedontheparticularfunctionalareaorontheotherhandmakeitalmostcommontoall.ForexamplewehadthecasewhenthemaintopicwascoveringSOF.Thecommanderdecidedtoincludeinthisroundtablediscus-siononlythepersonnelinvolvedinSOFoperations.Butanotherexamplewhenthetopicoftheroundtablediscussionwasdedi-catedtoCIVCASthecommanderrequiredparticipationofalmostthewholestaff.TheroundtablediscussionsrepresentcontrolleddiscussionchairedbythedesignatedfutureRCcommanderwhoalsodeterminesthescopeofparticipationfromhisstaff.Usuallytheyarethedeputieschiefofstaffallkeyleadersdowntothelevelofabranchheadandthosewhoareresponsibleforman-agementofindependentfunctionalareas.TheroundtablediscussionsaresupportedbyamoderatorlecturersSMEsWhiteCellMembersrepresentativesfromtheRCHQcurrentlydeployedinAfghanistanandANSFmembers.Alsoeachsessionisattendedbyamemberoftheanalysisandlessonslearnedsectiontocapturethemainout-comesobservationsandguidancefromtheRCcommander.FortheRC-N13-01train-ingeventthefollowingtopicshavebeendiscussedduringtheroundtablediscussions-Security.ImplementationofSFAConceptinRC-NAORCoordinationandIntegrationofANSFandRC-NHQPlanningProcessUtilizationofLiaisonandAdvisoryStructuresOCC-PRMilitaryAdvisoryTeamMATForwardPlanningandLiaisonTeamFPLTForceProtectionCellForceProtectionTeamFPCFPTImplementationofSituationalAwarenessandSecurityConceptSASCSituationalAwareness-Governance.GovernmentoftheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistanGIRoAResponsibilitiesandInteractionKeyLeaderEngagementPrioritizationResponsibilitiesPlanningLessonsLearnedCycle-InterculturalCommunication.BilateralBehaviorCrimeLocalPowerBrokers-PSYOPSINFOOPSSTRATCOM.PlanningandCoordinationinRC-NAOR-SOFOperationsinRC-NAOR.CompositionofForcesProcedures-SFAConceptTransition.MilestonesRetrogradeConceptofRedeployment-LegalFramework.CivilianandMilitaryInteractionGoodGovernance-ReconstructionandDevelopment.ANATrustFundRoleofInternationalOrganizationsIOsNon-GovernmentalOrganizationsNGOsGovernmentalOrganizationsGOsUSAIDUNAMATroopsContributingNationsPrioritizationandProceduresinRC-NHQ-Redeployment.CurrentStatusMilestonesResponsibilitiesProcedures.0212UE13-1COMMEX0312UE13-1MINIEXUE13-1INDIVIDUALTRAININGUE13-1BSTUE13-1MRXPAUSEUE13-1MRXEXCONTRAVELINPROCESSINGandADMINISTRATIONEXCONPREPARATIONBRIEFINGSandTRAININGKEYLEADERSTRAININGAUDIERNCECJOCTRAVELandADMINISTRATIONFASTFATTRAININGTRAVELALLKEYLEADERSPREPARATIONTRAININGAUDIENCEandCJOCFASTRAININGPrepFINALSYSSTEMCHECKCOMMAILJEMM261127112811291130110112021203120412051206120712081209121012111212121312TRAININGAUDIENCETRAVELandADMINISTRATIONCJOCFASTRAININGDay1Day2Day3Day4Day5Day6Day7Day8Day9Day10Day11Day12Day13Day14Day15Day16Day17Day18Picture2TrainingEventStructureforISAFRC-NTE13-01IJCTE12-2UEEX13-1AcronymsCOMMEXCommunicationExerciseMINIEXMiniExerciseMRXMissionRehearsalExerciseEXCONExerciseControlCJOCCombinedJointOperationCenterFASTFunctionalAreaServiceTrainingFATFunctionalAreaTrainingCOMCommunicationMAILE-mailJEMMJointExerciseManagementModuleAARAfterActionReviewCSRCommandersSummaryReport.KEYLEADERSMEDIATRAININGMISSIONSPECIFICTRAININGPANELDISCUSSIONSROUNDTABLEDISCUSSIONSACADEMICLECTURESSTARTEXBRIEFINGSTARTOFTHEEXERCISEENDOFTHEEXERCISECSRBATTLESTAFFTRAININGMISSIONREHERSALEXERCISEINITIALAARKEYLEADERSTRAININGROUNDTABLEDISCUSSIONS 18TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013OneoftheresponsibilitiesoftheRCcom-mandersistoprioritizethevalueofindi-vidualtopicsintermsoftheirimportanceforthemission.Basedontheirobserva-tionstheymaydecideduringtheexercisetoputforwardrequirementstoadjustthetimeallocatedtoindividualtopics.Theymayalsorequireschedulingofadditionalroundtablediscussionsiftheycometotheconclusionthatitisnecessaryfortheproperpreparationoftheirstaff.Havingmorethantworoundtablediscussionsperdayisphysicallydemandingforthefacilita-torsandattendees.Thereforethenumberofthesediscussionsscheduledforonedayshouldbekeptwithinmanageablelimit.Theroundtablediscussionsusuallystartwiththeintroductionofthetopicbythemoderatorandpresentationofthekeythemesforthediscussion.Sometimessev-eraltopicsmaybescheduledforonesession.AftertheintroductionalecturefollowswhichisgivenbyanSME.ItprovedtobeusefulifaftertheopeninglecturetheRCcommanderpresentshispersonalviewonthesubjectfollowedbythecommentsfromhisdeputieswhichinturnopensadditionaltopicsfordiscussion.Thediscussionshouldserveasavenueduringwhichthestaffgainsdeeperunderstandingofthesubjectmattergetsbetterunderstandingofthecommand-ersintentcontributestotheorchestrationofthestaffandunderstandingofthemis-sionimprovesknowledgeabouttheSOPsTTPsandtheirapplicationforthatspecificareafostersinternalcommunicationandfacilitatestheflowofinformationamongthemembersoftheinternationalRCHQ.TheAcademicLecturesaredesignedforthewholetrainingaudienceincludingtheKeyLeaders.Theyaremoregenericandacademicinnaturethantheround-tablediscussion.Overallpurposeoftheacademiclecturesistoincreasethelevelofunderstandingofthemissioncontext.FortheRC-N13-01TrainingEventthefollowinglectureshavebeenprepared-SFAConceptandLiaisonStructureofANSFANSFOverviewandDevelopment-RC-NOverviewGeographyPeopleInsurgencyMainOperations-OperationalOverviewTransitionandRedeploymentConceptUnifiedImplementationPlanUIPSASCAfghansinLeadPoliceTraining-PresentationbytheANSFLeaderAfghansinLeadANSFRoleinProvidingSecurity-JointPersonnelRecovery-CIMICandDevelopmentCooperationwithIOsGOsNGOsTrustFundsProjectsinRC-NAOR-IntelligenceAssetsandCourseofActionSituationalAwarenessGreenReporting-C-IEDSituationalAwarenessAttacktheNetworkTTPsNewThreats-JFIRESLegalAspectsTTPsCIVCAS-MedicalSupportStructureandCapabilitiesTacticsTechniquesandProcedures9-LinearMedicalEvacuationCoverage-SOFMissionUnitsStructureCapabilitiesTasksInformationSharingTTPs-COINInsiderThreatANSFDevelopmentShiftfromPopulationCentricCOINtoTimeBasedTransition-PSYOPSINFOOPSSTRATCOM-MediaAwarenessInternationalMediaAfghanMediaISAFPolicy-LeadNationPerspective.Compositionofthetopicswasdrivenbythesituationinthetheatreevolutionofthemissionrecommendationsfromthecur-rentlydeployedRC-NHQinAfghanistanandrequirementsoftheBwJFOpsCom.Thecontentofthelectureswasdiscussedwiththebriefersbeforethetrainingevent.DuringtheEXCONpreparationitisalwaysnec-essarytoalignthecontentofthelecturesandinformthebriefersofthemethodol-ogytechnicalandmaterialsupportwhichisavailableattheJFTC.Thelecturersusu-allycomefromdifferentinstitutionsorcom-mandsandhaveadifferentlevelofprac-ticalexperiencewithlecturing.ThentheMSTmanagerfromtheJFTChastoensure-Anin-depthexplanationandcoordinationwiththeSMEsandfacilitators-TherearenoredundanciesoroverlapsbetweenthecontentoftheJADLandMSTwhichhavetobevalidatedbytheBwJFOpsCOM-Thecontentofthelecturessupportsthetrainingobjectivesavoidsrepetitionandoutdatedtopics-Thebriefingsobservestandardformatslidessuchasintroductionagendatrainingobjectivesclassificationetc.-Eachlecturewhichwillbeintroducedtothetrainingaudienceobserveplannedbreaksandavoidthatthelecturegoeslongerthatthescheduledtime-Thereisalogicalflowofinformationinthelecturesandnooverlaporcollisionofthecontent.TheserequirementsapplytoallthepartsoftheMST.SincemanyoftheexternalEXCONmembersalreadyhavepreviousexperiencefromtrainingorganizedattheJFTCthequalityofthepresentationsissteadilyincreasingaswellastheabilityofthebrieferstodeliverhighqualitylectures.Thelecturersareresponsiblefortheselec-tionandapplicationofthetrainingmethodsandmethodicalturnswhicharethemostsuitableeffectiveforthetopicandachieve-mentofthespecifictrainingobjectives.ThePanelDiscussionsisanaddi-tionaltypeofvenuewhichfurtherexpandstheinformationobtainedduringtheJADLandacademiclectures.Thefocusofpaneldiscussionsisonthecontextbygroup-ingindividualtopicsintocoherentthemeswhichconstitutethebackboneofthecur-rentphaseoftheISAFmission.Paneldis-cussionshelpemphasizethecomplexityoftheoperationalenvironmentbyshowcasingmultipleperspectivesondifferenttopicssuchastheUNIOsGOsandNGOspro-gramsinAfghanistan.FortheRC-N13-01trainingeventtheBwJFOpsComrequestedpaneldiscussionsaboutfollowingthemes-ReintegrationTransitionStrengtheningtheLeadingroleoftheAfghans-IOsNGOsGOsProgramsinAfghanistaninRC-NAORprogresschallengesoutlook-CulturalAspectsoftheAfghanSocietyTribalStructureFactionsStructuresReligionCrimeCorruption-GenderIssuesRoleofWomenintheAfghanSocietyCrimeagainstWomenEducationandWomenWomenShurasFemaleEngagementTeams.ThepaneldiscussionsarefacilitatedbytheMSTmanagerdesignatedmoderatorandnecessarytechnicalsupport.ThepanelistsconsistoftheSMEsWhiteCellmembers THU291112FRI301112KeyLeadersTrainingKeyLeadersTrainingKeyLeadersTrainingTATrainingKeyLeadersTrainingTATrainingKeyLeadersTrainingTATrainingRTDandMediaRTDandMediaIntelligenceandOperaonalOverviewIntelligenceandOperaonalOverviewRTDC-IEDandMediaCampaignDesignThreatsandMedicalproceduresRTDandMediaCommunicaonDevelopmentandissues0755-08000800-08150815-08300830-08450845-09000900-09150915-09300930-09450945-10001000-10151015-10301030-10451045-11001100-11151115-11301130-11451145-12001200-12151215-12301230-12451245-13001300-13151315-13301330-13451345-14001400-14151415-14301430-14451445-15001500-15151515-15301530-15451545-16001600-16151615-16301630-16451645-17001700-17151715-17301730-17451745-18001800-18151815-18301830-18451845-1900FATFASTPanelDiscussion1PanelDiscussion4PanelDiscussion3SAT011212SUN021212MON031212TUE041212Lecture1SFAConceptTopicoftheDayKeyLeadersInduconBriengsandRC-NOverviewTAInduconBriengandRC-NOverviewTrainingTeamTrainingFATCaseStudiesBSTPresentaonsInduconBriengRoundTableDiscussion1SplitintocellsMediaBriengFASTOverviewMediaTrainingPanelDiscussion2Picture3MissionSpecificTrainingPlanAcronymsRTDRoundtableDiscussionTATrainingAudienceFASTFunctionalAreaSystemTrainingFATFunctionalAreaTrainingSFASecurityForceAssistanceConceptCIMICCivilMilitaryCo-OrdinationSOFSpecialOperationsForcesPSYOPSPsychologicalOperationsINFOOPSInformationOperationsSTRATCOMStrategicCommunicationCOINCounterinsurgencyC-EIDCounter-ImprovisedExplosiveDevicesJFIRESJointFires.InduconBriengRoundTableDiscussion2RoundTableDiscussion3RoundTableDiscussion4RoundTableDiscussion5RoundTableDiscussion6RoundTableDiscussion7RoundTableDiscussion8RoundTableDiscussion9FATFASTFATFASTFATFASTLecture2RC-NOverviewLecture3RC-NOperaonalOverviewLecture4AfghanPresentaonLecture5BwJFOpsComLeadNaonPerspecveLecture6CIMICLecture7IntelligenceLecture8SOFLecture9JointFiresLecture10JointPersonnelRecoveryLecture11MedicalLecture12C-IEDAackTheNetworkLecture13COINLecture14PSYOPSINFOOPSSTRATCOMLecture15MediaTransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201319andANSFrepresentativesdependingonthetopic.WhenthepanelistsdonotpossesssufficientcommandofEnglishtranslationmayberequired.Paneldiscussionsusuallystartwithabriefintroductiontothethemeandtheparticipatingpanelistsfollowedbypresentationsgivenbythepanelists.Thecon-tentofthepaneldiscussionsmaybeenrichedbyawiderangeofinstructionaltoolssuchasthedocumentarytrainingmovievideoconferencepracticaldemonstrationsvisualmaterialsetc.inordertoattractthetrainingaudiencesattentiontothetopicandensur-ingclarityoftheinformation.ThemainpartofthepaneldiscussionistheQuestionsAnswerssessionQAforwhichthebulkoftimeshouldbeallocated.Basedonourexperiencethedurationofthesessionsshouldnotexceedoneandahalfhour.Panelexpertsorpractitionersshouldhavediffer-entopinionsonthetopic.Anotherimportantpointalsoistonetworkwiththepersonnelwhowillbeonthepanelseveralweeksinadvancetosynchronizematerialsandallowthemtoputtheirthoughtstogetherinordertoproducecoherentpresentations.ThepurposeoftheMediaTrainingistoinformabouttheroleofmediaandimpor-tanceofstrategiccommunicationswithintheISAFmissiontoteachaboutNATOpoliciesandSOPsdirectingtheISAFinformationoperationsmediarelationsandlocalmediainAfghanistanandtotraintheKeyLeadersandthestaffinskilfulplanningcoordinationandexecutionofstrategiccommunicationsandmediarelatedtasks.Allinallthepur-poseofmediatrainingistotraintheRCHQinhowtoturnthemediafromanobstacletoanadvantage.ThustheMSTshouldcreatesufficientknowledgebaseforthestaffandtheKeyLeaderstobeabletopracticallysolvethescenariosituationswhichwillbeincludedintheBSTandespeciallytheMRE.DuringtheMSTsixandahalfhoursofmediatrain-inghavebeendevotedfortheKeyLeaderTrainingandadditionaltwohoursforthewholetrainingaudience.AlltheKeyLeadersweretrainedontheproceduresfordeliveringappropriateinterviewstothemassmediaTVradiobroadcastingprintjournalismandtheinternet.Theoreticalpartswerecoveredduringtheroundtablediscussions.Thetrain-ingaudiencereceivedcomprehensiveover-viewintwolecturesfollowedbydiscussionswithexpertsabouttheroleandfunctionoftheinternationalnationalandlocalmediainAfghanistanandthenorthernregion.FortheexecutionofmediatrainingtheJFTCcontractedtheCrownMediaCompanywhichspecializesinpre-deploymenttrainingofindividualmilitarypersonnelandthestaffs.DuringtheRC-N13-01trainingeventtheCrownMediawasusedtoconductlecturesroundtablediscussionspracticaltrainingforKeyLeadersinconductoftheinterviewsforvariousmediaplayedtherolesofinter-nationalandlocalmediaTVradiointer-netfilmedtrainingmoviefortheRC-NHQandprovideditsowntechnicalsupport.Video-conferenceswiththeISAFIJCHQandRC-NHQwereusedduringtheMSTfortheupdateoftheSMEsaboutthecurrentdevelopmentinthetheatreandalsofortheQAsessions.Roleplayingandsituationaltrainingwereincludedespecially 20TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013inthemediatrainingbutwerealsousedduringthelectures.DespitethefactthattheMSTtrainingistoalargeextenttheoreticalinnaturethereisaneedtoincludepracti-caltraininginordertodeveloprequiredknowledgeacquirementsandhabitsamongthemembersofthetrainingaudience.RoleplayingandsituationaltrainingnaturallyextendtotheBSTMREwhenthecontentoftheMSTmergeswiththeotherpartsoftheRCHQtraininginaholisticmanner.PreconditionforsuccessTheorganizationoftheMSTandthescopeofitssupportaredrivenbysev-eralfactors.Thetrainingobjectivesarethemostimportantastheyrepresentqualitativerequirementsthathavetobemet.Secondistheexercisebudgetwhichgovernsthequantitativeconfineswithinwhichthewholetrainingeventisorganized.Remainingfac-torsmayvaryandtheyarebothexternal-relatedtothemissiontrainingaudienceandtrainingrequirementsandinternal-referringtothecapabilitiesofthetraininginstitution.ThefirstmayincludethetypeoftheexercisesizeofthetrainingaudiencecompositionoftheStaffHQwhichistrainednationalmultinationalitslevelofexperi-encemissioncontextetc.Thelattermayreflectthelevelofexperienceofthestafftechnicalandmaterialcompetenceandoth-ers.TheJFTCovertheyearsofsystematicbuildupandinvolvementinthepre-deploy-menttraininghasalreadyaccumulatedasignificantamountofexperiencereputa-tionandexpertisewhichcombinedwithanimpressivetechnicalcapabilitiesmakethisplacewellsuitedforexecutionoftheMSTandmeetingitsbothmajorprerequisitesqualityoftrainingforafavorableprice.Basicpreconditionforsuccessfulexe-cutionoftheMSTisavailabilityoftherightcompositionofpersonnelforthemanage-mentandsupportoftheMST.DuringtheRC-N13-01TrainingEventtheEXCONwasrunningtheMSTthroughtheChiefMSTandhissectionPicture5.TheChiefMSTcarriesoutcomplexdutiesusuallycover-ingplanningpreparationcoordinationandexecutionoftheMST.Thatincludesdevel-opmentoftheMSTTrainingPlanalignmentofthecontentoftheFATFASTAcademicLecturesPanelDiscussionsandRoundtableDiscussionsarrangementsforparticipationoftheexternalexpertscoordinationofthematerialsupportplanningforavailabilityofthetrainingspaceandfacilitiesperson-nelsupportestablishmentofthecommandandcontrolstructureandmanagementplanandthedevelopmentandmanagementoftheMSTbudget.HecloselycoordinateshistaskswiththeChiefSMEsectionwhodirectstheSMEssupportduringthecourseoftheexercise.BesidestheJFTCstaffandtheJFTCSupportUnitcomponentsthesup-portingelementsfortheMSTconsistedoftheWhiteCellANSFpersonnelU.S.NavyReserveSupportUnitandalreadymentionedSMEsfacilitatorsandtheCrownMedia.TheWhiteCelltypicallyrepre-sentsagenciesorganizationsinstitu-tionsandindividualsoutsideoftheNATOandopposingforcesstructure.Thecom-positionoftheWhiteCellmayincludelocalgovernmentsatnationalprovincialandmunicipallevelsIOsGOsNGOsinternationalandlocalmedialocalcivil-iansandcountryexperts.FortheRC-N13-01trainingeventfollowingorganizationshavebeenrepresentedintheWhiteCell-UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugeesUNHCR-InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossICRC-GermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentBMZ-GermanGeneralConsultoPoland-UnitedNationsOfficeforCoordinationofHumanitarianAssistanceUNOCHA-UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopmentUSAID-AfghanDrugsJusticeUnitForeignandCommonwealthOffice-UnitedNationsOfficeforDrugsandCrime-UnitedNationsAssistanceMissiontoAfghanistanUNAMA-AfghanistanCountryExperts.TheirmainrolewastoprepareanddelivertheMSTlecturesforthetrainingaudiencebutalsotoactasspecialistsandadvisorstothetrainingaudiencethroughouttheexercise.AlsomembersoftheWhiteCellwereinvolvedintheMELMILscriptingandcoordinationoftheBSTMREwiththeeventmanagers.ParticipationoftheANSFperson-neltraditionallybelongstothehighlightsofthetrainingorganizedbytheJFTC.AlothasalreadybeensaidaboutthevaluewhichtheANSFrepresentativesbringtotheexercises.TheRC-N13-01TrainingEventwassupportedby26ANSFmembers.Thegroupcomposedof5membersoftheAfghanNationalArmyANA11policemenfromtheAfghanNationalPoliceANPand10interpreters.TheANAteamwasledbyMGSayedSarwerSejadiandtheANPbyLtGBabaJanFarhad.ParticipationoftheANSFflaglevelofficersprovidedadditionalqualitiesthatenrichedthetraining.Thepos-sibilityofpersonalinteractionbetweenthefutureRC-NcommanderandhisdeputiesandtheANSFgeneralsisthemostobviousone.OvertheyearstheJFTCmanagedtoreachfullcoordinationwiththeANSFwithregardstoselectionoftherightpersonnelfortrainingeventsinBydgoszcz.TheANSFpersonnelarenominatedfromthesameunitsregionswithwhichthetrainingaudiencewillbecooperatingafterthedeployment.Thatcreatesfavorableconditionsforestab-lishmentofpersonalcontactsandreinforce-mentofmutualunderstandingbetweentheANSFandtheRC-NHQstaffmembers.BotharetheindispensablequalitiesforsuccessfulexecutionoftheISAFmission.U.S.NavyReserveSupportUnitNorfolkisnotaveryvisibleelementoftheEXCONstructurebutitssupportishighlyvaluedbyboththeJFTCandthetrainingaudience.TheunitisofficiallydesignatedasasupportunitfortheACT.AssuchonrequestitalsomaysupportthetrainingeventsorganizedattheJFTC.SincetheJFTCstaffisfairlylimitedtheunitisanadditionalsourceofpersonnelforavarietyoffunctionswithintheEXCON.Theypos-sesstheexpertiseorganizationalskillsandarealreadyfamiliarwiththeJFTCanditsstaffandcapabilities.Thereforeitisrela-tivelyeasytointegratethemintotheEXCONstructure.TasksperformedbyitsmembersspanacrossallthepartsoftheMST.Theyareinvolvedinthepreparationandorganiza-tionofthesessionsassisttheSMEsinthepreparationofthelecturesactasthesitemanagersmoderatorsandfacilitatorsdur-ingtheroundtableandpaneldiscussionsorganizetechnicalsupportfortheMSTandparticipateinthelessons-learnedprocess. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201321ThescopeofthesupportwhichisrequiredfortheexecutionoftheMSTevokesthequestionaboutthecostinvolved.TheoverallbudgetfortheRC-N13-1approvedbytheBwJFOpsComwas830.000outofwhicharound600.000wasallocatedfortheMSTsupportitselfNCIASMEsCrownMediaANSFUSNavyReserveSupportUnit.ItisevidentthattheMSTisfromthecustomerspointofviewthemostexpensivepartoftheexercise.Thereforeitisthecus-tomerwhohasthefinalsayaboutthecontentandscopeofsupportoftheMSTandisthedecidingauthorityastotheapprovalofthetrainingobjectivesforthispartoftheexercise.OfferingresponsiveandrelevanttrainingEverytrainingeventisflourish-inganddyingwiththeactivitydedicationandinvolvementofthetrainingaudience.WhenthetrainingaudienceandtheEXCONestablishfromtheoutsetoftheexerciseaspiritofcommontrainingteamthesuccessofthetrainingisalmostcertain.CombinedwithaneffectiveutilizationofWhiteCellmembersSMEsfacilitatorsandANSFrepresentativesthentherealismanddepthoftheexercisecanbecreatedandsomeoftheartificialitieswhichobjective-lyexistinsyntheticCPXCAXmitigated.TheMSTsupportsachievementofthemajorityofthespecifictrainingobjectives.Ourexperiencehasshownthatshortlyafterthefirstfewacademicsessionsthereisatendencyfromthetrainingaudiencetoaskforinclusionofadditionalsessionsandtop-ics.SuchrequirementisonlynaturalsinceitisauniqueopportunityforhearingabouttheISAFmissionandAfghanistanfromvariousviewpoints.Butatthesametimeitisneces-sarytokeepinmindthattheMSTisonlyaportionoftheoveralltrainingevent.Adeli-catebalancemustbekeptbetweenallpartsoftheMSTespeciallybetweentheacademicportionandFATFAST.Theclashbetweenthedemandsandexistinglimitationsneedtoberesolvedthroughothermeans.Inthefuturetrainingeventsratherthanquantita-tiveexpansionofthetopicsandallotmentofmoretimethesolutionrestsintheadop-tionofmoreeffectiveorganizationalmea-sures.AmongthemmergingtopicsmoreeffectiveutilizationoftimeupdateoftheJADLandbetterapplicationofthetrainingmethodsseemstobetherightwayforward.CAXcapabilitiesinfrastructureandorganizationalconditionsexistingattheJFTCarealreadywelldevelopedandthecentreisamatureandcompetentinstitution.Therewillbeafewadditionstoourtechnicalcapa-bilitiesin2013forexampletheAuditoriumVTCSuitandsubstantialreplacementoftheCIS.Bothwillfurtherimprovetheconditionsfortheexercises.WeintendtouseVTCsmoreintensivelynamelyfortheroundtablediscussionsasthemosteffectivemeansofinteractionwiththeexpertsfromthethe-atre.Butotherwisewedonotexpectmajorchangesintheorganizationandsupportoftheexercises.Nonethelessinclosecoop-erationwiththefuturecustomerswehavetofindthewayshowtomitigatethecostofthe 22TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013MST.ApartialsolutionwhichiswithintheJFTCsreachistodeveloplimitedinternalFASTcapabilityforthemostcommonlyusedFASs.TheJFTCseekstoenhancetheabil-ityoftheassignedmilitarystaffinordertodeliverFASTintheareaofJ3JOCWATCHJCHATIGEOSITICCAdobeConnectJ2NATOIntelToolboxAnalystNotebookCIDNEBICESandJ4LOGFAS.OnceachievedtheJFTCwillbereadytoprovideatalimitedscaleandattheend-userlevelNATOFASTasapartofthetrainingsup-portpackagewithoutadditionalcostforthefuturecustomers.TheJFTCintendstoreachthiscapabilitybymeansoftheTraintheTrainerprogramwhichisalreadyongoing.Moreattentionneedstobegiventotheareaoftaxonomyofthespecifictrain-ingobjectives.Atpresentthelistof45specifictrainingobjectivesfortheISAFRCHQPre-deploymentTrainingisonlyalittlemorethanacomprehensivetrainingrequire-mentschecklist.Thetrainingobjectivesaremissingdeeperstructuralclassificationoftherequiredlevelofknowledgeknowbeabletobefamiliarwithandidentifica-tionofwhatthesetrainingrequirementsconstituteintermsofthequalitystandardsforpreparationofthepersonnelforthemis-sionknowledgeacquirementshabits.Obviouslyexperiencedcommandersandstaffsknowhowtoprepareforthefuturemissiontothebestoftheirabilities.Theissueisthenatureofthepre-deploymenttrainingwhichhasthreedistinctphasesNationalNATOTrainingandIn-theatre.Naturallyfullcoordinationofthetrainingeffortbetweenthesephasesissometimeshardtoachieveespeciallywhenconsider-ingthatthetroopcontributingnationshavedifferentroles.SomenationsconstitutethebulkofthefutureRCHQothershaveonlyacontributingrole.Thataffectsthecontentofthepre-deploymenttrainingatthenationallevel.EventuallywhengoingthroughtheMSTattheJFTCsomemem-bersoftheRC-NHQcomplainedabouttheoverlapbetweenthenationaltrainingJADLandNATOTrainingwhileforoth-erspracticallyeverythingwasnew.Oneofthereasonswhythissituationoccursisthatthosewhoareinchargeofthepre-deploymenttrainingatdifferentphasesmaytakefromthelistofspecifictrainingobjec-tiveswhatevertheyfeelisimportantandtrainittotheleveloftheirchoice.Thisishowthedisparitiesoccur.Thereforeoneofthelessonslearnedfromthetrainingeventwastheneedforaholisticreviewofthespecifictrainingobjectives.Theaimhereistoincreaseprecisionoftheircontentaligntaxonomyandimprovemeasurabilityqualitativequantitative.ThenthenewlyadoptedspecifictrainingobjectivescouldserveasatoolwhichwouldassisttheplannersatthenationallevelandNATOaliketobetteralignthecontentofthetrain-ingatdifferentphasesofthepreparation.Thereisstillroomleftforimprove-mentintheareaofterminologyandstruc-tureoftheMST.Theterminologycon-stitutesthebasisforanyfieldofscienceorinbroadertermsprofessionalhumanactivities.Termsusagevariesacrossthedisciplines.Thatisaknownfact.Butwhenusedwithinthesamecontextthemean-inghierarchyandapplicationneedtobestandardizedandcommonlyobservedinordertoaligncommunicationamongdif-ferentNATOandnationalbodiesandevenestablishmentoftheelementsoforderanddisciplinewithinthesystem.FunctionalAreaTrainingFunctionalAreaSystemsTrainingFunctionalServicesFunctionalServicesTrainingFunctionalSystemTrainingFunctionalSystemsTrainingetc.thosearejustsomeexamplesofdifferenttitlescurrentlyinuseanddescribingthesamething.VarietyofotherexamplescanbefoundacrosstheNATOdoctrinebutespeciallytrainingdocuments.ThesamecanbesaidaboutthehierarchyandstructureofthetermswhicharecommonlyusedintheNATOtrainingenvironment.TheNATOPre-deploymentTrainingforexampleisorganizedinthreephaseseachphasefur-therdividedintophasesandthetrainingeventalsoconsistsofseveralphases.ThetermslikeCrawlWalkandRunareaccordingtotheNATOdoctrinealsophasesofthepre-deploymenttrainingevents.Eventhoughdespitebeingcalledphasestheyarenotmeantasanadditiontoalreadyexistingstructuralpartsofthetrain-ingevents.Theyratherexpresstheexpectedlevelofcompetencethetrainingaudienceissupposedtoreachataparticularpointoftheexercise.Thereisanarrayoftheoreticalconceptsofferingmoreelegantsolutionsthanresortingtounofficialexpressions.Semanticshasneverbeenourconcern.Theissueismorepractical.Whenthereisatasktocreateanofficialtextparticipateinanexpertdiscussionororganizetrain-ingthenonehastoreconcilethedilemmawhethertorespectthecommonpracticemilitarywritingstyleoraffiliatedtheories.TerminologygoeshandinhandwiththecorrectutilizationofTheFormsandMethodsofPreparationoftheCommandersStaffsandForces.Therightselectionofadequateformsandmethodsoptimizestheprocessofpreparationandachievementofthetrainingobjectives.Theoutcomeoftheirdeliberateandthoughtfulapplicationleadstoanattainmentoftherequiredknowledgeacquirementsandhabits.Forbetterunder-standingofthemeaningletmeuseasasmallcasestudytherecentdiscussionabouttheusageofthetermscollectivetrainingandexercisesandhowtheyshouldbeembracedintheNATOdoctrine.AllbeganwiththeconcernthatthetermcollectivetrainingisnotfullycapturingtheNATOsexercises.EventuallybothtermswereconnectedandusedintheNATOconcep-tualdocumentsinthephrasecollectivetrainingandexercises.Withtheconjunc-tioninbetweenpresentingthemastwoseparateorganizationalformsoftraining.Militarypedagogyofferscompre-hensivesystemoftermsanddefinitionsaswellasmethodologicalguidanceenablingtocreateoptimalstructureoftheformsandmethodsoftheeducationalandtrainingprocess.WiththetheoryonthebackdropIwillattempttostreamlinethelinkbetweentheaforementionedtermsfromgenerictospecifictoofferoneofthepossiblewaysofresolutionforsimilartheoreticalproblems.Thefundamentaltermfromwhichevery-thingstemsispreparation.Itencompassesthreeinterrelatedcomponentswhichconsti-tutetheprocessmilitaryupbringingeduca-tionandmilitarytraining.Alllistedintheorderofimportanceroleintheprocessofpreparationofpersonnel.Discussionshere-afterfocusonthelastcomponenttraining.PreparationofthecommandersstaffsandforcesisorganizedintwoprincipalFormsofPreparationBasicandCombined.TheBasicFormsofPreparationincludeindi-vidualpreparationmethodicalprepara-tioncommandersandstaffpreparationfieldpreparation.TheCombinedFormsof Picture5RC-N13-01EXCONStructureAcronymsEXDIRExerciseDirectorOSEOfficerSchedulingtheExerciseOCEOfficerConductingtheExerciseCECGCombinedExerciseCommandGroupKLTKeyLeaderTrainingRTRoundtableDiscussionPDPanelDiscussionIJCInternationalJointStaffSITCENSituationalCenterMELMainEventListMILMainIncidentListLOCONLowerControlSIDECONSideControlCAXComputerAssistedExerciseCoECenterofExcellenceCISCommunicationandInformationSystemsOCC-RPOperationalCoordinationCentreProvincialRegionalLNOLiaisonOfficerNCIANATOCommunicationandInformationAgency.EXDIRDeputyEXDIROSERepresentativeJFCBOCERepresentativeBwJFOpsComTrustedAgentSeniorMentorsChiefTrainingTeamOfficerofPrimaryResponsibilityOPRTrainingDevelopmentSynchronizationMatrixManagerInformationManagerInformationManagerDeputyInformationManagerAssistantSharepointManagerJFTCEXCONLNOstoCECGGrafenwoehrFundManagersFundRequesterChiefMSTDeputyChiefFATManagerKLTCoordinatorRTFacilitatorPDFacilitatorFASTManagerFASTTrainersNCIAChiefBSTDeputyChiefChiefSMEDeputyChiefFASMECoordinatorFASMEsMSSMECoordinatorMSSMEsANSFCoordinatorANSFRepresentativesChiefEXCENDeputyChiefResponseCellsRC-NResponseCelltoIJCLOCONSIDECONWhiteCellRAOCCPAOMediaOCC-RANSFSIDECONChiefSITCENScenarioManagerMELMILManagerEventManagersRoutinePlansCIEDCurrentOperationsSOFINTELNon-KineticOpsDevelopmentTransitionChiefCAXCECGForwardChiefAnalysisAnalystsandObserversJFTCCoEU.S.NavyReserveUnitChiefSupportVisitorsandObserversBureauProtocolRealLifeSupportPublicAffairsSecurityCISManagerNCIASiteManagersTransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201323Preparationareinprinciplecourseseventu-allyvariouscommandandstaffworkshopsconferencesconventionsetc.TheFormsofPreparationrepresentthestructureofthetrainingprocessandorganizationofthetrainees.Theyarecharacterizedby1theobjectofthetrainingeffort2facilitationofachievementofaparticularsegmentrequirementofthepreparationofthecommandersstaffsandforces3aspecificplaceinthetrainingprogramtrain-ingcycleintermsoftimeandspace4andbytypicaltrainingmethods.Dependingonthecompositionandstructureofthetrainingprocessthetrainingmaybeorga-nizedasanindividualtrainingorcollec-tivetraining.Foreachthewholesetofthetrainingmethodsisdeveloped.Atrainingmethodrepresentsadeliberateprocedureaimingattheachievementofthetrainingobjectiveobjectives.Eachtrainingmethodincorporatestwocomponents.Firstarethewaysofpromotingknowledgedevelopingacquirementsandinstillinghabitsinordertoachieverequiredlevelofpreparationofthepersonnelcommandersstaffsandunits.Secondarethewaysofpromotingandsupportingmotivationandinitiativeoftrainees.Thestructureofthetrainingmeth-odsconsistsofseveralcategories.Amongothersitincludescategoriesfortheindi-vidualtrainingandcollectivetraining.ThetrainingmethodswhicharetypicalforthecollectivetrainingareforexampleCPXBSTLIVEXandmanyothers.Insummarythetermexercisesisgenericinnatureandcommonlyusedwithoutspecificaffiliationtoanysectoraleducationalandtrainingsystemprogram.CollectivetrainingisanorganizationalformoftrainingconductedwithutilizationoftheselectedtrainingmethodsMAPEXCPXBSTLIVEXetc.whicharetypicalforcollectivetrain-ingandoptimallysuitedforachievementofthestatedtrainingobjectives.Itisthere-foreplausibletoconcludethattheadden-dum-andexercises-isredundantbecausethetermcollectivetrainingitselfcontainsinformationabouttheexercises.AsithasbeendiscussedearlierinthisarticlesimilaranalogyexistswiththecurrentdefinitionoftheMSTintheJFCBtrainingdirective.Theflatstructureofcoordinatedtrainingactivitieshasworkedandoverthetimeithasbeensubjectofstepbystepimprovements.ButtheempiricalapproachisslowlydepletingitspotentialandmaybenowwhentheISAFmissioniswindingdownitistherighttimeforamorein-depthreview.FollowingproposalforthefuturestructureoftheMSTisonlyasmallcontributiontoamuchbroaderrevisionwhichmaybeneeded.Ourcurrentpracticecanbeeasilyfur-therimprovedwithonlyamarginaleffort.Whethertomakethatstepornotdependsonourlevelofambition.Comparativeadvan-tagesoftheJFTCsuchasthecentralloca-tionandrelativelyaffordablecostoftrainingmayonedaynotbetheprimeconsider-ationforthefuturecustomers.Thecommondenominatoroftherecentintensiveutiliza-tionoftheJFTCwastheurgentneedforthepre-deploymenttraining.Inthefuturetheequationmaychangeandinsteadoftheneedthefuturepotentialcustomerswillcon- 24TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013sideritachoice.UndersuchcircumstancestheJFTCwillremainrelevantonlyifitstaysabreastofthefuturedevelopmentsandremainstobeattractiveforthecustomersbyitsexceptionalqualitiespeopletechnologytrainingprogramsandinnovativesolutions.Thatleadsmetoanotherremarkwhichrelatestotherequirementforensur-ingcontinuitypromotinginstitutionaldevel-opmentandbuildingcredibility.Alltheserequiredeliberateeffortoveralongperiodoftime.WiththeadoptionoftheCFINATOembarkedonthechallengingpathandboldvisionfullofcomplexrequirements.ItmeansthatNATOtraininginstitutionswouldhavetohaveanembeddedexpertcapacityenablingconceptualandinstitutionaldevelopmentinordertoassumetheanticipatedfutureroles.Inanenvironmentofpermanentlyrotatingstaffitishardtoimaginethatsuchacapacitywouldbebuildinaforeseeablefuture.TheJFTCwoulddefinitelydeserveapermanentpositionofaseniorfellowwiththoroughexpertiseintheareaofeducationandmilitarytrainingandsignificantmilitaryexperience.Whenlookingintothepost-ISAFperi-odNATOwillshiftitstrainingeffortfromacampaigntoacontingencyposture.ThatwillalsochangethecontextofNATOexercises.ButstilltherearestrongindicationsthattherequirementfortheMSTwillremainanditsroleisnotgoingtodiminish.Theassump-tionisbasedonseveralfactors.ThemostimportantoneisthatNATOtrainingforthecurrentoperationsremainsamongitstoppriorities.TheISAFwillbereplacedbytheITAAMmissionforwhichthenewtrainingconceptandspecificationfortheNATOPre-deploymentTrainingwillberequired.ThecharacteroftheITAAMmissionmeansthattheMATPATmissionwillfortheforesee-ablefutureendure.LikeinallthepreviousNATOpre-deploymenttrainingtheMSTwillagainconstituteitscrucialpartinordertodelivermissionspecifictrainingrequire-ments.Inthesecondhalfof2013theJFCBrunssumplanstopublishthenewtrainingconceptandrequirementsfortheITAAMmission.Thatwouldprovideforcleartrain-ingguidanceandsufficienttimeforthetrain-inginstitutionsandthefuturecustomerstoproperlypreparetrainingforthenewmission.ForthemultinationalHQstherewillalwaysbetheneedfortheFATFASTinordertogaintherequiredlevelofexpertiseinrelateddoctrineSOPsTTPsandC2supportingtoolsandservices.ThatappliesequallyforthemultinationalHQwhichisgoingtobedeployedinthecurrentoperationaswellasfortheonetrainedfortheNATOResponseForceNRF.Alsothecompre-hensiveapproachisbecomingthecommonframeworkforthepotentialfuturecontingen-cyoperations.InthiscontexttheparticipationofthepartnersinthefutureNATOexerciseswillbecomeanorm.Thesepredictionsfur-therreinforcetheneedforhavingtheMSTpartincludedinthefutureNATOtrainingconcept.ThecontentandscopeoftheMSTinthefutureexercisesmaydifferdependingonthetypecomplexityandleveloftheexer-cise.ForexampletherewillprobablybethedifferencesbetweenthetrainingorganizedfortheHQsfromtheNATOCommandStructureandNATOForceStructure.EachHQmayhavedifferentlevelofexperienceandmaybefunctioningindifferentconditions.ButstillthepurposeoftheMSTwillremainthesame.ThatiswhyNATOtraininginstitu-tionswillhavetostayabreastofthedevel-opmentandbereadyfortheirfutureroles.Thetrainingforcontingencyoperationsimpliesflexiblecollaborativeandahighlyadaptiveapproach.ThetrainingrequirementsincludingthosefortheMSTmaybechang-ingfrequentlymoresothaninthecaseoftheISAFmissionwhichhasbeenaroundforadecade.NATOtraininginstitutionswillneedtohavereadilyavailablemecha-nismswhichwillenablethemtooutreachfortherequiredoftenmissionspecificanddiverseexpertiseandknowledge.OneofthepotentialwaysforwardistomovefromaroleplayingwhichcurrentlydrivesthecontentandorganizationoftheMSTtoaninstitutionalapproachrepresentedbyalong-termcooperationwithformalinstitutions.CapitalizingontheinstitutionalrichnessoftheEuropeanenvironmentisanobviouschoicewhichisfullyinlinewiththeCFI.TheJFTCisalreadylayingdownfoundationsofaregionalnetworkofmutuallysupportinginstitutions.TheJFTChasalreadyestablishedformalsupportingsupportedrelationshipwith16organizationsinstitutionsrepresent-ingnationalHQsCOEsandNATObodiesIOsandAcademia.Thesupportingsupportedrelationshipisbestexpressedbythefollow-ingtermstrainingexpertiselessonslearnedanalyticcapacitiesandexpertisecomprehen-siveapproachEXCONHICONSIDECONSMEinformationsharinginternaltrainingandeducationsupportdevelopmentoftrain-ingpackagesinternationalrecognitionMELMILscriptingroleplayingnavalexper-tiseetc.AdvantageoftheJFTCinthiseffortrestswithitscentrallocationandanattractiveprogramofworkwhichattractthepotentialpartnerstointeractwithus.ExperiencefromtheISAFPre-deploymentTrainingprovesthatinprinci-plethedesignoftheMSTwhichiscurrentlyusedinNATOiswellsuitedfortrainingmultinationalHQs.ThestructureoftheMSTenablesfullintegrationofthepartnersandcivilianactorsintothetrainingandeffectiveefficientutilizationofthecapabilitieswhichexistintheNATOtraininginstitutions.ItisalsoflexibleenoughtoaccommodateanyspecificfuturerequirementswhichmayarisefromtheNRFtraining.Thefocusofourworkinthenearfuturewillbeonthecontentandsearchingforinnovativesolutionswiththeaimtofurtherelevatequalitativecharacter-isticsofthetrainingprovidedattheJFTC.MissionSpecificTrainingMSTTrainingFormsTrainingAudienceTrainingMethodsTrainingObjectivesKeyLeadersTrainingCommandgroupandselectedpersonnelRoundtableDiscussionInteractionwithSeniorMentorsANSFandWhiteCellMembersKnowBeabletoBefamiliarwith________KnowledgeAcquirementsHabitsTheoreticalPreparationCommontoallbranchesLecturePanelDiscussionFunctionalAreaTrainingFATCommontoallbranchesLecturePanelDiscussionVignetteBasedTrainingBranchspecificCaseStudyVTCFunctionalAreaServicesTrainingFASTCommontoallbranchesVignetteBasedTrainingBranchspecificInstructionPracticalTrainingIndividualPreparationMediaTrainingCommandgroupRoundtableDiscussionPracticalandSituationalTrainingCommontoallbranchesLecturePracticalDemonstration TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201325 26TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013TheJFTCconstantlyseeksopportuni-tiestoexpanditsexpertiseinmultinational-trainingconvergentwiththeCentresmission.Oneoftheexpansiondirectionsisthroughenteringtheareaofrelevantnon-NATOledtrainingevents.ArecentexamplewastheSouthEasternEuropeSimulationNetworkExerciseinOctober2012SEESIM12.TheJFTCasamemberofthecombinedNATOAlliedCommandTransformationteamprovidedFederationManagementNATOTrainingFederationIntegrationandSynchronizationaswellasJCATSJTLSandVBS2simulationsystemssupportinthedistributedenvironmentoftheExercise.IntroductionTheSouthEasternEuropeSimulationSEESIMisamulti-nationalnon-NATOledcrisismanagementdisasterresponsedistributedComputerAssistedExerciseCAX.SEESIM12wasthesixthinaseriesofexerciseswithintheframeworkoftheSouthEasternEuropeDefenceMinisterialSEDMprocess.Itwasexe-cutedbetween15and19October2012.TheaimoftheSEESIMexerciseistopromotecooperationcoordinationandinteroperabilityofcivil-militaryoperationsandreinforcerealworldcrisisresponsewith-inandamongtheSEDMnationsandtheSEDMinitiativesthrougheffectiveuseofcomputermodellingandsimulationMS.Thespecificaimistodevelopcapabili-tiesandproceduresofnationalandregion-alcoordinationcooperationandmutualassistanceinresponsetosecuritycon-cernsandrisksrelatedtoaregionalcrisis.SEESIM12involvedabout500participantslocatedinAlbaniaBosniaHerzegovinaBulgariaCroatiaItalyMontenegroSerbiatheFormerYugoslavRepublicofMacedonia1UkraineandtheSouth-EasternEuropeBrigadeSEEBRIGHeadquarters.TheexercisewassupportedbytheUnitedStatesJointStaffJ7JointandCoalitionWarfightingJCWSwedenandNATO.TheUSprovidedexecutiveassistanceandtechnicalsupportthrough-outtheplanningprocessandexecution.Swedenprovidedtechandoperationalexper-tiseincrisismanagement.InadditionseveralInternationalOrganizationsassistedtoprovidearealistictrainingexperience.NATOparticipationwasrelatedtoNATOAlliedCommandTransformationACTDistributedTrainingandExercisesDTEprogrammeandinvolvedtheACTtheJointWarfareCentreJWCandtheJointForceTrainingCentreJFTCsup-portedbytheUnitedStatesJointStaffJ7JointandCoalitionWarfightingJCW.NATODTEExperimentsduringSEESIM12TheDistributedTrainingandExercisesDTEExperimentwasconduct-edconcurrentlywiththeSEESIM1215-19October2012.Theexecutionofthisexperi-mentculminatedthenearly18-monthcol-laborativeefforttoalignBulgariannation-alandAlliedCommandTransformationDTEprogrammegoalsinthecontextofanon-NATOledmulti-nationalexercise.TheaimoftheDTEExperimentwastogaininsightsandhelpanddeterminepotentialrolesNATOcouldplayinsupport-ingcollectiveexercisesinmulti-nationalsettings.Thisincludesinformationontheusefulnessoftoolsthatcouldcontributetoexpandingcapabilitiesleveragedincomputerassistedexercises.Thewaytoachievethishasprimarilybeenthroughtheintroduc-tionofNATOCAXtoolssuchastheJointExerciseManagementModuleJEMMtheNATOTrainingFederationNTFandtheExerciseScenarioResourcePortalESRP.Theexperimentwasdoneincon-junctionwithSEESIM12butdependingontheexperimentobjectivetherelation-shipbetweentheexerciseandtheexperi-mentvaried.TwoprimarycapabilitieswereassessedduringtheexecutiontheJointExerciseManagementModuleJEMMandtheNATOTrainingFederationNTF-JEMMisaNATOprototypeCAXtoolthatcurrentlyservesasstandardforNATOplanningdesignandexecutionforoperationalexercises.JEMMisusedextensivelybytheNATOTrainingCentresbutnotcommonlyusedinnon-NATOledmulti-nationalexercisessuchasSEESIMandmanyoftheparticipatingnationslackedJEMMexperience.TheJWCprovidedsupportinallaspectsoftheJEMMincludingadministrationtrainingJFTCexpandsCAXexpertiseportfolioatSEESIM12Mr.JacekWelzCAXModelingSimulationEngineerJFTCTrainingSupportDivisionWargamingBranch SEESIM12NTFexperimentCoreTeamfromtherightJacekWelzJFTCFederationManagementJCATSandVBS2supportPer-PhilipSollinPitchTechnologiesHLARTIfederationandnetworksupportAmyGromJCWNTFTechnicalLeadAndyBowersJCWFederationDesignGaryRedeniusRolandsAssoc.JTLSsupportMattDeMaarJCWFederationManagementJCATSsupportTransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201327andMEL-MILmanagement.TheJFTCsupportedthispartoftheexperimentbyhostingandadministeringSEESIM12JEMMserverattheJFTCforsixmonthsbeforetheMainPlanningConferenceMPCinApril2012.-TheNTFCAXcapabilityasusedinSEESIM12createdamodellingandsimulationMSfederationbetweentheJointTheatreLevelSimulationJTLSandtheJointConflictandTacticalSimulationJCATSsystems.TheSEESIM12NTFrepresentedavariantofthepreviousNTFfederationsandincludedspecificenhancements.ThetechnologytodevelopNTFforSEESIM12leveragedpreviousNATOModelingandSimulationGroupi.e.NMSG-068activitiesandinternationallyrecognizedstandardsi.e.HLAEvolved.TheNTFwasonlyavailabletothenationsthatchosetoparticipateinthisparticularexperimentalareaandwasnotexplicitlyassociatedwiththeExercise.TheJFTCparticipationinSEESIM12andDTEExperimentfocusedonthis.Experimentpreparationexecu-tionandoutcomeshavebeencapturedbyDataCollectorswhousedaseriesofsurveysinterviewsandobservablestocapturepertinentdataineachrespectiveareapriortoandduringtheexecution.NTFExperimentdetailsThemainsimulationsoftwareusedduringSEESIMexerciseswasJointTheatreLevelSimulationJTLShoweversomeSouthEasternEuropenationslikeBulgariaCroatiaSerbiathatusedJointCombatandTacticalSimulationJCATSattheirnationalsimulationcenterspreferredtouseitduringnationalandmulti-nationalexer-cisesinordertoutilizetheirownresourcesandskillsaswellasalreadydevelopednationaldatabasesandscenarios.TheNATOTrainingFederationNTFservedasthesolutiontoconnectdifferentnationalsimula-tionsystemslikeJTLSandJCATStogether.TheSEESIM12NTFExperimenthasbeendesignedtofederatethreedifferentnationalJCATSinstanceswithonemainJTLSwhichcoveredthewholeareaofSouthEasternEuropeSEEnations.Numerousadditionaltoolssupportingcomponentinterconnectionmaintenanceandmonitoringofthefederationhavebeeninvolved.Simulationdatawaspreparedinaspecialwaytohavecoherentdatainbothsimulationsystems.TheExperimentwasdistributedoverthefollowinglocations-BulgariamainsiteDefenseandStaffCollegeinSofiawithNTFhub-allfederationrelatedsoftwareHLARTImonitoringandmanagementtoolsJTLScompleteSEESIMscenarioandsideforcesfromallnationsnotparticipated 28TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013intheNTFExperimentadditionalsimulationsasapartoftheexperimentwhichincludedVBS2providedandrunbyJFTCCAXandSWORDrunbyMASAcompanyinvitedbyBulgaria-BulgariaremotesitecollocatedwiththemainwithJCATSBulgarianforcesonlyandfederationmonitoringtools-CroatiaremotesitenationalsimulationcenterinZagrebwithJCATSCroatianforcesonlyandfederationmonitoringtools-SerbiaremotesitenationaltrainingcenterinBelgradwithJCATSSerbianforcesonlyandfederationmonitoringtools-JFTCremotesiteJFTCBatLabwithNLVCsuiteandfederationmonitoringtoolslistenerfederateonly-JWCJCWSwedenremotesitesFederationmonitoringtoolslistenerfederateonlyEachofthesitesimplementedPitchBoostersoftwarecomponentwhoserolewastoimprovenetworkconnectionper-formanceandoptimizefederationtrafficbetweenthesites.Additionalfunctionalelementslikefederationmonitoringsoft-waredataloggersfiltersC2interfacesandviewerswereintegratedpartofthesolu-tion.Altogethertherewereabout40activefederatesseparatesoftwareinstancescon-nectedtothefederationrunduringtheNTFExperiment.Thesystemsneededtoprocessaboutonehundredfederationtrafficmes-sagespersecondaveragewithsomepeaksuptoafewthousandmessagespersecond.ThemaingoaloftheDTENTFExperimentandfocusareaforJFTCwastoassessandevaluateNATOviabilityspecificallyNATOsresidentcapacityto-managethefederationandleadpreparationforitsuse-runthefederationduringtheexecutionphaseAsatechnicalsolutiontheNTFandJTLS-JCATSfederationisnotacom-pletelynewconceptandhasbeentestedbeforee.g.duringMSG-068finalexper-imenthostedattheJFTCinNovember2010.Resultsofthatexperimentandrecom-mendationsfromMSG-068FinalReporthavebeenusedasabaselineforcurrentfederationsoftwareimplementations.DuringexecutionoftheExperimentanumberofincidentsfromtheSEESIM12exercisescenariohavebeenplayedinordertotestinteractionbetweendifferentsitesandsimulationsystemslikeJTLS-JCATSandJCATS-JCATSinthefollowingaspects-TechnicalaspectsoftheNTFlikeproperunitrepresentationcorrectinteractionbetweendifferentsimulationstimeofrejoinfederationafterlosingconnectivitycrashrecoverynetworkmonitoringperformancemeasurementetc.-OperationalaspectsofdistributedexercisewithNTFusescenarioincidentcoordinationandmanagementbetweenremotesitesNTFManagementinordertokeepallthesimulationsfederatedandsynchronizedovervariouslocationswhilefollowingtheflowofMELMIL.JFTCinvolvementduringSEESIM12NTFExperimentTheJFTCCAXBranchrepresenta-tiveshavebeeninvolvedfromthebeginningoftheSEESIM12exerciseandexperimentpreparation.Thatincludesparticipationinexercisespecificationandplanningconfer-encesaswellasregularteleconferencesandVTCs.NTFExperimentpreparationcoversparticipationinNTFIntegrationWorkshopinMSCoEinRomeJune2012EndToEndE2ETestingatBulgariaDefenseandStaffCollegeinSofiaSeptember2012andfinallySEESIM12NTFExperimentsetupandexecutioninSofiaOctober2012.Inordertosupportthemainobjec-tivesoftheNTFexperimentaswellastheJFTCintereststheCAXteamsup-portedthefollowingactivities-FederationManagerPostParticipationinplanningandpreparationprocessincludingsometechnicalactivitieslikeNTFintegrationon-sitesetupandE2Etestingaswellascoordinationmanagementandsynchronizationbetweenremotesitesduringtheexperimentexecution.-DataCollectionTechnicalAdvisorroleasapartofACTExperimentTeaminareasthatfocusedon-Whattheassociatedskillsetsarethoserequiredtomanageafederationandleaditspreparationforusei.e.NTFenhancementsandthosetorunthefederationi.e.specificcompetency.-WhatthetechnicalrequirementsaretosustainandorenhancetheNTFinthefuture.ThisJFTCactivelysupportedFederationManagementandthetechnicalplatformoftheSEESIMNTFexperiment ExampleofstateoftheartofCAXToolsJCATSVBS2federatedthroughPitchRTIwithothersupportingapplicationsTransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201329includesthesoftwarehardwareandnetworkaswellasthefederationmonitoringandmanagementtoolsthatmustbeutilizedtomaintainNTF.-TheJFTCCAXcapabilitytestingwithconnectiontoSEESIM12NTFExperiment.TheJTFChasbeenconnectedtoBulgariaNTFhubasoneoftheExperimentparticipantsusingJTFClocalsystems.NTFExperimentexecutionandinitialresultsOneofthebenefitsfortheJFTCfromparticipationinSEESIM12NTFExperimentwastogainnewknowledgeandexperiencerelatedtorunningdistrib-utedandfederatedexercises.TheCAXteamhasbeeninvolvedinbothtechnicalandmanagerialaspectsoftheExperimentdur-ingpreparationandexecution.Thisinvolve-mentallowedgettingacomprehensivepictureofrequirementseffortandskillsneededtorunexerciseusingNTFsolution.AnumberofincidentsfromtherealSEESIM12exercisehavebeenplayedduringtheNTFexperiment.TheSituationalForceswererepresentedindifferentsimulationsys-temsfederatedwitheachotherusinganumberofstandardizedinterfacesandinter-connectionsoftware.NotonlyJTLS-JCATSconnectivityhasbeenexercisedbutalsoJCATS-JCATSandJCATS-VBS2VBS2wasprovidedandoperatedbyJFTCaswellasotherconfigurationsandsolutionse.g.GoogleEarthasEXCONViewer.Itwasreallyexcitingandinterestingtohavemultiplenationalsitestalkingthroughtheteleconferencebridgeanddiscussingongoingscenarioincidentsplayedliveindif-ferentsimulationsfederatedwitheachotheratthesametimeseeingsimulationsviewsfromremotesitescombinedononebigscreen.ThenationsparticipatinginexperimentsprovidedverypositivefeedbackaboutusingNTFandNATOapproachtoexercisemanagement.AnimportantstepforwardhasbeenmadeinbuildingarelationshipwiththeSEEnationsespeciallyBulgariawhoseexpertsbecameknowntotheNATOcom-munityandviceversapreparingthewayforfuturecooperationdevelopment.TherewerenotanymajortechnicalissuesduringtheNTFExperimentexecution.Maindifficultieshavebeenresolvedpriortotheexecutionduringworkshopstestingeventsandsetupi.e.databasescorrelationsoftwareissues.TherewereminortechnicalissuesduringtheNTFexperimentexecutionrelatedtoparticularsimulationsnetworkconnectionsandsoftwarehardwareperfor-mancehowevertheywereexpectedandwel-comedfromanexperimentperspectiveinordertotestmanagementsupportandrecov-eryproceduresaswellastocollectitemscouldpotentiallybeimprovedinthefuture.TheDistributedTrainingandExercisesDTEFirstImpressionsExperimentReportFIERwasreleasedinDecember2012.TheFIERprovidedinitialinsightregardingtheDTEexperimentwhichwereverypositive.Mostoftheaimsoftheexperimenthavebeenachieved.TheFinalExperimentReportwithallexperimentresultsandrecommenda-tionswillbepublishedinFebruary2013.1TurkeyrecognizestheRepublicofMacedoniabyitsconstitutionalname. MultinationalSpecialForcesExercisePuma1230TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Specialoperationplanningandexecutionasapartofastabilizationmis-sion-thatwastheaimofthelargestandmostimportantexerciseknownasPuma12.Thismultinationalprojectwhichwasattendedbymorethan450soldiersfrom10countriestookplaceinBydgoszczbetween9and16November2012attheJointForceTrainingCentreJFTC.ThedirectoroftheexercisewastheCommanderofthePolishSpecialForcesBGPiotrPatalong.PreparationsforthePuma12startedasearlyas2010.Theaimofthoseactivitieswastoassessthelevelofreadi-nessoftheSpecialOperationsCommandSOCsetupbyPoles.TheSOCdirectstheSpecialOperationsComponentCommandSOCC.TheexercisewasheldattheJFTCinBydgoszczbecauseithasgreatcapabilitiestocarryoutsuchprojects.RightnowitistheonlyplaceinPolandwherewecanexecutemultinationalstaff-commandtrainingforspecialforcesonsuchscaleanddimension-generalPatalongsaid.TheexercisescenarioassumedparticipationofspecialforcesinaNATOoperationaimedatpreventingtheescala-tionofapoliticalcrisisandhumanitariandisasterinafictionalregionofEurope.TheSOCCpersonnelwerecommandedbytheSpecialForcesDeputyCommanderCol.JerzyGut.Themainpartofthecompo-nentabout70wasformedbythestaffofthePolishSpecialForcesCommandanditssubordinateunits.Theremaining30weresoldiersfromcommandsandspe-cialunitsfromCroatiaCzechRepublicFinlandFranceLithuaniaGermanySlovakiatheUnitedStatesandHungary.TheexercisewasakeyelementtocheckthelevelofreadinessofPolandtobecomeaLeadingStateintheareaofNATOspecialoperations.ThefinaltestoftheSpecialOperationsComponentCommandcreatedbytheSOCwillbeheldinautumn2013duringtheCobra13exercise.AtthattimeSpecialForcesCombatTeamswillgatherinmilitarytrainingareasinPolandtheCzechRepublicSlovakiaandLithuaniatoprac-ticallyconductoperationsplannedbytheSOCC.PassingthisexamisarequirementPolandmustfulfilltobecomeoneoftheLeadingCountrieswithcapabilitiestocommandtheNATOandalliedspecialoperations.ItisanambitionofthePolishSpecialForcestojoinasmallgroupofcountriesthatpossesssuchqualificationsin2014.AtthemomenttheyareFranceSpainTurkeytheUSAUnitedKingdomandItaly.Puma12wasobservedandevaluatedbyofficersfromtheUSandNATOcommandsUnitedStatesSpecialOperationsCommandUSSOCOMSpecialOperationsCommandEuropeSOCEURandNATOSpecialOperationsHeadquartersNSHQ.IntheiropinionaswellasinopinionofBGPiotrPatalongtheexerciseobjectiveswereachieved.Thecommandsystemandinformationflowweresuccessfullytested.Theexercisewasalsoanexcellentopportunitytorehearseproceduresforplanningandmanagingavarietyofspecialoperations.Theexperi-encegainedshouldallowforsuccessfulconclusionofthecertificationprocess.Besidesthecommandostherewerealsosoldiersfromotherservic-esofthePolishArmedForcesArmyNavyAirForceandinstitutionssubordinatetotheMinistryofNationalDefenseOperationalCommandoftheArmedForcesNationalDefenseAcademytheMilitaryPoliceArmedForcesSupportInspectorateInspectorateoftheMilitaryHealthServiceTrainingandDoctrineCentreoftheArmedForcesandtheAirForceInstituteofTechnology.MAJKrzysztofPlaukMr.PiotrOrowskiPolishSpecialForcesCommandPublicAffairsOffice PUMA12ShowcaseoftheConnectedForcesInitiativeInterviewwithBrigadierGeneralPiotrPatalongtheCommanderofthePolishSpecialForcesTransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201331ThePolishSpecialOperationsForcesCommandwasresponsibleforpreparationandexecutionoftrainingformultinationalspecialforcesexercisePuma12.AstheCommanderoftheSpecialOperationsForcesyouwerethedirectorofthetrain-ing.CanyousayafewwordsaboutthetrainingitselfWhatisthePuma12WhatarethegoalsofthetrainingFortheSpecialOperationsForcesCommandPuma12isakeyphaseonthewaytobecomeasocalledframeworknationwithintheareaofspecialoperations.DuringthetrainingwewantedtofindoutwhethertheSpecialOperationsForcesCommandisonthewayofdevelopingthecapabil-itytogainthestatusofSpecialOperationsForcesComponentCommandexactlywhereweplannedforittobewhilepre-paringthescheduletogainthiscapability.Themainideaofthetrainingwastocheckthemostimportantfactorpeople.Procedurescanalwaysbemodifiedandadjustedtodynamicchangesbutitmustbedonebyperfectlytrainedandquali-fiedpersonnel.WehavesuchpeopleintheSpecialOperationsForcesCommandWhilewesummarizethetrainingwehavetorememberthatitisastageleadingtocertification.Itisimportantthatwelookatthewholeprocessasawholenotrandomly.Developingsuchabigtrainingwassome-thingnewforyouandforyourstaff.HowdidyoupreparefortheexerciseWerethereanychallengesorproblemsthatturnedupduringthepreparationphase 32TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013AtSpecialForceswenevertalkaboutprob-lems.Eveniftheyturnupwetreatthemaschallengeswemustface.Italwaysmobilizesustoevenharderworkandnodoubtprepar-ingtraininglikethatwassuchachallenge.Anumberofconferencesdozensofagree-mentshundredsofworkingmeetings.Anytimewhenweareinvolvedinanyactionforthefirsttimewedoourbesttobereadynotfor100butfor200.WehaveanumberofverywellqualifiedofficerswhocompletedcoursesinPolandandabroadandweallworkedreallyhard.Thisissomethingthatbuildsourrelationships.Youmustrememberthatthereweremorethan450soldiersfromtencountries.Thesenumbersshowwhatthescaleofdifficultytopreparesuchtrainingis.IfIweretoinitiallysummarizethetrainingIthinkthatwedidagoodjob.AfterthetrainingIreceivedwordsofappreciationfromouralliesforprofessionalismtheSpecialOperationsForcesCommandhadpresentedduringthepreparationandexecutionofthetraining.YouhavementionedthatPuma12isthenextstepatestofPolandsreadinesstobecomealeadingcountrywithintheareaoftheNATOspecialoperations.WhenwillPolandgainthisstatusandwhatotherconditionsithastofulfillWhatareotherstepsaheadforPolandinthisprocessYesthatstrue.Puma12wasourlastbutoneexam.Itislikeatrialfinalhighschoolexam.Ourrealhighschoolfinalsaresched-uledforNovember2013.IamprettysurethatbothIandmysoldierswillsuccessfullypasstheirmostimportanttestnationalverifica-tionoftheachievedcapabilitiestoexecutetheleadnationtasksandPolandinaccor-dancewithnationalandNATOplanswillbeidentifiedasthefirstleadnationwithinthegroupofthesocallednewNATOmem-bers.Wevebeenworkingonthisforyearsandthoseeffortscannotbeundermined.InpracticewhatisthesignificanceofbeingaleadnationforPolandWhatimpactwillithaveontheAllianceHowwillNATObenefitfromthefactthatPolandachievesthestatusofaleadnationSpecialforceseventhoughthesmallestinnumberplayasignificantroleinourcountrysdefensesystem.Achievingthesta-tusofaleadnationintheareaofspecialoperationsisofgreatimportanceforPolandssecuritysystemandforthewholeAlliance.ItmustberememberedthatthepoweroftheAllianceisthesumofcapabilitiesofitsmemberstates.ThisiswhyNATOencour-agesitsmemberstodeveloptheirdefensecapabilitiesinnewareas.WhatisespeciallyimportantforNATOisasymmetricthreatrelatedtotheexistenceofsupranationalter-roristorganizations.Moreandmoreoftensecurityisdefinednotwithinthecontextofastatethatisincontroloveritsownterri-torybutalsowithinprovidingsecurityandqualityoflifeforitscitizens.ThereforeNATOactivelysupportsaspirationsofallthememberstatesthataimatdevelopingtheirspecialforces.NATOindicatesthatPolishwayofdevelopmentofspecialforcescanbeusedasamodeltofollowbyotherstates.AllthatshowsparticularsignificanceofPuma12.ComingbacktothetrainingDoyouthinkyoumanagedtoachievethestatedgoalsHowdoyouevaluateitsexecutionYesdefinitely.Allthegoalsonbothopera-tionalandtacticallevelwereachievedin100andtheexecutionwasexcellent.Itwasanothertestforthestaffnotonlyforthecommanders.Icansaywithcompleteauthoritythatallthepartsofthismachineareproperlysynchronized.OuralliesfromUSSOCOMUSSECURandNATONSHQevaluatedthetrainingashighlysuccessful.Ofcoursethereisalwaysroomforimprove-ment.Oneoftheaimsofthetrainingwastocheckwhereexactlywewere.Nowitisuptoourwisdomtodecidehowweusetheconclu-sionsfromthetraining.Weareluckytohaveanotheryearandtherearenottoomanythingsthatrequireimprovement.Weareoptimistic.HowdoyouevaluatethesupportyouandtheparticipantsreceivedfromtheJointForceTrainingCentreduringthepreparationandexecutionofPuma12ThevalueofthesupportwereceivedfromtheJointForceTrainingCentrecannotbeoverestimatedandthecooperationwasgreat.IcansaythatthetrainingpreparationprocessandthecourseofitwouldhavebeenmuchmoredifficultifnotimpossibleiftheJFTChadnotbeenactivelyinvolved.Letmeonceagainexpresswordsofappreciationandthanks.CooperationwiththeJFTCwasarealpleasure.QuestionsaskedbytheJFTCPAO. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201333BecausetheISAFInternationalSecurityAssistanceForcesoperationistak-inglongerwhichresultsinincreasingper-sonnelandmaterialcoststhefinaldateofthemissionhasbeenestablishedfor31December2014.ToachievethistargetitisnecessarytotrainAfghanSecurityForcesthatwillabletotakeovertheresponsibilityforsecurityinAfghanistanaftertheISAFforceshavewithdrawn.EventhoughsomeoftheAfghandistrictsandprovinceshavealreadybeenhandedovertotheAfghanforcesaproblemhasappearedrecentlythatmaydelayorevenparalyzethoseactions.TheproblemistheattackscommittedbymembersofAfghansecurityforcesagainsttheirISAFpartners.TheyhappenedbeforehoweverrecentlytheirscalecausedseriousunrestamongbothISAFrepresentativesandtheAfghansforwhomISAFassistanceintrainingtheirsecu-rityforcesisofkeyimportance.ThisarticleisanattempttopresenttheproblemofattackswhichareoftenreferredtoasGreenonBlueGoB1orInsidetheWireThreat.Theauthortriestodefinetheproblempresentitscausesconsequencesandcountermeasuresundertakentoneutral-izeit.DefinitionThereisnoonespecificdefinitionthatcouldbeusedwhiledescribingtheattacks.MostoftentheyarereferredtoasGreenonBlueGoB2InsidetheWireThreatorInsiderThreat.ThetermGoBisusedtorefertoattackswhenrepresentativesofAfghansecurityforcesattackISAFemploy-eesorsoldiers.Thisnameisusedwhenwetalkabouttheproblemingeneralorwhenwetalkaboutitwithoutaskingaboutdetails.HoweverthetermInsidetheWireThreatorInsiderThreatsismorepreciseandisusedwhenagivenattackcanfallintooneofthefourcategoriesInfiltrationCo-OptionImpersonationandPersonalMotivation3Grievance.TobemorespecificInfiltrationthistermisusedinsituationswhenrebelsterroristsorextremistgroupmembersplanttheirrepresentativewithintheISAFstructureandareatocollectinforma-tionorcommitanactofviolence4.Co-Optherewemeanasituationofvol-untaryornon-voluntaryrecruitmentofanactiveAfghansecurityforcesmembertocommitactsofsabotageviolenceortocollectinformationforanexternalorganiza-tion.Itmaybeachievedthroughcorruptionintimidationideologicalrecruitmentortheuseofpersonalreasons5.ImpersonationpretendingtobesomeoneelsesuchattackshappenwhenrebelstrytogettoanISAFbaseinordertocarryoutanattackthroughusingunauthorizeduni-formsorequipmentnormallyusedbyAfghanforcesorISAF6.PersonalMotivationGrievancetheseattacksareoftencommittedasaresponsetocasesofmistreatmentbyISAFsoldiers.SuchincidentsareresultsofmisunderstandingscausedbyculturaldifferenceshumiliatinganddegradingtreatmentsometimesitisaresponsetociviliancasualtiesorAfghanlossesresultingfromISAFactionspropa-gandaactionsorpublicstatementsmadebyworldleaders.FinallytheyarecausedbyvariousprovocativeactionslikeKoranburning.Theattackseventhoughtheyarenotusuallycommittedbyinsurgentsareveryoftenusedbythemforpropagandapurposes7.Thiscategoryisthemostdifficulttoidentifyandneutralizebecauseitisrelatedtopersonalperceptionofcertainfactsoreventsbyagivenindividualandmayalsoresultfromtakingdrugsstressorideologicalactivities8.StatisticsSomestatisticsshowhowsignificanttheproblemis.AccordingtoNATOinforma-tionbetweenMay2007andMay2011therewere26incidentswhichresultedindeathof58foreigntroopsmostoftheattacksoccurredafterOctober20099.Fromthebeginningof2011thenumberofattacksincreasedby75whichresultedin102deathsofISAFsoldiersbetweenMay2007andAugust2012.40ofthemwerekilledin2012.In2011itwas35people.In2012allthosewhowerekilledasaresultofGoBGreenonBlueAttacksThreatenISAFMissionSuccessLTCKrzysztofDanielewiczPolishArmy 34TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013accountedfor13ofcasualtiesofthe306killedinAfghanistan10.Officialstatisticsdonotsaytoomuchaboutreasonsoftheattacksortheirper-petrators.Duringapressconferenceheldon13August2012theISAFspokesmanBGGnterKatzstatedthatcontrarytotheTalibanstatementsthenumberofattacksagainstISAFtroopscommittedbypeoplerelatedtotheTalibanisasingle-digitnum-ber.HesaysthatsincethebeginningoftheyeartilltheinterviewthenumberoftheGoBincidentswas27andtheyresultedin37deaths.Hesaidi.a.Yeswehad27verytragicincidents.Wetakethemveryveryseriously.Butwemustnotforgetthatontheothersidewestillgotalmost500000sol-diersandpolicemenwhoworktogetheraswespeakrightnowactuallyinordertocrushtheinsurgencyandfightformorestabilityandsecurityhereinthiscountry11.Despitethosestatementsrepresenta-tivesoftheUSadministrationarenotcertainforhowmanyofthoseincidentstheTalibanareresponsibleandhowmanyofthemareindividualcasesnon-relatedtothem.DuringaVTCwiththePentagoncommentingtheGoBattacksinMayGeneralJohnAllenstatedItsimportanttonotethatintheanalysisthatwehavedonelessthan50oftheonesthathaveperpetratedtheseattackswereinfactTalibaninfiltrators.Manyofthesefolksareself-radicalized.Soitsimpor-tanttounderstandandbeabletorecognizethenatureofthatself-radicalizationintheranks12.APreporterBobBurnsnoticedthatearlierthePentagonhadmentionedthattheTalibanwereresponsiblefor10ofcasualtiesandaskedGeneralAllenwhythedifferencewassohuge.GeneralJohnAllenrepliedOurviewisitsabout25thisstillrequiresalotofanalysis.AndsoifitsjustpureTalibaninfiltrationthatisonenumber.IfyouaddtothatimpersonationthepotentialthatsomeoneispullingthetriggerbecausetheTalibanhavecoercedthefamilymembersthatsadifferentnumber.Andsoitslessabouttheprecisionof25versus10thanitisacknowledgingthattheTalibanareseek-ingultimatelytohavesomeimpactintheformation.AndBobIknowyouareawarethattheTalibantrytotakecreditforeveryoneoftheseattackswhetheritsapersonalgrievanceorwhetheritwasasuccessfulinfiltration13.DefinitelyAugust2012wastheworstasfarasthenumberofattacksisconcernednineISAFsoldierswerethenkilledinonlyelevendays14on7AugusttwoAfghansoldierskilledaUSsoldiertheyfledandjoinedtheTaliban.On9AugustinLaghmanprovinceUSsoldierskilledanattackingAfghansoldieron10AugustsixUStroopswerekilledintwoGoBattacksinGarmsirandSangin15inHelmandprovince.On13AugustanAfghanpolicemaninjuredtwoUStroopsinNangarharprovinceandon17AugusttwoUSsoldierswerekilledbytheAfghanLocalPoliceinFarahprovince.On17AugustinKandaharprovinceISAFtroopswereattackedbutluckilynoonewasinjured16.ReasonsNexttodiscussionsconcerningthenumberofattackscausedbytheTalibanthemselvestherearedisputesovertherea-sonsbehindtheattacks.AccordingtoGeneralAllenonlyincaseof25oftheattackstheprobablereasonsareknown17.MostanalystsagreethatmajorityofGoBattacksiscommit-tedbyAfghanswithnoparticipationorinspi-rationfromtheTaliban18.IfweassumeittobetruethentheGoBproblemismuchmorecomplexthanitseems.Personalreasonsfortheattacksaredifficulttoidentifybecausemostoftheattackersdieduringtheassaultorrightafter.Theattacksmaybetriggeredbyunlimitednumberofreasonsorpersonalconflicts.Veryoftentheyresultfromacul-tureshockthatAfghanscomingfromsmallvillagesexperiencemeetingISAFsoldiers19.TherearealsocasesofdifficultrelationshipsamongISAFsoldiersthatresultfromculturaldifferences.SomeISAFsoldiersareunabletoestablishpartnerrelationswithAfghanswhobeingpeopleofveryhighself-dignityareextremelysensitiveaboutthis.BecauseoftheadoptedagendaforwithdrawingISAFtroopsfromAfghanistanthemassproductionofsoldiersissurelyoneofthesourcesofproblems.Duetohugeneedsandveryrapidrateathoroughverifi-cationofeverycandidateisnotpossible20.BeforethedatesofISAFforceswithdrawalfromAfghanistanwerespecifiedtheprocesswasslow.NowitismuchfasterandasaresultneedsforcompetentISAFinstruc-torsandmentorsincrease.WithintherecentyearsthemanpoweroftheAfghanArmyhasincreasedfrom30000to170000.ThatsituationsignificantlyaffectedthenumberofcontactswithAfghanpartners.Calculationssaythatacompanyof150mentorsisneces-sarytoproperlysuperviseandtrainabri-gadeof4000sothereisahugeamountofpotentialcontactsbetweenpeople.Thelowerlevelofcontactthehigherriskofattack.Thesituationisbetterincaseofofficersofhigherranksastheyhavebeenbetterverifiedandtrainedsotheircredibilityishigher21.Ofcoursethereareotherreasonsbehindtheattackslikeradicalismandposi-tionsofsoldierswhoreturnafterleavesspentattheirhomeswithfamilies.TheirbehaviormaybeinfluencedbytheTalibanactionswhotrytoswaytherecruitsmindsets.ItispossiblethatthosesoldiersblameISAFforcesforthestateofsecurityortheneedtostayawayfromtheirfamiliesforalongtime.ThesereactionsareimportantbecausetheGoBattacksaremeanttoparalyzetheprocessoftrainingoftheAfghanarmyandpolice22.NATOinformsthatoutof22attackscommittedinthelastsixyears38arecasescausedbymentaloremotionalproblemsorstressresultinginpermanentparticipationinfights.Manyrecruitsareunabletofightastheyarenotemotionallymatureorlosetheirmentalstabilityduetouseofdrugs.ManyAfghansoldiershaveproblemswithdisciplineandareilliteratewhichmakesthetrainingprocessverydifficultorevenimpos-sible.Veryoftentheyareundertheinfluenceofdrugsalsoduringbattlemissionsopera-tionsorpatrols.UNOfficeonDrugsandCrimestatisticsfrom2010saythataround1millionofAfghansareaddictedtodrugsthisis8oftheadultpopulation14mil-lionofthiscountryandistwiceashighastheworldaverage.AccordingtotheUSdatabetween12to41ofallthepolicerecruitstestedpositiveforuseofoneofdrugsandinmostcasesitwashashish.ThereforeAfghanauthoritiesmusttoleratedrugslikemarijuanaorhashishinthearmyandpoliceother-wisethesecurityforceswouldnumberonly20-25ofthecurrentpersonnel23.GoBattacksareespeciallyimpor-tantfortheTalibanduetothepropagan- TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201335dareasons.On7August2012theTalibanpublishedtwopiecesofvideofootagethatshowANAsoldiersattackingISAFtroopsinKunarandUruzgan.InjihadforumMullahOmarrevealedtheinformationthatinfiltra-tionoftheAfghansecurityforcesistheresultofhisguidanceandplansthatwerepublishedlastyear.HealsoinformedthatCallandGuidanceLuringandIntegrationdepart-menthadbeencreated.ItstaskistopersuademembersoftheAfghansecurityservicestocommitattacksagainstISAFforces.AmongothersthisdepartmentdealswithconvincingAfghansoldiersandpolicementojointheTalibantreatingitastheirreligiousobliga-tion.TheTalibanclaimthatthedepartmenthasgotitscellsalloverAfghanistan.MostprobablyitalsotriestoplantitspeopleintheAfghansecurityservicesinordertolatercarryoutattacks24.MullahOmarsstatementpublishedinTheVoiceofJihadforumhasbeentranslatedbytheSITEIntelligenceGroup.InhisstatementonsevenpagesoftextandvideofootageOmarpresented33pointsandinformedthatthedepartmenthadbeenestab-lished.HerearethreepointsthatmayhelpunderstandtheTalibansintentions3.Mujahedeenhavecleverlyinfiltratedintheranksoftheenemyaccordingtotheplangiventothemlastyear.Manycon-sciousAfghansintherankandfilesoftheenemyhaveshownwillingnesstohelptheMujahedeeninashrewdandastuteman-nerafterhavingcomearoundtoknowthereality.Asaresulttheforeigninvadersandtheiralliesintheirmilitarycentersandbasesdocomeundercrushingblowsoftheseheroicsoldiers.Weappreciatethesebraveandhistoricalheroesandtheentirenationpaysthemgreattributes.Weexpectotherstodisplaythesameboldnessandspirit.ThankstotheinfiltrationoftheMujahedeentheyareabletosafelyenterbasesofficesandintelligencecentersoftheenemy.Thentheyeasilycarryoutdecisiveandcoordinatedattacksinflictingheavylossesontheenemybothinlifeandequipment.FurthermoreagreatnumberofsoldiersjointheranksofMujahedeencarryingtheirheavyandlightweaponsandammunitionafterleavingtheranksoftheenemy.TheMujahedeenhonorthemandprovidethemprotection.Intherecentdaysyouandwewerewitnessofsuchfrequentincidents.29.IinviteallpersonneloftheKabulAdministrationparticularlythepersonnelofpoliceandarmytheirofficersandtheemployeesoftheintelligencedepartmenttoabandonsupportoftheinvadersagainstyourreligionandcountryjointheranksofMujahedeenlikeyourheroiccolleagues--thosewhodealcrushingblowsattheinvad-ersfromtimetotime.Jointhecurrentstruggleaimedatliberatingyourcountryandoustingtheforeignusurpers--astrugglewhichisonthevergeofvictoryifGodwill-ing.ThiswillgiveyouasuccessfulandproudlifehereandintheHereafteryouwillbeamongthepiousmenoftheCreatorandtheMasterofallBeings.30.Itismoreproperforyoutotakeadvan-tageofthisopportunitybecausethedayisnotfarawaythattheinvadingenemywillfleeAfghanistan.TheIslamicEmiratehasaddedinitsorganizationalcharteradepart-mentbythenameofCallandGuidanceLuringandIntegration.ItsbranchesarenowoperationalalloverthecountrysothatinadditiontootherservicestheymayprovideyoufacilitiestoleavetheranksoftheenemyandjointheMujahedeen25.Duringapressconferenceorganizedon22August2012HamidKarzaiaccusedforeignsecretservicesofmostoftheGoBattacks.AdaylaterinhiscommentGeneralAllenstatedthattherewasnoinforma-tionthatwouldconfirmthatstatementandinformedthatthesituationwasstillbeinganalyzedinordertofindreasonsoftherecentincreaseofsuchattacks.KarzaisadvisorforsecurityAimalFaiziinformedthateachcaseofaGoBattackisthoroughlyanalyzedbytheAfghanside.Informationcomesfrominterrogationsinterceptedlettersandrecord-ingsoftalks.BaseduponthisinformationtheAfghansideassessesthatforeignsecretservicesarebehindtheattacksbutfailstoprovidetheirnames.Itishowevercom-monknowledgethattheAfghangovernmentblamesPakistanandIranfortheattacks26.WithreferencetotheincreaseofGoBattacksinAugust2012GeneralJohnAllentheformercommanderoftheUStroopsinAfghanistansaysthatthereismorethanonereasonoftheincrease.Helistedthefollow-ingasthemostimportantTalibanopera-tionspersonalreasonsoftheattackersandRamadanfatigueoffasting.AdditionallyRamadanoverlappedwiththeperiodoffightingwhichledtoaccumulationofnega-tiveenergyandfatigueofsoldiersandpolice-men.InsuchcircumstancesitismucheasiertotakeadesperatedecisiontoattackISAFtroops27.ThefactthattheUSforcesarereducedandinsteadsmallermentoringteamsareintroducedisalsoimportant.SmallISAFteamsremainwithinbigAfghanunitsandthereforedecisionstoattackthembecomeeasier28.ConsequencesIthasalreadybeenmentionedthatvictimsoftheGoBattacksaccountfor13ofallvictimsontheISAFsidein2012inAfghanistan.Thescaleandsignificanceofsuchattacksisunprecedentedinthehis-toryoftheUSarmedforcesanddidnotevenhappenduringtheconflictsinIraqorVietnam.AsimilarsituationoccurredalsoinAfghanistanbutitwasin19thcenturyandreferredtoBritisharmy.ThegrowingproblemofattacksagainstISAFtroopshasitspoliticalconse-quencesinAfghanistanandISAFstatesandalsomilitaryconsequencesforthemissionitself.IfthesituationremainsunchangedforlongeritwillgenerategreaterpressureinsomestatestowithdrawtheirtroopsfromAfghanistanevenbefore2014.Ithappenedtoe.g.NewZealandwhichdecidedtowith-drawitstroopsfromAfghanistanassoonaspossibleafteritsthreesoldiershadbeenkilledbytheirAfghanfriends29.AustraliabehaveddifferentlyafteranAustraliansol-dierwaskilledinUruzganprovinceinMay2012.ThisincidentalongwithanotheronefromNovember2011madetheoppositiongreenpartydemandimmediatewithdrawaloftroopsfromAfghanistan.ItwasrejectedbyJuliaGillardthePrimeMinisterwhoannouncedthatAustraliawouldabidebytheearlierdecisionsandcommitments30.ThecaseofFrancewassimilar.DuringavisitthattheFrenchministerofforeignaffairspaidtoAfghanistaninJanuary2012aftertheattackinwhichfourFrenchtroopshaddiedandseveralotherswereinjuredhewarnedthatFrancewouldwithdrawits3600soldiers.TherewasariskthatifFrancestartedwithdrawingitsforcesearlierothercountrieswouldfollow.Sotherealproblem 36TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013wasnotthewithdrawalofFrenchtroopsbuttakinganactionthatothercountrieswouldfollow31.Unfortunatelytheproblemofattackscouldnotbeopentoawidepublicdebatein2012duetotherunningpresidentialcampaign.AnywiderdiscussionaboutthetopiccouldputBarackObamasnextelectioninjeop-ardy.TheattackscouldadditionallythreatentheUSplansofwithdrawalfromAfghanistanandtransferringtheresponsibilityforsecu-ritytothehandsoftheAfghansecurityforces.Thisrequiresapropernumberofwellpreparedsecuritypersonnelwellpreparedsecuritypersonnelrequireswellorganizedtrainingeffortwhichisimpossibleifthereisnotrustbetweenthetrainersandtrainees32.Ithasalreadybeenmentionedthatnexttopoliticalconsequencestherearealsomilitaryconsequences.Aftertheincidentof17August2012whenUSSpecialForcestroopswerekilledinwesternAfghanistanbyAfghanrecruitsthewholeprocesswassuspendeduntilalltheAfghanLocalPoliceALPmembers16000membersagainundergothevettingprocess33.TheALP34thatwillbethefirsttoundergoanothervet-tingprocessistrainedbytheUSSpecialForcesresponsiblealsofortrainingAfghanSpecialForcesandcommandounits.Thesuspendedtrainingwillaffectaround1000people35.HighernumberofGoBattacksalsohaditsrepercussionsamongtheAfghandecisionmakers.AfewweeksaftertheminsterofinternalaffairsBismullahKhanMohammadiandtheministerofdefenseAbdulRahimWardaksteppeddownbecausetheyhadfailedtoreceiveavoteofcon-fidencefromtheparliamentRahmatullahNabiltheheadoftheAfghanspecialforc-esNationalDirectorateofSecuritywasremovedfromhisposition36.TheministerslosttheirpositionsdespitegoodrelationswithISAFduetoallegationsofcorruptionandlackofeffectivenessinmaintainingsecu-rityinAfghanistan37.WaysofneutralizingthreatTheproblemliesnotonlyindefiningthethreatbutaboveallinfindingefficientcounterorneutralizingmeasures.BecausethereisathreatofGoBattacksanumberofsuchactionshavebeentakenbybothISAFandAfghansthemselves.Duetotheincreas-ingnumberofattacksagainstISAFforcestheISAFCommanderGeneralJohnR.Allenscheduledanurgentbriefingwithmorethan40ofhissubordinatecommandersfor15August2012.Duringthebriefingheempha-sizedtheneedtostopthisalarmingtrendthatbadlyinfluencedthemoraleofsoldiersservinginAfghanistan.Oneoftherecom-mendationsaimingatprotectionofsoldiersiscarryingaloadedmagazineintheirweaponsinordertoshortenthetimetoopenfireincaseitwasnecessary38.ThethreatrelatedtoGoBattackshasbeennotedandcommentedalsobytheUSPresidentBarackObamawhoduringapressconferenceheldinAugust2012saidObviouslywevebeenwatchingwithdeepconcerntheseso-calledgreen-on-blueattacks.Wearealreadydoingarangeofthingsandwereseeingsomesuccesswhenitcomestobettercounterintelligencemak-ingsurethatthevettingprocessforAfghantroopsisstronger.AndwevegotwhatscalledtheGuardianAngelprogramtomakesurethatourtroopsarentinisolatedsitua-tionsthatmightmakethemmorevulnerable.Butobviouslyweregoingtohavetodomorebecauseoverthelast12monthsonthis39.Mr.Obamasresponseclearlyshowsthattherearethreemostimportantstepsthatshouldleadtoneutralizingthethreatimprov-ingthecounterintelligencesefficiencyrais-ingvettingeffectivenessandtheprogramknownasGuardianAngel.Thereisalsoaneedforacontinuousanalysisoftheproblemitselfanditssourcesbecausethecounterin-telligenceandotherintelligenceunitswilltakecareofidentificationofpeople.TalkingabouttheGuardianAngelprogramwemeanasoldieroragroupofsoldierswhoarenotengagedincontactswiththeAfghanparty.Theirmostimportanttaskistostaybehindonasideorinanotherplaceinsuchawaythatwithoutbeingnoticedtheyhaveafullviewofthesituation.Incriticalsituationtheymustbereadytoopenfireandimmedi-atelyeliminateapotentialattacker40.LeonPanettaclaimsthattheeight-levelvettingprocessshouldbeverifiedagainwithawideruseofbiometricdata.Noweveryrecruithastoproducetworeferenceletterspreparedbytheeldersfromhisplaceoforigin.Areferenceletterisakindofwarrantythatthepersonitbelongstowillbehaveproperlyandwillfollowtherules.L.PanettaandGeneralAllenmetwiththeelderstodiscusstheirroleinfightingtheproblem41.Thecurrentsituationisalsoinflu-encedbythequickincreaseofthenumberoftheAfghanforceswithinthelastthreeyearsfrom100000to352000troops.Suchaquickgrowthandimperfectvettingsystemmakethepenetrationeasierforunwantedelements.Additionallyeveniftherewereagoodverificationsystemlackofdatabasesprovidinginformationonfamilybackgroundfinancesoremploymentmakeseliminationofpotentialattackersimpossible42.LeonPanettatheUSSecretaryofDefensealsoemphasizedtheneedtointensi-fycounterintelligenceactivitieswhichshouldquicklyidentifytheGoBthreat43.ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffGeneralMartinDempseyduringoneofthepressconferenc-es14August2012informedthattheUSAplannedtosendmorecounterintelligenceexpertsatthebattalionlevel44orbelowand80counterintelligenceagentsweretobesenttoAfghanistan.Fightingthementionedthreatwasmeanttobetheirmaintaskmainlythroughintensifyingthevettingprocessfornewrecruitsandreviewanddeepanalysisoftheprofilesofthealreadyservingindi-viduals.AlsoproceduresthatearlierappliedtoidentifyrecruitswhowerepronetotheTalibanrecruitmentwillbeimproved45.AnotherwaytoreducethethreatisinformingtheISAFtroopsaboutthethreatsandthewaystofightthem.Specialempha-sisshouldbeputontheneedtoobservingculturaldifferencesandAfghancustoms.Accordingtooneoftheresearcherswhoexamined600Afghansoldiersandpolice-menmostofthemhaveanegativeattitudetowesternforces.SomeofthemjustifiedtheirviewsmentioningISAFattacksonciviliansorurinatingondeadAfghanbodies46.Duringoneoftheincidentsanewlyswornpolice-manopenedfireatUSsoldiershistrainersimmediatelyafterhehadreceivedweaponandkilledtwoofthem.AftersixmarineshadbeenkilledintwootherattacksGeneralAllenorderedallhissoldierstocarrygunswithmagazinesintheminsidecompoundswherenormallythemagazineiscarriedsepa-rately47.Unfortunatelytheimplementedactionsaimingatprotectingsoldierswho TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201337traintheAfghanarmymayevendeepenmutualdifferencesandlackoftrustwhichinthefuturemayresultinahighernumberoftheGoBattacks.ThisiswhattheTalibandesire.ColonelThomasCollinstheNATOspokesmaninKabulsaidWehavetohaveabalancingactbetweenprotectingoursol-diersandnotoffendingtheAfghanswearepartneringwith48.AnumberofactionshavebeeninitiatedbytheAfghansthemselvesforwhombreakingthetrainingprocessoftheirsecurityforcesisatragedy.AccordingtoMr.Obamatherecur-rentlyisahighernumberoftheGoBattacksbecausethecontactsbetweenISAFforcesandtheAfghansareintensiveandjointoper-ationsareexecuted.InthefuturehoweverastheresponsibilityforthesecurityisgraduallyhandedovertotheAfghansthenumberofattacksshouldquicklydecrease49.BecausethenumberoftheattacksisgrowingactionsweretakenaimingatanotherverificationofthebackgroundandcontactsofthemembersoftheAfghansecu-rityservices.Asaresultmorethan60sol-dierswereremovedandincaseof600othersproperexplanatoryprocedureswereapplied.RecruitmentprocedurestoAfghanspecialforcesunderwentanotherreview50.AsaresultofactionstakenbytheAfghansidehundredsofpeoplesusceptibletoradi-calizationoftheirviewsandattitudeswereremovedfromthearmy.TheremovedhadoftentravelledtoandfromPakistanactivelystudiedpropagandamaterialspublishedbytheTalibanorotherterroristgroups51.InordertoneutralizethethreattheAfghanpartyorganizedawideagentrecruit-mentactionamongsecurityforces.EarlieractionsaimingatminimizingthelevelofinfiltrationofthesecurityforcesbytheTalibanturnedouttobeineffective.ThebasicpreventivemeansimplementedbytheAfghanscoveredplacingintelligencecoun-terintelligenceorreconnaissanceofficerswithinthesecurityforcesranksmonitoringtelephoneconnectionsmadebysoldiersorpolicemenwiththeirfamiliesandyoungrecruitswerebannedfromusingmobilephones52.GeneralSherMohammadKarimitheChiefofArmyStaffstatedthatallthosepoliticalandmilitaryactionsshouldmakeeverysoldierfeelunderconstantsurveil-lance53.Heisobviouslyawarethatitmayhaveanegativeimpactonthetroopsmoralebutsomenecessaryactionsmustbeimple-mented.Thereforeamongothers176intelli-genceofficerswereplacedintheranks.TheirtaskwillbetogetherwithotherelementsearlydetectionandidentificationofpeoplewhocouldplannextGoBattacks.InhisstatementsKarimiemphasizedthatdespitehavingtheoreticallyperfectregulationscon-cerningvettingofthenewrecruitsbringingthemintoeffectwasimpossibleduetohugerecruitmentneedsofthearmy12000peopleamonth54.Anotherimportantelementismoni-toringandsupervisionofsoldiersgoingonleavestheircontactsandpotentialtoposeathreataftertheyreturntotheirunits.Alsoin2012somesoldierswereforcedtobringtheirfamiliesfromPakistantoAfghanistanandiftheyfailedtodothattheywouldhavetoleavethearmy.TheAfghansiderequestedISAFforcesmainlyAmericanfortechnicalsupportespeciallyfordeliveryofdifferentdevicesliedetectorsmobilephonemoni-toringsystemsorbiometricinstruments.ThelisteddeviceswoulddefinitelyimprovetheAfghanscapabilitytomonitorandvettherecruitspast55.EverydaycontactsbetweenAfghansandISAFrefertoalmost500000soldiersandpolicemen.TheAfghansareplanningtocollectbiometricdataandverifythemagainstpeoplesuspectedofcontactswiththeTaliban.Thesystemofverificationofyoungrecruitsandverificationlettersissuedbytheelderswillbeimprovedtoo56.ZahirAzimithespokesmanfortheAfghanNationalArmyANAsaysthatasaresultoftheactionstakenhundredsofsoldierswereremovedfromtheANAandmanyofthemwerearrested.Thereasonsbehindwereverydif-ferentsomeofthesoldiershadincompleteorforgedpaperssomeotherswereengagedininfiltrationactivitieswithinISAFetc57.SummaryAfter11yearsofAmericanpres-enceinAfghanistanthefollowingdetailsstrikearound2000UStroopskilled16000injured12000Afghancivilianskilledand400billiondollarshavebeenspentsince2007.TheworstthingisthatafterallthatthemissioncannotbeconsideredasuccessandtheAmericansarewithdrawing58.DespiteBarackObamasassurancethenum-berofattacksinthefuturedoesnothavetodecrease.ItisrelatedtothefactthattheplannedtransferofresponsibilityforthesecurityinAfghanistantotheAfghansmakesthewholeprocessoftrainingAfghanSecurityForcesgofaster.Thisrequiresahighernumberofmentorswhichcreatesbet-terconditionsforattackingtheISAFtroops.Inpracticein9outof10casestheoperationsareexecutedjointlywhichonlyincreasesthenumberofpotentialcontactsandconflictsandwhatfollowsattacksonISAFforces.Inthefuturelackofmutualtrustandsometakenactionsthatseparatesoldierswilldefinitelyleadtootherattacks.AfghanpartnersarelosingtheconfidenceofISAFsoldierswhotreattheminaverysuspiciouswayshowthemnotrustwhichinAfghancultureisconsideredtobearealinsult.DespitenumerousattemptstoisolateISAFsoldiersfromtheirAfghancounterpartsGeneralJohnAllensaysthattheclosercon-tactswiththeAfghansarethebetterrelationscanbebuiltandinconsequencethelevelofsecurityoftheISAFtroopsisincreasing.Itisreallyhardtostatewhethertheincreaseofthenumberofattacksisrelat-edtotheworseningofthesecuritysitua-tionincreaseofeffectivenessoftheTalibanactionsorsimplymoreintensivemutualcontactswhichincreasestheriskoftheGoBattacks59.SincemanyAfghansdieinthoseattackstoowemayassumethatkillingISAFtroopsisnottheaimoftheattacksitisratherparalyzingthetrainingprocessoftheAfghansecurityforces.1ThenameGreenonBluederivesfromcolorsusedtomarkownforceswithbluetheenemyswithredandAfghanallieswithgreen.2InsomecasesthereisatendencytoavoidusingthetermGoBbecauseveryoftenAfghansarealsovictimoftheattacks.InsuchcaseswetalkaboutGreenonGreenattacks.ManyattacksareaimedattheAfghansbutveryoftentheyarenotreportedorrecorded.J.ReedGuardianAngelsinAfghanistanForeignPolicy14.08.2012httpwww.foreignpolicy.com3InsidetheWireThreatTOPTIPSHEET 38TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013httpijcportal.ijhq.ms.isaf.nato.int4InsiderThreatsinPartneringEnvironmentsTheTacticalReferenceGuideforMilitaryLeadersJune2011httpwww.wired.com5Ibid.6InsidetheWireop.cit.7InsiderThreatsop.cit.8InsidetheWireop.cit.9Oneofthebiggestattacksin2012wasaimedatFrenchforcesdeployedinKapisaprovince.AnAfghansoldiershotatFrenchtroopsandasaresult4Frenchwerekilledand15wereinjuredL.JACINTOFrenchtolerancedwindlesoverAfghaninsiderthreatFrance2421.01.2012httpwww.france24.com10L.LundquistAnotherISAFsoldierkilledingreen-on-blueattackinAfghanistanLongWarJournal19.08.2012httpwww.longwarjournal.org11A.GulNATOMostGreenonBlueAttacksDuetoGrievancesStressVoiceofAmerica13.08.2012httpwww.voanews.com12M.ThompsonGoldilockingtheInsiderThreatNationTime24.08.2012httpnation.time.com13LatercommentingonAllensstatementNATOinformedthat25referstoallattackscommittedsinceMay2007whereas10referredto2012only.Ibid.Probablythisdataisnotpreciseeitherbecauseothersourc-essaythatNATOwassupposedtostatethatbetween2005-2011theTalibancouldberesponsiblefor19ofallattacks.L.JACINTOFrenchtolerance...op.cit.14R.TaylorA.Ferris-RotmanAnotherAfghaninsidershootingasU.S.talkstoKarzaiReuters19.08.2012httpwww.reuters.com15ThesourcesaysthatoneoftheAfghanPolicecommandersinvitedUSsoldiersforamealatacheckpointandthenopenedfirekillingthree.HavingdonethatherunawayandjoinedtheTaliban.ItisinterestingthatfamousAfghanhospitalitywasusedthere.ThesoldiershostedandprotectedbytheAfghanwerekilledbyhim.6USTroopsKilledbyAfghanCounterpartsVoiceofAmerica11.08.2012httpwww.voanews.com16L.LundquistAnotherISAFop.cit.17HesaidamongothersWedonthaveenoughdatafromthosewhohavepartici-patedintheattackstobeabletomakeanykindofadefinitiveconclusion.Wethinkthereasonsfortheseattacksarecomplex.Someofthemwedobelieveareaboutinfiltrationimpersonationcoercion.Butsomeofthemandwethinkthatsabout25orso.M.ThompsonGoldilockingop.cit.18Duringaninvestigationaftertheattackof11April2011duringwhich8USofficerswhowerementorsfortheAfghanAirForcewerekilleditturnedoutthattheAfghanattackerColAhmedGulwasnotrelatedtotheTalibanandwasdrivenbyanti-westernemotions.Itwasthebloodiestsingleattackinhistory.L.JacintoFrenchtolerance..op.cit.19L.KingAfghanistaninsiderattacksposethreattoWestsexitstrategyLosAngelesTimes20.08.2012httpwww.latimes.com20Herereactionsofthewitnessestoattackssoldiersorpolicementotheattackscommit-tedbytheircolleagues.Mostofthemaresadanddemonstratedisapprovalfortheattacks.Othersworrythatwesternforceswillwith-drawearlierthanplannedandtheywillbeleftalonewithoutpropertraining.Negativereactionsofsoldiersofhigherranksaremorestraightforwardastheyareawareofthesitu-ationandpossibleconsequencesoftheISAFforceswithdrawal.Ibid.21Thequestionofquickcreationofthearmyisnotaproblem.In1941theUSArmywasdevelopedfromthelevelof1400000troopsto8300000withinfouryears.IncaseofAfghanistansuchascenariowillnotbepossiblemainlybecauseofmissinghumanresources.L.JacintoFrenchtoleranceop.cit.22N.HopkinsAfghanistanNATOstrategyatriskfrominsiderthreatTheGuardian16.09.2012httpwww.guardian.co.uk23L.JacintoFrenchtoleranceop.cit.24L.LundquistAnotherISAFop.cit.25B.RoggioMullahOmaraddressesgreen-on-blueattacksLongWarJournal16.08.2012httpwww.longwarjournal.org26T.ShankerGeneralNotesTalibanCoercioninSomeAttacksonTroopsNewYorkTimes23.08.2012httpwww.nytimes.com27T.BowmanD.FilkinssGreen-On-BlueAttacksChallengeAfghanSecurityTheNewYorker23.08.2012httpwww.npr.org28Ibid.29SAPAAfghansreadytocounterinsiderthreatIolNews20.08.2012httpwww.iol.co.za30J.GrubelCh.KearneyAfghansoldierturnsgunonAustraliantroopswoundsthreeReuters9.11.2011httpwww.reuters.com31L.JacintoFrenchtoleranceop.cit.32J.HershAfghanistanGreen-On-BlueAttacksGetHigh-LevelAttentionHuffPostWorld20.8.2012httpwww.huffing-tonpost.com33Dependingonthecountrywheretheoper-ationisexecutedmonitoringactivitiesaredonethroughverificationofpolicerecordspapersrelatedtoearlieremploymentpublic-lyavailabledatadebtrelateddatadatabasesofinternationalantiterroristorganizationsormedicaldata.ThemainpurposeoftheprocessisdeterminingwhetherthemembershaveanycontactwiththeTalibanorotheroppositiongroups.PhysicalSecurityFM3-19.308.01.2011p.C534TheALPprojectisconsideredtobeoneofthemosteffectiveprogramsforfightingarmedoppositioninthecountrysidewhereregularpoliceorarmedforcesarenotsuc-cessfultheirpresenceisnotsufficientortheyarenotthereatall.TheAmericansareplanningtodoubletheALPforceseventhoughsomecriticsthinkthattheALPforcescommitabusesagainstcivilianpopulationsuchastorturesbeatingorextortion.TheALParetrainedbysmallgroupsofspecialforcesandafterthecertificationprocessiscompletedtheyareforcedtoworkinsepara-tionwithoutsupportfromISAFandofteninthemostdangerousregions.L.KingAfghanpolicerecruitstoberescreenedU.S.suspendstrainingLosAngelesTimes2.09.2012httpwww.latimes.com35Ibid.36TheheadoftheNDSlosthispositionaftertwoyearsinofficewhichaccordingtoKarzaiwillbeastandardprocedureinthefuture.TheNDSheadisexpectedtobecomeanAfghanambassador.ContrarytothebothdismissedministerstheNDSheadenjoyedtheconfidenceofbothwesternstatesandtheAfghanparliament.OneofMPsHajjiM.DaoudKalkaniofKabulafterameet-ingwithNabilannouncedthatNabilcouldpridehimselfonbeingsuccessfulfightswithforeignintelligence.M.Abi-HabibZ.SultaniKarzaiFiresAfghanIntelligenceChiefWallStreetJournal29.08.2012 TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201339httponline.wsj.com37Ibid.38R.A.OppelJr.G.BowleyAfghanAttacksonAlliedTroopsPromptNATOtoShiftPolicyTheNewYorkTimes18.08.2012httpwww.nytimes.com39J.HershAfghanistanop.cit.40J.SterlingCoalitionstepsupfightagainstAfghangreen-on-blueattacksCNN17.08.2012httpedition.cnn.com41Ibid.42N.HopkinsAfghanistanNatoop.cit.43J.SterlingCoalitionstepsop.cit.44UStoboostspypresenceinAfghanistanHurriyetDailyNews16.08.2012httpwww.hurriyetdailynews.com45U.S.SendingCounterintelligenceAgentstoAfghanistanReportAgenceFrance-Presse11.06.2011httpwww.defense-news.com46J.SterlingCoalitionstepsop.cit.47R.TaylorA.Ferris-RotmanAnotherAfghaninsidershootingasU.S.talkstoKarzaiReuters19.08.2012httpwww.reuters.com48R.A.OppelJr.G.BowleyAfghanAttacksop.cit.49J.TapperGreenonBlueAttacksinAfghanistanandActionontheJobsFrontTodaysQsforO820-2012ABCNews20.08.2012httpabcnews.go.com50N.HopkinsAfghanistanop.cit.51J.ReedGuardianop.cit.52K.SieffAfghanstospyonowntroopstostopinsiderattacksWashingtonPost21.08.2012httpwww.washingtonpost.com53InordertodetectapotentialthreatassoonaspossibleAfghanspecialservicestrytoplacetheiragentsinthearmyasearlyasdur-ingthebasictraining.B.StarrM.PopalzaiCh.J.CarterAllcoalitiontroopsatAfghanbasesnowarmedaroundtheclockCNN18.08.2012httpedition.cnn.com54K.SieffAfghanstospyop.cit.55Ibidem56L.KingAfghanistaninsiderattacksposethreattoWestsexitstrategyLosAngelesTimes20.08.2012httpwww.latimes.com57HundredsofAfghantroopsdisciplinedafterrogueattacksBBCNews5.09.2012httpwww.bbc.co.uk58T.BowmanD.FilkinssGreen-On-Blueop.cit.59L.LundquistAnotherISAFop.cit.KamilaSierzputowskaPhDisalecturerinthePoliticalScienceInstituteamemberoftheInstitutefortheHistoryofPolishDiasporaandMigrationintheKazimierzWielkiUniversityinBydgoszcz.ShegraduatedwithhonorsfromtheBydgoszczAcademyintheDepartmentofPoliticalScience.ShetookpartinanumberoftrainingsdevotedtolocalandinternationalpoliticsandinworkshopsonorganizingelectioncampaignsrunbyamongothersbytheNationalDemocraticInstituteNDI.From1994to1997shecooperatedwitharegionalbranchofthePolishTVasaproducerandco-authorofpro-gramsfortheyouth.BeingawinnerofaprizeorganizedbytheGazetaWyborczadailyshecompletedatraininginthenewspaperseditorialofficewhichresultedinalong-lastingcooperation.In2003shestartedworkingasalecturerattheUniversityoftheCommonKnowledgeAssociation.KamilaSierzputowskahasbeenworkingattheKazimierzWielkiUniversityinBydgoszczsince2004.In2011shedefendedherdoctoraldissertationonPoliticalDeterminantsofPolishEmigrationofthe80softhe20thtoWestBerlin.ForanumberofyearssheisanactivememberofthePolishAssociationofthePoliticalSciencePTNPandtheBydgoszczScienceAssociationBTN.Sheisaco-organizerofmanyscientificinitiativesorganizedbytheUniversityandinthepastshewasthesecretaryofthePoliticalScienceInstituteScientificCouncilamemberoftheProgramCouncilduringtheDaysofScienceacoordinatoroftheSocrates-Erasmusprogramaco-organizeroftheKnowledgeofPolandandContemporaryWorldContest.In2008beingtheCoordinatoroftheFestivalofScienceshereceivedthePresidentoftheUniversityAwardforheroutstandingorganizationactivities.InherresearchKamilaSierzputowskafocusesmainlyonissuesrelatedtoPolish-GermanbilateralrelationsmigrationofPolestoGermanyPolishDiasporainGermanyinternationalrelationsandmanyothers.Herworksandanalyseswerepublishedbytheuniversitypublishinghouseandindifferentperiodicals.InherteachingshespecializesininternationalrelationsPolishforeignpolicyinternationalsecurityandnationalandethnicminoritiesinEurope.KamilaSierzputowskaisaregularparticipanttoconferencesandmeetings.AtthemomentsheisthesecretaryoftheconferenceentitledConflict-Crisis-War.SecurityinGlobalRegionalandLocalPerspectivethatwillbeheldinApril2013.KamilaSierzputowskaKazimierzWielkiUniversityBydgoszczPolandTHEPEOPLE 40TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013In1997aSpecializedTrainingCentresCommandCCPFwassetupinMAILLY-le-CAMP1.Collocatedwithseveraltrainingareasitiscontinuouslyre-tailoredaccordingtooperationalrequire-ments.UnderthecommandoftheLandForcesCommandbasedinLILLECFTcoveringawidescopeofactivitiesandfacilitiesspreadalloverFrance.TheCCPFmissionistogivestan-dardizedgenerictrainingaccordingtotem-poraryneeds-performpre-deploymenttrainings.Rotationslast2or3weekswithacomprehensiveevaluationsofknow-howandskillsaswellasevaluationsofkeylead-ersareconductedbypermanentobserver--controllerteamsatthecentresCoyandplatoonleaderslevelmainly.Pedagogyisparamounttoouractivities.Afteractionreviewsandmissionrehearsalsarethecoreofthebuilding-upprocess.Thekeyfocusistoimprovetheglobalabilityoftheunitsandhelpthemimprovetheircombinedarmsmanoeuvres.TheCCPFofferspermanenttrainersandequipmenttogetherwithvarioussimulationsystems.Sinceitsappearanceinthelate90stheCPtrainingfacilityCEPCMAILLY1hasoperatedvarioussimulationsys-tems-BBSatthebeginningandnowSCIPIOaTHALESproduct.ThetargetunitsaretaskforcesTFandbrigadecom-mandpostsforwhichGenerictrainingandpre-deploymentexercisesareorganized.In2012duringFLANDRESthekeysub-jectwasinteroperabilitytestsbetweentheBritishDesertRatsandaFrenchbrigade.ROCHAMBEAU2014isthenextkeyinter-nationalactivityinthatfield.InthemeantimefollowingatrialinHohenfelsanopenfieldtrainingfacilityCENTACMAILLY1begantestingtwoandlaterthreereinforcedcompanieseverytwoweeks.Thekeyisaprofes-sionalpermanentarmouredOPFORandatrackingsystemlinkedwithindividualandmainarmamentweaponssimulationdevices.ArmyAviationAirForceaircraftsandUAVSareinvolvedforalmosteveryrotation.LaterreferringmainlytothesecondGulfWarlessonslearnedanurbanterraintrainingfacilityhasbeendesignedCENZUBSISSONNE2andwasopened4yearsago.Amoderncitywithseveralstoreybuildingsanoldcitycentreundergroundcarparksewagenetworkastationarivermodernsmallsuburbanhousesandacommercialareahavebeenquicklybuiltandarefullyoperational.Thisfacilitycanhouseuptoabattalion.Inthesametrainingfieldthereisalsoavillagebigenoughforacompanyormore.Therotationslastfortwoweeks.ThefirstphaseisdedicatedtolearninganddrillactivitiesandtheprofessionalOPFORhasadualroleastrainersandopposingmanpower.Inthesameregion150eastofParisseveraltrainingfieldshavebeenupgradedandarenowunderthesamecommandCEB-MOURMELONandSUIPPES3.Theoldtimeartilleryandair-to-groundactivitiesarestillongoingandsomeareashavebeenshapedforcombattrainingwithobstaclessmallcompoundsandaC-IEDtrail.A400strongfleetofarmouredorengineervehiclesandgunsisavailablefortrainingpurposes.Thebuildingofanewlivefirerangeforarmouredinfantryiscurrentlyonthewaytobereadyforspring2014.ThisrangewillallowMBTfiringonthemove.Atrainingfacilityforconvoysisonitswaytoo.The2008majorreorganizationoftheFrenchArmybroughtotherfacilitiesunderthecommandoftheCCPF.TheseunitsareinsouthernFrance.NamelyfromWesttoEastaground-to-airsmallarmsfiringrangealongtheAtlanticOceancoastlineinBiscarrosse417thARTYGroupwithlow-costhomemaderemoteflyingtargetsandsomemachinegunrangesoverlookingtheopensea.FurthertotheeastaninfantrylivefirerangeinLeLarzac5CEITOwherecompaniesaretestedandindividualsmallarmsmachinegunsanti-tankweap-onsandinfantrymortarsfiringskillsareevaluated.IntheAlps7closetoItalytheCCPFmonitorsamountaintrainingfacil-ityforinfantryexceptfortheMountainBrigade.TheaimistogivesomebasicmountaineeringskillstononspecializedTheFrenchTrainingCentresCommandColEmmanuelR.PoucetDeputyCommanderCCPF TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201341units.InthesouthofFrancenearToulonthebiggestFrenchtrainingareaisnowundertheCCPFscommandCanjuersfieldtrain-ingarea61erRCA.TherewecanfindanFOBsimilartoAfghanistanforlastminutepre-deploymenttrainingArtilleryrangestanksandarmouredvehiclesbasicdrivingandcrewtrainingareasorsimulatorsfiringrangesandplatoonorcompanylevelfir-ingrangesetc.TheruggedMediterraneanterrainandhigh-groundsfitverywelltolightordismountedinfantrytraining.Asecondfleetof350vehicleslightwheeledarmouredvehiclesMBTsMCVscoutcarsandgunsaredeployedthere.InmosteveryCCPFfacilitypara-chutelandingandArmyAviationskillscanbepractised.FollowingthedirectivesoftheLandForcesCommandCFTinLilleCCPFliesintheheartofoperationaltrainingmat-tersandiskeentoupdateitsmethodsororganizationandmaintainslinkswithotherforeigncountries.ApermanentUKliaisonofficerisinsertedinCCPFsstaff.Theplan-ningandtrainingcyclerequirementsoftheFrenchArmyallowstrainingwindowsforforeignunits.Thebasicpackageisa2or3weekcompanyleveltrainingrotation.OPFORCENTACandCENZUBbothhaveOPFORcompaniesblueguys.Genuinelycombinedarmsintheircomposi-tiontheseOPFORcompaniesarechargedwithplayingmanyrolesduringtrainingexercisestheycanrepresentregularmili-taryforcesmilitiasinsurgentscivilianpopulationoranycombinationofalltheseasrequired.FlandresexerciseFlandresincom-mandposttrainingcentrein2012betweentheBritishDesertRatsandaFrenchbri-gade.CEITOvalidationoflivefiringstan-dardsinCEITO.Validationoflivefiringstandardscanberealisednightanddayin1stRCAorinCEITO.copyrightSIRPATerre 42TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013IntroductionInshorttheissuessurroundingcon-temporaryterrorismresearcharearguedtobetoocontroversialandtoocontesteduponwhichtobasepolicy.Evenwithqualitativeattemptstogivepsychologicalinsightstotheunderlyingmotivesforterroristbehaviourtheresearchispartisanandanobstacletothosehavingtomakevaluejudgmentsbaseduponthem.FurthermorewhencompoundedwiththedebateastowhetherornotAlQaedawillemploydronestheargumentscanbeseentohavespiralledintolittleotherthancyclicaldiscussionsthatlackthesubstanceofanynewsubjectbasedcontent.Simplyputacademicsthathavestrayedintothefieldofterrorismstudieshaverarelygonebeyondthesemanticsofterrorismandhavehadlittleconceptionofeitherthehistoryofterrorismcontemporarywarfareatthestrategiclevelortheworkingsofthemodernbattlefield.Thispaperexaminesthecon-troversythroughanoverviewoftheargu-mentsasadvancedinrecentliteraturewithaprimaryfocusontwogroupsAlQaedaandtheMilitantsofIrishRepublicanismMIR.Thefirstpartintroducesthetypesofdronesandthetypesofactorsmostlikelytousethem.Itdrawsparallelsbetweenthetwothroughanassessmentoftheimpactofterroristideologiesontheirchoiceoftargets.Byprofilingthemotivationalinflu-encesonterroristsandfocusingontheiroriginsstructureandstrategiesspecifictypesofdronesarematchedtospecifictypesoftargetsandbyaprocessofelimi-nationthetargetstotheterroristsmostlikelytoattackthem.ThissectionshowstheUnitedKingdomtobeparticularlyvulner-ablewithinitsborderstoattacksfrombothgroupsprofiledandSouthernEuropeSpainItalytheBalkansandGreecetoattacksfromNorthAfrica.Primetargetsarekey-personnelmovingcarscrowdscongestedmotorwaysshippingaircraftcentresofcultureinfrastructureandhigh-speedcom-mutertrainsrunningacrossopencountry-side.ThethreattotheUnitedStatesabroadisattacksonitsembassieswarshipskeypersonnelandcitizenry.Onthehome-frontsuchcitiesasDallasHoustonPhoenixMinneapolisLosAngelesSeattleChicagoNewYorkandWashingtonarevulnerabletoattackbydroneslaunchedfrominsideMexicanandCanadiancontrolledterritory.Thedronesarelikelytofallinitiallyintofivecategoriesoff-the-shelflong-range1000kmhunter-killerdronesHKDswithheavypayloadsofupto50kgshort-range100kmsuicidedronesSSDsabletocarryincendiaryfragmentaryandfuel-airexplosivedevicesofupto1kgortheweightoftwomodernhandgrenadestheRPO-MforillustrationhasaTNTequivalenceof5.5kgofTNTandsimilarcharacteristicstoa40kghighexplosiveartilleryshellpurposebuiltsurveillancedronesPSDswithaflight-timeofdaysandcapableofrelayingreal-timeintelligenceintelligentsurface-borneseaminesandthemostfeareddronesofallTheJackalsone-offstailoredtotarget.Tacticswillfollowthelessonslearnedfromhavingbeenonthereceivingendofseveralthousanddronestrikesoverthelastdecadeincludingthedeadlydouble-tap.Singleattackswillrapidlydevelopintomultipleattacksanduptosquadronlevel.ItisworthnotingatthispointthatthestaticattacksonBishopsgateLondon1996andMumbaiIndia2008costtheUKandIndiabillionsofdollars.Inthecaseoftheformernewtacticsbroughtthestatetothenego-tiatingtable.TheattacksinMadrid2004collapsedtheSpanishgovernmentand9112001changedtheworld.Asustaineddroneattackcouldbringacountrytoitskneespoliticallyeconomicallyandsocially.ThesecondpartdealswiththemetamorphosisofterrorismresearchandJackalsandDronesAlQaedasChrysalistheMetamorphosisofTerrorismResearchChristopherMcKeatingPost-GraduateResearcherCentrefortheStudyofTerrorismPoliticalViolenceStAndrewsLecturerDefenceLanguageInstituteArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublic TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201343itsstrengthsandweaknessesasaresultoftheissuesfacedindefiningterrorism.Considerationisalsogiventothedifficultiesofterrorismresearchasaninter-disciplin-aryandpoliticallycontroversialresearchareathepoliticizationofthetermandthedownsidesofrecentstudiesthathaveiso-latedthephenomenonfromitssocialmilieu.Thispartalsoraisestheimplicationsofconfrontingterrorismwithterrorism-howdronesepitomizethefaceof4thgenera-tionwarfarechallengethevaluesofoncehithertopassivetolerantliberaldemocra-ciesandhavebroughtlegitimacytoissueshithertoconsideredextrajusadbellumextrajusinbelloetextrajuspostbellum.Thepaperconcludeswithanoverviewofdronesinthecontextofnewterrorismandseveralneglectedareasofresearchthathavecloudedtheargumentsandhaveasyettobeadequatelyaddressed.Insum-marythispaperisasystematicviewpointonwhereterrorismresearchstandstodayandinwhichdirectionitshouldbeheadingtoaddressthequestionofconflictshapedbydronesglobalizationandthefundamen-talshiftinmoralandethicalnormsthathastakenplacesince911.ItisneitheraquantitativeorqualitativeanalysisofanyexistentialdronethreatnorariskanalysisofthethreatposedbyAlQaedaortheMIR.Part1FranzKafkaandtheClashofCivilizationsTheKafkaesquemainandsubtitlesKafka1917tothispaperarenoaccidentbutanallusiontothenatureofthecyclicalviolencethatterrorismandtherelation-shipsbetweencivilizationsepitomizeandtheummaofnationalliberationmovementsthatepitomizeAlQaeda.Itismenacinglycomplex.Inshortthoughasdroneshomeinontheir3475thTheBureauofInvestigativeJournalism2013victiminPakistanalonetheyareunravellingtheremnantsofwhatwasonceadelicatewebofeconomicsocialandculturalrelationshipsthathadexistedforcenturiesandfuellingnotonlyHuntingtonsflamesofaneracharacterizedbycultur-alconflictascaricaturedinKafkas1917analogicalparablebutthetransformationofterrorismitselfwithdronesthemes-sianicfigureofKafkasstoryisnolongerthemediatingEuropean.ThereasonforthisisthatKafkasworkisnotjustaparallelbetweentheoppressionofthoselivingundercolonialpowersandtheJewsinEuropeatthetimebutoftherelationsbetweencivilizationsandtheelasticityofthecul-turesbetweenthem.WereKafkatorewritethestorytodaytheallegorieswouldhavetobereversedandtheJackalslooseduponnotthecamelinthestorybuttheEuropean.TheReturnoftheJackalisanInductiveArgumentandaStatisticalSyllogismThroughoutthehistoryofmodernterrorismfromtheMIRsradicaladvancesinmortartechnologyduringthe1990stotheuseofmobilephonesasremotedetona-torsintheIraqwartheadoptionofmilitarytechnologybycivilianshasbeenrapid.FromthefirstWesterndroneattacktotakeplaceinNovember2001againstMohammedAtefinAfghanistanittookbarelyfiveyearsbeforeIsraelbecamethetargetofasimilarattackbyHezbollahwitheachmodelusedcarry-ingapayloadofupto30kgofexplosives.ScarcelytwoyearslateritwasLashkar-e-Taibathatshowedtheworldhowjusttenmencouldbringacityof20milliontoastandstillthroughitsexecutionofoneofthemosttechnologicallyadvancedterroristattacksinhistory.WhathitMumbaiwasnottengunmenintentonslaughterbuttenarmedmicroprocessorssupportedbyanoperationscentreover500milesfromthekillingfields.Throughcoordinatingtheattacksinreal-timeusingBlackBerryssat-ellitephonesGSMhandsetssearchenginesandsocialnetworkingsitestheterroristswereabletosustainakillratioof181.Althoughtechnologyandterrorismhavealwaysmarchedinpacewithmodernitywhatisdifferenttodayishowtechnologyhasopenedupthebattlefieldforthestatethecorporalhasbecomestrategicinthathisdecisionsmaynowdirectlyinfluencetacticaloperationalandstrategiclevelsofcommandtothedegreethattheyaffectpoliticalchangeonanationalscalefortheterroristsithasenabledtheircorporalstoaffectpoliticalchangeonaglobalscaleandnotonlyexploitthegapingpowervacuumsleftinthewakeoffailedrevolutionsbutbuildtheirchrysalidesacrossthedecayingnation-statesoftheworld.UnfortunatelythequestionisnotaboutwhetherVillasenorUCLA2012oranyoftheotheradvocatesforcounter-dronemeasureshaveasyettocomeupwithanyrealevidenceofadronethreatasdisparagedbytheeditorofOpEdNews.comlastyear.NorisitaboutwhetherterroristsaremorelikelytoemploysuicidebombersthansuicidedronesorsnipersforassassinationstheMIRforexamplehavenorecordofsuicidebomb-ing.Itisaboutbreakingthroughtherheto-ricthatobscurestheproprietyofresearch-ingbuildingandimplementingcounter-dronemeasures.ThequestionissimpleInthelightofwhatweknowaboutthemodioperandiandsententiaeofvari-ousterroristgroupsandgiventhatacommutertrainwithathousandpassen-gersonitcouldbedestroyedinIsraelbyHezbollahtodaywoulditnotmakesensetoatleastlookintooffsettingtheoddsofthishappeningtomorrowinEuropeTheargumenthereisthattheWestIsraelhasalreadyexperiencedattacksbyJackalsandirrespectiveofwhetherornotthethreattoEuropeortheStatescaneverbequantifiedthehistoryofterrorismdemon-stratesthatitisunlikelythatthetechnologywillremainuntapped.ItissimplythereforesoundandprudentjudgmentbasedonasimpleperceptionofthesituationMerriam-Webster2003thattheReturnoftheJackaltoEuropeisanobsoletedebate.Theconundrumiswhethertherisksoffollowinganintuitivepathofsensuscommunisareworthtakingagainstsuchalackofempiricalevidence.Ascanbeseenhowevertheriskissmall.ForwherebothVillasenorandGosztolafalldownisintheirfailurethroughpartisanagendastodefinewhattypesofdronesactuallyexisttodayandwhattypesofdronesarelikelytobedevelopedwhattypesoftargetsarevulnerabletotheseandtowhichstateactorsandnon-stateactorsthesecapabilitieswouldproveattractive.Itisonlythroughsuchresearchthatthoughtcanthenbegivenastowhetherornotlegislationorfurthercounter-terrorismmeasuresneedtobeemplaced.WithoutittheworddroneisasmeaninglessasthewordterroristanddiscussionontheirvaliditylittleotherthananinsighttotheissuesthatKafkasallegoriesbroughttolightwaybackin1917. 44TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013DronesTerroristsTargetsAirandseadronesbasicallyconsistoflittleotherthanafuselageanautopilotnavigatingsystemandapowersource.Shortrangedrones30kmwithadurationofseveralhoursFirstPersonVisualcontrolsFPVwaypointinputswithGPSandeitheraweaponsorsurveillancesystemcanbebuiltforlessthan2000.TechnologyhascomealongwaysinceMaynardHillsmodelaero-planespluttered3000kmacrosstheAtlantic.Todaystoyshaveautonomouscapabilitiesandcanflythemselvesinexcessof400mph.Theycanalsobecontrolledorlaunchedfromabroad.For10000adronewithapayloadof50kgcouldbeplacedoutsidePariswakeupinsixmonthstakeoffforLondoninthemiddleofthenightanddestroyBigBen-liveontheinternetwitharunningcommentary.Thisisthepricethattheterroristhastopaytoday.Thepricetomorrowwillbesignifi-cantlyless.SowhyhasitnotbeendoneThereasonisthatthereisasyetnorealprecedent.AstheyoungergenerationmoveuptheranksoftheterrornetworkshoweverandasthepropagandacouptoavengeAmericasReapersgainsmorecredencethechancesofitnothappeningarediminishingbytheday.MoreoverfollowingtestsattheUniversityofTexas2012ithasbeenshownthattheabilitytohijackdronesbyspoofingGPSreceiverscouldputthefarmoretech-nologicallyadvanceddronesofthestateintothehandsoftheterrorists.IronicallywhilsttheGPSreceiversareadvancedtheinfrastructureinwhichtheyoperatewasdesignedinthe1970sandiseasilyhacked.Therearemanyotherunknownquantities.OneflawforexampleinstatecontrolleddronesenabledIraqiinsurgentstotapintothelivefeedsoftheReaperswithequip-mentorderedofftheinternetforjust40.Proliferationisalsoaconcernthedirectorofthenationalsecuritystudiespro-gramattheNewAmericaFoundationPeterBergenstatedTheexplosionindronetech-nologypromisestochangethewaynationsconductwarandthreatenstobeginanewarmsraceasgovernmentsscrambletocoun-terbalancetheiradversaries.Infactover70countrieshavedronestodayincludingChinaandtheRepublicofIranandthetechnologyhasalreadyfiltereddown.Furthermoretheproliferationandaffordabilityofdroneandcounter-dronetechnologymuchofwhichiscommerciallyavailableorfoundindual-usecomponentsmeansthatthedissemina-tionofmilitarytechnologytocivilianuseistodaymeasuredinmonths.SadlytheairdefencesystemsdesignedtocounterRussianandChineseintercontinentalballisticmis-sileswillnotstopaswarmofdrones.Ouronlydefenceliesingrass-rootsintelligence.Thereisalsolittleofsubstanceintheargumentthatdronesareunlikelytoreplacesuicidebombersandcarbombsthehall-marksofthemodernterrorist.Thereasonforthisisthatincertainscenariosawell-directedexplosiveofseveralkilosflyingattwohundredmilesperhourwouldhavefarmoreofadevastatingeffectthana500kgcarbombatgroundlevel.Thefactisthatdronesopenupareasthatwerehithertoofflimitswithexistingweapons.Furthermorewhilstasuicidebombermaywellforexamplehaveasequallyadevastatingeffectonastadiumcrowdasasmallsuicidedronethedronecouldflyinfastfromhundredsofmilesawaywithdozensoffriendstakeintargetsofopportunityontherouteandhomeinonsecondarytargetsi.e.searchandrescueteams.Inshorttheirmeanstoterrorizeandthemeanstowhichtheycanbeappliedareinfinite.ItismerelyquestiontodayoffuelandpayloadcalculationsMaxPayloadMTOW-OEWFuelCapacity.Inordertoillustratethepossibilitiesofdronesandtheirlikelyusesforterrorismonecrudeparadigmofwheretostartwouldbetogroupterroristsintooneoffourfight-ingcategoriessuchasMilitaryTerroristsMTPara-MilitaryTerroristsPTCivilianTerroristsCTInternationalTerroristsIT.Knownattackscouldthenbekeyedintothethirdcolumnandtacticstothefourth.Thethreattocountrieswouldthenidentifythetypeofdronewearelikelytoface.SeeBelowScenarioscouldthenbeposedanddeliberatedwithexplosivesengineerscon-structionengineersandsecurityforcestodiscussthetruethreatandtheimplications.ForexampleWouldanSSDbecapableofdestroyingamovingcaratnightcrossingTowerBridgeHowmanySSDswouldbeneededtodestroyBigBenorputtheHumberBridgebeyondeconomicalrepairWhatwouldbetheeffectofamid-air-fuelexplosioninacrowdedstadiumHowmanyphosphorousgrenadeswouldittaketosettheNationalArtGalleryablazeWouldanSSDtravellingat200MPHwitha5kgwarheadderailafastmovingcom-mutertrainWhatwouldbetheeffectofanHKDhittingtheHousesofParliamentWouldtheUKsairdefencesbeabletocopewithasimultaneousswarm-attackonLondonandBirminghamWhatisthelikeli-hoodoftrackingandshootingdownafastmovingdronethesizeofafootballflyingthroughthepopulatedstreetsofacityBrainstorminghowmilitarytechnolo-gythathascrossedovertothecivilianworldTypeGroupAttacksTacticsThreattoUKMTTamilTigersNationalMilitaryCivilianTargetse.g.2001AirportattackCon.Asym.AttacksincludingtheuseofSuicideBombersZeroThreatPTHAMASRegionalMilitaryCivilianTargetse.g.2002ParkHotelIndiscriminateAttacksusingSuicideBombersLowThreatfromHijackingHostagesCTTheIRARegionalMilitaryCivilianTargetse.g.M62CoachBombingMostlyDiscriminatoryattacksusingCarBombsIEDsHighThreattoKey-PersonnelCarsCrowdsMotorwaysShippingAircraftCultureInfrastructureTrainsITAlQaedaInternationalMilitaryCivilianTargetse.g.1998EmbassyBombingsIndiscriminateMassCasualtyAttacksHighThreattoKey-PersonnelCarsCrowdsMotorwaysShippingAircraftCultureInfrastructureTrains TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201345e.g.GPScouldbereappliedsaveslives.MoreoverwhilstanattackontheHousesofParliamentoneNovemberthe5thmayneverhappenBritainisanopencountryandtheweightofevidenceavailablepointstothefactthatitcouldhappenthatitisdesiredandthatitcouldbethisyear.AstheUnitedStatesismorelikelytobeattackedabroadandfromabroadsotoogivenitsproximitytoNorthAfricaisSouthernEurope.AlQaedasChrysalisTofullygaugewhydroneswillbeafeatureofAlQaedaandtheMIRinthefutureitisnecessaryhowevertogobeyondthetechnologicalaspectsandlookatthetwogroupsingreaterdepth.WhilstBinLadenforexamplewasfundamentaltothebirthofAlQaedatherolesoftwoothermenQutbandAlZawahiriareasequallyinstru-mentaltounderstandingthemotivationbehindtheoriginsofthegroup.QutbakeyideologueoftheMuslimBrotherhoodwhowasexecutedin1966forhisroleinSadatsassassinationwroteextensivelyontheconflictbetweenmansnatureandhisneedsespeciallywithregardtotheJahiliWorldhewasalsoanavidreaderofKafka.QutbwasalsoanadvocateofJihadasaperpetualglobalwaragainsttheinternalandexternalenemiesofIslamJihadisanunendingstateofwarbecausetruthandfalsehoodcannotco-existonthisearth.Qutb1964.HiswritingsandtheirpromotionbyhisbrothertheacademicMohammedQutbhaveinfluencedtheintel-lectualfoundationsbehindthreegenerationsofSalafiJihadists.Bythelate1990sacom-binationofBinLadensfinancialresourcestheremnantsofAbdullahAzzamsMaktabal-KhadamatandAlZawahirisintellectualleadershiphadtransformedAlQaedafromaregionalorganizationwithglobalambi-tionstoaninternationalassociationwithstrongregionalinterestsandaglobalreach.AlQaedahencehasstrategiclongtermandshort-termobjectivesallofwhichcouldbesupportedbydrones.AnexampleofthefirstwouldbetoinciteIslamicmove-mentsacrosstheworldtouniteintheirJihadagainsttheUnitedStates.Thishow-everwouldnotbepossiblewithouttheshorttermobjectiveofforinstancewin-ningtheheartsandmindsoftheUmma.WhatisclearisthatAlQaedasstrategicobjectivesareglobalandrevolvearoundfourcentraltenetstheexpulsionofWesternpowersfromtheMiddleEasttheunifica-tionofMuslimmovementsthedestructionoftheStateofIsraelandthroughthelib-erationoftheAl-AsquaMosqueandMeccatheestablishmentofanIslamicCaliphate.InordertoimplementthisstrategyAlQaedasfundamentalobjectiveslieprimarilyintheareaofincreasingrecruitmentthroughtheinternetandthemediaandreinforcingtheirpositionasthemostsignificantthreattotheWestthroughterrorismkillinglargenumbersofpeopleandbleedingAmericatothepointofbankruptcy.BinLaden2004.AlQaedasshort-termobjectivesKeeney2009canbedividedintosixcategories1.EstablishinganIslamicCaliphate2.ThefutureofAlQaeda3.WinningtheheartsandmindsoftheUmma4.Militarypre-paredness5.CyberWarfareandtechnologyand6Propaganda.Insightstotheshort-termobjectivesarevitaltocounter-terrorismpracticesastheycharacterizeoperationsandenablesecurityforcestobuildprofilespre-dicttargetsandfutureweaponssystemsandputcounter-terrorismmeasuresintoeffect.ThemotivesbehindAlQaedasinitialattackswerecleartoradicalizeandmobi-lizetheIslamicworldJasonBurke2005andpromoteanideologythatunitedandmotivatedJihadistgroups.AsAlQaedahasmatureditsrankshavecontinuedthisthemeandthegrouptodayisreflectiveofaninter-nationalacademicallyqualifiedandyoungergeneration.Furthermoreadecadeofrepres-sivelegislationandwarhasfragmentedanddecentralizedthehierarchytothedegreethattheiraffiliateshavebecomeincreas-inglyautonomousandtheirmotivationsforalliancemorevariedGartenstein-RossandDabruzz2008.ItthisaspectofAlQaedathatisimportantwithregardtothequestionofdroneuseunlikeotherterroristgroupswhereinnovationisoftenstifledAlQaedahasbecomecreativeandtechnologicallyoriented.MoreoverwhilstAlQaedasoriginalleadershipinspiredagenerationofterroristattacksthemotivationalinfluencesonthegroupsmembershavedifferedenormouslyovertheyears.BinLadensandAlZawahirisgenerationforexamplepre-datethesev-eralthousandjihadiststhathavefoughtoverthelastdecadeasadirectresultofthewarsinIraqandAfghanistan.AnddespiteAlQaedasinitialtacticalsuccessesrecentinfluenceshaveactuallyledtoadeclineinmotivationstojoinorevenpassivelysupportorsympathizewiththegroup.InfactacrosstheMiddleEastthestrategyofglobalJihadwasoutrightlyrejectedinthespringof2011infavourofstrategicdecisionsbeingbasedonnationalanddemocraticinterests.Thatthegrouphoweverhasmaintainedsufficientenoughsupporttocontinuetowageitswarandmoreimportantlythecapabilitytoproj-ectitsterroronaglobalscalesuggeststhekeyattributetoitsresurgenceandentrenchmentacrossNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEasthasbeenitshistorycontinuityandmodernity.OnereasonforthisisthatdespitetheArabSpringRevolutionsandthechangesinAlQaedasleadershipnewrecruitswithstrongfamilyconnectionstothefirstgen-erationhavelongbeenfillingthegapsintheleadership.WhilsttheydonothavethenetworkfromfightingtheSovietsthatBinLadensgenerationreliedonwhattheyhaveincommonisasharedexperi-enceandasharedideology.Theirmoti-vationalinfluencesstemfromthebattle-fieldsofBosniaChechnyaAfghanistanIraqandanincreasinglyglobalisedworld.TheleadershipofAl-Qaedatodayhenceoverseesamulti-layerednetworkofcellsaffiliationsandalliances.Italsohasaglobalpoolofthousandsofradicalsfromwhichtorecruitforspecificpurposessuchasthosewhoperpetratedthe911attacks.Itsphysicalstructureisthereforedecen-tralizedwitheachbranchoperatingonanindependentbasisasafranchisewithfinan-cialtechnologicalandlogisticalsupportfromtheparentorganization.Thisstruc-turehasprovedappropriatetothegoalsoftheorganizationinthatithasenabledAlQaedatonotonlysurvivetheonslaughtofasuperpowerbutmaintainitspositionattheforefrontoftheSalafistmovement.LikeallterroristsAlQaedasideol-ogyisreflectedinboththetargetsitselectsandthetacticsandweaponsitusestoattackthemmassivecasualtiesinaninternationalcontext.Byreversingtheequationintelli-gencecandeterminetheirweaponsofchoiceDroneTypePSDsHKDsSSDsPSDsJackalsHKDsSSDsPSDsJackals 46TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013andhowtocounterthem.Inthefollow-ingcasetheAlKhobarcompoundattackof2003SaudiArabiaitwascar-bombsandtheuseofblast-walls.Itwasalsothiscasewherethecounter-measuresfailedtoholdtheterroristsandafterseparatingthehostagesintoMuslimsandnon-Muslimstheyproceededtoslitthethroatsofthelat-terAbdulHameedBakier2006overathousandWesternfamiliesleftthecountryinthefollowingthreemonths.Longtermreconnaissancehighqualityexplosivesandacoordinatedhighlydaringattackthatincludedsuicidebomberstobreachthecar-bombproofwallsandheadsetsforcom-municationssetthestandardforwhatwastobecomethehallmarkfortheterrorismthatisAlQaeda.Theattacknotonlyterrorisedbutdemonstratedtotheworldthattheyhadthetechnologyandcapabilitytostrikeatboththenearandfarenemyatwill.TheimpactofAlQaedasideologyontheirtacticsbetween911andtheArabSpringUprisingsof2011issignificantasoverthedecadethetacticstheyemployedtoachievetheirlongtermobjectiveshadsufficientenoughsupporttosustainacon-tinuedcampaignofviolence.Thesitua-tionnowhoweverissimilartothatofAlQaedasbeginningsinthe1990sinthattheyhavereturnedtohavingtopersuadeJihadistfighterstotakeaglobalperspec-tivetostrikeonceagainattheWestdirectly.WhatunfoldsfromthischrysalisasadirectresultoftherecentchangesacrossNorthAfricatheYemenandSyriahoweveriswhatwilldetermineAlQaedastacticsforthefuture.OnefearisthattheexodusofrefugeescreatedbytherevolutionsandtheacquisitionofnewtechnologymayinfactprovidearichhuntinggroundforAlQaedainbothEuropeandtheUnitedStates.TheMIRsChrysalisThisprofilelooksattheMIRfromahistoricalperspective.ThereasonsforthisasMarthaCrenshawargues1981aretheSocialmythstraditionsandhabitsthatpermitthedevelopmentofterrorismasanestablishedpoliticalcustom.AsshepointsouttheMIRisanexcellentexampleofthisanditshistoryisfundamentaltounder-standinganypresentorfuturecapability.Furthermoreperhapsunlikeanyothermod-ernterroristgroupstheMIRhavebecomesynonymouswithsuchtraditionandlikeAlQaedasrootsthisislikelyitssingularmostdangerouscharacteristicandthereasonforitslongevity.AgraspofthehistoricalcontextinwhichtheMIRemergedisthereforeessen-tialtodeterminingandcounteringitsdrones....itisthenthatweshallseetherisingofthemoon.FinaldiaryentryR.Sands1981AlthoughwrittenduringtheUprisingof1867theexcerptfromCaseys150yearoldballadaboveactuallyreferstotheinsur-rectionof1798.Itsusein1981bythehun-gerstrikerRobertSandsishenceaclassicexampleoftheperceivedcontinuityofthistraditionthatCrenshawarguesischarac-teristicofIrishRepublicans.ForTheRisingoftheMoonrepresentsnotjustavisionbutacauseandonethathasdominatedpoliticsinIrelandforthelast150years.ThatcauseistheunificationandindependenceoftheislandofIrelandandasaconsequencetheMIRsoriginscanbetracedbacktothebeginningofthelastcenturyandindeedtheideologyinwhichtheyareensconcedtotheFrenchRevolutionof1789andbeyond.Howeveralthoughthecentraltenetsoftherepublicancausehaveremainedessen-tiallythesametheactualoriginsandaimsofeachmanifestationoftheIRAhavebeenverydifferentoveritshistory.ForexampletheIRAofthe1860swaslargelydrivenbylocalpoli-ticstheIRAofthe1920sbynationalismandtheIRAofthe1950sbyunemployment.Asforthede-factoIRAoftodaytheProvisionalIRAtheiroriginsarefirmlyembeddedintheCivilRightsmovementsofthe1960s.Thedifferentenvironmentsinwhicheachoftheaboveoriginatedalsoimpacteddirectlyupontheiraimsandthemeanswithwhichtheyindividuallysetouttoachievethem.UnliketheIRAofthe1920sforexampletheProvisionalIRAsinitialaimwastodefendthecommunityitrepresentedasopposedtolaunchinganoffensivefromit.ItwasonlyaftertheBattleoftheBogsideandBloodySundaythatthiswasreversed.Furthermorethestrategytheyadoptedtoachievethiswasnotthefieldingofastand-ingarmylikethatofCollinsbutasym-metricalurbanwarfaretechnologicalinno-vationandpoliticalagitation.ThispolicydevelopedintowhatbecameknownastheLongWarandthemeanswithwhichtowageittheArmaliteandtheBallotBox.Thevariantsalsohavedifferentori-ginsfromanideologicalperspective.Thatofthe1920srevolvedaroundthenationalismoftheanti-treatyistsandinthatitshistorywasforgedfromthedeedsofnationalistheroessuchasWolfeTonewasasrepresentativeoftheProtestantworkingclassasmuchasthatoftheCatholic.Itsoriginsstemmedfromwhatwasessentiallyaninternecineandmilitaryorientatedconflictthathadspawnedfromthepoliticsofpost-WorldWarIBritainnamelythegrowingassertivenessofnation-alprideamongstCommonwealthnations.SincetheemergenceoftheProvisionalIRAhowevertheleadershiphasbeendomi-natedbythesamecharactersatthestra-tegicandpoliticallevelatraitthathasmarginalizedboththemoremilitantandyoungermembersoftheMIRovertheyearsContinuityIRAin1986andtheRealIRAin1997.IncontrasttherearenoBritishofficerstodayoftherankofMajorthathaveseenactiveserviceinNorthernIreland.Datedandhavingnotmovedbeyondtheargumentsoftheearly1970stheProvisionalIRAwerehenceneverabletotakethewarbeyondtheinsurgencylevel.Twootherrea-sonsforthisweretheinitialscaleoftheactualconflictitwasnotunusualfortheBritishArmytohaveupto10000soldiersonthestreetsbrigadetodivisionalstrength-intheearly1970sandthenumberofyearsthatseniorMIRmembersspentimprisoned.Whattheywereabletodohoweverwastomaintainafarmoresuccessfulpropagandacampaignthanthatofthepro-stateorgani-zationstocontinuethestrugglepolitically.WithmuchofthehistoryofIrelandthefearisitstendencytorepeatitselfandaswiththeratificationoftheTreatyin1922thattheleadingdissidentsoftheGoodFridayequivalentwillbreathelifeintoanewandmoremilitantMIR.ItisthisbodyofthemovementthedissidentRepublicansofthe32CSM32CountySovereigntyMovementtheservingmembersoftheRealandContinuityIRAandthedisaffectedyouthoftodaythathavenorecollectionofthetroublesthatarebydefaultthelead-ersoftodaysandtomorrowsMIRnottheagingcommandersofwhatwastheProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy.Andthis TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201347isthekeytotheirlikelyuseofdronesovertheyearstocome.Moreoverin1977theoldNorthernandSouthernstructureofBrigadesandCompanieswasreplacedwithanewsystemofsmallsquadsizedActiveServiceUnits.LikeAlQaedaitwaseffectivemilitar-ilyenhancedcreativityandperhapsmoreimportantlyforthefutureleftthestructureoftheMIRintactattheoperationallevel.DespitethefactthattheMIRhasneverbeenabletoengageinaconventionalcon-flictboththe1920sand1970ssawguerrillatypewarfarethateffectivelyputthecountrybeyondthecontrolofthepolice.Amajordifferencebetweenthetwohoweveristhatinthe1970stheMIRmovedtheiroffensivealmostentirelyfromthecountrysidetothecities.InfactitwasthisstrategythatlednotonlytothebirthoftheProvisionalIRAbutanescalationinsectarianismasymmetricalwar-farebombingsandballotboxpoliticsthatwereaimedatattackingnotjusttheoccupa-tionandtheadministrationbuttheeconomy.Indeedinitsinfancyitwasalmostsuccess-fulinthatitbroughtabouttheceasefiresandnegotiationsof19721975and1976.TheIRAsLongWarhoweverwasnotasuccess.Britishpolicyofthe1980swasnottonegotiateandbytheearly1990stheMIRwasinahopelesssituationmilitarilyfinanciallyandpolitically.WhatledtoSinnFinsinvitationtothenegotiatingtablewasthefallofThatchersgovernmentandalastdesperateanddramaticchangeinstrategy.Thiswasthebombingcampaignoftheearly1990swhichcausedclosetoabillionpoundsworthofdamagetotheUKseconomy.TheMIRsmilitarysophisticationmustnotbeunderestimated.In1972forexampletherewere1853bombattacks10564shootings1264weaponsconfiscatedalongwithmorethan27tonnesofexplo-sivesand130BritishArmysoldierskilledasadirectresultoftheterrorism.Overthecourseoftheconflict1123securityserviceswerekilledmorethanthecombinedtotalofcasualtiesfromtheFalklandscampaignof1982bothconflictsinIraqandtheISAFcampaigninAfghanistantoday.Mostofthesedeathsweretheresultofhighlysophis-ticatedIEDsanditwouldbedisingenuoustosaythathadtheMIRofthetimethetechnol-ogytomakethemflyhoverorswimthattheywouldnothaveusedthetechnology.Onthe28thJuly2005theIRAannouncedanendtoitsarmedcampaign.Thisisnottosayhoweverthatthethreatisoverinfactquitethereverse.Althoughthesocialpoliticaleconomicandcultur-alcircumstanceswhichbroughtaboutthebeginningoftheTroublesarenolongerpresenttheProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmyhasleftnotjustapowervacuumbutabittersenseofbetrayal.IndeedthattherebelsongsoftheMIRhavestoodthetestoftimeisindicativeofthepathtocome.Part2TheMetamorphosisofTerrorismResearchTenyearsofdebatesontypologiesanddef-initionshavenotenhancedourknowledgeofthesubjecttoasignificantdegree.WalterLaquerDespitethispapersconclusionrecentresearchintoterrorismhashelpedenor-mouslytoputthesubjectintoanhistoricalandphilosophicalcontextthathasaidedanunderstandingastowhathasbeenhappen-ingoverhugeswathesoftheworld.Inshortwhilstthispaperstandsbytheimmeasur-ablecontributionofpre911researchanditsvaluetodayandseriouslyquestionsthemethodologiesofpost911researchandagendaitisbelievedthattherecentdemandforknowledgeinthefieldwouldhavebeenseverelycompromisedhadthelatternotcomeaboutresearchintoterrorismbeforetheadventofglobalizationsimplylackedthemandateofacontemporaryunderstandingofthekindsofinstitutionsandresearchthatarenowneededtocounterit.Thisisnottosayhoweverthatterrorismstudiesismaturingintoanauthorityuponwhichacademiaandthestatecanrestassuredwiththemeth-odsresearchandscholarsofarecognizeddiscipline.Infacttheexplosionofinterestandliteratureinterrorismstudiesoverthelastdecadehasunbalancedwhatwashith-ertoaself-imposedequilibriumofrestraintbyacademicsfromdifferentdisciplinesonthestrengthsandweaknessesofnotjusttheirresearchbutthefield.ThereasonforthisisthatastheveryconceptofthetermdefiesanyrealinferencethroughresearchonitsnatureorfuturethetemptationtorevolutionizeitsincetheattacksonNewYorkandcategorizeitintochronologicalandquantitativeformatshasbeenintense.Withthesurgeinterrorismliteraturepost911mostresearchtookthisrouteandpre911researchthatdefinedthemissionwaslargelyreplacedbyliteraturewherethemis-sionquicklybegantodefinetheresearch.Evenbeforetheattacksof2001Crenshaw2000sawthedangersinisolat-ingterrorismfromitscontextside-liningthepreviousthirtyyearsofresearchonwhatterrorismconstitutedandrelyingontheassumptionthattheworldwaswitnessingtheadventofanewterrorism.InherAgendaforthe21stCenturyshedrewattentiontotheproblemsofnotonlydefiningterror-ismanddistinguishingitfromotherformsofviolencebutresearchingitinaneventsdrivenworld.Thequestionwasnotsomuchtheanalyticalusefulnessofsuchapejorativeandsubjectivetermbuttheincreasinglydiverseandfluctuatingnatureofitsusage.Insummaryherargumentwasformorestudiesbasedonpragmaticdevelopmentalmodelsofprimaryresearchthatanalysedindividualsandgroupswithintheirpoliticalandsocialenvironmentsasopposedtotheapplicationofpersonalitytheoriesandstudiesofthepsy-chologyofterrorismthatboundrationality.OthershoweverlikeJacksonseethedefinitionalproblemascrucialtoter-rorismresearch.Althoughnotanadvocateofeschewingthetermaltogetherhedoesaccusethemainstreamofresearchersofmisinterpretingitscharacteristics.Incom-parisonwithCrenshawsAgendaforthe21stCenturyJacksonsfocusisradical-lydifferentandbasedontheinnocenceofvictimsofterrorismtheselectionofvictimsofterrorismtheinnatedifferenc-esbetweenpublicityandcommunicationandthetermscommondefinitionasbeingaformofillegitimatepoliticalviolence.Iftheobjectofterrorismresearchisindeedtoaccumulateenoughknowledgetotracethecausesoftheemergenceofterrorismandonthebasisofthispredictpatternsinwhichitislikelytore-emergeandtheweaponsitislikelytousethefieldhasfailedtotakeourunderstandingofthephenomenonbeyondtheexploratorystageofresearchSilke2001.Silkesargu-mentsrestedonfindingthatlittleheadwayhadbeenmadesinceareviewonterrorism 48TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013researchbySchmidandJongmanin1988.ThroughanexaminationoftheliteraturepublishedinthetwoleadingjournalsofthetimeTerrorismandPoliticalViolenceandStudiesinConflictTerrorismfrom1995to2000hecametotheconclusionthatter-rorismstudiesexistedonlittleotherthanadietoffastfoodresearchquickcheapreadytohandandnutritionallydubious.Adecadeonagainandwithfurtherincreasedpoliticalinterestswhilstthelit-eratureonterrorismhasincreaseddramati-callytheresearchthatitisbasedonhasnot.Researchingterrorismisstillcompoundedbyalackofprimarymaterialtogetherwithamountainofsecondaryandre-workedresourcesthatareoflimitedvalueespe-ciallygiventhechangingnatureofterror-ismtechnologyandstateagendas.Thattheresearchmethodsemployedoftenreflectthedifferentcampswithinthefieldofterrorismstudiesisnomystery.Whathasemergedparticularlyoverthelastdecadeislittleotherthandifferentperspectivesofthesamematerial.Betheydescriptivequantitativeorexperimentaltheirvalueishencelimitedinthattherangeofmethodologiesespeciallythoseemployedingatheringdatabeyondopensourcedmaterialshasbeenweak.Thefactissince911terrorismresearchhastakenonanewrelevance.Itisnolongerjustafieldofresearchbutawar-fightingassetanabstractinflectiveprosodyofcommunicationinwhichtheresearchhasceasedtobelongsolelytotheworldofacademia.Withnewterrorismcamenewresearch.Toattainafieldwiththeanalyticalskillscapableofrespond-ingto21stcenturyasymmetricalwarfarethevaluesandlimitationsofsuchresearchfromatacticaloperationalandstrategicperspectiveneedtobeunderstood.Theaca-demictensionbetweenideologyandevi-dencewhilstdifficulttodiscernacohesiveacademicapproachisunlikelytobeanobstacleforthemarketindictatingwheretheresearchortheterrorismgoesfromhere.Unfortunatelyaswiththemajorturn-ingpointsinthehistoryoftheworldter-rorismisoftenportrayedtodayashavingalineagethatstretchesbackundisturbedalmosttranquillikeacrossasuccessionofreadilytraceableevents.Inthiswayitcanbeseenasatapestryassuchthatdepictswhatisforexamplenewterrorismoroldterrorism.Butterrorismisanabstracttermandthedangersofsuchtapestrieslieintheimplicationsofseekingknowledgefromeventssoimpreciseintheirmeaningsandsoremotefromeachotherintimeandplacethattheyhaveinfactveryfewcom-mondenominatorsandanythingispossible.Ontheotherhandtoignorethelin-eageofasubjectistofailtorecognizethatresearchintopeopleslivestheirpersonali-tiesandtheircharactershowevercontradic-torytheresultsisneverthelessaworthwhileaccumulationofknowledge.Itisonlyforexamplebyresearchingsuchcontextsthatwecanidentifysomethingthatisindeedtrulynew.Inresearchingterrorismthereforewithitsmyriadoflineagesandhistoriesitisonlyunderthelightofsustainedresearchandscholarshipandacommitmenttounderstand-ingwhatiswovenintotheverytapestryofthesubjectthatwecanbegintounderstandthethreadsofitandwhereitsfabrichaseitherfadedorbeenpatched.Contemporaryunder-standingsofthepastareotherwiselittleotherthansubjectiveinterpretationsandtheirvalueastotheknowledgethatcanbeaccumulatedfromsuchresearchwithterrorismisreducedevenfurtherespeciallygiventhelimitedprimaryresourcesavailable.Thefollowingpiecesofliteratureonterrorismresearchillustratesomeofthekeystrengthsandweak-nessesofitsabilitytoanatomizethistapestry.Pape2009isoneofthefewresearch-ersinthefieldofterrorismstudiesthatisprofoundlypositiveastothedirectioninwhichitisheading.Heseesnotjustthemarriageofsocialscienceandthestudyofterrorismandtherecentapplicationofnewmethodologiesasleadingtonewques-tionsbuttheentirenewwaveofterror-ismresearchashetermsitashavinghadafarmorerationalapproachthanpre-911researchtheoldwave.Dolnik2011howeverislessconvinced.WhilsthealsocommendstheenthusiasmthatPapessec-ondwavehasbroughttothefieldlikeSilke2004hedoubtsthequality.ThegreatestweaknessforDolnikisthecom-mitmenttofieldworkinterrorismresearchasawholealongacknowledgedproblemwithinterrorismstudiesCrenshaw2000.AswithSilke2004andDolik2011Hemmingsens2011workonSalafiJihadismisequallyacallformoreresearchresearchthatengageswiththeactorsandforamovebeyondtherealmsoftheextraordinaryandspectacularandintotheordinaryandnormalworldsoftheterrorists.Sayingthissheequallyacknowledgedtheweaknessesofsuchiso-latedstudiesandalsofoundnotjustthedefinitionalquestionalimitationonherfieldworkbutindeedmuchofthevernacularthatisemployedtoconverseonterrorism.Weinbergdoeshoweverseeweak-nessesinrelyingtoomuchonthecasestudyapproachadvocatedbyDolniknamelythattherearesimplytoomanyvariablesincom-parisontothenumberofstudieslikelytoeverbeundertakenandcaveatshiscritiquewithacallforsubstantiatingsuchworkswithconventionalstatisticalprocedures.LumKennedyandSherleys2006reviewofevaluationresearchoncounter-terrorismstrategiesCTSisacleardemonstrationofjusthowimportantitistolookatwhathasasyettoberesearchedi.e.JackalsandDrones.ThesheercostofdefendingastateagainstterrorismputsthisintoperspectivemorethantreblingintheUSfrom2000tothepub-licationoftheirresearchin2006.Theirargu-mentishenceforevidencebasedpoliciesassessedontheeffectivenessofCTstrategies.ThePoliticizationoftheTermTerrorismThemainproblemisthatasapoliti-calderogatorytermwithnorealinher-entlymeaningfuldefinitionandwiththewarbeingwagedagainstitinitstenthyearterrorismhasdividedtheworld.Onereasonforthedivisionstemsnotfromthenatureofitsambiguityoranyfundamen-talchangeinitsmanifestationbutintheWestsdifficultyinconceptualizingthemoti-vationsbehinditsmanyfaces.Terrorismdoesnotdefinethemotivesbehindanactofterror.Itcharacterizesthemandthisiswhathasledtoitsincreasinguseasapoliticaltermparticularlysince911.Indeedsincethecoinageofthetermterrorismitscharacteristicshavealwaysbeensynonymouswithorganizedviolenceandapoliticalend-goal.Thedifferenceisthatitsusagehadalwaysbeenmoreofavernacularconveniencethanapoliticalexpression.Overthelastdecadethoughthesocialimpactofterrorismhasbeenoutof TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201349allproportiontoanythinghithertoseenandthishasledtoitsincreasingapplicationinadvancingnotjustpoliticalobjectivesbutpoliticalstrategies.Indeedsincethe2001attacksonNewYorkithasevolvedfromwhatwasessentiallyarelativelysubjec-tiveepithetwithnointrinsicmeaningtoahighlychargedpoliticalsynonymfortheenemyasynonymthathasputpaidtoanyrationalnegotiationandonethathaseffectivelybeenemployedtobothlegitimizeactsofterrorandterrorizeactsoflegitimacyAlthoughthecharacteristicsofterror-ismarestatichowtheyareperceivedandappliedisdynamicandthedefinitionofitsnatureisthereforefluidanddependentoncontemporaryevents.AnexampleofthisphenomenonistheheavypoliticizationofthetermthattookplaceaftertheattacksofSeptember11th2001andthesubsequentmisconceptionthatterrorismhadactuallyundergoneaseriesoffundamentalchangesnamelythatithadmanifesteditstrueselfanddeclaredwarontheUnitedStates.Asthecauseforthewarintensifiedsotoodidtheconceptofterrorismacrossthepoliti-calspectrum.Infactoverthelastdecadetherehasbeensuchashiftinthedefinitionofterrorismacademicallythattherearenowoverahundredschoolsofthoughtonwhatitactuallymeans.Somesaythatithasde-centralizedandde-politicizedoth-ersthatithasmovedonfrompreachingviolenceasameanstoapoliticalendtothephenomenonofusingviolenceasatacti-calendinitself.Severalconcurthatithasmovedfromtheshadowstoopen-combatonthefieldandtohaverooteditsagendasintheologyasopposedtoanyknownide-ology.Oneconcurrentthemehoweveristhatthedramaoftraditionalterrorismhasbecomebutadatedirrelevanceandsuper-sededbyamodern911typeofwarfare.HoweverwithoutthecommonalityoftheColdWarthesubsequentattemptstodemonizeitresultedinlittleotherthanbring-ingtolightthegulfsofentrencheddifferencesbetweenhithertosolidallies.Furtherfailureswereinitiatedbythewritingoffofthefun-damentaldifferencesthatterrorismhaswithlegitimateuprisingsincludingironicallythosebetween1775and1783andattempt-ingtore-classifyitthroughthedismissingofguerrillagroupssuchasFARC.Thisrenais-sanceperiodfortheterroriststhereforewastheresultnotjustoftheworldstoleranceofitbutitspoliticizationofit.InfactthedemonizationandclassificationofterroristshassinceunderminednotjusttheWestsfuturepositionsinanymediatoryrolesorfuturepeacekeepingcapacitybuttheirhith-ertounquestionedsenseofrighteousness.Therearethreelessonstolearnfromthisandeacharecrucialtotheissueofdronestheter-roriststhevictimsandthegeneralpublics.Thefirstisalessoninlegitimacythesecondalessonininnocenceandthethirdalessoninculpabilityandtheantitheticalnatureofterrorismthathasunequivocallyledtothisstateofaffairs.Thereasonforthisisthatwhatwearetalkingaboutherearetheimpli-cationsofconfrontingterrorismwithterror-ismandthechallengesfacedbyliberaldemocracieswithregardstodronestrikes.Conclusion-TheHistoricityofNewTerrorismThispaperhassoughttoshowthatwhilstterrorismhaschangedithasnotchangedbeyondrecognitionandalookintoitshistoryisallthatisrequiredtoconfirmwhetherornotdroneswillbeusedagainstus.Itwasarguedthatwhatisoftenportrayedtobenewisoftenlittleotherthanacon-temporarylearningcurveinanhistoriclineofdevelopmentwithestablishedprecedentsandaclearlineage-thatterrorismisprimar-ilyapoliticalphenomenondeeplyreflectiveofmodernsocietywithunmistakablecon-nectionstothepastandahistorythatisoffundamentalimportancetounderstandingandcounteringthedrone-threatitposestoday.Unfortunatelyitisalltooofteninferredthattodaysterrorisminvolvesdif-ferentcharacteristicssuchasaimsandmoti-vationsandthatallmanneroftraditionalapproachestocounteringitneedtobere-evaluated.Laqueurisnotaloneinthisanaly-sisseeLesseretal.1999Neumann2009Juergensmeyer2000Hoffman2002andKegley2002.WiththeColdWarusurpedbycontendingimagesofworldpoliticsG.Fry2001terrorismofthe1990sisoftenseentodayasevidenceforwhatFukayamacalledtheEndofHistoryandHuntingtontheClashofCivilizations.Aftertheattackof911New-Terrorismhencebecamethefreshgenustowhichmanyspeciesofter-roristwereassigned.Itwasdeemedtobeunlikeanythinghithertowitnessedandofsuchlethalityandcomplexitythatnothingpastcomparedtoit.ItsgoalsasHoffmanstatesarealmosttranscendental.Inshorthoweverthereislittlenewaboutnew-terrorism.Old-TerrorismissimplytooriddledwithaccountsofmasscasualtiesRIRAOmagh1998theindiscriminatetargetingofciviliansIRALondon1939utopiandreamsRedBrigadesapoca-lypticordivinelyinspiredgoalsZealotsandThuggeesindeedallthetraitsthatarethehallmarksofnew-terrorism.Indeedasimplelookatthepastpres-entandfutureaspirationsofthecommunitiesthatsupportterrorismgiveusaclearerper-spectiveofthenatureoftheterrorismthatwefacethanmuchofthepost-911literature.Fortheessenceofterrorismresearchisneededinitshistoricalcontextasopposedtotherecentmilieuofcategoriesanddenominationsinwhichthedistinctionsarelargelyartificialandpoliticallycharged.IfforexampleAlQaedadoesindeedrepresentanewterror-ismitisnotbecauseitisamateurishandnetworkedbutbecauseitspersonnelaremoreprofessionalandbetterorganizednottomentionbetterfinancedthanmanyofitspre-decessors.Tucker2001.Historyenablesustoputterrorismintobetterperspectivetoevaluateitscharacteristicsinthecontextofthetimeanddevelopstrategytocounteringitwithaslittlecosttothestateaspossible.Whenlookedatinthislightterror-ismcaninfactbeseentohavebeenseededalongsidethedevelopmentofnation-statesandthatithasgerminatedinlinewiththeirsocialandpoliticaleconomiesinthelate19thCenturyitwasanarchismareactiontothenationalistuprisingsofthe1840sand1850sintheearly20thCenturythebegin-ningsofanti-colonialterrorismandinthewakeoftheFascistsandtheStateTerrorismofthe1940stheriseoftheFarLeftinthe1960s.Asthewarsofthe1990sinBosniacouldbearguedtohavebeenthelastbattlesoftheSecondWorldWarAlQaedacouldbearguedtohaveitsrootsfirmlyembed-dedinnationalismJuergenmeyer2006.Ironicallythecasefornew-terrorismisactuallybuiltuponthreehistoricalevents1AsaresultofthedemiseoftheOttomanEmpireand70yearsofrepressiveWesternbackeddictatorialregimes-theriseinreli-giousextremism2Theriseinethno-nation- 50TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013alistterrorismandseparatistviolenceasaresultoftheSovietEmpirescollapseand3thesubsequentpoliticaleconomicandsocialram-ificationsofglobalization.ThattheendoftheColdWarreignitedcolonialtribalandnation-alistconflictsthathadhithertobeencontainedbySovietproxywarswasironicallyarguedasearlyas1996byLaqueur.IneffectasthewallcamedownacrossEasternEuropeandglobal-izationbegantoencroachuponthepowerofthenation-statemuchoftheworldeffectivelyhadtoreturntodealingwithwhattheirgrand-parentshadinheritedfromtheoutcomeoftheGreatWar1914-1918.Infacteventhereli-giousrhetoricofnewterroristsisinfluencedmorebythepoliticsofhistoricalagendasthanthestrategicobjectivesofareligiousideology.Theargumentforanew-terrorismthereforeisnotjustblightedbyhistoricalprec-edentsartificialparametersandprematurejudgementsbuttheX-factoroftheunknownnamelyhowtheyouthoftodaywillrespondtoJihadin20years.Asmotivationalinfluenceschangeandnew-terrorismbecomesmorereactivethanproactiveattheoperationalandnationallevelitislikelytobecomeincreas-inglydistancedfromitsstrategicinternationalobjectivesandapocalypticideology.Tosum-marizethemainreasonfortheargumentovernew-terrorismstemsnotfromthenatureofitsambiguityoranyfundamentalchangeinthemanifestationofterrorismpost911butinnew-terrorismcharacterizingasopposedtodefiningthemotivesbehindactsofter-ror.Theargumentforterrorismasapoliticalmodernphenomenonisequallysalienttotheunderstandingofrecentterrorismandonefromwhichlessonspastcanbeappliedtotheques-tionofdrones.FurthermoreasrecentterrorismisrootedinthehistoryoftheMiddleEasttheColdWaranditsaftermathitneedstobestudiedinnotjustthecontextofold-terrorismbutinlinewiththeexistingthreatofthismostlydormantmonster.Additionallycasualorperceptualusesofnew-terrorismtheorytocastigatelegitimaterevoltsagainstoppressionjustifyactsofrepressivelegislationthatareoutofallproportiontothethreatorignorediscardexistingworkingpracticesshouldbecountered.Hencealthoughnew-terrorismisaverydifferentcreaturetoold-terrorismitisverymuchofthesamespeciesanditscapacitytousedronesliesinitsblood.IntroductionRepublicofSloveniaRSandSlovenianArmedForcesSAFareasthestateandamilitaryorganisationfacingmajorchallenges.Inadditiontothechallengesaris-ingfromtheenvironmentthemostnoticeableeffectsarelimitedfinancialresources.ReductionoffinancialandotherresourcesisamajorchallengefortheSAF.Ifitwantstosurviveandcontinuetoper-formlegaldutiesitmustrespondchangesintheenvironmentinanappropriateway.ThisprocessasapartofadaptationtochangesintheenvironmentintheSAFismentionedastransformation.AdaptationisnothingnewalsoexplainedinSystemsTheoryastheessenceofsurvival-existingofasystem.Itisconstantadaptationtotheenvironmentandthechallengesitbrings.OfficialswithintheSAFareawarethatweneedtoadaptandchangesothatwecandeliverourcommit-mentstotheAllianceandwearealsoreadytodefendourhomeland.Transformationshouldnotbetreatedasanexternalconstraintbutasaconsciousdesireforsomethingbet-termoreefficientandlastbutnotleastasabasicsurvivaloftheorganization.Transformationinarapidlychanginganddynamicinternationalenvironmentpromotesneedforinnovationsandthedevelopmentofmoderntechnologiesforthefuture.GenerallytwoideashaveappearedwithinNATOandtheEUrecently.Thefirstisso-calledconceptPoolingSharing.ThishasbeendevelopedwithinNATOandEUmilitarystructuresandpromotesanideaofpoolingandsharingsomeofthenationalmilitarycapabilitiesthatfulfiltheconditionsofdeployabilityandinteroperability.Theconceptisbasedonavoluntaryapproachtofindwaystoreducecostsandtoavoiddupli-cationoffacilitiesorfilltheircriticaldeficits.Thesecondisso-calledSmartDefenceforthefirsttimepubliclypresentedbyNATOSecretaryGeneralAndersFoghRasmussenaftertheChicagoSummit20121.AsaconsequenceofshrinkingdefensebudgetsNATOleadersagreedtosharecostsofweaponsandequipmentaspartofaso-calledSmartDefenceInitiative.TogetherwewillkeepNATOcapableofrespondingtothesecuritychallengesoftomorrowbecausenocountrynocontinentcandealwiththemaloneNATOSecretaryGeneraltoldtheleadersaheadofthediscussionaboutbudgetcuts.Wecanfindcommonsolutionstocommonproblems.RasmussenexplainedthereasonbehindtheSmartDefenceini-tiativeisthatthemilitarymustdomorewithlessinatimeofbudgetcutsduetoNATOmembersneedtosavemoneyinthetimeofGreatRecessionAProjectoftheGeorgeC.MarshallInstitutewww.dw.de2012.SmartDefenceisintendedtomakeEuropemoreresponsibleforEuropeansecurityandtheEuropeanperipheryastheUnitedStatesmilitarywithdrawsfromthecontinent.BothideasaremakingitthroughthetransformationprocessesintheSAF.TheRSandtheSAFmustbeabletodefendthehomelandandcontinuetoremainacrediblepartnerfortheAlliance.TheResolutionontheGeneralLong-TermDevelopmentandEquippingProgrammeoftheSlovenianArmedForcesupto20252010p.7statesthatTransformationinLighofKnowledgeDevelop TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201351thelikelihoodofaninterstatearmedcon-flictintheEuro-Atlanticregionhasdimin-ishedsignificantly.Militarythreatswillmain-lyemergeaslocalandregionalinstabilitieswhichcaneasilyspillover.Moreovercon-temporarythreatsareincreasinglybecominghybridintheirformandmulti-layeredandinternationalinnatureundertheinfluenceofstrongglobalisationeffects.Inadditiontolandseaandairthetheatreofthefuturewillalsoincludecyberspaceandspace.Theauthorsthusbelievethatthefuturesecurityenvironmentwillbecomeevenmorecomplexduetoacombinationofdifferentelementsgreaterlethalityofmodernweap-onsdevelopmentofmeansforamorerapiddeploymentofmilitaryforcesinternationalterrorism2proliferationofweaponsofmassdestructioneasieraccesstoinformationpresenceofthemediaetc.Militarystructuresandmethods3suitableforresolvinginterna-tionalconflictswillnotbeabletomanagecomplex21stcenturysecuritysituations.NATOhaslearnedfromitsoperationalexperiencethatmilitarymeansalthoughessentialarenotenoughtomeetthemanycomplexchallengestotheAlliancesecurity.BothwithinandoutsidetheEuro-AtlanticareaNATOmustworkwithotheractorstocontributetoaComprehensiveApproachCAeffectivelycombinespoliticalcivil-ianandmilitarycrisismanagementinstru-ments.Itseffectiveimplementationrequiresallactorstocontributeinaconcertedeffortbasedonasharedsenseofresponsibilityopennessanddeterminationandtakingintoaccounttheirrespectivestrengthsmandatesandrolesaswelltheirdecision-makingautonomy.Amilitaryoperationmaybesuc-cessfulintacticaltermsbutitsperformancemightbecounterproductiveattheoperationallevel.Thismeanslossoftrustandfailuretoachievecentresofgravity4.Thisisoftenthecaseincounter-insurgencyCOINinwhichtheenemysoperationprimarilydependsonlocalsupportseeCeleski2005.Thusmilitaryopera-tions5thathaveotherwisebeensuccessfulatthetacticallevelmightshiftthefocusofsym-pathytotheenemy.Thisisduetosideeffectsamongthecivilianpopulationandoncivilianinfrastructureorduetodisapprovaloflocalcommunitieswhichattheoperationalleveldemandmuchmoreeffortandtimetocreateasecureenvironment.TheMid-TermDefenceProgrammehereinafterSOPRfor200720122006indicatesthatthefuturestrategicsecurityenvironmentshallbesignificantlyaffectedbyglobalisationsophisticatedlethalweap-onsandvariousformsofasymmetricwar-farerapidlychangingsecuritysituationsdemographicandpoliticalfactorsandthelackofresourcesthatcausemassmigrationsspreadofradicalideologiesunresolvedinternationalandinternalconflictsandmajornaturaldisasters.TheSOPRfor20072012alsoanticipatesthatglobalizationwillmaketheWesterndemocraciesinparticulartheireconomiesevenmoresensitivetostabilityindifferentpartsoftheworldwhichwilldirectlyorindirectlyaffecttheireconomicinterestandopenmarketoperations.Thethreatswillbeposedbyunstablestatespoormanagementofresourcesandconstantcompetitionforthem.Unresolvedconflictsaswellasgroupsandcountriessupportingradicalideologieswillrepresentthreatswhichcouldbecomeglobal.ThussomesevereformsofthethreatsinquestionmightshakefoundationsofglobalstabilityRode2007p.5.InthecaseofaMountainBattalionthroughdifferentideasstudiesexamplesandprocesseswetriedtofindaproposalforaneworganizationalunitthatwillbemorecapablepresentinganimportantpartinSAFandthenationalsecuritysystem.AMountainbattalionhasalongtraditionandhighrep-utationwithinSAFprovidesspecializedcapabilities-understandingmulti-dimensionphilosophy-willbeasapartoftransforma-tionre-organizedasMountainRegiment.TheoreticalbackgroundTheoryofSystemMulejMulejetal1996p.1statesthattheTheoryofSystemsisdistinguishedbyatleasttwocriteria.Thatdistinctionishard-systemssoft-systemsandphenomeno-logicalmethodologicalcriteriasfordistin-guishingtheoriesofsystems.Thesystemwasanalyzedbyphenomenologicalperspectivewherewerestrictourselvestothedescrip-tionofthephenomenonfromourpointofviewandcomparingitwiththesystem.Methodologicalaspectsandsystemicthink-ingwasusedasatooltoachievecomprehen-siveunderstandingresolvingandmanagingarmedforcesinourcasetheSAFandMountainRegiment.tmentarkoHenigmanAneRodeTheauthorsareassociatedwiththeUniversityofMariborSloveniaFROMMOUNTAINBATTALIONTOMOUNTAINREGIMENT 52TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Defenceormorewidelynationalsecurityisacomplexanddifficulttaskfortheprovisionofamodernstateformednationalsecuritysystems.Itconsistsofcomplexsocialsubsystemswhicharedifferentindifferentcountriesresultingfromaspecificsocialsituationandneeds.Acommonfeatureofallisthattheytheiraimistoprotectanddefendthecountryagainstalltypesofthreatsandprovidecitizenswithsecurityinthebroadestsenseofthewordandthusprovidetheconditionsforsocio-economicdevelop-mentofthesocietyandwell-beingofpeopleHostnik1997p.2.DefenceSystemunderstoodasorga-nizationofallservicesandresourcesfortheprovisionofdefenceandsecurityfunc-tionsofasocietythatinthiscontextissyn-onymousfornationalsecuritysystemcanbeunderstoodinabroadestsenseasapartofpublicadministration.Themainroleinthedefencesysteminmostofthecountriesbelongstothenationalmilitaryorganizationorarmedforces.TosummarizewecanseesomestronglinksinsystemsbehaviourusingtheTheoryofSystemswhichoriginatefromavari-etyoflinksbetweenelementsofthesys-teminternalreasonsandenvironmentalinfluencesexternalreasonsKljaji2002p.5.TheTheoryofSystemsAnalysisandOrganizationalTheoryhasbeenusedinourresearchsincetheSAFandNATOareseenasasystemandorganization.SpecificknowledgeaboutthesysteminourcaseSAFsMountainRegimentarmedforcescannotbereplacedwithageneralTheoryofSystemssinceithasspecificfea-tures.ThegeneralTheoryofSystemsoffersonlythebasicframeworkforthestudy.ExaminingthesystemKljaji2002p.10seesatotaltheoretical-methodologicalbasisexistenceofthesystemintheenviron-mentexistenceofthesystemmanagementsystemproductionanddirectionoftheeffectsoftheselectedmodusoperandi.ApplyingTheoryofSystemswearetryingtoexplainbehaviourandstructureofthesystem.Ideallytoachieveintegritywewouldcaptureallofthecharacteristicandtheirlinksrelationsrelationships.Thecon-ceptofthesystemforitsformaldefinitionMulejetal1996p.19putassystemstheoryingeneralsaysthatthesystemcon-sistsoftwomultiplicitiesnamely-setofcomponentspartscomponents-setofconnectionsrelationshipsinteractionsandrelationsbetweenthem.MulejMulejetal1996p.19thinksthatitisnotpossibletoconsiderallthepossibilitiesandtheactualcharacteristicsofthesystemevenifwewanttoresearchitsystematically.Specializationofknowledgeandexperiencesaswellasemotionsorotherorientationsaretheunforeseenhindrancethatcanhamperobjectivity.Allthishastobedeterminedwhileweareexaminingthesystem.BeingawareofthefactthatitisnotpossibletoconsiderallthecharacteristicsoftheactualsystemwehaveusedthesameapproachdealingwiththeMountainRegiment.Wehaveincludedthreeselectedfactors-theenvironmentinwhichthesystemworks-goalsorrequirementsarisingfromtheenvironment-theorganizationsystemfromwhichitarises.AccordingtoMulejMulejetal1996p.17systemmeansaverycomplexphe-nomenon.WiththisMulejbelievesthatthephenomenonisemergenceofeverythingthatoccursobjectivelyandsubjectivelythatisrealisticinthinkingandfeelingbyhumanpeople.TheSystemhelpstorealizewhilebringingtransparencythatdoesnotdimin-ishtherealityintoomanysimpleindividualeventsbutratherthanthatseesthemasasingleunitoratleastpartofawhole.MulejMulejetal1996p.17talkingabouttheTheoryofSystemsalsobelievesthattheactualcomplexityoftheworldshouldnotbeoversimplifiedbutratherrea-sonableinstead.Complexityissomethingwecannotcompletelylosefromsightnorloseourselveswithinitsboundlessnessoreveninitsexcessivesimplification.ToavoidexcessivesimplificationonourMountainRegimentsystemmodelweusedsomekindoftechnicalapproachtostudythesystem.TechnicalmodelofanopenandclosedsystemasshownbyKljaji2002p.19-20facilitatesthestudyasjuststudyingofprocessesinsideMountainRegimentisverydifficultcomplexityandsecrecy.Itismucheasiertostudytheinputstothesystemtasksandmissionnormativeregulationsthreatstotheenvironmentetc.andoutputsfromthesysteme.g.functioninginoperationsprotectionandrescuesystemetc..Inengineeringthesystemisoftendescribedasablackboxwherewedonotcareforwhathappenedinside.Whatwedoisfollowonlytheinputsxtintothesystemandoutputsstfromthesystem.Whenwehavefeedbackinformationstwecancorrectinputxtandchangeoutputytfromthesysteminthewaytheyaremorefavourabletous.Thisistheadvantageofanopensystem.WithoutfeedbackwhichcouldaffecttheoutputsytwecantaffecttheoutputsfromthesystemwhichisaweaknessofaclosedsystemFigure1.TheopensystemwhichtheMountainRegimentundoubtedlyisshouldberespon-sivetotheenvironmenttosurvive-itneedsresourcesfromtheenvironmentandgivesthemback.AnopensystemmustconstantlychangeandadapttotheenvironmentseeDaft2001p.14.TheTheoryofSystemsisbasedonstudiesofissuesandexperiencestailoredtospecificproblems.ItisespeciallyimportantthatthesocialsystemwithacertainstructurehastofulfilcertainrequirementswithfunctionalresultswhichmustbefollowedinordertokeepthesystemaliveseeLuhmann1981p.329.Mali1994p.87believesthatthesystemmustactivelyinterferewithitsenvironmentandinthegivenframeworktoOpenSystemSYSXtSYSXtSYSCloseSystemFigure1CloseandOpenSystemModel TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201353manageenvironmentalconditionswhicharethebasicreasonforitsexistence.InouropinionaMountainRegimentmustthereforecomplywiththerequirementsoftheenvironmentandbesuccessful.Itmustactivelyinterferewiththeenvironmentpreventionactivedefenceandmanagethethreatsthatwilljustifyitsexistencebeforethepublic.OrganizationalTheoryWhenexaminingtheenvironmentOrganizationalTheorymightalsoapply.AMountainRegimentfunctioningisanorga-nizedactivitywhichcanbeanalysedthroughthisapproach.Theorganizationaltheorywhenconsideringlearningorganizationputsgreatemphasisontheenvironmentbecauseitaffectsgoalsandmeansinstrumentsthoseonesresultingfromtheenvironmentandmustcomplywithitsrequirements.Wemustthereforetakeintoaccounttheenvi-ronmentinthefirstplaceespeciallyastheedgeconditionsoverwhichwehavenocontrolRode2007p.15.AsalreadymentionedtheMountainRegimentdependsontheenvironmentaschangesintheenvi-ronmentrequiredthechangeofbehaviour.Atthesametimechangesinthepoliticalenvironmentmustalsobringchangesinthesecurityenvironmentaseachpoliticalsys-teminordertoensureitsdevelopmentandexistenceorganizeandinstitutionalizeanappropriatesecuritymechanismsandcon-tent.AchievinggoalsbyOrganizationalTheoryrequirescoordinationplanningandcontrol.Itisnecessarytosystemati-callyintroducethecriteriaofrationalityreasonandconsequencescostsandbenefits.Tendencytoachievetheobjectivesencour-agesthestructuretoreduceuncertainty.Allthisaffectstheestablishmentoftheorga-nizationresourcesandgrowthofbureau-cracyandcharacteristicorganizationalforms.Thespecificityofthebureaucracyisreflectedinitsobjectivesresearchanddevelopmentorsecurityrequireadifferentstructurethanforexamplesteelproductionseemidovnik1985p.40-75andBuar1981p.100-130.Objectivesandinterestsofindivid-ualcountriesaredifferentanddifferentlydefined.Therulingelitebeingadictatororademocraticallychosengovernmentstillsetsnationaltargetsandclaimstoactinthenationalinterest.Politicianshavenodoubtthatsurvivalofthenationandpreservationofnationalsovereigntyisaprimarygoalfollowedbyprosperitydevelopmentandmaintenanceofsocialvalues-andlatertheremainingobjectiveswhicharedifferent.InmanyWesterncountriesforexampledemo-craticvaluesanddemocracyarethekeyele-mentsofnationalidentitywhichisreflectedinthestructureandfunctioningofthepoliti-calsystem.InsomeIslamiccountriesthisdefinitionandemphasisonmaterialismandsexualfreedomposeathreattothebasicmoralandreligiousvaluesseeRode2001p.25.Toachievetheobjectivesoforganiza-tionstheOrganizationalTheoryrequiresresourcesandtoolsthatareabigsourceofuncertainty.Whilethegoalrequiresrational-itymeansandinstrumentsmaynotbeabletoprovidethatanditisveryrarelytoreachfullrationalization.Peoplearepresentevery-wherethehumanfactorandarenotcon-tentwithasimplerefund.Theywantmore-powerauthorityprestigerespectcom-monsocializing.AllthisaffectsoperationofinstrumentsandresourcesbuthumanfactorremainsthemainfactorinthearmedforcesinourresearchintheMountainRegiment.Neverthelesstheachievementofrational-itynecessarytoachievethegoalremainsaproblemseemidovnik1985p.45.TransformationReductionoffinancialandotherresourcesisamajorchallengefortheSAF.Ifitwantstosurviveandcontinuetoper-formstatutorydutiesitmustbere-organizedinsuchawaythatitcanrespondtothechallengesandchangesintheenvironment.ThisprocessofadaptingtosuchchangesintheSAFisreferredtoastransformation.AlsoAlberts2003indicatesthechallengesoftheinformationsocietyandtheassoci-atedchangesinthenewmillenniumwiththetransformationknownastransformationalperiod.Wehaverealizedthatthearmedforcesandtheentiredefencesystemwillbeapartofthefuturepoliticaltechnologicalandorganizationalsolutions.teiner2011p.46pointsoutthatthetransformationisbasedonanon-violentsophisticatedandknowledge-basedinformationsocietyrelyingonchangingthedefenceandmilitarystruc-turesorganizationandfunctionsandtheroleofthemilitaryinsociety.IntheAllianceandnationalenvironmentsinsecurityandalsointhearmedforcesthetransformationprocessbringshighexpectationsandequallyhighdoubts.Thesecanbeseenasafearofthedisappearanceofnationalorevenconven-tionalsoldiers.Inaperiodoftransformationcountriesaresettingtheobjectiveofforminganarmywhosescopeissmallerbutmoreefficientmoreprofessionalandmoderninteroperableandcapableofperformingthemissionofvariousnationalandtransnationaltasks.Transformationisacontinuouspro-cessalsomentionedintheNATOHandbookNATOHandbook2006p.20-21wherethisnewapproachisreferredtoasatrans-formativeprocessactivelydisplacingandreplacingtheparadigmrevolutioninmili-taryaffairs.TransformationwithinNATOisaproactiveandinnovativeprocessofdevel-opmentandintegrationofnewconceptsdoctrineandcapabilitiesandstructuresinordertoimproveinteroperability.teiner2011p.46-47notesthatTheStrategicConceptfrom1999empha-sizedthetransformationprimarilyasglobalandtransnationalandaguideforfurtherdevelopmentofmilitaryinsociety.The2010ConceptcontinuesandexpandsthistotheEMYtEMYtEMStLegendXt..SystemsInputsinrelationtotimeYt..SystemsoutputsinrelationtotimeSt..ReversibleconnectionwithothersystemSourceHenigmanRodeadaptedfromKljaji2002 54TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013nationallevel.HavinganewNATOstrate-gicconceptmeansthatwearefacinganewperiodoftransformation.Theargumentisbuiltonthefactthatthroughchangingthedirectionoftransfor-mationfromthebottomupsothattheover-alleffortcomingfromtheAlliedCommandforTransformationACTshouldallowforthedirectionfromthetoptothebottom.Inotherwordsitisacollectionandintegrationoftheoreticalmodelsandbestpracticesandfacilitatingtheirexchangeandupgrades.ThisallowstheAlliancetoenforcethenationaltransformationprocessesinenvironmentswithvaryingspeedandintensitydependingonthelevelofdevelopmentanditsintegra-tionintheoveralltransformationprocess.Whenspeakingaboutenteringthetrans-formationprocessitisalsoimportantinwhatsituationsitispossibletosuccessfullymakechangesespeciallyifweknowthatthetransformationshouldnotimplementanyradicalorviolentchanges.Allthisishappeningattimesofglobaleconomiccrisisandrecessionwhichaffectedbothlargeandsmallcountries.Asthenationaldefenceandmilitarysystemsarecloselyrelatedfromthetechnologicalviewifnotcorrelatedwithsci-enceandindustrythespeeddependsontherelationshipandtheabilitytotrackchangesandmutualadjustment.AftertheLisbonsummittheNewNATOStrategicConceptrequestoverhauloftheAlliancetobepreparedforthesecuritychallengesofthe21stcentury.Theconceptemphasizesthestrengtheningofbothnation-alandAllieddefenceandpreservationofmilitaryidentityandalsosomehowturnbacktotheMembers.ThenewNATOstrategicconceptisprimarilyincentiveandinclusiveAbrial2011.Itpromotesanddirectsmem-berstatestoeffectiveandefficientdefence.ItalsohighlightsthatNATOandconceptmissionistosetstrategicdirectionandiden-tifypossibleareasforcooperationandactionclearinghouseapproachandtofacilitateexchangeofbestpractices.EffectsBasedConceptandComprehensiveApproachTheconceptoftheEffects-BasedOperationsEBOwasintroducedintheUSAirForcesatthetacticallevelduringtheFirstGulfWar.Itreferstoplanningandconductingcombatoperationsbycombiningmilitaryandnon-militarymethodstoachieveeffects.Theconceptwasdevelopedtotakeadvantageofthesignificantprogressinmili-tarytechnologyandtacticswherebythecommandersaimscouldbeachievedcaus-ingminimalcollateraldamageandposingminimalrisktotheirownforcesBatschlet2002.NATOthroughtheExperimentationprogramoftheACTisconductingexperi-mentswithdoctrineandtoolsforEBO.Althoughallgoodcommandershaveproba-blyalwaysconductedeffect-basedoperationsitisequallyclearthatthecurrentdevelopmentandformalizationofEBOconceptsextendsthetraditionalframeworkfortheplanningandconductofmilitaryoperations.Thisisdirectlyrepresentedbyextendingtheopera-tionalspacetoincludeallthedimensionsofthePoliticalMilitaryEconomicSocialInfrastructureandInformationPMESIIenvironment.Theincreaseindimensionalitynecessarilyincreasescomplexityoftheplan-ningandexecutionwiththeassociatedneedforextendedexpertiseinallPMESIIdimen-sionsandanalyticalsupporttotiethestrandstogetherintocoherentoperationaldesignThuve2006.p.2ItisworthmentioningtheEBOandthelastCADoctrineareconceivedasapro-cessintendednotonlytotheassetsforcescombatequipmentlogisticandeconomicstructurebutalsototheadversarysbehav-iourMidan2009.TheconceptwaslatertestedatthestrategicandoperationallevelsbutwasofficiallydroppedfromcommonusageduetodifferentinterpretationsandowingtothebeliefthatitgivesthecommandersafalsesenseofpredictabilityMattis2008.ItwasreplacedbytheComprehensiveApproachConcept.AccordingtomanycriticsVego2006Mattis2008Riper2009seealsoSmolej2011theconceptisusefulespe-ciallyintermsoftargetingatthetacticallevel.Despitebeingnolongerusedatthehigherlevelsofcommandtheconceptstillpresentsausefultoolforgoalachievementatthetacticallevel.OnthebasisintelligencespecializedunitssuchasmountainunitshavemoreleewayintargetidentificationprocessesespeciallywheretheEBOconceptisusedtoguidetheiroperationsintermsofachievingspecificeffects.NATOandEUlearnedfromopera-tionalexperiencesthatpurelymilitaryactsarenotenoughtomeetmanycomplexchal-lengestotheinternationalsecurity.Theyhavetoworkwithotheractorstocontrib-utetoaCAeffectivelycombinespoliti-calcivilianandmilitarycrisismanagementinstruments.AttheBucharest20086andStrasbourg-Kehl20097summitsNATOHeadsofStateandGovernmentendorsedasetofpragmaticproposalswhichaimatdevelopingandimplementingNATOscon-tributiontoaCA.ExperienceinAfghanistanandKosovodemonstratesthattodayschallengesrequireaCAbytheinternationalcommunityinvolv-ingawidespectrumofcivilandmilitaryinstrumentswhilefullyrespectingmandatesandautonomyofdecisionsofallactorsandprovidesprecedentsofthisapproach.TothisendwhilerecognisingthatNATOhasnorequirementtodevelopcapabilitiesstrictlyforcivilianpurposestheNATOHeadsofStatesandGovernmentstaskedtheCounciltodeveloppragmaticproposalstoimprovethecoherentapplicationofNATOsowncrisismanagementinstrumentaswellaspracticalco-operationatalllevelswithpart-nerstheUNandotherrelevantInternationalorganisationsIOnon-governmentalorgan-isationsNGOandlocalfactorsintheplanningandconductofongoingandfutureoperationswhereverappropriate8.DevelopingpragmaticproposalstheengagementofNATOatalllevelsofcom-mandisofimportance.NATOHQshouldfocusonbuildingconfidenceandmutualunderstandingbetweeninternationalactorsincludingdevelopingmodalitiesforbettercooperation.Attheoperationallevelthepri-orityistocooperatewithotherinternationalactorsintheoverallplanningforcomplexoperationsinwhichalargedegreeofcivil-militaryinteractionwillberequired.Atthe-atrelevelNATOforcecommandersmustbeempoweredtoundertakeeffectivecoopera-tionandcoordinationwithindigenouslocalauthoritiesandin-theatreprincipalsfromotherinternationalactorsintheexecutionofoperations.ThekeythingtoachievethisisanappropriateorganizationalstructurewhereakeyelementisKnowledgeanditsKnowledge TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201355DevelopmentKDandSystemsofSystemstoidentifyoperationallyrelevantelementswithinthePMESIIdimensionsandtherela-tionshipbetweenelementsbothwithinandamongthePMESIIdomains.KnowledgeDevelopmentKnowledgeiscreatedbypeopleandreflectstheirknow-howandinvolvestheireducationexperiencethinkingdecisionmakingandallothercapacitiesforcreatingchoicesandtakingaction.Peopleexchangeandshareknowledgewithinformalandinformalnetworkspartici-patingincollaboratingnetworksaugmentsthelevelofknowledgeintheorganisation.Organizedorganisationwillsystematicallyasallavailableknowledgeisretrievedstoredandprocessedbyusingstandardizedmethodsandinformationalsystemscreateanorgani-zationalknowledgebasethatwillbeofgreathelpintheoperationalplanningprocess.Wehavetodevelopamuchbroaderandmorecomprehensiveunderstandingoftheoperationalenvironmentwehavetomoveabi-dimensionalapproachandstarttothinkmulti-dimensionalHenigmanetal2012p.3738.KDisanevolutionnotarevolu-tioninthinking.Processesandinformationalreadyexistinmanycasestheysupportthedecision-makingprocesses.Theproblemisthatthisinformationorisolatedpocketsofknowledgeresideintheheadsandofficesofsubjectmatterexpertsacrossandexternaltootheorganizationitisnotfusedde-conflictedorsharedatleastnotinaformalwell-establishedmanner.Oftentheenduserusuallyacommanderislefttointegrateorsearchforapplicableknowledgeinordertomakeadecision.Thereforethereisaneedtoconnectorfuseexistinginformationknowledgeandtheprocessesthatdevelopitsothedecision-makerispresentedasearlyaspossibleinthedecisionprocesswithaholisticunderstand-ing.Thisnotonlyaddressestheaboveprob-lemsbecauseaproperKDalsoreducesthedecisioncycleandhelpsthecommandersattentionfocusonacomplexoperatingenvi-ronmentonthemostimportantcomponents.AdditionallybecauseoftheComprehensivenatureofmodernconflictthereisalsoarequirementtoconnectwithsourcesofinformationoutsidethetra-ditionalmilitarysphereororganizationi.e.IOsNGOsacademiaetctobroadentheunderstandingoftheenvironmentengage-mentspace.KDasoutlinedintheBI-SCconceptisaprocesswhereinformationiscollectedfusedandanalyzedtocreateactionableknowledgeandthenitismadeaccessibleacrossthestaffcoalitionAlliance.Inordertobetterunderstandthedefinitionandmean-ingoftheKDithastobeunderstoodasaninteractiveprocessthatcoverscollectionanalysiselectronicstorageanddistributionofinformation.Itutilisesavarietyofmili-taryaswellasnon-militaryinformationgatheringassetstoidentifyandcollectdatafromawidevarietyofsourcesandusesthistoproduceacommonoperationalpictureCOPtoprovidesharedsituationawarenessSITAWARE.KDsupportsplanningexecutionandassessmentbyprovidingaholisticunder-standingofafocusareaorengagementspacewiththestatedaimofpresentingknowledgetoadecisionmakerwherebyhecantakeactione.g.makeadecisionselectacourseofactionetc.TheKDdoesnotreplacewell-establisheddecision-supportingprocessesandmechanismsbutrathertheKDultimatelylookstoleveragethoseprocessestocreateabaselineofknowledgefromwhichactionsdecisionsderive.AkeyelementoftheKDoratoolintheKDtoolboxisSystemsAnalysis.SystemsAnalysisisananalyticalprocessthatholisticallyexaminesadversarialpotentiallyadversarialneutralandfriendlynationsorentitiesplustheirenvironmentsascomplexadaptivesystemstoidentifybehaviorsandstructuresandtoassessstrengthsvulner-abilitiesweaknessesandinter-relationships.ItviewsanareaofinterestorengagementspaceasasystemforexamplethenationofAfghanistanandrecognizesthatmostsystemsarecomplex.Tounderstandacom-plexsystemsystemsanalysismethodologyaimstopresentaholisticunderstandingofasystembydividingtheenvironmentintomanageablesectionsasastartingpointitishelpfultodividemostsystemsintoPMESIIsections.Withanunderstandingofeachpartofthesystemitisthenpossibletore-constructormodeltheenvironmenttounderstandkeylinksstrengthsandvulner-abilitiesofthesystemswhichultimatelyaidesindeterminingwhereandhowbesttakeaction.Byunderstandingthesebasiccompo-nentsitispossibletobegintounderstandtheimportanceoffactorsoftennotconsideredinatraditionalmilitaryanalysissuchaspoliti-calsocialandeconomicaspects.TheKDapproachusessubjectsmatterexpertstoanalyzethedifferentactorsandsysteminseveralrelevantdomainsaswellasthespecificaspectsoftheregionandoper-ationalenvironment.Itisfromthecontinu-ousanalysisofthiseverchangingCOPthatknowledgecanbedeveloped.Thisknowl-edgehelpsusunderstandtheoperationalenvironmentandassistscivilianofficialsandmilitaryleadersinthedecisionmakingpro-cess.TheKDisthereforeastaff-widepro-cessandinvolvesallmembersofheadquar-tersHQstaff.Itiscontinuousadaptiveandnetworkedactivitywhichseekstoprovidecommandersandtheirsstaffacomprehen-siveunderstandingofcomplexoperationalenvironmentthatseeksforchangingthepres-entwayofthinkingsupportingmoreproac-tiveandinteractiveapproachtocollectionofInformationIntelligenceandKnowledgeitcombinesinformationfromacrosstheentireorganizationandfusesthiswithinputsfromalargenumberofexternalactors.MountainBattalionvs.MountainRegimentMountainBattalionisatacticalcom-batunitwithmissionofthecombinedwar-fareinthemountainsandparticipateintheProtectionandRescuePR.Sincewearetalkingaboutfightingcapacityofthejointcombinedforceswemusttakeintoaccountairsupportfireintelligenceandothersupportthatarenecessaryalsoveryexpensiveandweshouldbeabletouseit.Especiallylimitedresourcesgavethemaxi-mumencouragementforthinkingoutsidetheestablishedframeworks.Theyprovokethink-ingwhatweurgentlyneedforourselvesandwhatcanbeofferedfromotherunitsortheAlliance.Atthesametimeweshouldtakeintoaccountthecapacitiesoftheunitanditsfunctionsandprinciplesonwhichtacticalunitsoperate.Thegoalwastofindasolution 56TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013withthehelpoftheKnowledgeDevelopmentKDandrecognitionfromtheTheoryofSystemswhatweneedtochangeandadapttotheincomingchangesfromthecontemporaryworld.Oursolutionpresentsanewformoforganizationunits.WeretalkingaboutaMountainRegimentalightinfantrytacticalunitwithcapabilitiesandmissionofthejointcombinedfightinginthemountains.TheunitisthecorecapacityforbuildingbattalionbattlegroupwheretheconceptofSmartDefenceandPoolingSharingarecomingintopracticalrealityontacticallevel.OfcoursethereisthedilemmawhatisessentialtonationaldefenceandwhatthepriorityfortheAllianceisandhowtocoordinatewhenresourcesarelimited.ThemottooftheMountainRegimentincombatoperationsstillisThinkopera-tionallyacttactically.TheEBOandCAconceptsareimportantfortheMountainRegimentastheydictatethecontentsofthetrainingprocesswithregardtootherSAFunits.Thistrainingprocesshastoreferbothtotheindividualsandtheunit.Theunitsmusthavegreatergenericcapabilitiesforobtain-ingintelligenceandmorerobustanalyticalprocessingcapabilitiestooperateinaccor-dancewiththeEBAOconceptHenigmanetal2012p.3738.Moreovertheyhavetobeadaptivesinceunitsbeingsmallintermsofpersonnelandlightintermofequipmentmayhaveawiderspectrumofcapabilitiesevenincom-parisonwithlargerconventionalunitsseeSpulak2007p.20.DilemmaaboutSmartDefenceandPoolingSharingwasfirstsolvedwithinownarmedforcesseekingsupportforopera-tionswithinAlliancefirstlookinginthelocalandnationalenvironment.Asanexampleofnewandinnovativesolutionsasinglefleetofcombatvehiclestheconceptofrotatingunitsinthesinglesetofequipmenthasbeenestablished.WhatisoptimalforusisalsoperfectfortheAlliance-ThismottosolvesthedilemmabetweenhomeandAlliancespriorities.ConclusionssummaryTodaysadversaryisadynamicadap-tivefoewhooperateswithinacomplexinter-connectedPMESIIenvironment.AheadoftheAlliancethereisachallengetoadaptfromlookingatatwo-dimensionaltimeandspaceproblemtounderstandtheimplicationsofafullPMESIIenvironment.Thisisnotasmallchallenge.Changesarealsonecessaryinthoughtsandintheorganisationalpart.Thisinvolvesunderstandinghowvarioussystemsrelatetooneanotherandhowsomeoverlapsarenestedineachother.EBOandlatestCAConceptadoptedbyNATOaredesignedtoinfluencethewillofanadversaryonourownforcesthroughthecoordinatedapplicationofmilitarycapa-bilitiestoachievethedesiredstrategicobjec-tives.Itfocusesonactionsandtheirinfluenceonbehaviourratherthanattritionandtargets.TheEBOisthecoherentandcomprehen-siveapplicationofvariousinstrumentsoftheAlliancecombinedwiththepracticalcooperationalongwithinvolvednon-NATOactorstocreateeffectsnecessarytoachieveplannedobjectivesandultimatelytheNATOendstate.KDisaheadquarterswideactivitydesignedtoimproveourlevelofSITAWAREandunderstanding.Itisacontinuousprocessthatsupportsplannersanddecisionmak-ersandisrunfromtheinitialstagesofanoperationtillitsend.TheKDisunderstoodasaconceptprocessthatcollectsandanaly-sesinformationintegratesisolateddataintoauseablebodyofinformationbasedonanunderstandingofsystemsandmakesitavailablesoitcanbeshared.ItenhancesourcurrentanalyticalcapabilitiesbyaddingSystemsAnalysismethodologytoourexist-ingtoolboxre-examinestheorganizationsapproachtoInformationandKnowledgeManagementcreatingafoundationforInformationIntelligenceandKnowledgesharingandfinallyitfocusesonmakinginformationandknowledgeavailabletomul-tiplecustomers.InrealitytheKDiscurrentlylittlemorethanjustaconceptstrugglingtobeimplementedacrosstheorganization.Therequiredstructuresmanningandexpertisearenotinplaceandthedoctrineonhowtooperatethisprocessisnotfullydeveloped.InpracticewhatwecurrentlyhaveinthecaseoftheMountainBattalionisanenhancedinfointelligencegatheringcapability.ThisisindangerofcompetingwiththeexistingintelligenceandstafffunctioninsteadofcomplementingthemandisnotwhatwasenvisagedintheKDConcept.Despitethesechallengestheoriginalrequirementforenhancedsituationaware-nessandabetterunderstandingofthecom-plexoperationalenvironmentstillremainsandwebelievethattheKDcanprovideanimportantpartoftheSAForganizationalsolution.Ourproposalforanewformoforga-nizationunitsfollowsTheoryofSystemsandtheEBOaswellastheCAphilosophythatcomplementsotherphilosophiessuchastheindirectapproachandmissioncommand.Itfocusesontheend-stateandondeterminingtheeffectsthatmustbecreatedinordertoinfluencethebehaviourandcapabilitiesofkeyactorstoachievethat.Accordingtoitsphilosophywehavetoconsidertheengage-mentspaceasaSysteminwhichallactorsandentitiesinteracttocreateeffectsandrequireananalysisofSystemsandSystemsofSystemstounderstandtherelationshipbetweenactionsandeffects.Afterstudyingandanalysesweareproposingestablishinganewmodelofmoun-tainunit-MountainRegimentlightinfantrytacticalunitwithcapabilitiesandmissionofthejointcombinedfightinginthemountains.TheunitisthecorecapacityforbuildingbattalionbattlegroupwheretheconceptsofSmartDefenceandPoolingSharingareAlisgravenillat.-NothingisheavytothosewhohavewingsIntheturbulentenvironmenttheorganizationsmusthavecouragetocopewithchallenges.Whenthereiswillingnessmotivationandproactiveactionthereisawayhowtocopewiththeexistingsituation. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201357comingintopracticalrealityontacticallevel.TheRShascommitteditselftohavedevelopedandpreparedforceswherelightinfantryunitscouldberepresentedbyMountainRegimentinaccordancewiththeSAFsdevelopmentplanswithinforcegoals.1ChicagoSummitDeclaration20MAY20122Terrorismepitomizescontemporaryasym-metricalthreats.InthiscontextPrezeljstates2007p.67thatasymmetryreferstothedisproportionallityoftheentitywhichthreatensnon-stateactorsagainstthestatetheresourcesitusesandtheconsequencesminimuminputmaximumoutputout-comewhichforexampleexceedthedirectconsequencesofabombexplosion.3NaturallytheMountainbattalionisbutasegmentofacomprehensiveresponsetoter-rorismbymoderncountriesPrezelj2007p.68whichenhancesjointactivityandthecountrysresponsetheoverallpicture.4TerroristsinsurgentsenemiesattackpeoplewhoarethepointoffocusPOFwherebytheirtacticaloperationcreatesastrategicimpact.TheCentresofGravityCOGaredefinedasfeaturescapabilitiesorsitesfromwhichacountryalliancemilitaryforceorothergroupdrawfromthefreedomoftheiractionsphysicalstrengthorthewilltofight.Thesepointsexistatthetacticaloperationalandstrategiclevelsandrepresentthecentreofpoweroroperationonwhicheverythingdepends.Theyarealsothepointwherealltheenergyisfocusedtoachievetheobjec-tive.Fromthispointarisestheenemyforcesabilitypowerandwill.Theirdestructionorneutralisationbringsadecisiveadvantageandvictory.5Successfulintermsoflinearbattlefieldswherebythemaingoalistocausedamagetotheenemy.6BucharestSummitDeclaration3APR20087Strasbourg-KehlSummitDeclaration4APR20098RigaSummitDeclaration29NOV2006References1.AbrialS.2011.TheNewStrategicConceptThreedifferentperspectivesOperational.VVoxcollegiiVolume11jan.2011str.1317.RomeNatoDefenseCollege.2.AprojectoftheClaremontInstituteMay2012.NATODeclaresMissileDefenseSystemOperational.httpwww.missi-lethreat.comarchivesid.7496detail.asp.Retrieved23December2012.3.AlbertsD.S.2003.InformationAgeTransformationgettingtoa21stCenturyMilitary.WashingtonD.CCCRPPublicationSeries.4.BatscheletA.W.2002.Effects-BasedOperationsANewOperationalModelStrategyResearchProjectU.S.ArmyWarCollege.5.Bi-StrategicCommandKnowledgeDevelopmentPre-DoctrinalHandbookFinalDraft.November2010.AlliedCommandforTransformationSHAPE.6.BuarF.1981.Upravljanje.LjubljanaCankarjevazaloba.7.CeleskiJD.2005.OperationalizingCOIN.JointSpecialOperationsUniversityJSOUReport05-2.8.DaftR.L.2001.OrganizationTheoryandDesign.Seventhedition.AustraliaCanadaMexicoSingaporeSpainUnitedKingdomUnitedStates.South-WesternThomsonLearning.9.DeutscheWelleMay2012.NATOdeclaresfirststageofmissileshieldoperational.httpwww.dw.dedwarti-cle01596461900.html.Retrieved20December2012.10.HenigmanZ.etal2012.KnowledgeDevelopmentResponsetoModernChallenges-aCaseofSAFMountainBattalion.TransformationThroughTrainingJointForceTrainingCentreJFTCBydgoszcz.IssueNo1pages35-39.11.HostnikI.1997.Upravnopolitinipod-sisteminupravljanjedravenaobramb-nempodroju.LjubljanaCenterzastrateketudije.12.KljajiM.2002.Teorijasistemov.KranjModernaorganizacija.13.LuhmannN.1981.TeorijasistemaSvrhovitostiracionalnost.ZagrebGlobus.14.MaliF.1994.Znanostkotsistemskideldrube.LjubljanaFakultetazadrubenevede.15.MattisJ.N.2008.USJFCOMCommandersGuidanceforEffects-basedOperations.ParametersVol.XXXVIIISpring2008.pp.1825.16.MidanC.ImplementationofNATOEBAODoctrineanditseffectsonoperation-alStaffsstructureandfunctions.StrategicImpact42009pages39-54.17.MulejM.insoavtorji1996.Teorijesistemov.MariborEkonomsko-poslovnafakulteta.18.NATOPublicDiplomacyDivision2006.NatoHandbook.BrusselsPublicDiplomacyDivision.19.PrezeljI.2007.NujnostmedresorskegasodelovanjainkoordiniranjavbojuprotiterorizmunekateriprimeriizRepublikeSlovenije.VBiltenSlovenskevojske2007-9t.2.LjubljanaGeneraltabSlovenskevojskestr.65-80.20.RodeA.2001.Varnostnapoli-tikaRepublikeHrvake.Magistrskodelo.LjubljanaFakultetazadrubenevede.21.RodeA.2007.Vojakaobveevalnadejavnost.Magistrskodelo.CeljeFakultetazalogistiko.22.VegoN.M.2006.Effects-BasedOperationsACritique.JointForceQuaterlyIssue41str.51-75.23.RiperK.P.2009.EBOThereWasNoBabyintheBathwater.JointForceQuaterlyIssue52str.82-85.24.ResolucijaosplonemdolgoronemprogramurazvojainopremljanjaSlovenskevojskedoleta2025ReSDPROSV20252010.UradnilistRepublikeSlovenijetevilka992010zdne7.12.2010.25.Srednjeroniobrambniprogram2007-2012MORSifra803-22006-58zdne27.11.2006.26.SpulakR.2007.ATheoryofSpecialOperations.JointSpecialOperationsUniversityJSOUReport07-7.httpjsou-public.socom.milpublicationsjsouJSOU07-7spulakATheoryofSpecialOps_final.pdf4June2010.27.teinerA.2011.Transformationdowewantitcanwemanageit.InContemporaryMilitaryChallenges13-2June2011str.4360.28.midovnikJ.1985.Teoretineosnoveupravljanja.LjubljanaDDUUniverzum.29.ThuveH.2006.CCRTS-THESTATEOFTHEARTANDTHESTATEOFTHEPRACTICEAState-SpaceFormulationforEffects-BasedOperations.NATOC3Agency.TheHagueNetherlands. 58TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013DuringthetwolastdecadespartsofSouthernEuropehavebeenconsideredbymanyasthemostinsecurespotsofourcontinent.TherecentworldwidefinancialcrisiswithitsinitialepicentreinUSAhasprovokedparticularlydeepeconomicandsocialtroublesinseveralMediterraneanEUmembersandthreatenedtheEuroahighlyvisibleandweightysymboloftheEuropeanintegration.PoliticalcrisessocialunrestviolenceandwarsinNorthernAfricaandtheMiddleEastaddedtothelonglastingtensionsandconflictsintheMediterraneanvicinityofSouthernEurope.TheseeventsresultedinanincreasedinflowofrefugeesandjobseekersfromNorthernAfricawhichhadanegativeimpactonsocialstabilityandpoliticalclimateinSouthernEuropeanstates.TheensuingpoliticaltensionsamongEUmembersendangeredinturntheworkingoftheSchengensystemanotheremblematicachievementofEuropeanintegration.ThealreadyprecariouseconomicandpoliticalstabilityintheeasternpartofSouthernEuropewereparticularlystronglyaffectedcastingashadowontheachieve-mentsofthelastdecade.AccordingtothestatisticsconcerningarmedconflictsaroundtheworldrecentlycompiledbytheUppsalaPeaceandConflictResearchProjectEuropeamongallthecontinentshasexperiencedtheirdeepestdropsincethelastpeakintheearly1990s.Therealvalueofthispositivefindingshouldnotbehoweveroveresti-mated.SimilarlyaselsewherealthoughlessintensivelythaninAsiaandAfricaaconsid-erablepotentialforconflictsstillexistsonorclosetoourcontinent.ThisisparticularlytrueofSouthEasternEuropeandalsooftheadjacentregionsacrosstheMediterraneaninNorthernandSouthernCaucasusandintheMiddleEast.Inadditiontopowerpoliticsunresolvedinterstateterritorialandpoliti-caldisputesdomesticreligiously-coloredextremismcompetitionforenergywaterandotherscarcenaturalresourcesexternalmed-dlingetc.theconflictpotentialinEuropesneighbourhoodhasbeenenhancedbyseveralaspectsofglobalizationincludingitsmassinformationeffectsandbyinthelong-runinevitableprogressofindividualandcol-lectiveemancipationinternallydestabiliz-ingestablishedauthoritarianpoliticalordersparticularlyinmultiethnicandmultireligioussocieties.SecuritybackgroundofSouthEasternEuropeTherehasbeenatangibleinterconnectionbetweengeopoliticaldevelopmentsintheEuro-AtlanticareaandregionalsecurityinSouthEasternEuropeSEE.Ononehandtheshiftsinpowerrelationsamongmajorextra-regionalpowershaveinfluencedtheinbalancebetweenconflictandcooperationamongandwithinintheregion.SomerealorpotentialthreatstotheSEEsecurityendan-geralsootherpartsofEuropeaswellas.InadditionduringthelasttwodecadestheSEEitselfhasbeenanotablesourceofinsecurityspillingovertootherpartsofthecontinent.TwofeaturesoftheSEEtreatedasregionstandoutitsextraordinarymultifacetedheterogeneityanditshighsensitivityoftheelitestoexternalinfluencesandtotheshiftsinrelationsamongmajorcontinentalpow-ers.IntheserespectsSEEhasdifferedveryappreciablyfromotherEuropeanregionsparticularlytoScandinavia.NotincidentallyZ.BrzezinskibrandedthegeopoliticalfaultlinestretchingfromSEEeastwardallthewaytothePacifictheEuroasianBalkans1.ThegeopoliticalinstabilityinSEEhasdeephistoricalroots.SEEoverlapspartlywiththeEasternMediterraneanwithCentralEastEuropeandtheBlackSearegions.PersquaremilethecentralpartofSEEtheBalkanshasrepresentedauniqueandcultur-allylinguisticallyandreligiouslythemostheterogeneousmixtureofpeoplesandethnicminoritiesinEurope2.ConsequentlySEEhasneverbecomeacoherentregioninculturalpoliticaloreconomicsenseclearlylackingitscentreofgravity.TheBalkanshaveforlongbeencon-sideredthemostvolatilepartoftheEuropeancontinent.Throughout19thandthe20thcenturieswidersocialupheavalsandwarsbetweencontinentalpowersstimulatedlocalrebellionsrevolutionscoupsdetatstatebreakdownswarfarewithintheregionter-rorismandotherformsofviolence.ThelatestboutsofarmedviolenceandwarsintheBalkanstookplacein19911995andin1998-20033.TheformerupsurgewaslargelytriggeredbyotherpositivedevelopmentsSecurityChallengesinSouthEasternEuropeProfessorDr.AntonBeblerFacultyofSocialSciencesUniversityofLjubljanaSlovenia TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201359intheEuro-AtlanticareatheendoftheColdWarbreakdownofEasternEuropeanandoftheSovietregimesdissolutionoftheWarsawPactandtheensuingtransitiontowardsdemocracyandtomarketecono-mies.Socialinstabilityeconomicdifficul-tiesandpoliticalunrestverysignificantlycontributedtoanexplosionofinterethnicconflicts.Theirseveritywasfurthermagni-fiedbymodernmassmediaandexploitedbyruthlesspoliticians.Since1970spoliticalinstabilityaccompaniedbyviolencehadledtofragmentationofCyprusMoldovaandYugoslavia.TheprocessofbalkanizationdoubledthenumberofdefactoexistingstatesinSEEfrom8to16.TheBalkanwarsproducedupto130thousanddeathsandabouttwotothreemillionrefugeesanddis-placedpersonswiththemosttragicresultsinBosniaHerzegovinaBHCroatiaandKosovo.OtherdestructiveremainsofthewarsareillegalcashesofsmallarmsandammunitionwhichsupplytheEurope-wideblackmarketcontrolledbyorganizedcrime.Additionallytherewereroughlyatleastamillionanti-tankandanti-person-nellandminesplanted.Althoughde-miningactivitiessupportedfinanciallybyUSAandseveralEUmemberstateshavebeenquitesuccessfultherearestillabout2.100sq.kmofsuspectareasinBHandCroatiawithpossibly400.000plantedmines.TherearealsothousandsofmortallydangerousremainsofclusterbombsinruralSerbiatheresultsofNATObombingsin1999.SEEhaswonthedistinctionoftheonlyregioninEuropethatwasthetheatreofseveralUNpeace-keepingmissionsandofthefirstNATOsout-of-areamilitaryintervention.In1995followingunsuccess-fulattemptsbyUNCSCEOSCEandEECEU4andonlyafterconsiderablehesitationtheWesternpowersledbytheUSAdecidedtoimposepeaceontheWesternBalkansbyforce.Theendofarmedhostilitieswasfinallyachievedin2003inCroatiaBosniaHerzegovinaKosovoandMacedonia.Politicalfragmentationandarmedconflictsaswellasthefailureofthecom-munistpoliciesofindustrializationinSEEcausedhugeeconomicdislocationanddam-agetotheregionseconomiesandinfrastruc-ture5.Asaresultmostformercommunist-ruledstatesinSEEstillhavenotreachedthepre-1991levelsofindustrialandagricul-turalproduction.InsomepartsoftheWesternBalkanswarlossesdislocationofhumanandnaturalresourcesbreakdownofprevi-ouslyintegratedtransportationandenergysystemseconomicfragmentationandlossofexportmarketselsewhereinEuropeandonothercontinentswipedoutmostpositiveresultsoftheprecedingeconomicprogress.Theveryunevenlydistributeddamagehasgreatlyincreasedtheintraregionaldifferen-tialsinGNPp.c.6andthelevelsofunem-ployment.InthepoorestSEEstatesthelatterhavebecomethehighestonthecontinent.TheBalkanwarsledtoabigincreaseinthegovernmentssponsoredortoleratedtraffick-inginwarmaterials.Thewarsalsocontrib-utedtoaspill-overoforganizedcrimeintoWesternEurope.Highunemploymentandpovertyinpartsoftheregionstimulatedcor-ruptionorganizedcrimeillegalmigrationandnumerouskindsofillegaltraffickingparticularlyofnarcoticsandsmallarms.Thegeopoliticalshiftsintheearly1990sandthecrisisofneutralismandnon-alignmentledtoaradicalpoliticalandmili-taryrealignmentinSEE.WiththegreatlyreducedSovietRussianinfluencepracticallytheentireregionhasbecomepoliticallyandeconomicallyorientedtowardstheWest.TheendoftheNATOWarsawPactconfronta-tionandthelackoflarge-scalemineralenergyorothernaturalresourcesledtoaveryconsiderabledeclineoftheregionsgeopoliticalimportance.SEEhasceasedtobeanobjectofovertcontestsforpoliticalandmilitarydominationbysuperpowers.Theextra-regionalsourcesofconflictinoveroraboutSEEhavebeenthereforereducedtoaminimum.TheWesternBalkansarenotEuropespowderkeganymoreastheywerein1914.TheeraofwarsofreligionofideologyandofredrawingstatebordersintheBalkansseemstobeover.Unfortunatelytheregiongainedinternationalnotorietyasasourceoftroublesandacostlynuisance.ThecurrentsecuritysituationTheEuropeanSecurityStrategyadoptedbytheEuropeanCouncilin2003positedthefollowingasthemainglobalthreatstotheEUmembersproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionfailedstatesterrorismandorganizedcrimecybersecu-rityenergysecurityandclimatechange7.OtherEUdocumentsalsomentionasrealorpotentialproblemsunresolvedconflictsamongandwithinneighbouringstatesandsecuringtheEUexternalborders.TheactualsituationinSEEandevenmoresothepublicperceptionofsecuritythreatsdifferverysub-stantiallyfromtheseofficialEUassessments.RespondentsinpublicopinionsurveysinmostEuropeanstateshavebeengenerallymoreconcernedwithotheraspectsofhumaninsecuritysuchasunemploymentcrimecorruptionnaturaldisastersfloodsfiresetc.Onceimposedfromoutsidethesuper-ficialtranquillityintheregionhasbeenmaintainedintheWesternBalkansbyinter-nationalprotectorates-inBHandKosovo.InBHtheNATO-ledSFORhasbeenreplacedbythemuchsmaller2000-strongEUFORsupportedbyasmallNATOspecialunitandrapidinterventioncapability.InKosovoNATOmaintainsabout6.000sol-diersinthemultinationalKFORwhileEUrunsthe2.300-strongmissionEULEXwithinternationalpoliceprosecutorsprisonoffi-cialsadministrativeoverseersetc.Thelattermissionislikelytobereducedinnumbersby2013.Since1975thelineofdemarca-tionbetweentwopartsofCyprushasbeenguardedbytheUNmissionUNFICYPtodaywithabout600peace-keepers.Twodecadesafteralocalmini-wartodaythereareabout335Russianpeace-keepersinMoldova.Althoughmuchlessintensethandur-ingtheColdWartherivalryforinfluenceinSEEbetweentheUSAandtheRussianFederationhasbeenobserved.TheRussianshavebeenusingenergyexportsandsizeableparastateinvestmentsastheirmaintoolsparticularlyintheenergysectorsinSerbiaandRepublicSrpskainBHandmostlyinrealestateinMontenegro.TherearesomeUSandRussianoperationaltacticalnuclearweaponsstillpresentinorclosetoSEE.Abrigade-sizemilitaryoutpostinMoldovaalargenavalandairbaseontheUkrainianterritoryintheCrimeatheRussianNavyintheBlackSeaandarotatingsquadronintheEasternMediterraneanmarkthedecreasedRussianmilitarymuscleinSEEanditsimmediatevicinitycomparedwiththeSovietpre-1990levels.TheUSmilitarypresenceinSEEhasontheotherhandmoderately 60TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013increasedmainlyduetothevolatilityintheMiddleEast.InadditiontotheUSNSixthFleetintheMediterraneanandtheUSAirForcespresenceinItalyGreeceandTurkeytheUSAhasbuiltupasubstantiallandbaseBondsteelinKosovoandacquiredtherightstousemilitarytrainingandtransitfacilitiesinRomaniaandBulgaria.InJuly2011theUSAconcludedanagreementwithRomaniaonplacingonitsterritoryabatteryofantibal-listicmissiles.TheseactivitiespresageSEEsfutureroleinthedeclaredUSandNATOTheatreMissileDefenseagainstpotentialthreatsfromIranwhiletheRussiansviewthisdevelopmentverydifferentlyandasathreattothem.OneimportantaspectofsecurityinSEEsincetheendoftheColdWarhasbeenaveryconsiderablechangeinthelevelsofdefensespendingmilitarymanpowerstockofconventionalweaponsarmsproductionandexport.Thesemovementsarereflectedintheholdingsofheavyconventionalweap-onspriorandsoonaftertheimplementationoftheCFETreatysignedin1990andin2011seeTable1.ThetableshowsthattheformerCommunist-ruledstatesreduceddrasticallytheirdefenseoutlaysbothforpoliticalandeco-nomicreasons.ThisappliesnotonlytothetwoformerWTOmembersRomaniaandBulgariabutalsototheformernon-WTOstatesnotincludedintoCFE-toAlbaniaandtosevenex-Yugoslavstates.ThepresentlevelsinsevenstatesexistingtodayontheterritoryoftheformerSFRofYugoslaviaareaspresentedinTable2.InthisgroupofstatesthereductionstookplaceaftertheterminationofBalkanwarsin1995andby1999producedmuchlowertotalsofmilitarymanpowerandheavycon-ventionalweaponscomparedwiththoseinthe1980sinthenowdefunctSFRY.Activearmedforceswerereducedroughlybyahalfwhilethoseofthereservesandheavycon-ventionalweaponsbyatleasttwothirds.OntheotherhandthetwoolderNATOmembersTurkeyandGreecehavecontinuedwithunabatedhighdefensespendingduei.a.totheunresolveddisputesoverCyprusandtheairspaceovertheAegeanSea.ThispolicyinGreecehascontributedsignificantlytoalmoststatebankruptcy.Duetodisagree-mentsbetweenNATOandMoscowtheCFEtreatyadaptedin1999hasnotbeenfullyimplemented.Anotheraspectofregionalsecurityrelatestotheexistingnuclearinstallations.Thereareonlyfiveoperatingnuclearpowerstationsintheregionandasmallnumberofnuclearresearchreactors.AlthoughallSEEstatesadheretotheNPTregimetheproblemofnuclearsafetyincludingthedisposalofnuclearmaterialsexits.ItsacutenesshasbeenreducedbyshuttingdownundertheEUpressureoffouroutofsixolderSoviet-builtreactorsatKozluduyinBulgaria.Thesuppressionofarmedviolencedidnotadduptolong-termstabilityintheBalkansashasbeenmanifestedsince2001byoutburstsofviolenceinKosovoSerbiaandMacedoniabytheparalyzedcentralgovernmentinBosniaHerzegovinabydestructionofaborderstationbyroadbar-ricadesclosetotheKosovoSerbiaborderarmedclashesofSerbswithKFORsoldiersandviolentincidentsinMacedoniain2011-2012.IntheregiontherearethreedefactoexistingstateswhoselegalstatushasbeencontestedtheTurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprusRepublicofTransdnistriaandRepublicofKosovo.IntheadjacentregionofTranscaucasiathereareadditionallythreeflashpointsofsharpinterstatetensionswhichin2008resultedinseriousarmedconflictswiththeuseofheavyconventionalweaponsandin2012indeadlybordershootings.TheyhaveinvolveddirectlynotonlythreesecessionistandinternationallypracticallyunrecognizedparastatesAbhaziaSouthernOssetiaandNagorno-KarabakhbutalsotheRussianFederationGeorgiaArmeniaandTanksArtilleryAircraftRomania2960137534539281475870505430103Bulgaria220914753012085175073833523491Greece227617351590214918783156458650303Turkey323427954503321035297450355750694Table1.SourceTheMilitaryBalance2011RoutledgeLondon2011pp.93-94114-116138-140151-154.GoldblatJ.ArmsControlAGuidetoNegotiationsandAgreements.OsloInternationalPeaceResearchInstituteLondonThousandOaksNewDelhiSagePublications1994.pp.176-177.ActiveReserveMBTsSerbia28.18450.171212Croatia18.60021.000261BosniaHerzegovina10.577-334Slovenia7.6001.70045Macedonia8.0004.85031Montenegro2.984--Kosovo2.500800-Total78.44578.521883Table2.SourceTheMilitaryBalance2012InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesLondon2012pp.14910097134137150. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201361Azerbaijan.AllthethreefrozenconflictsremainonEuropessecurityandpoliticalagenda8.KosovothelatestadditiontothelisthascontributedtopoliticaltensionsbetweenUSAandmajorWestEuropeanstatesononehandandtheRussianFederationontheotherKosovosproclama-tionofindependencein2008hasalsodividedthemembersofEUandNATO.Despiteoffi-cialterminationbytheInternationalSteeringGroupon10September2012oftheinterna-tionalsupervisionofKosovosindependencethesedivisionsstillremainaswellastheonlypartlyimplementedAhtisaariproposaloftheKosovostatussettlement.AlthoughitsexistencehasbeensecuredKosovodefactoremainsaninternationalprotectorateandaninternallyveryweakstateadditionallylack-ingthecontroloveritsentireterritoryandpopulation.Theunsettledsituationofthethreesecessioniststatesprovidesamplegroundsfornewpotentialconflicts.Moreovertherehaverecentlybeenpublicthreatsbyandaccusationsofsecessionistintentionsagainstsomeprominentpoliticiansandpublicfig-uresinBosniaHerzegovinaandinSerbia.Sothepotentialforsharpinterethniccon-flictsalsoinMacedoniaandforfurtherfragmentationintheex-Yugoslavspacehasnotyetbeenfullyexhausted.Moreoveramongthesixinternationallyrecognizedex-YugoslavstatesthereisstillanumberofunresolvedtouchyissuesofsuccessionincludingcontestedsegmentsofinterstatebordersonlandontheDanubeandintheAdriaticSea.AmongotherpoliticalissuesintheBalkansthesituationofunderprivilegedethnicminoritiese.g.theRomasandofatleastahalfmillionrefugeesanddisplacedpersonsmustbementioned.SEEhasrecentlywitnessedmassunrestviolentdemonstra-tionsandvandalismprovokedbyeconomictroubleshighunemploymentandpoliticaldissatisfactioninAlbaniaSerbiaCroatiaandGreece.Evenworsesocialandpoliti-calconditionsexisthoweverelsewhereintheBalkans.Greecehasbeenalsounderstrongpressureofillegalmigrationprin-cipallyfromtheMiddleEast.Fromamongupto120.000-150.000estimatedirregularmigrantsp.a.acrosstheMediterraneanatleastathirdreachesEUviaSouthEasternEurope.Theincreasedflowhasledtotrou-blesandsubsequentmilitarizationalongtheshortEUexternalborderbetweenGreeceandTurkey.OntheotherhandthenewestEUmemberstates-RomaniaandtoalesserextentBulgariaexportedpartoftheirownsocialinsecuritywhenalargenumberofRomasmigratedtoandoverstayedinillegalencampmentsinItalySpainandFrance.HarshpolicecountermeasuresproducedpoliticalripplesinEUinstitutionswhilethefloodofotherRomanianjobseekersinSpainposedadditionalproblemsforthefreedomofmovementofpersonswithinEU.SEEhasbeenexposedtoanumberofothernon-militarythreatstosecurity.SomeofthesehaveoriginatedinSEEitselfwhilesomehavebeenimportedfromorlinkedtosimilarphenomenainstatesoutsidetheregion.Prominentamongnon-militarythreatsareorganizedcrimeandcorruption.Accordingtosomeanalyststheyhavethepotentialofbecomingthemostdanger-ousthreattoregionalsecurity9.OrganizedcrimefromtheBalkansoftenincooperationwithItalianandotherextraregionalcriminalorganizationshasbeenactiveinbankandpostofficerobberiesinvariousformsofsmugglingandillegaltraffickingincludinghumanshumanorgansdrugsarmscounter-feitgoodstobaccoproductsetc.IthasbeenestimatedthataboutthreequartersofheroinmostlyfromAfghanistanandaconsider-ablepartofcocainefromLatinAmericaentersWesternEuropeviaSEE.ThesinglebiggestsourceoflightweaponsillegallyexportedfromSEEhasbeenreportedlytheRussian-protectedandinternationallyunrec-ognizedRepublicofTransnistriainMoldova.SincetheterminationoflastwarstheBalkanspreviouslyahotbedofpoliticalterrorismhavelostagooddealofthisnoto-rietyandbecomemainlyatransitorhidingarea.Amongrealorpotentialnon-militarysecuritythreatswhichaffectSEEandotherpartsofEuropeoneshouldmentionalsonat-uralandecologicaldisastersclimatechangeandenergysecurity.Partsoftheregionhaverecentlysufferedfromdevastatingfloodsandforestfires.TheRussian-UkrainiansquabblesovergastransithaveexposedthefragilityofenergysecurityinSEE.Theinter-ruptionofgassupplyinwinter20082009hitworstthecitydwellersinBH.ThealreadyhighdependenceofSEEonimportsofcar-bonfuelsislikelytoincreasesoon.Severalcompetingprojectsoftransregionalgaspipe-linesnotablytheEU-supportedNabuccoandtheRussian-promotedSouthernStreamenvisioncrossingSEE.Ifandwhenimple-mentedtheseverydemandingundertakingswillstronglyimpactenergysecuritynotonlyofSEEbutalsooftheEUatlarge10.SouthEasternEuropeandthewiderinternationalcommunityThefrozenpoliticalconflictsinCyprusandinMoldovaaswellasthosebetweenSerbiaandKosovoMacedoniaandGreecehavetestifiedtotheBalkanelitesinabilitytofindpragmaticsolutionsthroughcompromiseandmutualaccommodationandtoassureregionalstability.Sofarnoneoftheregionallygeneratedinitiativesofenhancedcooperationhasprovenviable.Theeffortstoinfusefromoutsidecooperationwithandamongtheregionsstatesseemtobemorepromising11.Since1990stheseeffortshaveresultedinawebofinternationalorganiza-tionsalmostexclusivelyWesterninorigin.ThiswebhasincludedtheStabilityPactforSouth-EasternEuropeCEFTASECINATOsPartnershipforPeaceSouthEastEuropeInitiativeetc.TheinternationalrecordofdealingwiththesourcesofinstabilityandinsecurityinSEEhashighlightedthecomplexityofitsproblemswhichdefyquickunidimen-sionalsolutionsandtheunderestimatedlinksbetweentheregionssecurityandthesecu-rityinotherpartsofEurope.ThereisaneedforarobustinternationalactiontoimprovetheeconomicandsocialsituationinmostoftheBalkanswhileavoidingtheviciouscircleoftheregionsexternaldependency.Foreignmilitaryandpolicepresencewillstillbeneededprobablyformanyyearstocome.TheinternationalcommunitysabilitytohelpmanagenumerousproblemscouldbebestenhancedbyfurtherstrengtheningEUsandNATOsroleandinfluenceinSEE.TheNATOStrategicConceptof2011stressestheaimoffacilitatingEuro-AtlanticintegrationoftheWesternBalkansinordertoensurelastingpeaceandstabilitybasedondemocraticvaluesregionalcooperationandgoodneighbourlyrelations12.InspiteofnumeroushurdlestheEUandNATOhaveactivelyfosteredmultifacet- 62TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013edregionalcooperationparticularlyamongtheex-Yugoslavstates13.Since2008thenetoftheEUstabilizationandassociationagreementshasbeenextendedtocovertheentireregionexceptKosovo.Theseagree-mentshaveservedasstepsinbringingclosertoandeventuallyadmittingallremainingBalkanstatesintotheranksofEUmembers.In2011thepre-accessionnegotiationshavebeenconcludedwithCroatiaandafterverylongwaitingTurkeyobtainedthestatusofanofficialcandidatebutnegotiationshavebeenstalledmainlyduetotheCyprusproblem.SerbiaandMontenegroenteredtherankofcandidatesin2012MacedoniascandidacybothtoEUandNATOremainsinlimboduetoGreecesridiculousvetooverMacedoniasname.AlbaniaBosniaHerzegovinaandalsoKosovowithinthecontextofUNSecurityCouncilResolutionno.124499remainpotentialfuturecandidates.TheadmissionofCroatiaandAlbaniaintoNATOin2009alsocontributedtostabilizationintheregion.TheNATOsummitinChicagoinMay2012reconfirmedMacedoniascan-didacywelcomedMontenegrosprogresstowardsNATOmembershippraisedBosniaHerzegovinasmembershipaspirationsexpressedsupportforSerbiasEuro-AtlanticintegrationandfortheEU-facilitatedBelgrade-PrishtinadialogueaswellasforfurtherconsolidationofpeaceandstabilityinKosovo.Inthedecadestocomethepro-cessofEUandNATOenlargementindeedprovidesahopeforprogressofSEEregionalsecurity.Howeveranoteofcautionwouldbeinorder.TheforeseeninclusionoftheentireregionintotheEuro-Atlanticintegra-tionwouldbeclearlyinsufficient.TherecordshowsthatdespitesimultaneousbelongingofbothstatestotheEuropeanUnionittookGreatBritainandIrelandmorethanthreedecadestoreachasymbolicreconciliationandconcludethecompromiseGoodFridayAgreementonUlster.AfterasimilarlylongsimultaneousmembershipinEUandNATOtheconflictbetweenGreatBritainandSpainoverGibraltarstillremainsunresolved.SixtyyearsoftwocountriesmembershipinNATOhavenotstoppedthearmsracebetweenGreeceandTurkeyandbroughtaresolutionoftheCyprusproblemcloser.TheadmissionoftheRepublicofCyprusintheEUdidnotadvanceitsresolutioneitherandperhapsmadeitevenmoredifficult.Todaymorethan60yearssincethecountrysjoiningNATOandtheEuropeanCommunitiestherelationsbetweenthetwomainnationalcommunitiesinBelgiumareworsethantheyhaveeverbeen.Etcetc.Thehistoricrecordalsoshowsthatinthe1860slate1870s-early1880sin1908-19131914-19211937-19451947-1949mid-1970slate1980sin1991-1995and1999-2003theflare-upsofviolencehavealmostregularlypuncturedtheperiodsofrelativepeaceintheBalkans.ThelasttimepeacedidnotcomefromwithintheregionbutwasimposedbytheWesternmilitaryintervention.Theunderbrushofnationalismintoleranceandintercommunalhatredunfor-tunatelystillsurvivesintheBalkans.Thisiswhyinordertobreakwiththenegativepatternofthelast150yearstheBalkanelitesneedtoshowmuchwiserandresponsiblebehaviour.Mostcountriesintheregionhaveundergoneradicaltransformationoftheirpoliticalorders.Insteadofauthoritarianandamongthemalsototalitarianregimesinthelate1980stheregioniscomposedtodayofinvariousdegreesdemocraticpoliti-calsystems.Anddemocraciesalmostneverfightwarsamongthemselves.MoreovertheconsiderabledemilitarizationinmostBalkanstateshasgreatlyreducedtheirwarfightingcapabilities.TheBalkaneliteshavehopefullyalsolearnedfromthenegativeexperienceofthelasttwodecadesandofitsconsequences.Unlikein1990-1991thehottestpotentialtroublespotsintheWesternBalkansaretodayunderinternationalsurveillanceintheformi.a.ofpresenceofforeigntroopsciviliancontrollersandtwodefactoprotec-torates.Inadditionthecountriesoftheregionarerecipientsofconsiderablefinancialassis-tanceanddevelopmentalloans.Thereisalsoaweboftheabove-mentionedregionalcoop-erationschemesincludingthoseinsecurityanddefensematters.Allthisprovidesgoodreasonsformoderatelyoptimisticexpecta-tionthattheBalkanswillonedaybecomearegionofdemocracyprosperityandstabilityenhancingandnotdiminishingthesecurityonandaroundtheEuropeancontinent.1ZbigniewBrzezinski.1997.Chapter3EuroasianBalkanspp.7-2529-4599-108.InTheGrandChessboardNewYorkBasicBooks.2JohnsenWilliam.1995.DecipheringtheBalkanenigmaUsingHistorytoInformPolicy.CarlislePaStrategicStudiesInstituteU.S.ArmyWarCollege.Chapters2in3pp.9-60.3BlankStephenJ.ed..1995YugoslaviaswarsTheproblemfromhell.CarlislePaStrategicStudiesInstituteU.S.ArmyWarCollege.Chapters2356.4BurgL.Steven.1995.YugoslaviaswarsTheproblemfromhell.p.p.4786.5AltmannFranz-Lothar.2004.Regionaleconomicproblemsandprospects.InTheWesternBalkansMovingon.ChaillotPaperno.70.ParisInstituteforSecurityStudies.p.p.6984.6BattJudy.2004.Introductionthestabili-zationintegrationdilemma.InTheWesternBalkansMovingon.ChaillotPaperno.70.ParisInstituteforSecurityStudies.p.p.719.7VasconcelosAlvaroed.2009.TheEuropeanSecurityStrategy2003-2008BuildingonCommonInterests.ParisEUISS.pp.38-4164-67.8ClementSophia.1997.TheInternationalCommunityResponseinConflictPreventionintheBalkans.ChaillotPaperno.30.ParisInstituteforSecurityStudies.p.p.46-74.9Lt.gen.BlagojeGrahovac.2012.GeopoliticsOrganizedCrimeandCorruptionintheEarly21stCenturywithReferencetotheBalkans.InEuropeanPerspectivesJournalonEuropeanPerspectivesoftheWesternBalkans.Vol.4No.16.LokapriMengeuCentreforEuropeanPerspective.10AltmannFranz-Lothar.2011.EnergyprocurementsecurityintheEuropeanUnion.InInternationalconferenceEuropesenergysecuritychallengesandprospects.LjubljanaEuro-AtlanticCouncilofSlovenia.pp.37-41.11DelevicMilica.2007.Ch.23RegionalcooperationintheWesternBalkans.ChaillotPaperno.104.ParisInstituteforSecurityStudies.pp.31-72.12StrategicConceptNATOBrussels2011p.31.13RupnikJacques.2011.TheBalkansasaEuropeanquestion.InRupnikJacquesed.2011.TheWesternBalkansandtheEUTheHourofEurope.ChaillotPapersno.126.ParisEUISS.pp.17-30. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201363On1820September2012inTrencinSLOVAKIAtheExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalCentreofExcellenceorganizedtheNATOEODDemonstrationsTrials2012DT12.Thepurposeofthiseventwastofacilitateinteractionbetweentheindus-tryoperationalcommunityandacademiainordertoimproveknowledgeandtoshareexperienceamongEODIEDDsocietyasso-ciatedwiththeconflictinAfghanistanandemergingterroristthreat.Duringthelastfewyearsthreatofter-roristattacksdirectedatthemilitaryandcivil-ianpopulationhasconsiderablyincreased.Inresponseanumberofmeasureshavebeentakentocounterthosethreats.TheDT12wasaneventsponsoredbytheNATOEmergingSecurityChallengesDivisionandsupportedbytheSlovakMinistryofDefense.Itisaperfectexampleofaconcertedefforttotakeonnewchallenges.OrganizingbiennialeventsforexpertsfromindustryandmilitarysuchasEODCIEDconferencesdemonstrationsandtri-alshasbecomeanexcellenttraditionwhichhelpstheentireEODrelatedentityunder-standeachotherbyexchanginginformation.BringingtogethertheoperationalarmamentandtechnologicalEODrelatedentitiesfromNATOPfPMDnationsisconsideredaregu-larbasicneedforfuturework.Equallyimpor-tantissuewastoopenspacefordiscussionsattheconferenceandsubsequentseminarstoanalyzetheexistinggapsintheEODareawithfocusonUrgentMilitaryRequirementsandtoproposepossiblewayahead.TheumbrellatopicofalleventswithinDT12wasDetection.Thesesupplementarymeet-ingsgaveexcellentopportunitiesfordiscus-sionsnotonlyonparticularthemesbuttheygaveachancetoshareandexplainperspec-tivesfromacademicmilitaryandproducerspointsofview.DT12primarilyaNATOeventwasopenedtoallpartnerframeworksandlike-wisetotheNATOstructures.TheJointForceTrainingCommanddelegationledbyMGPavolMACKOtheJFTCCommandertookanactivepartattheeventprovingveryclosecooperationwiththeNATOEODCOEnotonlyintheISAFpre-deploymenttrainingbutatalllevelstoemphasizetheexchangeofinformationandknowledgethroughamutualparticipationinmajorprojects.Duringathreedayeventwithlivedemonstrationsofrecenttechnologiessup-plementedbystaticexhibitionsandmeetingsmorethan200expertsSMEsguestsfrom25NATOandPfPcountriestookpartandatleast1200visitorssawstaticexhibitionsandlivedemonstrations.Morethan50worldleadingcompaniesintheEODdomainfrom18countriescontributedtothesuccessofthisNATOEODevent.Duringthelivedemonstrationspro-ducersandvendorstooktheopportunitytopresenttheirproductsinrealfieldconditions.ThecapabilitiesofpresentedequipmentweredemonstratedbytheproducersandvendorsinthefollowingcategoriesROVsexpectedtoconducttasksindifficultgroundconditionsIdentificationofhazardousmaterialsusingX-raydevicesandhanddetectorsOtherdevicesmachinesandEODtools.VeryimportantandinterestingwasthedemonstrationofROVscapabilities.ThisNATOEODDemonstrationsTrials2012LtColPiotrBednarczykDeputyHeadofTechnologyDevelopmentDepartmentEODCentreofExcellenceColJaroslavBielenyDirectorofEODCentreofExcellence 64TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013kindoftestsdemonstratedusefulnessofvariouscategoriesofequipmenttoperformspecifictasks.Oneofthefuturesolutionsistodeveloponebasicplatformandwithadditionaltoolsdeliveringimprovedtacticalflexibilityandbettersustainability.Aperfectrobotwouldbesmallpowerfulandmanoeu-vrablewithalltoolsanddetectorsexecutingtasksindependently.ManufacturersputalotofemphasisonsafetymeasureswhileincreasingtechnicalequipmentspecificallyinCBRNarea.Moreoverevensingletoolslikehookandlinesetreportedthedevelop-mentprogressofsomedetailsbutcrucialforoperators.AresultoflivedemonstrationscouldbesummarizedinthiswellknownfactWithoutreallypreciseindividualtrainingwithnewtechnologiesandequipmentitisverychallengingtodoanyexcellentjob.ConferenceandtheSeminargaveaspacetobriefanddiscussvisionsandchal-lengeswithintheEODdimensionbetweenacademicsindustryandmilitarySMEs.Manychallengeswereidentifiedper-tinenttoEODtrainingEODoperationsandverificationoftheEODEquipmentbuttheonepresentedbelowrelatedtothetechnol-ogyisoftheutmostimportanceThelong-lastingchallengeisuniversalityversusspecializationasthereisallthetimeafightbetweenuniversalbroadscaledequipmentwithlowersensitivityandspecializednarrowscaledequipmentwithhighersensitivity.Ifweaddperspectivesofmulti-functionalitymodularityandmobilitythendemandsbecomenever-ending.Fromthemilitarypointofviewtheequipmentintegrationintoamobilesystemcompositestructuresdemountableexchangeableareessentialforitsmobility.DT12provedthatcompaniesarefocusingonuniversalityandmulti-functionalityoftheirproductsbutthechallengetoreachcompatibilityamongproductsmadebydifferentcompaniesstillremains.Thesummaryofchallengesresult-edfrombriefingsanddiscussionswithinDT12reflectsalsoourunderstandingand TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201365thinkingaboutcurrentchallengesandfuturetrendsandtendenciesintheEODarea.UnderstandingthismessageandapplyingittothepresenceitisbelievedthatthewayaheadintheEODareawillbeacombinationofprogressandeffortinfollowingareasNewalternativemethodsofdetectingwillbeinventedFocusonequipmentproducerswillmoveclosertouniversaloneswithbroaddetectionscaleFurtherdevelopmentofverificationprocesswillbeachievedWelldevelopedandmissiontailoredtrainingwillbeinplaceAmechanismforquickimplementationofprogressintopracticewillbeimplementedDecreasingoftechnologydependenceincl.maintenancedependencywillbeconsideredasawaytoeliminateownweaknessSummarySufficientEODandespeciallyIEDDtechnologiesalreadyexistandmajorityofthemareintegratedintonationalarmedforc-es.ThesuccessofindividualtechnologiesinmostcasesisdirectlyassociatedwiththefinalusersexpertiseandtheirTTPsapplied.TheavailabilityofcertainEODequipmentontheworldwidemarketsceneprovidesmilitaryEODIEDDSMEswithachoicewhichshouldbeshapedbyasearchfocusedoncomparisonandverifyingofparametersspecifiedbyindividualcompanies.Areaofexplosivesdetectionremainsthemostchal-lengingforfurtherresearch.Newmethodsandtechnicalthoughthavetobedevelopedinordertobebeneficialforall. 66TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013FormanypeopletheIslandofCyprusandtheRepublicofCyprusRoCaretour-istandholidaydestinationsbutforlocalGreekCypriotsandTurkishCypriotsfromthesocalledTurkishRepublicofNorthernCyprusTRNCitisabasicsourceofdisputetwodifferentcommunitieslivingtogetherorrathernexttoeachotherwithdifferentopinionsonhowtheCypruspeaceprocessshouldunfold.InbetweentheRoCandtheTRNCthereisaBufferZonetheareabetweentwoceasefirelines1974mannedbyUNbluehelmetssince1964.ButwhatisthesituationsurroundingtheislanditselfandaffectingthetemperatureofthebathingwatersoftheAphroditesislandTherearemanymorethanjustinter-nalissuesaffectingCyprusanditsconnec-tionstoothereasternMediterraneancoun-tries.FinanciallyalthoughCyprushasfoundrichsuppliesofnaturalgasinitsExclusiveEconomicZonesEEZeconomicallyitisstilltightlydependentandconnectedtoGreekbanksandtheirsolvencyproblems.GreeceasthemainsupporterandstrategicpartnerofCyprushassignificantfinancialtroublesandquestionsremainaboutachangeofitscurrencyregime.CyprusasthemainholderofGreekpublicandprivatebondswasalsohitbytheGreekfinancialrestruc-turing.ThetwobiggestbanksBankofCyprusandLaikiBankarebelievedtoneedatleast5billionEurostorecapitalizethem-selvesinaccordancewithBaselIIIrule.TheTroikarepresentativesofEUCommissionEuropeanCentralBankandIMFispres-entontheislandtryingtodefinehowmuchEUbailoutmoneyCyprusneeds.Marketsarespeculatingthatitmighteven10billionEurosbutStandardandPoorsRatingagencyannouncedinJulythatthebailoutbillcouldreachupto15billionEuros.Takingintoaccounttheexistingandfuturefinancingneedsitisover80ofGDP.SurprisinglyCyprusalsoplayedtheRussiancardmakingmightyRussianfinancialplayersevenricher.ThewayCyprusthinksandweighsfinancialoptionscreatedgaverisetodiscussionanddiscontentwithintheEUasCyprusisafully-fledgedmemberoftheEurozone.HoweverwhatmakessummerheatintheMediterraneanevenhotteristhesitu-ationaroundtheislandandexternalrelation-shipswithotherstates.CyprusisanEUandEurozonememberbutnotamemberofNATO.OntheotherhanditsmainsupporterGreeceisalsointheEUandEurozoneaswellinNATO.ItsrivalforinfluenceovernorthernCyprusisTurkeyalsoaNATOmemberstateandadisappointedcandidateforEUmembershipfacedwithfrozenacces-sionchapters.TurkeyactsasapowerfulinformalleaderoftheArabspringandservesasaninfluentialrolemodelasasecularstateintheIslamicworld.DrillingandseparationoftheExclusiveEconomicZonesEEZintheeasternMediterraneanSeaRoCreferstoTurkishthreatsasunacceptable.ChangeinIsraeli-Turkishrelationsheraldnewerafriendship.ThegovernmentoftheRepublicofCyprushassignedanagreementtodelineateitsExclusiveEconomicZonewithIsraelandEgyptwithaviewtoexploitanypossiblenaturalgasandoilreservesinitsEEZgivingCyprushopeforhugefutureincome.Asimi-laragreementhasbeensignedwithLebanonbuttheLebaneseParliamenthasnotyetratifieditbecauseoflargerdemandsoftheseabed.ThefirstroundoflicensingresultedingrantingrightsforHouston-basedNobleEnergyforexploratorydrillinginCyprusEEZblock12southofCyprusroughly120kmfromLimassol.NobleEnergystarteddrillinginSeptember2011andtheinitialdatathatemergedfromtheexploratorydrill-ingandtheevaluationcheckscarriedoutindicatedtheexistenceofanaturalgasres-ervoirrangingfrom5to8trillioncubicfeet.Inthesecondroundoflicensingthisyearbidsweresubmittedfor9ofthe12offshoreblockscomprisingtheCypriotEEZ.TurkeysaysanoffshoregassearchbytheGreekCypriotgovernmentfloutstherightsoftheTurkishCypriotsandinApril2012beganexploratorydrillingofitsown.Lastyearitsentawarship-escortedresearchvesselsouthofCypruswhilePrimeMinisterRecepTayyipErdoganwarnedthathisgovernmentwouldretaliateevenmorestronglytoanyfurthersearchformineraldepositsaroundPoliticalEffectsofGlobalWarmingintheMediterraneanSeaistheweathertheonlyfactorbehindtheeasternMediterraneanheatAssoc.prof.Ing.PavelBUKAVice-rectorforEducationArmedForcesAcademyLiptovskMikulSlovakiaCaptIng.MichalHARNDEKMilitaryPublicInformationOfficerUNFICYPCyprus TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201367theisland.TurkeyhascontinuouslyputindoubtCyprussovereignrighttocarryoutexploratorydrillinginitsEEZclaimingthatthewealthfromnaturalgasbelongstobothcommunitiesontheisland.TurkeyandIsraelrelationsnewIsraelandCyprusgasfriendshipTurkeyandIsraeloncealliesarenowdiplomaticallyestranged.Thiswasachievedgraduallybutreacheditspeakon31May2010whenanIsraelinavalcommandoconductedadeadlyraidonaGazaboundTurkishaidshiptheMaviMarmarakill-ingnineactivistsandinjuringmanyothers.Turkeyrepeatedlyrequestedaformalapol-ogybutofficialsfromIsraelcalledtheMaviMarmaramissionaclearprovocationstatingthatIsraelhasarighttoprotectthelivesofitssoldiersandhasnoreasontoapologize.ThischangeinrelationshiptogetherwiththenewfriendshipofCypruswithIsraelwithregardstoitsEEZintheMediterraneanheightenedtensionswithTurkey.AccordingtomediareportsIsraeliPrimeMinisterBenjaminNetanyahumetwiththePrimeMinisterofCyprusDemetrisChristofiasinFebruary2012andofferedtoassumeallcon-structionexpensesforagasextractionplant.InexchangeIsraeliswouldbecontractedforall10000positionsnecessarytomanthefacility.TheemployeesfamilieswouldalsoliveontheGreekpartoftheisland.Therewassomespeculationthattheywouldbeaccompaniedby20000Israelisoldierstosafeguardthecivilianworkforceandfam-ilymembersaccordingtoasourceclosetotheGreekCypriotgovernment.Israellaterdeniedthesereports.ChristofiasreportedlyalsoaskedNetanyahutoconvinceIsraelibusinessleaderstohaltallIsraeliinvestmentinTurkishCyprus.RelationsbetweenCyprusandIsraelseemtogenerallybeinverselyrelatedtothosebetweenIsraelandTurkey.TurkeycontinuestoofficiallyinsistthatIsraelshouldapologizeforitsraidontheMaviMarmarashippayfinancialcompensa-tionandlifttheGazablockade.IsraelIranrelationshipsTopicturehowcomplicatedtheregion-alrelationshipsarethereisnobetterexamplethantraditionalfriendshipbetweenCyprusandSyriathatCypruswantstokeep.OntheoppositesitethereisarelationbetweenSyriaandIranthatisenemyofCyprusnewallyIsrael.WhatmakestheCypruspositiononthepoliticalmapevenmorecomplicatedarerelationsbetweenIsraelandIran.ThenewfriendshiperawithIsraelcouldeasilymakeittargetforHezbollahfighters.Thehistori-calrelationshipbetweenIsraelandIranhasneverbeenidealfollowingcallsbyIransPresidentMahmoudAhmadinejadtoeradi-cateIsraelfromtheworldmap.InlightofIraniannuclearresearchwhichisasubjectofinterestfortheUNnuclearwatchdogIAEAInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyIranisstillclaimingthatitsnuclearresearchispurelyforcivilianpurposesandforener-gyproduction.GiventhatrecentchecksofIraniannuclearfacilitiesinParchinrevealedthepresenceofenrichedradioactivematerialto27thereisaseriouspossibilitythatitisjustaquestionoftimebeforeIranpro-ducesenoughenricheduraniumtoproduceanatomicweaponusingoldtechnologyofuraniumpurificationincentrifuges.IranhassufferedfromEUembargoesonitscrudeoilexportsandsignificantsetbacksinitsforeignpolicy.Israeldoesntwanttostayoutofthesecuritygameandwiththebigbrotherbehinditsbackittriestostayinformedandstrategicallyatleastonestepaheadofitspotentialrivals.AsrecentlyasJune2012therewasareportthatRussia-basedinternetsecuritycompanyKasperskyhadfoundabrandnewvirusnamedFlameattackingmachinesinIranandelsewhereintheMiddleEast.ItsoriginhasnotbeenidentifiedbutIsraelsvicepremierfueledspeculationthathiscountryknownforitstechnologicalinno-vationandtirelesscampaignagainstIranssuspectnuclearprogramunleashedit.ThevirusstolelargequantitiesofinformationfromvariousIraniangovernmentagenciesbutapparentlyalsodisrupteditsoilexportsbyshuttingdownoilterminals.Thesitua-tionisunclearatthemomentandthenewestIAEAreportsandsatellitepicturesprovethatIranhasclearedanareaattheParchinnuclearsite.Agencyinspectorsfoundeverythingsuspiciouslyclearwithnosignsofpreviousbuildingsorotherformernuclearfacilities.IsraelstaysonalerttestingtheworldsanditsowncitizensreactiononapossiblepreventiveattackonIranbearinginmindtheinevitableconsequencesfollowinganairstrike.Nuclearactionhasnotbeenmentionedyetbutthereisspeculationofpreventiveactionandthispossibilityistreatedasapos-siblesolutionnomattertheconsequences.TheIran-Israelissueearnedthemen- 68TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013tionbyIsraelipresidentShimonPeresasanopenwarwithIsraelpointingthefingeratIranandHezbollahforthelastbombattackinBulgariathatkilledfiveIsraelis.Cyprusisalsointhegameasa24-yearoldLebanesesuspectwithSwedishpassportwasarrestedandsuspectedofplanningattacksonIsraeliinterestsinCyprusmirroringthebehaviorofamandetainedforaterroristattackintheBulgariancityofBurgasthismonth.CivilwarinSyriaWithintensivefightsintheSyriancitiesofAleppoHomsandsubsequentlyDamascustheUNandotherworldorga-nizationsreportafullscalecivilwarinPresidentBasharalAssadsSyria.Syriahasthefourthlargeststockpileofchemicalweap-onssuchasmustardgasSaringasandVXnervegasintheworld.USPresidentBarackObamawarnedAssadthathewouldbeheldaccountablebytheinternationalcom-munityifhisgovernmentmadethetragicmistakeofusingitschemicalweapons.AssadsregimeclaimsthatSyriawillonlyuseitschemicalweaponsifitfacesexternalaggressionbutwillneverusethemagainstitscivilians.TherebelFreeSyrianArmyFSAlaunchedanewoffensivetogaincontrolovertheareaandbiginternationalplay-erssuchastheUnitedStatesFranceandotherEuropeancountriescontinuetoopposeAssadsregime.RussiapursuingitsowninterestsremainsthemainsupporteroftheAssadgovernmentprotectingitsarmstradeandtheonlyMediterraneannavalbaseinTartusfortheBlackSeafleet.ThismonthforthefirsttimeinhistoryRussianmilitaryshipsrefueledintheCypriotportofLimassol.ThisgaverisetorumorsaboutCyprusandRussianavalcooperationinlightofapossiblechangeofpoliticalregimeinSyriaandensuinglossofthenavalbasethere.GenerallywhatthesituationwillbelikeinthedaystocomeinSyriaisnotclearyetbutAssadsregimeeventuallylostitsmainsupportersandforthemainplayersthefalloftheregimeisonlyaquestionoftime.Cyprusisgettingreadyforadmittingupto200000refugeesandalreadyrequestedtheEUforfinancialsupport.TurkishEUrelationshipsduringCyprusEUPresidencyTurkishandEUrelationsaretaintedbythefirmstanceofTurkeytowardstheRoContheexplorationofitsEEZcreatingnega-tivetensionsbetweenTurkeyandtheEUaswell.SofarnoonefromtheEUhasofficiallycriticizedTurkeysconstantnegativestancetowardsCyprusbutvoicesarerequestingamorecooperativeapproachandlesssaber-rattlingespeciallyintodaysenvironmentandgivenitsEUcandidacy.TheopeningofnewchaptersintheEUaccessiontalkscouldbeoneofafewincentives.TherearevoicesfromTurkeycommentingonCyprusEUPresidencyasabananapeeloftheEUorusingotheradjectivestodescribearealitythattheydonotlike.Turkeycurrentlyhasabout30000troopsontheislandapresencethatprovokesparticularuneaseintheGreeksouth.InMaytheUnitedNationsSecretaryGeneralBanKi-moonscrappedplansforaninternationalconferenceonCyprussayingthetwosideshadfailedtomakeadequateprogressonproposalstobringthemtogeth-erunderafederalpower-sharingumbrella.DespitethefactthatTurkeyhasthreatenedtofreezeitsrelationshipwiththeEUduringCypruspresidencynonegativeresultshavebeenregisteredyetbutanyhopeofeasingtensionsislow.TheCypruspeaceprocessisprettymuchsimilar.TheprocessisfrozenwhilewaitingfortheendoftheCyprusEUPresidencyandnewpresidentialelectionsinCyprus.ConclusionCyprusasthethirdlargestislandintheMediterraneanSeahasaverystrategicloca-tionandisstillconsideredtobethelargestunsinkableaircraftcarrierclosetotheMiddleEast.PoliticallyithasadelicatepositionandmanyinternationalplayersaretryingtogainorkeepinfluenceonthisMediterraneanregion.ForconsiderationTurkeyisjust70kmnorthSyriaabout100kmeastLebanon120kmeastIsraelroughly150kmsoutheastandEgypt170kmsouth.ThenearestGreekislandofRhodesis250kmawayandthemainlandGreekcapitalofAthensis420kmaway.Cyprusisnearallofthesecountrieswithcomplicatedinternalissuesandinterrelations.AbasicquestioncouldbeabouttheneedfortheUNFICYPmissionbutconsideringthecurrentpoliticalsituationCyprusEUpresidencyandthepresidentialelectionsinFebruary2013therearemanyotherchallengesbeforethereunificationoftheislandandapeacefulsolution.Perhapsthereisnotenoughofpoliticalandpopularwilltoreunitetheislandleadingtotheeven-tualcreationoftwodifferentstatesasolu-tionoftencalledTurkeysPlanB.TurkishmediahavesuggestednorthernCyprusmightallowGreekCypriotstoreclaimpropertyinVaroshaamilitaryenclaveofFamagustatownaseafronttownseizedbyTurkishtroopsin1974.ButisthistheendstatethatlocalCypriotshaveontheirmindCyprushasalwayshadmanyinter-nalandexternalissuesandthisalsocon-tinuesnowadays.Itisaveryspecificenvi-ronmentinafastchangingworldwherethefinancialcrisisisjustasymptomratherthanacauseofthoseproblemsbutmakesthepositionofCyprusinthehotMediterraneanwatersevenmoredelicate.AftertheArabspringandfollowingthefalloflongtermdictatorshipsitisobvi-ousthattheregionhasnewdynamicsandCyprushastokeeptrackofitasaplayer.Ithasbeen53yearssincetheislandofCyprusgaineditsindependencefromtheUKin1960.Duetoethnicclashesandapoliticalcrisisin1963betweenthetwocommunitiesofGreeksandTurkstheUNestablishedapeacekeepingmissioncalledUNFICYPUNPeacekeepingForceinCyprusin1964.TheUNFICYPhasamandatetopreventtherecurrenceoffightingandcontributetomaintenanceandrestorationoflawandorderaswellasareturntonormalcondi-tions.Hostilitiescontinueduntil1974whenaGreekmilitaryjuntaseizedpowerbyforce.ATurkishpeaceoperationcalledAttilaledtoamilitaryinvasionofNorthCyprusinthesummerof1974andtheestablishmentoftheBufferZone.Nowadaysthereare860militarypeacekeeperswithsome69policeelement.NoticeAllviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofandshouldnotbeattributedtoUnitedNationsPeacekeepingForceinCyprus. JacekCieniuchisaStaffOfficerFiscalandTreasuryattheJointForceTrainingCentre.PreviouslyemployedintheBREBankS.A.ComerzbankGrouphespecializedincorporatebankingandperformedafullrangeofresponsibilities.Thoseincludedacquiringnewcorporateclientsconductofcreditanalysesactingasaforeignexchangeanddepositsdealerclosingcurrencyexchangeanddeposittransactionsandmanymore.In2004hebecameamemberoftheJointForceTrainingCentreJFTCImplementationTeamandwasassignedtocreateanddeveloptheBudgetFinanceBranchwithintheJFTCstructure.DuringtheearlydaysoftheJFTChewassolelyresponsibleforexecutionofalltheJFTCfinancialactivitiesperformingtheentirespectrumoffiscalcontractingandbudgetaryduties.AstheJFTCBudgetFinanceBranchdevelopedhewasrecruitedtothepermanentNATOstaffasaNATOcivilianA2gradeStaffOfficerFiscalTreasury.HeisalsoaDeputyBranchHeadandactsasalocalconsultantforthetheJFTCstaffwithregardtoCentralizedNATOAutomatedFinancialSystemCNAFS.ThesystemwasimplementedattheJFTCin2009andJacekCieniuchwasinchargeofthelocalimplementationproject.JacekCieniuchgraduatedfromtheUniversityofSzczecinPolandDepartmentofEconomicScienceandManagementwithmastersdegreeandhonourablemention.Hismajorwasforeigntrade.AfewotherselectedachievementsincludeIn2004hewasformallyexaminedandcertifiedbythePolishMinistryofNationalTreasurytositinthesupervisoryboardsofstateownedcompanies.In2005hecompletedtheInternationalDefenseManagementCourseIDMCattheNavalPostgraduateSchoolinMontereyUSA.Theprogrammefocusedonresourcesmanagementissuesandsystemanalysisandmodelsdevelopmentinsupportofthedecisionmakingprocess.In2008hepassedwithhonorstheadvancedInternationalPublicSectorAccountancyStandardsIPSASprogramme.HealsocompletednumerousinternalcoursessponsoredbyNATOincludingwiderangeofcoursesontheCentralizedNATOAutomatedFinancialSystemCNAFSandResourceManagement.In2011JacekCieniuchwasqualifiedtotheeliteyearlyNATOExecutiveDevelopmentProgrammeNEDPandcompleteditin2012.JacekCieniuchStaffOfficerFiscalandTreasuryattheJointForceTrainingCentreTHEPEOPLENATOExecutiveDevelopmentProgrammeNEDPisaprestigiousnine-monthprogrammedesignedforNATOciviliansatmidtouppermanagementlevelsA2-A5.Throughrigorous2stageselectionprocessthegroupof20-24participantsischosenfromlargenumberofapplicants.Theprogrammehelpstheparticipantsintheirpersonaldevelopmentanddevelopmentoftheirmanagementskills.ItalsovastlyenhancestheirknowledgeofNATOaswellasgivesaninsightintoarapidlychangingworld.AnotheraimoftheprogrammeistobuildanddevelopanetworkofinternationalcivilianswithtalentandpotentialfromacrosstheAlliance.TheNEDPconsistsof5residentialmodulesrunattheEuropeanSchoolofManagementinLondonNATODefenceCollegeNDCinRomeNATOSchoolOberammergauNSOHeadquartersSupremeAlliedCommandTransformationHQSACTinNorfolkandNATOHeadquartersinBrussels.Theprogrammealsoincludes4distantlearningmodulesandlastsfor9monthsintotal.TheNEDPissponsoredbytheAssistantSecretaryGeneralforExecutiveManagement.TheacademicpartneroftheprogrammeisTheEuropeanSchoolofManagementESCPEurope.Withsupportofnumer-ousrecognizedexternalacademicsandNATOsubjectmatterexpertsinvolvedintheprogrammeESCPensureshighestcontentqualityandfacilitatesthelearn-ingprocessfortheparticipants.Inthecourseoftheprogrammetheparticipantsaresplitintoprojectgroupsofsix.Eachgroupisassignedtheprojecttoworkon.TheprojectsarefocusedonspecificreallifechallengesexperiencedacrossvariousNATOareasofactivity.Eachprojectgroupisexpectedtodevelopanimplementablesolutionpackagetotheproblemgivendescribeitinthecomprehensivereportandprovidethepublicpresentationfollowedbyques-tionsandanswersession.ThepresentationsaregiveninNATOHQandattractlargeaudiencesthatincludeshighlevelNATOleaders.TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201369 70TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013Throughinternationalacknowledge-mentofitsacademicrecordandtheindi-vidualachievementsofitsalumnifromthebattlefieldsofAfghanistantothecorridorsofBrusselsandNorfolktheCzechDefenseLanguageInstituteDLIhasclearlydem-onstratedthatwithinjusttenyearsofitsfoundationithasmaturedintoanadaptableandthoroughlymoderninstitutionofwhichthecountrycanbeproud.InfactitstandstodayasakeycomponenttotherequirementsofnotjustNATOsEnglishLanguageForceGoalsbutthenationalrequirementsofboththeMinistryofDefenseMoDandthecoun-trysArmedForces.Inadditionandperhapsmoreimportantlyitisalsothedirectcontinu-ationofatraditionsetinmotionbyProfessorVilmMathesiusinCzechoslovakiasomeonehundredyearsago.ToelucidatethebirthofEnglishStudiesacrossthelandsoftheCzechstookplaceasfarbackastheyear1912whenMathesiusthelinguistphilologistandanglo-philewasappointedExtraordinaryProfessortothenewlyestablishedDepartmentofEnglishStudiesatCharlesUniversityinPrague.Ashisstudentsandprotgesquick-lybegantodominatetheEnglishStudiesDepartmentsofotherCzechandSlovakuniversitiesarevolutionwassecuredandthefoundationsoftheacademicheritagethatweenjoytodayinthisfieldwerelaid.Indeedby1926togetherwithhiscol-leaguesBohumilTrnkaBohuslavHavrnekJanMukaovskMathesiushadalreadyfoundedwhatwetodayconsiderourparent-age-thePragueLinguisticCircleCercleLinguistiquedePragueorwhatlateralsobecameknownasthePragueSchool.IndeedjustpriortoWorldWarIIasanexampleoftheimpactthiscirclemadeitcouldbesaidthattheyhadasstronganinfluenceonthedevelopmentofEnglishStudiesandthegeneralattitudetowardsteachingforeignlanguagesinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesasVirginiaWoolfsnotoriousBloomsburysethadontheliteraryworld.AswiththelatterforeigncontributorssuchasRomanJakobsonN.S.TrubetzkoyS.KarcevskijH.BeckerK.Bhlerwereasofequalimpor-tanceandsignificantlyenrichedthestudyoflinguistics.ThereasonforthisisthattheCirclehadcometogetherwithnothingotherthanthecommongoalofstrivingforexcellenceofcastingacriticallightontheacceptedlinguis-ticsofthetime.Furthermorethemembersdealtwiththevernacularatatimewhenthiswasvirginterritoryandpublishedprolifi-callyontheirsynchronousattitudetowardsit.Theyalsopursuedpragmaticgoalsnamely1structuralpositioni.e.thatnolanguagecomponentcanbefullyunderstoodifstudiedseparatelyandsansrelationtootherpartsofthelanguagesystemand2functionalposi-tionthatlanguageisnotanauto-telicsystembutonewithsignificantfunctionse.g.com-municativeones.Asaresulttheseactivitiesgaverisetowhatistodayreferredtoasthedevelopmentoffunctionalstructuralism.DepartmentalMoDLanguageEducationLiketodaytheperiodfrom1948onsawtheconceptoflanguageeducationaffect-EnglishStudiesintheTerritoryoftheCzechRepublicandtheHeritageoftheDefenseLanguageInstituteCol.LadislavChaloupskPh.D.ChristopherMcKeatingHelenaRlichovMSc.JaroslavGorkTheauthorsareassociatedwiththeDefenseLanguageInstituteoftheCzechArmedForces TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201371Ifwespokeadifferentlanguagewewouldperceiveasomewhatdifferentworld.LudwigWittgensteinedbyanoverbearinganddominatingpoliticalsituation-theinternationalsituationandthenationalsideliningofacademics.Acurtainhaddescendedacrossthecountryshithertointernationalperformanceonthestageoflin-guisticsandtheStatehadbeguntodictatethelanguagestobemastered.Bothcareersoldiersandcivilianemployeesalikehencebegantostudylanguageswithintheframe-workofsetcurriculaatthemilitaryandcivil-ianschoolsledbytheAntonnZpotockMilitaryAcademyinBrno.Veryquicklyhoweverasaresultofthecriticismthatthisprocessoflanguageeducationwastoofocusedonpracticinglanguagecomponentsregardlessofthefactastohowfarthestudentswereabletoapplythisknowledgeinrealcommunicationstheendofthe1950ssawafundamentalabout-turnandamovetowardsthepracticalaspectsoflanguageinuse.Aswitnessedbythereadaptedcontentsofcurriculaschedulesteachingmethodstestingoflanguageprofi-ciencyandteachingmaterialsthenewcon-cepthadaconsiderableandlastingeffectondepartmentallanguageeducation.DepartmentalMoDLanguageEducationduringthe1990sItwasnotuntil1989howeverthatthisconceptwasalignedwithmainstreamcontinentalEnglishStudiesandtheplethoraofchangesandresearchfromwhichthecountryhadabsenteditselfwerefaced.IntermsoflanguageeducationthemomentofcardinalimportancecamewithNATOBILCBureauforInternationalLanguageCoordinationmembershipandtheimple-mentationofNATOSTANAG6001stan-dardizationagreementonlanguageprofi-ciencylevels.ThenewpoliticalarrangementinEuropeafterthefalloftheIronCurtainenabledtheCzechandSlovakFederativeRepublictodevelopextensivelywithintheframeworkoftheUSIMETInternationalMilitaryEducationandTrainingprogramandbyvirtueofthisprogrammanyoffi-cersandcivilianemploy-eeshadauniqueopportu-nitytostudyatvariousUSMilitarySchoolsandfacili-tieswheretheycompletedcoursesbasedoncurriculadesignedfortheimprovementoflanguageskillsthestudyofAmericanvaluesandpolitical-militarycon-cepts.Onaccountofthefactthatthelistofgraduatesfromtheabove-mentionedcoursesalsoincludedahighnumberofpersonnelfromdepartmentaleducationalinstitutestheprocessoflanguageeducationexperiencedaqualitativeleapforwardandarapidimprovementinresults.AUSinvestmentalsoprovidedmaterialassistancespecificallyinanumberoffirst-ratetextbookswithotherdidacticmediabothacousticandvisualandmodernequipmentsuchaslanguagelabora-toriesprojectorsandcomputersetc.InturntheArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublicstartedhiringlinguisticexpertsaufaitteachersandmethodolo-gistswhoworkedasmobileteamsoperatingwithintheoverallframeworkoftheIMETprogram.Asearlyas1995theLanguageTrainingInstitutetheMilitaryAcademyinBrnohadintroducedatestingsysteminaccordancewithSTANAG6001andtheCzechRepublicsArmedForceshadsenttheirfirstrepresentativetoparticipateattheheartofwhatmakesNATOworkfromalin-guisticperspectivetheNATOBILCconfer-ences.On12March1999whentheCzechRepublicbecameafullmemberofNATOtheremnantsofthecurtainthathadfallenonMathesiusdreamofthecountryasaforceintheworldoflinguisticsandinternationalreasonhadbeensweptaway.Thenextmilestonewas2003whenthesystemoflanguageeducationunder-wentafurthersignificanttransformation.OnSeptember1stinordertomeetthespe-cificdemandsplacedonmilitarypersonnelintermsoflanguageeducationtheDefenseLanguageInstitutecameintoexistenceasanautonomouscostcenterandwasincorpo-ratedintotheorganizationalstructureoftheTrainingandDoctrineDirectoratesubordi-natetotheChiefoftheGeneralStaff.ThemainreasonfordisbandingtheLanguageTrainingInstituteoftheMilitaryAcademyinBrnoitspredecessorlayinthefactthatitscapacitycouldsimplynotsatisfytheneedsofa21stcenturymilitaryforceprovidingsoldiersandtheAirForcewiththelanguagethattheyneededtodotheirjobsinaninterna-tionalenvironmenthadbecomeaspecializedmilitaryfield.ThisdecisionhassinceproventohavebeenoneofincredibleforesightandcouragenotonlyhastheDLIenabledtheCzechRepublictostandalongsideheralliesinAfghanistanIraqandacrosstheworldasaninteroperableEnglishspeakingtroopcon-tributingnationbutthrougheducationandlanguageprovidedourofficersandsoldierswiththeskillsandintereststore-establishthefriendshipsandrelationshipsmadeatsuchcostbythoseofpreviousgenerations.ThereasonforthisisthatoverthelastdecadeEnglishhaschangedbeyondallrecognitionforNATOitisnolongerjustameansofcommunicationbutawarfightingskillandthekeycomponenttointeroperabilitythefoundationuponwhichtheentireallianceandrelativepeacethatweenjoytodayrests.ForMasarykthegeniusbehindourFirstRepublicthewayaheadlaywithourLegionstheyoungmenandwomenwhostoodfoughtanddiedalong-sideourEnglishspeakingallies.ForthoseoftheSecondWorldWarthewayaheadlaywithmenlikeFrantisekFajtlwhopilotedEnglandsSpitfiresatatimewhenthiscoun-tryhadfallenandtheUnitedKingdomstoodalonemenwhowereforcednotjusttoflyinEnglishinEnglishmachinesinEnglishfor-mationswithEnglishManualsandEnglishCommanders-inaworldinwhichtheEnglishruledtheseasbutlivedinexilefarfromhomeinEngland.TheDLIishencenotjustadirectdescendantofthePragueCircleacontinuationofMathesiusdreamoranacademicinstitutionbutverymuchthisgenerationswayaheadtheirLegionandtheirSpitfire.WhatmustberememberedisthatNATOisnotjustaboutpiratesoffthecoastofSomaliaortheinsurgentsofAfghanistannorisitaboutthelanguagevaluesandinterestsoftheUnitedStatesCanadaortheUnitedKingdom.WhatNATOisaboutandtheDLIisanintegralpartofisavoidingthenextwarandbeingstrongenoughandpreparedenoughtowinitifitcomes.Awarinwhich 72TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013deploymentscouldconsistofnothundredsbuthundredsofthousandsawarinwhichthecasualtiescouldnumbertoomanytothinkaboutawarinwhichentirecitiesandcoun-triesmayceasetoexistiftheWestfailstostandtogether.IndeedawarsuchastheFirstWorldWar.WhatisoftenforgottengiventherelativepeaceofthelastsixtyorsoyearsisthatatsomeplaceoranotherthethreatofwarispermanentandhencetheDLIsinter-pretationofitselfasbeingattheforefrontofthesepreparations.Thebeginningsofourvocationhow-everwerefarfromeasy.InfacttheDLIwasestablishedforwantofabetterphrasefromscratch-therewerenotextbooksforexampletheclassroomswerethirtyyearsoutofdateandtheteachersofficeswerefur-nishedwithlittleotherthanafewoldwoodenchairsfromthe1950sand23steeldesks.Inallhonestyallthatwehadandthatraisedourspiritswereacoupleofarchaiccomput-ersthatwehadsalvagedfromanadjacentbuildingandthedreamofMathesius.WithinthefirstweekthoughthecurrentdirectoroftheDLIColonelLadislavChaloupskyPhDwasabletohiremorethansixtyteachersandstartthelanguagetrainingtheweekafter.InfactwithinjustsixmonthswiththehelpofMs.SallyFenstermacherfromtheUnitedStatestheTrainingandDoctrineCommandandtheGeneralStaffwewereabletostarttacklingtheverycoreofNATOschallenges.LookingbackatitshistorytheDefenseLanguageInstitutehasnotchedupalonglineofachievements.Indeedwehavecomealongwaynotjustintermsofthefactthatwenowhavethesystemsmaterialsandcur-riculatomatchthebestofEuropebutthatwehavereturnedtothecountrywhatwassoverynearlylostanacademictraditionofexcel-lence.Inhindsightsomuchwasachievedbystrivingforjustthisalmostimmedi-atelyafteritsinceptionforexamplethenewDLIfacultylaunchedsignificantchangesthenumberofstudentsinclasseswasloweredfromtwentyoddtoeightforSLP3andto10forSLP2thedurationofintensivecourseswasextendedfromfourtosixmonthstwoorthreeninetyminuteclassesadayweremodifiedintosixfiftyminuteclassesaday.Studentswerealsopre-testedbeforebeingadmittedtoacourseandthendividedintohomogeneousgroups.Comprehensiverulesfortestingwerealsoissuedandeventookintoaccounttheverysmallnumberofpeoplewhosufferfromdyslexia.Furthermorebi-leveltestingwasintroducedalongwithre-testingofsinglelanguageskillsandthankstoCol.PetrpikachiefofGeneralStaffEducationalDepartmentatthattimepluslevelstomeetnotjusttheneedsofthestu-dentsbuttherealityof21stcenturywarfare.WithintheDLIitselfallofthiswasduetodedicatedemployeessuchasSoniaamalikovandHelenaRlichovatheassistanceofcolleaguesfromDLI-ELCinTexascolleaguesfromthePartnerLanguageTrainingCenterEuropePLTCEtheGeorgeC.MarshallEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudiesandcolleaguesfromtheBureauforInternationalLanguageCo-ordinationBILC.ToquoteWinstonChurchillneverinthisfieldhassomuchbeenowedbysomanytosofewDr.F.CartwrightS.FenstermacherK.SacreK.WertP.GarzaDr.R.MonaghanJ.DubeauandJ.V.Begovic.Todayasthecentrallanguageeduca-tionfacilityoftheCzechRepublicsArmedForcestheinstitutionisengagedindraw-ingupconcept-settingmaterialsforrunninglanguageeducationcoordinatingitsimple-mentationandproposingmethodicalandorganizationalmeasurestoincreaseitseffi-ciency.AtNATO-BILCannualconferencesthedirectorsubmitsregularreportsontheactivitiesrunbytheinstituteandtheleveloflanguageproficiencyachievedbytheArmyspersonnel.JustlastOctoberforexampleatthelastconferencetheCzechRepublicwasoneofthefewcountriesinNATOnotonlytopublicallyvoicethecurrentpitfallsininterop-erabilitywithregardstolanguageashassooftenbeenespousedbytheAmericansbuttoaddresshowtheyshouldbetackled.Buttheseexampleshoweveradmi-rablefailtoportrayitsrealsuccessandthatliesinitspreparationsfortherealityof21stcenturywarfare.TogivejustoneexampletheDLIhasdirectlytrainedmanysoldiersforserviceinAfghanistanamissionareawhichconsistsof36differentnationalitiesoperat-inginrealtimeintelligenceofwhichonly6speakEnglishasanativelanguageandjustahandfulthataremembersofNATO.Itdoesnotneedtobesaidthereforethatinteroper-abilityisavitalmilestoneandthattheDLIandEnglishStudiesarecriticaltosustainingit.Nordoesitneedtobesaidthattopursuestabilityandconductmulti-nationalmissionspost-conflictoperationsmaritimesecurityhumanitariannation-buildingandstabilityoperationsthattheACRisdependentonit.ToachieveallthistheDefenseLanguageInstituterestsasawholeonthreemainpillarsandtheinstituteseffec-tivenessisbasedonthejointcooperationofallthesethreesegmentstheLanguageEducationDepartmenttheMethodologyandTestingDepartmentandtheOrganizationandPlanningSection.DLIStaffMeeting TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201373MethodologyandTestingDepartmentMTDIntheprocessoftestinglanguageproficiencyforkeymilitarypersonnelinaccordancewithSTANAG6001theMethodologyandTestingDepartmentappliesthelatestknowledgeandlessonslearnedandthuspromotesthereputationofthecountryintheframeworkofaccomplishingNATOForceGoalsG0356E1101Englishlan-guagerequirementsforpersonnelofNATOearmarkedunits.Asisthecasewithallsciencesthefieldoflanguagetestingisrapidlyadvancingasevidencedbyemergingnewmethodsandprinciplesandthedepartmentiscommittedtoapplyingthelatestintheseinformationandcommunicationtechnologies.Thesetrendsaremonitoredandanalyzedbytheinstitutepilotedandintroducedwhereappropriateintothelanguagecoursesandtestingactivities.Undoubtedlyoneofthemostadvancedmethodsintheareaoftestingiscomputer-adaptivetestingCATaprocesswhichtheDLIspecificallytheMethodologyandTestingDepartmentisintroducingintoprac-tice.IndoingsotheMTDalsoestablishedasuccessfulrelationshipwiththeAcademyofSciencesoftheCzechRepublicin2009.TheCATisaformofcomputer-basedtestingthatadaptstotheexamineesabilitylevel.Thetestisbasedonsoftwarethatselectsquestionsfromavoluminousdatabankasaresponsetothetesttakerspreviousanswers.Ifansweredcorrectlytheyreceiveamorediffi-culttaskandvice-versaafterawronganswer.Bychoosingdifficultygradesthetestingsoftwareisthenabletogaugethecandidatesproficiencylevel.LanguageEducationDepartmentLEDTheLEDcoordinatesandimplementsthelanguageeducationofanadmirablenum-berofAFCRpersonnel.Over4000stu-dentshavehithertograduatedfromdifferenttypesofitscourses.Theyrunintensiverefreshercombinedandspecializedcours-esdesignedforteachingEnglishRussianFrenchGermanandArabic.BesidesstandardcoursesingreatdemandareEnglishMilitaryTerminologycoursesandclassesforthemedicalpersonneloftheMilitaryHospitalinOlomouc.WithregardtotheincreasingrequestsfromtheAFCRbranchesMoDsectorandthenecessitytoaccomplishForceGoalsG0356E1101theInstitutehasalwaysstrivendependingonitsavailableresourc-estomeettheserequests.ForexampleinrecentyearstheInstitutehasruntheCONAMScoursesAirForceTerminologycoursesclassesforthe5thOMLT1the153rdEngineerBattalionterminologycoursesfortheMilitaryPoliceandCzechlanguageclass-esfortheAustrianArmedForcesandPolice.IntheframeworkofcooperationamongthedepartmentallanguageinstitutestheDLIhasalsoheldseminarsonmilitaryterminologyfortheUoDLanguageTrainingCenter.InadditiontomeetingdepartmentalrequeststheInstitutehasalsobeencommit-tedtoraisingtheeffectivenessandqualityoftheteachingprocessacrossitslanguagecourses.BesidesmodernequipmentsuchassmartboardslisteninglaboratoriescomputerclassroomsandtheSelf-AccessCenterforindividuallearningandconsultationsstu-DLITeachersOfficeComputerAdaptiveTesting 74TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013dentscannowappreciatelecturesonIslamforexampleandhaveaccesstonativespeak-ingstaffmanyofwhichhavemilitaryback-grounds.TheLanguageEducationDepartmentisequallyengagedinthefieldoftranslationandinterpretingservices.Thelonglistofactivitiesincludesforexamplethetransla-tionofColErnsts3bookTheHistoryofCzechlanguageteachingandCzechmilitaryterminologyintheAustrianArmedForcesEALTA4CoordinatorsandTranslatorsoftheEALTAGuidelinesforGoodPracticeinLanguageTestingandAssessmentandinterpretingatinternationalconferencesandmilitaryexercisese.g.thePragueAKTEConferenceinAugust2012andtheDingoFightingVehiclesMechanicsCoursethattookplaceinGermanyinOctober2012.TeachersalsocontributetotheA-reportmag-azinewithEnglishtextsonmilitarytopicsthearticlespublishedhereinforexamplehavebeenadaptedfortheupcomingbookpublicationtitledMilitaryEnglish.AmatterofmoreimportanceistheDLIscooperationwithforeigninstitutes.TheLEDhasdevelopedanintensiverela-tionshipwiththeMarshallCenterGarmisch-PartenkirchenGermanywhichbasedonmutualagreementstrained10studentsinmilitaryterminologyin20112012com-pletelyfreeofcharge.CloserelationshipshavealsobeenestablishedacrossstaffandmanagementwithothercountriessuchasTheUnitedStatesGreatBritainNewZealandandSlovenia.Manyexpertsbothmilitaryandcivil-iansareteachingandlecturingmilitarystu-dentsonmanydifferenttypesofcourses.TomentionjustahandfulofthemCol.ClementMachacekretanexpilotandITexpertfromtheUSAMaj.JohnWelchaDoctorofMedicinefortheNZAirForceandhiswifeandMr.ChristopherMcKeatinganexofficerandPostGrad.AresearcherfromStAndrewsintheU.K.specializinginterrorism.AsalreadymentionedaboveahighlysignificantpartneristheDLIELCDefenseLanguageInstituteEnglishLanguageCenterLacklandAFBTexaswhichinadditiontoprovidingkeymaterialsforrunningEnglishcoursesarrangesupontherequestfromDLIVykovandincoordinationwiththeODCOfficeofDefenseCooperationPraguesendingofmobileteamstogiveworkshopsandpresentationse.g.onthemethodologyofteaching.FurthermoreworthpraisingareteachersfromtheLandesverteidigungsakademieinViennawhoDr.TomasRadejandhisPopularLectureonIslamanditsRelevancetotheAFCR2ChristopherMcKeatingexplainingBritishmilitarytacticsandstrategyColonelMachacekretiredUSAFlecturingstudentsonspecialmilitaryterminologyandICAO5terms. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201375assistbothdirectlyorviaSkypeinteachingtheDLIstudentsinGerman.InreturntheDLIlecturersparticipateinteachingCzechlanguagecoursesrunbytheSprachinstitutdesBundesheeres.Anothertrendinmodernteachingmethodsandapproachesisundoubtedlytheso-calledlearningmanagementsystemLMSi.e.asoftwareapplicationthatpro-videsassistanceinthemanagementoflan-guageeducationthroughe-learning.MostLMSapplicationsarefurnishedwitharicharrayofdifferenteducationalmodulesrang-ingfromthosedesignedfortheadministra-tionofclassesthroughtovariouscommuni-cationinstrumentstotestingtools.InconsultationwithexpertsfromtheMarshallCenterinGarmisch-PartenkirchentheInstitutehasstartedintheframeworkoftheNATOe-learningsystemdevelopingitsowneducationalcourses.InadditiontheDLInowintendsbasedoneffectiveagreementstoaccessthecoursesthathavealreadybeendevelopedbyNATOexperts.Agreatadvan-tageofthise-learningplatformliesinusingasystemthathasnotonlybeencertifiedasthefirstopenLMSbySCORM1.2andSCORM2004standardsbutthatiscompatiblewithNATOssecureintranetseehttpwww.ilias.dedocugoto_docu_cat_580.html.InconclusiontheheritageofEnglishStudiesintheterritoryoftheCzechRepublicisingoodhands.WhatwasfoundedacenturyagocontinuestobebuiltuponbytheDLIandwhatwasdreamedofsolongagocontinuestobelivedandexperienced.IndeedaswithMathesiusCircleitremainsinternationalinscopeensconcedinthecontemporaryandwiththeDLIatitsheartintunewiththechal-lengesoftomorrow.1OperationalMentoringandLiaisonTeam2ArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublic3Col.JosefErnstPh.D.isthedeputychiefoftheMilitaryLanguageInstituteinAustriaSprachinstitutdesBundesheeres4EuropeanAssociationforLanguageTestingandAssessment5InternationalCivilAviationOrganization6AdvancedDistributedLearningAnnualDLILanguageConferencewithguestsfromtheUSAAustriaSlovakia.NATOJointAdvancedDistributedLearningJADLDLIe-learningenvironmentADL6LMSIlias 76TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013ItwasaveryspecialdayforGeneralSimeonSimeonovtheBulgarianChiefofDefence.After8yearshecamebacktoBydgoszcztore-discovertheJointForceTrainingCentre.In2004and2005BrigadierGeneralSimeonovservedastheJFTCChiefofStaff.HewasthefirstCOSofthenewlyestablishedcentre.On13February2013GeneralSimeonovwhoisnowresponsibleforthewholeBulgarianArmedForcespaidavisittotheBydgoszczNATOtrainingcentreandobservedhowtheJFTChasevolved.Iamgladthatthetraditionsestab-lishedin2004havebeenaffirmedandcul-tivatedtheBulgarianCHODwroteintheJFTCguestbookattheendofhisvisit.Beforehewasbriefedonthecentrescur-rentmainactivitiesandchallenges.ForthefirsttimehecouldalsoseetheJFTCfacili-tiestheconstructionstartedin2005whenGeneralSimeonovworkedinBydgoszczbutthecentresstaffmovedtothenewcom-poundfromitstemporaryseatin2009.ApartfromdiscussingtheevolutionthecentrewentthroughduringpastfewyearstheJFTCguesttalkedtothecentresCommanderMajorGeneralPavelMackoalsoaboutthefutureoftheNATOtraininginBydgoszcz.TheGeneralsdiscussedpartici-pationofBulgarianMilitaryAdvisoryTeamsintrainingeventsprovidedbytheJFTCaswellaspossiblecooperationbetweentheBydgoszczNATOtrainingcentreandtheBulgarianArmedForcesinexercisesorga-nizedundertheConnectedForcesInitiativeCFIumbrella.AfterthelastNATOSummitinChicagowheretheheadsofstatesapprovedthisNATOsSecretaryGeneralslatestinitiativetheJFTCprovedthatthecen-trewouldplayacrucialroleinimplementingtheCFI-theinitiativefocusingoneduca-tiontrainingandclosecooperationofNATOforces.Nowthecentreisworkingondevel-opingthistypeoftrainingandremainsopenfordifferentNATOnationswhichwouldliketotraintheirsoldiersattheJFTC.Mysincerewishesofsuccessfulendeavoursandbrightestfutureinthesys-temofNATOtraininginstitutionsgotoallJFTCpersonnelandtheCommandGroupGeneralSimeonovexpressedhiswishesfortheJFTCbeforetheendofhisvisit.GeneralSimeonHristovSimeonovwasbornin1955inthetownofPlovdiv.HeisagraduateoftheAirForceAcademyDolnaMetropoliyaY.A.GagarinAirForceCommandandStaffCollegeRussiaandtheGeneralStaffFaculty-FuhrungsakademiederBundeswehrHamburgGermany.HejoinedtheArmedForcesin1979asapilotinafighteraviationregimentDuringhismilitarycareerhehasoccu-piedconsecutivelyvariouscommandposi-tionsintheAirForcehierarchicalstructurecommanderofaviationsquadronaviationregimentairbaseandaviationcorps.In2004hewasnominatedtheChiefofStaffCOSoftheJointForceTrainingCentreJFTCBydgoszczPoland.ThushebecamethefirstBulgarianGeneralappointedataNATOposition.Inthefollowingperiodthesummerof2005thesummerof2009hewastheCommanderoftheBulgarianAirForce.HebecametheChiefofDefenceoftheRepublicofBulgariainJuly2009.FighterpilotI-classinstructorinalltypesofconditionsnightanddayinfairandbadweather.HehasflownL-29MiG-15MiG-17MiG-21MiG-29GeneralSimeonHristovSimeonovBulgarianCHODDiscoverstheJFTCfortheSecondTime TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201377IhadthehonortoworkinNATOJointForceTrainingCentreJFTCBydgoszczPolandduringthefirstrota-tionofcommandstaffwhichcomprisedMajorGeneralPeterKhnelfromDenmarkDirectoroftheJFTCBrigadierGeneralBronisawKwiatkowskifromPolandDeputyDirectorandmeatthattimeBrigadierGeneralSimeonSimeonovfromBulgariaChiefofStaffCOS.InpracticewestartedfromscratchandtheCentregraduallygrewupintermsofpersonnelstrength.Westartedwithworkingoutalldocumentsandgraduallyintroduc-ingandrecognizingtheNATOstandardoperationalproceduresintheprocessofwork.InthiswaytheCentrehadtheoppor-tunitytostartitsworkproperlyfromtheverybeginningtothebestofitscapabilitiesandtoachieveinitialoperationalcapabilitiesIOCenvisagedbytheAlliedCommandTransformationtowhichweweredirectlysubordinateintheindicatedperiodin2005.Simultaneouslyweweresolvingallevery-dayproblemsandcommunicationsproblemsintheCentrebecauseitwasnecessarytoequipallworkingplacesinthetemporaryCentrelocatedinDwernickiegoStreetinBydgoszcz.InparallelwiththatstrenuousworkanddiscussionswithvariousNATOteamsstartedregardingtheconstructionandestablishmentofallfacilitiesrequiredforthefuturepermanentstationingoftheJFTCinSzubiskaStreet.SixmonthsaftertheestablishmentoftheJFTCofficersfromtheJFTCpartici-patedinexercisesconductedbyotherNATOcentresandwestartedinourexercisesfortrainingattacticalleveluptobrigadelevelinaccordancewiththeACTNorfolkdirec-tionandJWCStavangerfocusedontrain-ingatoperationaltacticalandoperationallevels.ThePeopleandtheTeamwithWhomWeWorkedAlthoughtheprocessoffillingalltheJFTCpositionsbytherespectiveendorsednationswasrelativelyslowduringthefirstmonthstheavailablestaffworkedwithgreatenthusiasmanddiligence.WewereallawarethatwewerethepioneersinGeneralSimeonSimeonovChiefofDefenceoftheRepublicofBulgariaTheDutyTourinaNATOCentre 78TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013thatendeavourandhadtoestablishaverygoodfoundationforworkandoperationoftheJFTCwhichwouldguaranteeitaproperplaceamongallotherNATOcentres.AtthispointIwouldliketopar-ticularlymentionColonelLeoHirschmanntheformerHeadoftheTrainingDivision.Inadditiontohisdutieshewasalsoimple-mentingpartofthedutiesoftheDirectorofManagementandTrainingSupportDivisionwhosepositionswerenotfilledatthattime.WehadverygoodcollaborationwithLieutenantColonelSteveHartovthemili-taryassistanttoMajorGeneralKhnelandwithmyassistantLTCYuliyFerdinandov.WehadverybeneficialcooperationandverygoodunderstandingwiththeDeputyDirectoroftheJFTCBrigadierGeneralBronisawKwiatkowski.Ithinkthattheteamwithwhichweworkedintheperiod2004-2005providedtherequiredbasisthatwasapreconditionforthesubsequentdevelopmentandsuccessesoftheJFTC.TheHostNationOneofthemostimportantrea-sonsfortheJFTCsuccessistheunreservedsupportprovidedbytheGovernmentandMinistryofDefenceofPolandlocalauthoritiesoftheCityofBydgoszczandlastbutnotleastwarmhospitalityofourPolishcolleagues.IamgladthatinthatperiodIhadtheopportunitytomeetandworktogetherwithLieutenantGeneralMieczysawCieniuchatthattimetheDeputyChiefoftheGeneralStaffnowtheChiefoftheGeneralStaffofthePolishArmedForcesMajorGeneralZbigniewGowienkatheCommanderofthePomeranianMilitaryDistrictnowtheCommanderoftheLandForcesBrigadierGeneralBronisawKwiatkowskiwithwhomwewereboundtogetherbytruefriendshipthatendedbecauseofhisuntimelydeathintheSmolenskplanecrash.OtherPolishcolleagueswithwhomweworkedandlivedtogetherwerealsoveryopen-heartedmen.MydutytourattheJFTCbroad-enedmyknowledgeandunderstandingofthenationaltraditionsandmentalityofPolishpeople.Myeverydaycontactsandcommu-nicationaddedalottobothmyprofessionalandpersonalexperienceandthismakesallmymemoriesaboutthetimeIspentinBydgoszczveryemotional.MyPersonalContributionandExperienceGainedduringtheDutyTour.TheDirectoroftheJFTCMajorGeneralKhneltheDeputyDirectorBrigadierGeneralKwiatkowskiandmeinmyCOScapacitymadeeveryeffortwedidourbesttoensurethesuccessfulstartofthistrainingcentreanditsestablish-mentasaNATOtrainingfacilityattacticallevel.OfcourseeverybeginningisdifficultespeciallyifyouhavetostartfromscratchbutIwouldalsoliketoacknowledgethecontributionofalloursuccessors.TodaysoutlookprestigeandcredibilityoftheJFTCinBydgoszczarearesultofourjointeffortsthroughouttheyears.AnotherproofofthehighqualitytrainingprovidedbytheJFTCisthefactthattheJFTCinBydgoszczwasentrustedwithtrainingourunitsbeforedeployingthemtoISAFAfghanistan.MydutytourattheJFTCisofspecialimportanceforme.Ithappenedinthesameyear2004whenBulgariajoinedNATO.ThisjobhasallowedmetoexpandmyhorizonsaboutNATOworkflowstoimproveandconsolidatemyknowledgeabouttheSOPsStandardOperationalProceduresrequiredforaparticularjob.Myexperi-enceastheJFTCCOShashelpedmealotduringmyfollowingseniorassignmentsin2005theCommanderoftheBulgarianAirForceandin2009tillpresenttheChiefofDefencethehighestmilitarypositionintheBulgarianArmedForces. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013793rdNATOSignalBattalion3NSBwascreatedinFebruary2010asaresponsetoincreasingdemandforDeployableCommunicationsandInformationSystemsDCISandspecialistsabletooperatehightechnologywhichDCISrepresents.3NSBisapartoftherecently1.7.2012createdNATOCISGroupwhichisasuccessorofNATOCommunicationandInformationSystemsServicesAgencyNCSAdeployablestructure.ItisapartoftheAlliedCommandOperationsACO.Mission3NSBisresponsibleforprovidingflexiblerobustandreliablestrategiccommu-nicationstoallNATOdeployedHQinsup-portArticleVandNon-ArticleVoperationsandexercisesinordertoallowthedeployedcommandertosuccessfullyprosecutehismission.Structure3NSBconsistsofHQsixdeployablecommunicationsmodulesDCMsandmain-tenanceandsupportcompanyMSCoy.ThebattalionssubordinateunitsaredistributedacrossalargepartofEurope.HQDCMAandMSCoyislocatedinBydgoszczPolandtheDCMBinLipniknadBecvouCzechRepublictheDCMCinRuzomberokSlovakiatheDCMDinVilniusLithuaniatheDCMEinSzekesfehervarHungaryandDCMFinIzmirTurkey.TheDCMDandDCMEarenationalDCMswhichmeansthattheirper-sonnelcanbeusedfornationalpurposesafterreceivingNATOapproval.BesidesthisalltheDCMsaresimilarintermsofstructuredutiesresponsibilitiesandservicesprovided.3rdNATOSignalBattalion 80TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013LieutenantColonelZbysekWeissCommander3NSBsaysItisnicetohavesubordinatedunitsplacedalloverEuropebutitalsobringssomechallengestoperformcommandandcontrolpreventivemainte-nanceinspectionstransportationforpeopleandshipmentofallkindofequipment.WorkingConditionsSinceMarch2010whenthefirstper-sonnelwereassignedtothebattaliontillnowthebattalionhasbeengrowingconstantlynotonlyintermsofmanningbutalsointermsofimprovingitscapabilitytocarryoutitsmission.Tobeabletodosoitspersonnelhavecompletedanumberofcoursesandexercisesthatdrawitforwardtothestage TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201381whenitssuperiorHQcancountonthemandbesurethatthetaskgiventothe3NSBwillbefulfilled.Inordertoimproveandensurequalityoftrainingandtheaccumulationofexperi-ence3NSBhascreatedinternaltrainingandmentorteamswhereDCMshavebeencombinedaccordingtotheirleveloftrain-ingwherethebettertrainedmoreskilledtutortheothers.ThisallowsforcontinuousincreaseofknowledgeandapplicationoftheoreticalknowledgegainedbystudyingintopracticaltrainingwithDCIS.In2011and20123NSBprovidedCISsupporttomanyNATOexercisesinclud-ingSteadfastJunctureSteadfastCobaltSteadfastIllusionRamsteinRoverISAFPOMLTandothers.Aperfectopportunitytotrain3NSBSoldiersisalsosupportfortheclosestNATOunittheJFTCBydgoszcz.Thissupportisbeneficialforbothsides-theJFTCreceivesCISsupportand3NSBper-sonnelreceivehands-ontrainingwithCIS.High-qualitytrainingconnectedwithtop-qualityexercisessupportprovidedthebattalionafoundationfortheabilitytosup-portoperations.3NSBsupportedOperationUnifiedProtectorandfromthebeginningof2012thebattalionssoldiershadbeendeployedtoISAFandKFOR.Fromtheverybeginningthebattalionanditsmembershavebeenperformingtheirdutiesinthemostexemplarymannermeetingalltherequirementsandexpectations.Manyunitsandsoldiershavebeenawardedfortheirexcellentjobwhichhasmadeacommitmentofall3NSBmemberstocontinueintheirjobonthesamehighlevelandworkontheirimprovementinordertosupportthebattal-ionsmission.FutureanditschallengesTheverynearfuturewillbringalotofchallengesforthebattalion.In20133NSBisasecondarybattalionfortheNRFbutisplannedtobecomeitsmainonein2014.Inordertotofulfillthetasks3NSBpersonnelhavetocompletealotofcoursesexercisesintegratenewDCISandimproveinfrastruc-tureinallDCMslocationswhichmeansincreasedcostforNATOandeachnationpar-ticipatingin3NSB.LTCWeisssaysIknowthattheincomingdayswillbedifficultbutIamoptimisticItrustmysoldiersandIamsurethattheywillalwaysdotheirbest. 82TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013JFTCStaffRidetoAusterlitzBattlefieldAttheOldPostOfficeoneofthemostfamoushistoricalsightsontheAusterlitzBattlefieldmembersoftheJFTCsawinthedemonstrationofthebattledrilloftheFrenchtroopsperformedbythemembersofthelocalNapoleonicClub.DuringthestaffridetheparticipantsvisitedtheMonumentofPeaceandtheMuseumtheOldPostOfficeAusterlitzCastleZuranandLedniceCastle.InallthelocationstheyreceivedguidedtoursandlecturesaboutthebattleanditsimpactonthehistoryofEurope.ThestaffridewasorganizedbyBrigadierGeneralJaromirZunaandhostedbytheNationalDefenceUniversityinBrnoCzechRepublic.LifeattheJFT2012inRet TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201383FestivalofFrenchcultureandcuisineBeaujolaisNouveautraditionallybelongstothemostappreciatedculturaleventsorganizedattheJFTC.AgainColFrancisMarecandhisteampreparedforthepeopleservingandworkingattheJFTCasplendideventwithabundanceoftradi-tionalFrenchfoodwineandmusic.ThankyouverymuchBrigadierGeneralJaromirZUNAwelcomestheGeneralStaffCoursefromtheNationalDefenceUniversityinBrnoCzechRepubliconOctober242012ThevisitwasorganizedasapartofthefieldtriptoPolandduringwhichtheattendeesofthecoursealsovisitedtheGeneralStaffofthePolishArmedForcesNationalDefenceUniversityinWarsawand3rdNATOSignalBattalioninBydgoszcz.TheaimoftheJFTCvisitwastoinformthestudentsabouttheJFTCsmissionitscapabilitiesandtrainingforcurrentoperationsorganizedattheJFTC.ospect 84TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013BrigadierGeneralJaromirZUNAawardsColFrancisMAREContheoccasionofthecelebrationoftheIndependentCzechoslovakStateDay28October1918isconsideredtobeoneofthekeyhistoricalmomentswhichhasformedtheCzechNation.Inrecogni-tionofitsimportancethecelebrationoftheIndependentCzechoslovakStateDayisaccompaniedwithofficialeventsorganizedacrossthecountrydedicatedtorecognitionofthepeoplefortheirachievementsandcontributiontotheCzechStatehoodinvari-ousfieldsofhumanactivitiesincludingthesecurityanddefense.FortheArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublicthecelebrationoftheIndependentCzechoslovakStateDayistra-ditionallytheoccasionforpromotionstothehighestmilitaryranksdecorationofsoldierswithmilitaryawardsandbesidesmanyoth-ersalsorecognitionofmilitarycooperationwithourAllies.ColMarecassumedhisdutiesattheJFTCin2010.HisperformanceasMissionTrainingBranchHeadhasbeenexceptionalandinaccordancewiththebesttraditionoftheFrenchArmedForces.BesidesassignedNATOdutiesColMarecisalsotheFrenchSeniorNationalRepresentativetotheJFTCandotherNATOunitslocatedinBydgoszcz.Inthiscapacityhehasalwaysbeenpro-motingthespiritoffriendshipcollegialityandcohesionamongthepeopleservingandworkinginNATOunitsinBydgoszcz.ItisbroadlyrecognizedandappreciatedthatundertheleadershipofColMarectheFrenchContingenthasmadesignificantcontributiontothequalityandculturalrichnessoflivesoftheservicemenfromNATOcountriesservinginBydgoszczandtheirfamilydependants.ThereisalsoagreatdealofsymbolisminrecognitionofColMarecontheoccasionoftheIndependentCzechoslovakStateDay.ThebirthofthenewstateCzechoslovakiain1918alsomarkedthebeginningofbuildupofitsarmedforces.TheCzechRepublicneverforgetsinvaluablesupportwhichwasthenprovidedbytheRepublicofFrance.AstatueofthefirstChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheCzechoslovakArmedForcesFrenchDivisionGeneralMauriceCsarJosephPellstandstodayintheofficeoftheChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublic.ItisalastingreminderofthecontributionoftheFrenchMilitaryMissioninCzechoslovakiatothedevelop-mentofourArmedForces.ColFrancisMarecinrecognitionofallyourachievementsandappreciationofyourpersonalcontributiontothecoop-erationamongtheArmedForcesoftheCzechRepublicandtheArmedForcesoftheRepublicofFranceIamhonoredtodeco-rateyouwiththeCommemorativemedaloftheCzechRepublicNationalMilitaryRepresentativetoNATO. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201385OktoberfestIthasalreadybecomeanannualtradi-tionthatoneautumneveningattheJFTCisreservedforOktoberfest.AlsolastyeartheGermanJFTCcommunityinvitedthewholecentresstaffwiththeirfamiliestocelebratethismostfamousBavarianfestival.On27Septembermorethan200peopleinclud-ingimportantguestssuchasDr.JarosawKuropatwiskitheHonoraryConsuloftheFederalRepublicofGermanyinBydgoszczandMr.HenrykMaciejewskitheHonoraryConsuloftheRepublicofCroatiainBydgoszczgatheredattheJFTCcompoundtotasteGermanbeerfoodbeveragesandtolistentoGermanmusicperformedlive.PolishandGermanMilitaryOrchestrasConcertFor8yearsGermanandPolishsol-diershavebeenworkinghandinhandintheNATOJointForceTrainingCentre.TheGermansoldiersfeelverywellreceivedbytheirPolishcolleaguesaswellasbythecityandthepopulationofBydgoszcz.InitiatedbytheGermanandthePolishSeniorNationalRepresentativesandgenerouslysupportedbytheMayorofBydgoszczMr.RafalBruskitheGermanandPolishsoldiersoftheJFTCinvitedallcitizensofBydgoszcztoamili-taryorchestrasconcert.On27SeptembertheGermanWehrbereichsmusikkorpsIfromNeubrandenburgandtheMilitaryOrchestraofthePolishArmedForcesSupportInspectoratetooktheaudienceonanenter-tainingmusicaljourneyperformingmarchesandpopularmusic.TheeventtookplaceattheBydgoszczOldMarketSquare. 86TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013TheBallintheOperaItwasthefourthtimewhentheJointForceTrainingCentreinvitedthewholeBydgoszczNATOfamilyfortheball.On17Novemberalmost300membersfromtheJFTCNCIASquadronBydgoszczJFTCSupportUnitthe3rdNATOSignalBattalionaswellasotherguestsgatheredinOperaNovaHouseinBydgoszcztoenjoyasplen-dideveningwhichtraditionallyrepresentsthesummitoftheannualculturalactivitiesorganizedbytheJFTC.Theballwasfullofattractionsperformedbymorethan100artistsandmusicians.AtthebeginningtheguestswereinvitedforaconcertperformedbytheMilitaryBandfromToruconductedbyCaptainDominikSierzputowskithebandcommanderandLieutenantColonelPaweLewandowski.TherewasalsoaperformancepresentedbytheChoiroftheUniversityofTechnologyandLifeSciencesandtheCopernicusMaleVoiceChoir.AlsoperformancesofaCubansingerMariaRodriguezaBalletGroupfromtheOperaNovaandtheVocalBandoftheRiwieraNavyClubenchantedtheaudi-ence.TheyentertainedtheguestswithpiecesofgoodmusicsuchasDanseDiaboliqueThePiratesoftheCaribbeanTheBlueMoonandmanyothers.AlsotheJFTCBallCharityLotteryalreadybecameatradition.EveryyearbeforetheballthewholeBydgoszczNATOCommunitycollectsmoneyforpeopleinneed.Thelot-teryticketswereavailableforapproximatelyamonthbeforetheball.Togetherwithatick-etpeopleboughtachancetowinoneof17basketsfullofnationalproducts.Theywereprovidedbyrespectivenationsthe3rdNATOSignalBattalionandtheJFTCCommander.LuckywinnersenjoythecontentsofbasketsandtheNATOfamilycanbeproudofcol-lectingapproximately5000PLN.ThiswasthebiggestballintheJFTCshistory.Almost150couplesenjoyedtheeveningsomeofthemstayedonthedancefloortillearlymorning.ItwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportofkindandfriendlypeopleincludingtheMarshaloftheKujawsko-PomorskieProvincetheDirectoroftheOperaNovaandmanyothers.TheJFTCthanksallofthemfortheirtremendoussupport. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201387SlovakArmedForcesAcademyDiscoversNATOTrainingFiveSlovakColonelsparticipatingintheNationalSecurityCourseledbyProfessorPavelBukaarrivedinBydgoszcztolearnmoreaboutNATOtrainingandtoseehowtherequirementsoftheAlliancearefulfilledinpractice.HowtheJointForceTrainingCentrepreparessoldiersforfuturemissionsandhowtheCentreconductsmoreandmorechallengingexercisesthesewerethemaintopicsofbriefingsanddiscussionsduringthevisitthattookplaceon10October2012.PolishandFrenchMilitaryBandsMusicalUnionTwomonthsafterthejointmusicalforcesoftheGermanandPolishmilitarybandsper-formedattheBydgoszczOldMarketSquareasimilarconcertthistimewithFrenchandPolishmusicianstookplaceinthecon-certhalloftheFeliksNowowiejskiMusicAcademyalsoinBydgoszcz.On22NovembertheFrenchInfantryBandfromLyoninvitedbyColonelFrancisMarectheFrenchSeniorNationalRepresentativeattheJFTCtogetherwiththeMilitaryOrchestraofthePolishArmedForcesSupportInspectorateplayedsomewellknownpiecesofmusicfortheNATOfamilyinBydgoszczgatheredattheAcademy.OnthenextdaytheFrenchInfantryBandmetalsowithpupilsoftheInternationalSchoolofBydgoszcz.Afterashortconcertthechildrenundertheprofessionalguidanceofthemusicianscouldtrytheirskillsinplayingafewinstrumentsincludingtrumpetclarinettromboneanddrums.Bothconcertswerereceivedverywell. 88TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013SportEventsShortbreaksbetweentrainingeventsexer-cisesworkshopsandconferencesconductedbytheJointForceTrainingCentrecreatedafewopportunitiestoexaminetheBydgoszczNATOsstaffphysicalcondition.NumerousmilitaryandcivilianrepresentativesoftheJFTCtheJFTCSupportUnittheNATOCommunicationandInformationSystemsServicesAgencySquadronBydgoszczandthe3rdNATOSignalBattalionrespondedtosportinvitationsandeagerlyparticipatedinvarioussporteventsorganizedfortheBydgoszczNATOfamily. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201389PrimeexampleofunityfriendshipandculturalenrichmentLikeinmanyotherNATOcommandsandinstitutionstheJFTCinclosecoopera-tionwiththeSeniorNationalRepresentativesorganizedannualInternationalDay.Overtheyearstheeventhasbecomeatruereflec-tionofmultinationalcharacteroftheJFTC.Nationalcontingentspreparedavastarrayofsamplesoftraditionalnationaldishesdrinksandpromotionalmaterialsabouttheircountries.SincetheNATOcommunityinBydgoszczissteadilygrowingandthenum-berofdependantswithitthemainfocusthisyearwasonchildren.Playgroundsentertain-mentcompetitionsandmanyotherthingswerepreparedforthembytheHostNationPoland.LifeattheJFTC2012inRetrospect 90TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013SlovakNationalHolidaysattheJFTCForthesecondyearinarawtheSlovakNATOcommunityinBydgoszczcelebratedtheirtwonationalholidaystheConstitutionDayandtheSlovakArmedForcesDay.TheeventledbyMajorGeneralPavelMackotookplaceon20September2012andgatheredmembersoftheJFTCrepresentativesoftheJFTCSupportUnittheNCIASquadronBydgoszczandthe3rdNATOSignalBattalionaswellasinvit-edguestsincludingHEMr.VasilGrivnaSlovakAmbassadortoPolandaccompa-niedbyColonelVasilKuzmiaktheSlovakMilitaryAttachtoPoland.TheJFTCcommemoratedtheSlovaknation-alholidayswithaunitparadeaflagrisingceremonyandanoccasionaladdressgivenbyGeneralMackointroducingthehistoricback-groundofbotheventsandtheirsignificancefortheSlovakNation.VelvetRevolutiontheendofCommunisminCzechoslovakiain1989wasfollowedbydissolutionofthecountry.InJuly1992Slovakiadeclaredsovereigntyon1September1992thecountryadopteditsconstitutionandon1January1993theSlovakRepublicandCzechRepublicbecameindependentstates.Slovakscommemorateadoptionoftheirconstitutionannuallyon1September.In2012theycelebratedits20thanniversary.TheSlovakArmedForcesDayRepubliciscelebratedannuallysince1997on22September.ThedatecommemoratesthefirstvictoryofSlovakvolunteersatBrezovapodBradlomintherevolutionaryyear1848whenthesuppressedSlovakNationstoodupagainstthepowerofAustro-HungarianEmpireinthefightforfreedomandindependence. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201391BrigadierGeneralGrzegorzBuszkaOpensPolishIndependenceDayRunItwasthethirdtimewhenthePolishcommunityattheJFTCorganizedthePolishIndependenceDayRuntocommemoratethemostimportantnationalholidayoftheJFTCsHostNation.Therewasalsoanoffi-cialceremonyattendedbylocalauthoritiesaconcertwithpatrioticmusicandareceptionwithpeasoupandPolishbigos.Thedaywasopenedbya1-kilometerrunforwomenanda3-kilometerrunformen.Approximately30participantsrepresentingtheJFTCtheJFTCSupportUnitJFTCSUandtheNCIASquadronBydgoszczNCBYenteredthecompetition.AfteraverytoughrivalryKatarzynaTerebusJFTCSUandMajorStphaneBoucharinNCBYreceivedcongratulationsforthebestperformance.Togetherwithsecondandthirdplacewinnersfrombothcompetitionstheywereawardedduringtheofficialceremonywhichtookplaceinthesecondpartoftheday.InthepresenceofMr.ZbigniewOstrowskitheDeputyVoivodeofKujawsko-PomorskieProvinceandMr.JanSzopiskitheDeputyMayorofBydgoszcztheJFTCfamilylis-tenedtoashortoccasionallecturegivenbyBrigadierGeneralGrzegorzBuszkatheJFTCDeputyCommanderandaveryinter-estingpresentationaboutPolish-Italianrela-tionsoverthepastfewcenturiespreparedbyanItalianJFTCofficerLieutenantColonelAttilioBurdi.TheceremonyalsocreatedaperfectopportunitytodecorateChiefPettyOfficerWillemdeBestwhowasawardedtheBronzeMedalofthePolishArmedForcesforhiscontributiontoPolish-Dutchmilitarycooperation.TheDeputyVoivodedecoratedCPOdeBestonbehalfofthePolishMinisterofDefence. 92TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013PolishArmedForcesLogisticsDayOn7March2012soldiersfromvariouscountrieswhocurrentlyserveinBydgoszczhadanunusualopportunitytolearnmoreaboutPolishlogisticequipmentandfacilitieswhichwerepresentedattheJFTCcompound.CommandPostMobileModuleExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalEODUnitaFieldHospitalModuleandaFieldBakerywereshowntothevisitors.AstemperaturesinMarchinPolandareratherlowtheorganiz-erspresentedeverybodywithabowlofwarmPolishtraditionalmilitarypeasoupaswellasaloafoffreshbreadbakedintheFieldBakery.AnotherSuccessfulYearfortheNATOSpouseClubinBydgoszczIthasbeenanothersuccessfulandforsurethemostfruitfulyearforthemembersoftheNATOSpouseClubinBydgoszcz.Morethantwentyculturalsocialeduca-tionalandcharityeventswereorganizedin2012.InadditionthememberswereengagedinFrenchEnglishandPolishlan-guagecourseswhichhelpedtoreinforcethefriendshipandmutualunderstandingamongtheladiescomingfromvariouscountries.BesidesalltheseactivitiestheNATOSpouseClubinBydgoszczactivelysupportedvarietyofeventsorganizedbyNATOunitslocatedinBydgoszczsuchasInternationalDay. TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March201393ChristmasTreeLightingAround100JFTCandNCIASquadronBydgoszczfamiliesaltogether250peoplemetattheJFTCcompoundtocelebratetheChristmasTreeLighting.IthasalreadybecomeatraditionfortheJFTCmemberstospendadaybeforeChristmasinthecompanyoftheBydgoszczNATOfamily.Lastyeartheeventtookplaceon14Decemberandwasfullofgoodspiritchildrenslaughterjoyandmagic.LifeattheJFTC2012inRetrospect 94TransformationThroughTrainingIssueNo3March2013PUBLICATIONGUIDELINES1.ThearticlesshouldbesubmittedinEnglish2.Thearticlesshouldbe1000-5000wordslong3.ThearticlesshouldbedeliveredaselectronicfilesonaCDDVDtothefollowingaddressJointForceTrainingCentreul.Szubiska285-915BydgoszczPolandorsentviaane-mailtothefollowingaddresspaojftc.nato.int4.ThearticlesshouldbewritteninMicrosoftWordformatsingle-spacedTimesNewRomanfont12sizeA4papersize5.PhotossentasanillustrationforthearticlesshouldbesentinJPEGfilesminimum500KB6.Theauthorofthearticleshouldprovidetheeditorwithashortinformationabouthisprofessionacademictitleprofessionalaffiliationandcontactdetails.