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26 Transformation Through Training Issue No 7 July 2015 of Al Qaedas crusade to reconquer lost territories and cities but terrorism itself and Huntingtons flames of an era characterized by cultural conflict. To be frank with the United States fighting a war that started in 2001 and Al Qaeda and Islamic State fighting a war that started in the 7th Century positions on a generational conflict not only appear nave in 2015 but positively dated. MoreoverthemodernityofIslamic States application of revolutionary tradition has made a mockery of this and not only further compounded the paradoxical nature of this conflict but through its ability to transcend borders and engage symmetrically brought the concept of a clash with Islam closer to reality. In fear of their own Muslim populations the Wests insistence as to the secular nature of the terror has ironically compounded this threat and led not only to misinterpretations of the language spoken by Islamic State and Al Qaeda but miscalculations as to their intentions. By staking the argument on a skewer of political correctness and dubious theological grounds centuries of conflict with Islam have been dismissed. More dangerously the Wests ability to win the argument has been assumed. Regardless of its religious rhetoric and that the language of Islamic State has more in common with the verbiage of 20th century fascism than the magnificent courts of Harun al Rashid or the Golden Age of Baghdads Abbasid Caliphs understanding that the theological and religious basis for the terror is inherent and real and nothing new is fundamental to exploiting it. A Foreign Enemy When the Mayor of London said in the wake of the execution of Fusilier Rigby that it is wrong to try to draw any link between this murder and British foreign policy he was mistaken - there is a clear connection between British foreign policy and the Woolwich slaying. What linked the murder to Britains policies abroad was the manifestation of enemy forces on the streets of Britain and treason. Intrinsically however Johnston was right regardless of foreign policy as Britain has been targeted in a global insurgency against the international powers of the 21st century she along with Russia America France Australia and Canada will be attacked. Irrespective of arguments to the counter the United Kingdom like the United States is a threat to the insurgency by its very existence and to suggest otherwise is to underestimate the adversarial nature of the enemy the power of modern Britain and a cousinry with the Islamic world that no other Western country comes close to. Whilst a change in policy towards Israel or Iraq for example might shift the frontlines of the global insurgency at an operational level and pacify a number of militants intent on individual acts of terrorism in the UK it would not affect the theological justification for political violence as espoused by Al Qaeda and Islamic State or the mechanics of their ideologies. Capitulating to the violence and arbitrary dictat of foreign forces is hence unlikely in itself to reverse any extant threat to Britain and not only risks the consolidation of political Islam as a global force but the strengthening of radical positions within the UK itself. This is not however to say that a re-positioning of British power is futile. Indeed a glance at the sub-text of the insurgency not only enables insights as to the need for reform but the vulnerability of the country to forces beyond the Crown and the potential benefits of weighing anchor on the remnants of the 20th century and forging ahead into the 21st. To better understand the threat to Britain to push what has become a frontline in an offensive against the West beyond the territorial boundaries of the British state and to take the fight to the enemy the consensus needs to be deeper than a reaction to the spill-over and blow- back from Iraq Libya Syria and Israel and deeper than a policy of hunkering down and holding course. And this is where the crux of the question lies unless absolute countering the foreign threat by targeting terrorists not only fails to undermine the rationale behind the insurgent forces engaged in political violence but exacerbates the potential for that rationale to morph particularly at home. In short in that counter- terrorism is generally reactive and by definition employed ex post facto it is not designed to counter the intangible idiosyncratic traits of an insurgent force. Counter-insurgency however is so and is not only proactive and geared towards the root causes of a political struggle but the heart of a struggle. Unfortunately in that such measures would require the mobilisation of not just the military and the police forces of the UK but the state it is also more radical and overtly confrontational in the paradigm of this proposal counter-insurgency would translate to the mobilisation of the state itself to protect its citizenry. With regards to the last two decades the reason the rationale for counter-terrorism as opposed to counter-insurgency became the vehicle through which to counter mainstream analyses of Al Qaeda and later Islamic State is not because of any reluctance to engage terrorism politically or that the terrorism was unprecedented but because there was little architecture in place to enable readily comprehensive understandings of the scale or nature of the Islamic insurgency. Al Qaeda and the horrors of the Caliphate have catapulted Islamic violence beyond the tenets of ordinary terrorism and