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„Transformation Through Training“

The aim of this magazine is to provide a forum for exchange of information and expertise among training and educational institutions across NATO in the area of training, military professional education, and related technological support. In the context of The NATO “Smart Defense” approach, there is growing importance for cooperation with partner states and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and others. With the above in mind, the JFTC invites authors from countries and institutions beyond the NATO environment, to publish in the Transformation Through Training magazine. The magazine will focus on the best practices in the areas of command and staff training, professional military education, simulations and simulation technologies, distributed training, military training development, and other related areas. The JFTC also welcomes recommendations for the application of the most recent experience and lessons learned from ongoing operations, training events and recent innovations in the field of simulations and information technologies. The magazine will also briefly cover the life of the international community at the JFTC with the aim of promoting the centre within NATO and among the partner nations. The magazine will be published twice a year, during the spring and fall, by the NATO Joint Force Training Centre in Bydgoszcz.

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Bold Dragon 2012

■ **LTC Benoit Langrand,**
JFTC Training Division, Staff Training Branch

Approximately 200 soldiers, deployed by the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (JFCBS), trained at the Joint Force Training Centre between 17 and 29 October 2012. The Bydgoszcz NATO Training Centre co-hosted the Bold Dragon 2012 (BODN 12) Exercise which was held concurrently at the JFTC and at the JFCBS Headquarters. The two-week BODN 12 was tailored for the HQ

JFCBS to provide practice in deployment and operational-level command and control (C2) procedures.

BODN12 is one of the milestones of the Deployable Action Plan (DEPAP) for JFCBS HQ to acquire Final Operational Capability (FOC) deployability at the end of 2014. This deployability concept is a consequence of the new NATO Command

Structure, stating that JFCBS HQ - as well as JFC HQ Naples - should be able to man, deploy and run a DJHQ (Deployable Joint HQ). So far, this capability was owned by the Force Command (FC) Heidelberg and the FC Madrid.

The overall aim of the exercise was to develop understanding of NATO's new Joint Task Force Headquarter Concept and its implications, in particular deployment of the HQ and staff in any future operations and also to instil a spirit and culture of deployability within the HQ. The exercise created a great opportunity for the JFCBS leadership to recognize shortfalls within the deployability concept and to test all aspects of this concept.

As BODN 12 was only one of the first steps in the deployability training plan of the JFCBS HQ, the full C2 structure (500 personnel) was not intended to be played, the main objective was to deploy and run the Initial Command Element (150 personnel).

The BODN 12 was an internal exercise for the HQ JFCBS staff, but, to achieve all the goals, they were supported by external personnel from the NATO Response Force 2012 Component Commands. Subject Matter Experts (SME) from FC Heidelberg, NDC Greece, German JFAC, STRIKEFORNATO and JALLC had been requested to reinforce



the Exercise Control (EXCON) structure.

During the two-week exercise the HQ JFCBS members worked on a fictitious NATO-led crisis response operation with humanitarian assistance under United Nations' mandate. All these created a very complex test bed for the HQ's abilities in support of the new NATO concept.

The scenario used for BODN12 was based on CERASIA II, developed by JWC Stavanger. The exercise animation was MEL/MIL driven, the incident data base was developed to trigger specific actions from the Training Audience (TA), in order to meet the approved training objectives.

EXCON was the first party to move to the JFTC on 17th October 2012: it was comprised of J7 Branch from JFCBS HQ, augmented with SMEs from NRF Compound Commands and the JFTC personnel.

The Scenario was developed so as to train JFCBS HQ mounting, preparing and checking different teams and elements before allowing them to be deployed in theatre. The Operational Liaison and Logistics Reconnaissance Team (OLLRT) deployed on 18 October 2012. In the frame of the Exercise Specifications, the OLLRT's role was to review internal SOPs, have basic training on theatre CIS liaison means and prepare integration of the next team. The team consisted of 25 JFCBS personnel.

The next day, the Forward Coordination Element (FCE) arrived in Bydgoszcz. FCE - once integrated with the OLLRT - was responsible for developing situation awareness in order to help decision making for main HQ in Brunssum and for coordinating the first deployment of forces and setting conditions for the establishment of initial C2 structure. During this phase, a lot of role-playing was performed, as the FCE was supposed to engage and coordinate with the Host Nation, GOs and NGOs so as to facilitate the deployment of the next team. The FCE comprised of 35 personnel from JFCBS HQ.

On 23 October 2012, the Initial Command Element (ICE) was deployed to the JFTC. This team integrates with the FCE, and then starts its activity during a 4-day play period. As an initial C2 structure in theatre, the ICE took over the Situation Awareness function, performed current operation planning and assessment and coordinated joint activities within its area of responsibility.

This element is also the 1st to engage and coordinate deployment of troops in theatre (maritime, air, land and logistic entities). 80 personnel were deployed in the JFTC as part of the ICE.

Finally, a Redeployment Coordination Team (RCT) was established during the last 2 days of BODN 12. Its role was to plan C2 step down and hand over - takeover to the Host Nation and also to plan the redeployment of forces in the perspective of the end of DJHQ mandate in theatre.

The peak of activity was reached during the second week of the exercise (24th to 28th October 2012) when the ICE was up and running. Most of the incidents and injects were scheduled during this period, so as to trigger a maximum response from the training audience cells.

Almost all personnel (EXCON and Training Audience) redeployed on 29 October with military flight from the Bydgoszcz airport.

BODN 12 was an event with a high visibility not only within ACO, but also within NATO. Several VIP visits took place during this time such as DSACEUR's.

The Exercise was supported by the JFTC, the JFTC Support Unit and the NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz staff. They assisted the participants during the whole event, providing help in various fields. The JFTC Support Unit personnel offered assistance

in Real Life Support matters, facilitating the deployment to Bydgoszcz of successive teams from HQ JFCBS staff. They also assisted the Training Audience during their 12-hour working days. NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz (NCBY) was responsible for implementing the CIS linkage with the JFCBS Headquarters personnel who stayed in Brunssum, mainly because of a huge number of VTC slots (nearly 100 in 10 days). In addition to NCBY, the JFTC TSD personnel were involved in the set up of the CIS architecture and in meeting JFCBS requirement related to the CIS issues.

Personnel from the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion performed training on the Tactical Liaison Kit (in theatre encrypted means of communication) to the OLLRT personnel.

JFTC TD personnel assisted EXCON, sharing experience regarding exercise preparation (scenario events management) or exercise execution, providing with advice or recommendations to JFCBS DCOS J7 acting as BODN12 Exercise Director.

Lieutenant General Richard G. Tieskens, the JFCBS Chief of Staff who commanded the Exercise at the JFTC, asked for his assessment of the Centre's support provided to the BODN 12, said: *"If I could use only one word I would say "outstanding". I think General Macko with his team are doing a fantastic job (...) I think you will see more of us here in the future."* ■





Bold Dragon 12 Successfully Completed

Interview with Lieutenant General Richard G. Tieskens, the Joint Force Command Brunssum Chief of Staff

Sir, as the Chief of Staff of the JFCBS you commanded the Deployable Joint Headquarters during the Exercise Bold Dragon 2012 which was held here at the JFTC. Could you please tell us a few words about the exercise? What is its aim and how was the execution conducted?

The overall aim of the exercise is, in fact, developing a culture of deployability. Since we've been a static Headquarters for the last couple of years, we have to reinstall an expeditionary mindset in our people. They are used to working in a completely different environment. We have to become deployable, so we have to get out of our offices and that requires a mind adjustment of all the people who work in the HQ. And therefore, this type of exercise was conducted for the very first time. Of course we have exercised a lot more in the past as well, but now for the first time we took all our people away from their comfortable offices, from their comfort zones and brought them

into a different environment, where they had to be able to execute their functions and roles.

What challenges did you face preparing the JFC for its deployment and during the exercise?

I think one of the major challenges is that, of course, we lack experience in deployability as headquarters. Since we have been a static HQ for quite a while, and now becoming a deployable HQ, nobody has all the answers. So we have to find answers to the questions of deployability together, based upon the experience from this exercise. Another challenge is that within NATO we have developed a New Deployability Concept for NATO HQs, for the NATO Command Structure. Since this is a new concept, currently under development, so there is only a draft of the concept available, we are now more or less testing it for the first time. Lisbon conducted the exercise earlier this year and as we speak, I think maybe this

or the next week Naples will also conduct an exercise based upon this New Concept. So for all the three, currently still three Joint Force Commands, it is a new world to discover. And that is really a challenge. The third challenge we had in this exercise was the phase of deployment. Normally, in most of the exercises I have seen you exercise the first part of a deployment - develop a plan, and then once developed you go and execute it. Then, normally you make a time shift and go somewhere in the execution of the mission and are notionally already two or three months deployed, so you by pass the actual deployment. And in this exercise we have discovered that there is a lot to be learned of what challenges we face in the actual deployment phase.

How long has the JFC BS had the task to set up a Deployable Joint Headquarters and how is its role evolving?

The new structure goes back to the Lisbon



Summit 2010, where NATO asked for a new NATO Command Structure. We started planning, thinking, and eventually the new concept was agreed, in the summer 2011. At that time I wasn't involved myself, but the decision for this New Deployable HQ Concept was taken in 2011. In the first place, of course, you have to reorganize your HQ. The New NATO Command Structure goes from three Joint Force Commands to only two – because Lisbon will close down. But on the other hand it is not the case that we just carry on. We also have to change our own structure. We will be augmented by about 200 staff in the coming years and we've had to change our internal structure. We had the effect based structure which was adopted in NATO, and now we've gone back to the old J structure which everybody is still familiar with, and we are currently in the process of changing our HQ. So, that keeps us busy of course, and this is a challenge, since we have to conduct these kinds of exercises while performing our daily mission. But I think as what I've seen during this exercise, we are well on the way.

How does the concept of DJ HQs fit into the Alliance's core tasks, why does NATO need it?

We can implement this concept both for the collective defence role and for the crisis

response operations. In both cases NATO may have to deploy forces. And therefore it needs a deployable HQ to support, and command the operations. You never know when and where you will have to deploy and therefore you should always be prepared for the unpredictable. That means that we might conduct operations from Brunssum but it might also be needed to deploy somewhere. And therefore this is really a big challenge for NATO because, as you know, the new NATO Command Structure had a drawdown of staff capacity, about 30% in total. The level of ambition was not brought down, but the available staff capacity was brought down by 30% – that means we are really in the middle of a great challenge.

Coming back to the exercise - How do you assess the exercise? Do you think it met its objectives?

Let me speak now for myself. We still have to review our progress and conduct. But the general assessment from my personal point of view is that it was a great exercise. In the first place, while we tested the concept, I think we have found some very interesting points that need further discussions and further development – and that was of course the aim of the exercise. The aim that we have defined for ourselves, as I told you at the beginning of this inter-

view, was to develop the culture of deployability. And if I look now, over the last couple of days, I see my staff working, and I think we have really achieved that goal. From the very first minute of this exercise until now as we speak, people are all enthusiastic, have the right attitude and I think they have really made a step forward in developing their expeditionary mindsets. So this is a great success as far as I am concerned and I'm really anxious to hear of course the opinions of the others and we will share them in a minute.

How do you evaluate the support the JFC BS got from the JFTC?

If I could only use one word I would say "outstanding". Everything from communication support, the facilities we were in, the offices, the building, the dining facility, I think were all great. They are very well kept, new facilities. I think General Macko and his team are doing a fantastic job. And I already spoke about it with my Commander that for us deploying to Bydgoszcz is a great success since it is far away from our comfort zone. On the other hand it is not too far away and it's a great facility where we can achieve our goals completely within the environment of your facility. I think you will see more of us in the future. ■

Questions asked by the JFTC PAO.

Smart Intelligence

Beyond Joint to Coalition Intelligence Collaboration¹

■ Dr Mark A. Thomas

Shrinking national budgets is not only a specter haunting the United States intelligence community but one looming across those of its alliance and coalition partners. War-weariness over Afghanistan, nagging public skepticism over governments' good stewardship of public funds and persistent allegations of intelligence entities infringing on civil liberties further fuel public demands in the ante-chambers and parliamentary halls across Europe and Asia to reduce spending on national security programs. Hardly, a NATO member-state military has escaped unscathed. Even Germany, the financial cornerstone of Europe, has trimmed defense-spending in its recent budget. All NATO member-states now face the challenge of doing more with less.

Hope remains. In times of austere national budgets, there is no better time than the present to capitalize on the untapped opportunities available through increased multinational intelligence collaboration, especially among the military intelligence communities of NATO allies and other reliable coalition partners. Aside from collective defense and demonstrating broad-based international political resolve, the value of an alliance is burden-sharing. NATO's experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and other recent endeavors have shown the value of multinational operations, leveraging coalition's best assets for a common objective, in a form of Ricardian comparative advantage, a theoretical kernel at the

heart of NATO's Smart Defense.

Although they have clearly and successfully leveraged one another's operational forces, NATO member-states have not yet realized the fruits of multinational intelligence collaboration. Smart Defense requires Smart Intelligence. No nation has, as of yet, realized the full potential of multinational intelligence collaboration. Efficient and effective coalition intelligence collaboration requires a legitimate, responsive, flat, coalition-wide network rapidly and reliably linking collectors to analysts and analysts to decision-makers.

Undoubtedly, LTG Flynn's approach to "fixing intelligence" catapulted intelligence collaboration within NATO light years ahead of its experiences in previous contingency environments such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Most notably, through ISAF, NATO has made significant progress, especially in creating the (Afghan) Mission Network into a coalition-wide knowledge management environment, one supporting both the coalition war-fighter as well as informing coalition decision-makers. The encouraging news then is a coalition wide-network exists, at least in a rudimentary form. But it is only formally sanctioned in a single theatre of operation. If all proceeds as hoped, the Mission Network will be a baseline network for coalition endeavors in future contingency environments. The truly innovative could perhaps even envision a similar network to

enable peace-time collaboration.

That said, while it can likely support Smart Defense, the Mission Network is not yet supported by Smart Intelligence. Each coalition partner has several types of collection platforms rich with data, which, though valuable to the coalition war-fighter, often remains stove-piped, or worse, "clogged up" in national channels. Anecdotes abound of information collected in a theatre of operation being transmitted to a national capital remote from the battlefield and then re-transmitted back to theatre several hours, even several days, later. Or, worse, in at least one case, information collected at a brigade level and transmitted to a division headquarters was removed from the coalition network, placed onto a national network and then classified as national secret, a series of actions which made the information unavailable to other members of the coalition, including those who collected it in the first place.

Smart Intelligence in support of Smart Defense requires better. In coalition contingency environments, national stovepipes, if required, must meld seamlessly and push information fluidly into a mission network where consumers are coordinating and conducting vital operations. Smart Intelligence requires linking the collection platforms into the operational network, essentially flattening the network even further and thereby increasing responsiveness. Responsiveness and "flatness," are two mutually support-

ive. Increasing “flatness” will ultimately improve responsiveness of the intelligence cycle in support of Smart Defense and coalition operations.

There are generally two schools of thought on how to flatten the coalition intelligence community. The first advocates fielding a coalition network of coalition workstations to all users and mandate all operators rely only that network. Such an option underutilizes national collection platforms and counters the benefits of Smart Defense. A variant would be fielding of coalition collection platforms as capable as the best national collection platforms, an option which at best is a straw-man and is realistically a pipedream, if for no other reason, it countermands national intelligence communities’ prerogative and obligation to protect sources and methods. Further, creating capable coalition collection platforms in all the intelligence disciplines would be resource prohibitive in the current budget environment.

The second school of thought is to link national collection platforms through a trusted interface to the coalition network, the so-called “Future Mission Network.” In this scenario, national teams deploy with their national workstations and pipe through a trusted interface into the coalition network. That interface must be bidirectional, pushing from national systems to the coalition network and pulling from the coalition network to the national networks, thereby alleviating the collection burden on alliance partners, leveraging the best collection platforms, and, in the process, increasing the legitimacy of the network itself. In the concept of Smart Defense, this seems the more cost-effective option. And it is in this direction, the knowledge managers are putting their efforts.

A third option, a hybrid of the other two options, is also possible, but requires the same prescriptions as that proposed for the second school of thought. The hybrid option also either increases the number of workstations on a user’s desk or puts a coalition workstation in a remote corner of the office close to the coffee machine.

Creating a system to support Smart Intelligence requires improved technology but, more critically, political will and leadership commitment. A nonnegotiable precondition for linking the stovepipes into the mission network is ensuring coalition part-

ners are confident in the network’s security. Specifically, at a minimum, the system must meet or exceed the requirements of confidentiality, availability, integrity and accountability of the data as outlined in SP 800-14, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information Technology Systems. Second, the members of the coalition intelligence community must be confident the means of providing a responsive, flat link into the mission network does not compromise or endanger the sacred jewels of their profession, the sources and methods of national collection platforms. There is little doubt among coalition partners in the value of the intelligence they gather. What remains in question is whether a technical solution, be it hardware or software, exists which can ensure nothing leaks through the sieves of the interface which would compromise a sensitive source or undermine a critical national collection capability.

Third, all coalition partners must consider the solution legitimate. In other words, all coalition partners must view coalition intelligence as a common enterprise and accept the technical solution as “the solution” to information-sharing across the coalition intelligence community. Some may argue NATO has an intelligence-sharing network in place. In fact, it does. There are at least three such systems, which vie at any given moment for the honor of being NATO’s intelligence network backbone. NATO must mandate a solution and that solution, along with the accompanying regulations and doctrine must be approved through the appropriate military and political bodies.

On a more practical level, in any given theatre of operations, the smaller coalition partners must have confidence the coalition-partners, who have the larger intelligence collection footprint, deem it as critical to push actionable intelligence to the coalition as it is to their national consumers. Likewise, those with the larger national footprint must be confident in others’ unerring commitment to the mission and its security, and in their ability to share the burden of meeting the commander’s priority intelligence requirements. In Smart Intelligence, there can be no free-riders and no bullies.

Most importantly, the solution must be collector-friendly insofar as it is either readily accessible to the collector or it must

link the national collector transparently to the coalition interface, e.g. not forcing a person to type and re-type the same information on two separate computer systems. Toward that end, the technical solution should leverage existing nationally fielded networks and the workstations predominantly used by each coalition-partner’s intelligence community. Finally, the technical solution must provide a reliable, responsive and rapid feedback loop from decision-maker to the analysts and collectors.

The technical solution may be the easy endeavor. Far more challenging may be adopting and adapting national policies to realize the benefits of Smart Intelligence. Each coalition member must examine its national caveats on intelligence collection and information-sharing as they relate to their involvement in contingency environments. National caveats hinder burden-sharing, constrict information-sharing, and undermine others’ confidence in the competency and/or commitment of coalition partners’ intelligence communities to mission accomplishment. In some cases, some coalition partners must first breakdown stove-pipes to intelligence-sharing between members of their own national intelligence community.

Next is the task of developing the directives and doctrine necessary to support Smart Intelligence. NATO’s experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan etc. have generated treasure-troves of lessons learned and best practices upon which to base NATO doctrine in support of Smart Defense. While collection, like counterintelligence, will always be a national prerogative, other matters are not. From reporting formats to collection management and intelligence fusion methods to coalition intelligence staff operations, NATO, its member-states and its coalition partners must benchmark the successes and identify areas of improvement.


Further, like soldiers, intelligence teams fight as they are trained. Once drafted, NATO and its member-state military intelligence communities have the obligation to integrate NATO doctrine into national military training doctrine, at least so member-state military members arrive competent to collaborate and confident in their nation’s commitment to the coalition intelligence enterprise. Too frequently, individuals have arrived in NATO contingency environments,

only seeing NATO doctrine and formats for the first time as they disembark from the aircraft. If fighting in coalition is a direction which NATO's member-states consider a likely course of action for the foreseeable future, then drafting, promulgating, and training common doctrine is not just an option, it is an imperative so Smart Intelligence supports Smart Defense.

Finally, Smart Intelligence requires examining which technologies and methods NATO member-states can share with each other to improve alliance, even coalition, intelligence collaboration. Where laser-range finders and thermal imaging devices have given US infantry teams a combat overmatch, so too have certain technologies, for example those used in document and material exploitation, increased the combat effectiveness of US collection efforts. He with the better technology has both the advantage but he must also bear a larger burden. In a coalition theatre of operation, where insurgents and other adversaries exploit even the slightest chink in the armor, the question is whether and how to promulgate the intelligence combat multipliers more broadly to alleviate the burden on the more technologically gifted coalition partners.

Many of the basic technologies and concepts for Smart Intelligence already exist. It is only a matter of sifting through the chafe to identify the best practices, drafting the doctrine, and building the consensus necessary to implement the change. And, unlike the Cold War years, the post-Cold War years have given NATO and its member-states an array of opportunities to work in multinational environments, where the success of the mission rests of soldiers with different national flags on their uniforms. Many of them know better the benefits of alliance than leaders in their national capitals. Budget crises, like any significant emotional event, often force change which leaders may otherwise discount or overlook. As we collectively run out of money, it is more urgent to work smarter. ■

¹ The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not represent the position of the US Army or the US Department of Defense.



Challenges of In-

Induction training is a training given to newly arrived personnel in a given Area of Operations (AOO). In accordance with the JFC Brunssum training directive for the ISAF pre-deployment training, it is usually 1 – 2 weeks of training including hand over left seat/right seat training and selected training as appropriate. It is an initial preparation upon taking up a post for a certain period of time. This sort of training is meant to help newly arrived service members to settle down quickly into the respective field of activity, thus becoming familiar with the environment, the particularities of tasks and responsibilities, comrades and colleagues.

It is important to provide the newly arrived service personnel with a good overview before their tour of duty officially starts. The induction training, therefore, should be based on a systematic approach and cover all the necessary topics and functional areas in the shortest time necessary. When properly conducted, the induction training offers many benefits for the soldiers as well as for the unit/HQ. For example:

- As the mission is continuously changing, the military personnel need to be regularly updated about the mission progress and trained accordingly. Regardless how realistic the pre-deployment training is, there are still realities which need to be personally shared between in-coming and out-going personnel in the HQ.

- The induction training keeps soldiers motivated. Refreshed skills and knowledge can help to reduce potential future risks. Also, such training promotes the feeling among the newly arriving soldiers that they are valuable members of the unit/HQ, which has been waiting for their arrival with great expectations and is dedicated to their support and professional development.
- It facilitates establishment of good working relationships to creation of a positive atmosphere among the servicemen. The induction training focuses on clarification of the tactics, techniques and procedures used in the mission and helps the soldiers to understand what is expected from them by their unit, command and the nation.
- High quality induction training saves the money and effort by making the soldiers more competent and effective in execution of their duties and functions.

It is a near commonplace that success in a nowadays' battlefield greatly depends on the appropriateness of training and the quality of information available. In accordance with NATO regulations the pre-deployment training takes place in three phases. Phase I stands for selection and training, which is entirely a national responsibility. Phase II is a training under the auspices of a given NATO Command and accords with the operational demand of a specific theatre. Phase III stands

-Theatre Training

■ Lt. Col. Dr. Zoltan Jobbagy
Lt. Col. Lajos Komjathy

for the in-theatre training, which is conducted by the respective operational command in accordance with relevant Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). This phase usually lasts three to five days. All three phases cover topics and training requirements which are often similar or they overlap with each other. But it is done this way by design. In each phase of the pre-deployment training the scope, complexity and level of detail are increasing. Thus, at each stage, the pre-deployment training presents new challenges for the training audience and forces the soldiers to creatively embrace them, effectively using the knowledge and expertise gained during the previous phase.

Specificity of the Phase III in-theater induction training rests on the fact that the soldiers are often partnered with out-rotating personnel. That enables passing on the most recent information to in-rotating units, from person to person, on procedures such as Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS), Counter-insurgency (COIN) and Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED).

Besides the pluses, there are also challenges. Based on our experience, we would like to share few examples representing the main problems we experienced during the Induction training after deployment to Afghanistan:

- The first problem was that most of the in-rotating units and their personnel had

already served in the area of operations. They thought they knew everything and there was no need for such training. This feeling was further reinforced by the fact, that indeed, they often did not see much has changed in the theatre and therefore any sort of familiarization was unnecessary.

- The second problem was caused by the obvious overlap of the topics addressed. During the C-IED training, for example, it happened that soldiers who had taken part in the respective „Train the Trainer” program did not see any need for participation in the pre-deployment training consisting of three phases and preferred specific, shortened and intensive training. It had to be explained, that despite recognizing the fact that there are obvious differences in terms of theoretical and practical content, C-IED training is compulsory and no step in the process can be omitted.

There are many reasons why the induction training needs to be taken seriously. First imperative is the successful execution of the mission and protection of the troops. Second is a variety of views and perceptions with which the soldiers arrive to Afghanistan. Often, some over-motivated servicemen deploy to the theater with “stars in their eyes”. Also, there may be soldiers with rosy dreams of a great performance, formidable achievements and

comraderie. The soldiers may begin their tours with a positive attitude and hearts full of new ideas. They may not be mentally prepared to face indifference, ambiguity and disinterest. On the other hand soldiers with previous experience from the deployment, already without illusions, may have a negative, often cynical attitude. They might scoff at the programs of the Induction training thus putting their comrades’ life deliberately at risk. The induction training is the last opportunity to overcome all these differences, instill positive attitude, strengthen the cohesion of the units, teams and HQs and have all the personnel focused on the mission.

Despite a great deal of knowledge about the ISAF mission from the previous phases of the pre-deployment training, there is always a certain gap between the last training event and deployment itself. The newly arrived personnel, therefore, have to be made familiar with all the changes which have impact on the mission execution. The program of the induction training can also be seen as a sort of specific training conducted until the soldiers are truly immersed into the mission. The induction training is also important in motivating new service members to boost their ambitions for higher performance. It is not a coincidence that the induction training begins on a high note, and everybody involved in its execution must look at it accordingly. ■



Conceptual Approach to Mission Specific Training

■ **Brigadier General Jaromír Zůna,**
JFTC Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff

Between 26 November and 13 December 2012 the JFTC conducted its already third ISAF Regional Command North Training Event 13-01 (RC-N 13-01) of the year. The training event itself was a part of a larger training effort organized by NATO for the ISAF mission, connecting the RC-N 13-01 with the ISAF International Joint Staff Training Event 12-02 (ISAF/IJC 12-02) and U.S. Exercise UNIFIED ENDEAVOUR 13-1 (UE 13-1) (Picture 1). By connecting several previously stand alone exercises, in various locations and representing different levels of command, NATO demonstrated a true extent of its capabilities in the management of complex, multilevel, and distributed exercises. NATO, together with participating national training centers, has used the ISAF pre-deployment training as one of the main ways for development of the distributed training capability, which

is now revealing its full potential. Years of fruitful co-operation between NATO training institutions and national training centers lead to impressive results from which the Alliance may benefit in the years to come. These benefits pertain to all the domains which constitute complex, multilevel and multinational training organized under the umbrella of a comprehensive approach. For those, who still may have some doubts about the practical meaning of the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI), the NATO's distributed training capability may serve as a good example that the new initiative already leans on real concepts, structures and capabilities. This training event, like many other exercises organized in NATO, has shown that the CFI has the potential to become the framework which will enable NATO to retain and improve our ability to train and operate together and effectively collaborate with the partners.

Personnel of the future RC-N HQ, which was trained at the JFTC, mainly derived from the 10th Armored Division HQ (GE). It was further augmented by soldiers from other allied nations participating in the ISAF mission. The overall size of the training audience was 184 personnel, including five flag officers, and commanded by Major General Joerg Vollmer, the future RC-N commander. Additionally, 315 personnel participated in various Exercise Control (EXCON) positions and functions, including four flag officers and 26 representatives of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Of course, like in the case of other training events organized at the JFTC, the training drew attention of the NATO top military leadership as well as of the national levels. For example, Lieutenant General Reinhard Kammerer (GE), Commander Field Army and Vice Chief of the Army, and Lieutenant General Rainer



Glatz, Commander Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command (BwJFOpsCom), visited the exercise twice. ACT COS Vice Admiral Anthony Johnstone-Burt observed the training as a part of his visit to the JFTC. In addition, the Chief of Defense Lieutenant General Peter Vojtek (SVK) paid a visit to Bydgoszcz to obtain a firsthand experience of the training organized by the JFTC, one of the most important NATO training institutions. Using the RC-N 13-01 Training Event as a background, the intent of this article is to share the JFTC's conceptualization of the Mission Specific Training (MST).

In accordance with the NATO pre-deployment training concept, Phase 2 – NATO Training consists of following parts: Mission Specific Training, Battle Staff Training and Mission Rehearsal Exercise (Picture 2). While Battle Staff Training (BST) and Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE), the culminating parts in any pre-deployment training, often gain lots of coverage in the military circles, there is usually not that much what external audience can read about the other parts of the training, including the MST. The NATO Bi-SC Exercise Directive 75-3 provides only definitions of Functional Area/Systems Training and Functional Services Training. But it is not dwelling much into the details and meth-

odology of the MST. The reason is that the directive is generic in nature and therefore does not reflect the specific training requirements for ongoing operations, such as ISAF. Among its training responsibilities for the ISAF mission, JFC HQ Brunssum (JFCB) is obliged to provide further training guidance for execution of the pre-deployment training for Regional Command Headquarters (RC HQ), which should be observed by both, the troop contributing nations and NATO training centers. Therefore, in the JFC HQ Brunssum Directive 75-8: COM JFC Brunssum ISAF Training Directive (8 May, 2012), and subsequent training directives and guidance issued by the JFCB, the MST requirements, objectives and structure are more clearly articulated. But, at the end, it is predominantly in the hands of the training institutions and designated future RC commanders how the generic guidance will be translated into a realistic training event.

While recognizing the requirement for commonality and standardization as a *modus operandi* in the NATO training environment, due to objective reasons, the training institutions may have slightly different approach to the MST. Almost certainly we would not find two NATO or national training centers with an identical design and execution of the MST. Even the text of the

JFCB ISAF Training Directive recognizes that a generic guidance always has to be creatively adjusted to the current situation in Afghanistan, differences in operational roles between the RCs and designated RC commanders' training priorities. In each of the training centers the question how the JFCB training guidance is applied depends on countless factors. The governing ones usually include the customer requirements, situation in the area of responsibility of the respective RC, commander's priorities, experience and capabilities of the training centre which supports the exercise, and sources available. Therefore, the final realization of the MST mirrors the circumstances and existing conditions in the training institution.

While discussing the conceptual approach to the MST, in theory, one could always adhere to the official NATO doctrine. The content of the JFCB ISAF Training Directive has visibly improved over the years. That implies that the Lessons Learned process works and there is a constant exchange of the information between all the parties involved. Highly positive news is that the training directive also provides sufficient room for flexible adjustment of the training requirements to the concrete conditions of a particular RC and its training priorities. Like most of other roofing

documents, the JFCB ISAF training directive is not a textbook. It refers only to the basic framework and requirements for the training, and as such, when it comes to the definition, content and structure of the MST and hierarchy between affiliated terms, these are practically intact and, therefore, to some extent, it lacks cohesion. The whole Phase 2 – NATO Training is labeled as “Mission Specifics” (page 7). Later in the text, the MST is streamlined to “MST (Academics)”. According to this part of the directive, the MST includes only Academic Lectures, while Roundtable Discussions and Panel Discussions are listed as standalone training activities (page 24). The directive does not distinguish that all the three activities are not separate parts of the training event, but they represent three different training methods of communication. These methods are applied for the same purpose, in support of the attainment of the same training objectives, in order to communicate the knowledge and information about the same subject. By the definition, this differentiates training methods from organizational forms of training. This misconception will be later explained in more depth, during the discussion about the application of the training methods in different parts of the exercise. In addition, the MST is listed among other training activities which together constitute initial part of the training event: “Round table Discussions, CG Media Training, MST (Academics), FAST, FAT, PANEL DISCUSSIONS (Q/A)” (page 24). Bereft of any description which would shed more light on how all these terms, forms and methods of the training are related to each other. This eclectic mixture of terms and fluid structures leave practically everything open to a subjective interpretation. The JFTC doesn’t have conceptual capacities and almost everything is driven by empirical approaches. Over the time, the JFTC adopted its own solution and integrated all the training requirements under one umbrella of the MST Training Plan (Picture 3). In order to provide coherent information, this article is based on the structure of the MST currently in use at the JFTC. Although recognizing, that such approach may not be always optimal, but on the other hand, it is the closest reflection of the true sense of the MST.

The JFTC is not in any way different from other training centers. It has its strong

points as well as areas where it largely depends on the external support. While having relatively a small staff, for example, is a constant challenge, the years of experience with the ISAF pre-deployment training is the JFTC’s strength, which makes it unique. Many similar examples may be given and how they specifically affect the way the JFTC approaches its training tasks and how it organizes the MST. Thus, the JFTC’s conception of the MST represents only one variant among many others which are likely to exist in the NATO and national training environments. Nevertheless, what we can say with confidence is that after the years of firsthand experience with organization of different pre-deployment training events, there has always been a high level of satisfaction among the commanders and their staffs with the quality, content and organization of the MST they received at the JFTC.

Building capable, confident and cohesive staff

Phase 2 - NATO Training aims at preparing the personnel for their mission by providing one-source knowledge, increasing situational awareness and ensuring standardization. In this framework, the purpose of the MST is twofold.

First is the mission’s context. The MST provides the conceptual foundation for the knowledge based approach to the mission execution and ability to understand the circumstances in the theatre, which reach beyond the realm of military security, purely military tasks and application of the military force. The MST should, therefore, focus on the themes, which can’t be mastered via other forms of training and require in-depth knowledge. It is important to cover especially those areas where the situation is constantly evolving and thus it is necessary to provide the training audience with the most recent information from the theatre. The staff training in general is designed to achieve required level of orchestration among the staff elements and staff members, and to obtain, or retain, common military command and staff competencies. Staff officers often consider it as, although creative, but still, a routine process. The purpose of the MST is to overcome this perception by


providing comprehensive information about the mission, its development, realities in the theatre and in such a way adding complexity and depth to the staff training. In order to achieve this aim the Subject Matter Experts (SME), who are supporting the exercise, need to have the most recent, as well as in-depth, knowledge about the situation in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the RC HQ that conducts the pre-deployment training.

The second purpose of the MST is to allow the staff members to gain the capacity to understand the related doctrine, operational plans, functional area services, supporting tools and systems, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). During the MST the staff members, in their individual and collective functions, will achieve the required level of knowledge, acquirements and habits in order to build capable, confident and cohesive staff teams that support the Commander’s decision making process. All these requirements have to be achieved in a relatively short time, by a multinational HQ, where the staff members often see each other for the first time only at the beginning of the training event.

The JFTC is NATO’s designated training centre to conduct the RC level training in order to ensure preparation of the commanders and staffs for the ISAF mission in accordance with the NATO standards. In line with this requirement, the RC-N 13-01 training event was designed to meet four standing NATO pre-deployment training objectives, which are:

- Promote continuity and common standards,
- Establish mission awareness in individuals,
- Ensure functional area competence,
- Facilitate staff integration and coordination and exercise the full decision-making process.

To ensure that the members of the RC-N HQ possess the required level of understanding of the current Afghanistan and ISAF mission-related issues the aforementioned overreaching training objectives were further divided into 45 specific training objectives encompassing the following themes: Afghanistan Overview, ISAF Strategy, Regional Command Operations (with emphasis on RC-N), Military Co-Ordination,



Picture 1 Distributed Training Event RC-N 13-01, ISAF/IJC 12-02, UE 13-1

Civil-Military Co-Ordination (CIMIC), Strategic Communication (STRATCOM) & Information Operations (INFOOPS), and Legal Framework. Specific training objectives are standardized for all RC HQ training and guide the process of preparation and execution of the training event as such. Nevertheless, for any training event these specific training objectives are often adjusted to better reflect the current development in Afghanistan and specific situation in the AOR of the relevant RC. During the course of preparation of the RC-N 13-01 training event the training objectives were discussed with the currently deployed RC-N HQ, BwJFOpsCom, which was the main customer, and designated future RC-N commander. This approach ensured alignment of views among all the participating organizations and also created preconditions for successful execution of the exercise. During the MST, 39 out of 45 specific training objectives had been addressed. This reiterates the importance of the MST among the other parts that made out the RC-N 13-01 training event. A thing to remember - successful completion of the MST and meeting of the specific training objectives should facilitate the training

audience's performance in the BST and MRE.

The MST is a continuous process encompassing all the three phases of the NATO Pre-deployment Training – National, NATO Training and the In-theater. During the NATO Training the training audience should further complement the basic knowledge about the ISAF mission developed by the individuals during the national training and obligatory Joint Advanced Distributed Learning (JADL). JADL is a prerequisite for attending any NATO-led ISAF training events. In the case of the RC-N 13-01 the rate of successful completion of the JADL by the training audience was 96%, which is about the standard in training events organized at the JFTC.

The MST like no other part of the training expresses the ideas of the comprehensive approach to the crisis management. Leveraging expertise and knowledge of the civilian actors such as IOs, NGOs, GOs, etc., is crucial for successful execution of the MST. These organizations possess a unique skill-set, experience and in-depth knowledge from the civilian domain which can't be adequately replicated within the military environment. For

that reasons the training institutions should have in their disposal formally established functional relationships with civilian actors from mutually supporting/supported organizations. When such a prerequisite exists, then the planning, preparation and execution of the training events becomes easier.

Structure, training methods and content of the training

For the RC-N 13-01 the JFTC developed the MST Training Plan consisting of two main parts - Functional Area Training (FAT) and Functional Area Service Training (FAST), complemented with the Key Leaders preparation and theoretical preparation. The Roundtable Discussions, Panel Discussions and Academic Lectures represent training methods, which are used astride the confines between individual parts of the training event as well as areas of preparation. These methods may be used, for example, for the Key Leaders and HQ Staff preparation, but equally for the theoretical preparation or FAT. Media Training is a specific training requirement (Picture 3).

One needs to have a personal experience with the MST in order to understand how it all fits together. All parts of the MST represent an interwoven training process rather than separate steps of the training. Several different activities may support one training requirement. From the organizational point of view for the RC-N 13-01 the MST was organized for the whole training audience (for example the Academic Lectures and Panel Discussions), for the Key Leaders and selected personnel (for example the Roundtable Discussions), and for the staff branches in the following functional areas: CJ1-CJ9, Command Group Advisors, CIED/EODCC, RPSE, CJMED/PECC, CJENG, PATG, INFOOPS and CJOC. Speaking about the FAT/FAST training topics, these were divided into the two main groups – training topics common to all the branches (content of the Panel Discussions, Academic Lectures, Vignette Based Training, etc.) and branch specific training topics (list of topics developed for each branch). Then, the MST can be pictured as a matrix with the following components - the staff structure (Key Leaders, HQ Staff, Staff Branches, even Staff Functions and Processes); the training requirements (ISAF Mission, FAT, FAST, Media Training, categorized as Common to all the branches and Branch specific); and training methods (Roundtable Discussions, Panel Discussions, Academic Lectures, Vignette Based Training, Case Studies, Situational Training, Practical Training using the tools and systems, interactions with the SMEs, facilitators, NCIA instructors, ANSF and the White Cell representatives, video-conferences etc.) (Picture 4). In order to facilitate the training process each staff branch (functional area) was supported by a designated subject matter expert and facilitator (person with previous experience from the RC-N HQ in the same functional area). In the RC-N training design the FAT and FAST are strongly connected with frequent intersections. After an initial, theoretical training provided by the NCIA, the staff commences work dedicated to respective staff branches under direct assistance from the SMEs and facilitators. During the FAT the branch members have to deliver an operational overview on how and when to use respective FAS tools in their area of expertise.

The FAT focuses on developing the

individual's competency in staff functions and operating procedures in his or her functional area of expertise and may be organized in individual or collective forms of training. The training audience members have to become familiar with the staff practices, TTPs, SOPs, and other requirements associated with their own branch or section within the RC HQ. Information obtained during the academic sessions is further expanded and clarified during the work within the staff branches under the lead of the key leaders and supported by SMEs and facilitators. One of the most effective methods used to trigger the decision making process within the branches is the Case Study.

The FAST is organized for the personnel who require specific functional services skills to perform their functions in the RC HQ. Functional Area Services (FAS) are Software Based Systems that provide support to a specific staff function, process or mission area. In a nutshell, by the FASs we mean command and control support tools and knowledge of related doctrine, TTPs and SOPs used in ISAF. People often think that the overall purpose of the FAS training is to learn how to utilize the systems and become familiar with the hardware and software. In reality, the FAS training deals mainly with the processes which those systems and tools support. The systems may experience failure, or may not always be available, but the military operations and all the processes which support their execution have to be continued. There is a large number of them currently deployed in ISAF. Some of the FASs are purely national assets, while others have been developed for NATO or specifically for the ISAF mission. That is why only those which are requested by the trained RC HQ are included in the training plan.

As mentioned before, the FASs are designed to support the staff functions and expedite the decision making process and staff work in general. In theory, the national phase of the pre-deployment training should bring the RC HQ almost ready to deploy. The reality is obviously different and stems from the nature of multinational operations and a coalition environment. These systems are often not on the inventory of the ISAF troops contributing nations and therefore this training requirement can't be always fulfilled during the national phase of the

pre-deployment training. That explains the reason why it is an indispensable part of the Phase 2 -NATO Training. Ability to fully utilize these systems is a prerequisite for occupation of the staff positions, but also, it is precondition for advancement into the next parts of the training, such as the BST/MRE. During the RC-N 13-01 the training audience requested training for the following FASs:

- NATO Intel Toolbox,
- Analyst Notebook,
- CIDNE-Combined Information Data Network Exchange,
- ICC-Integrated Command and Control
- JOCWATCH-Joint Operational Centre Watch,
- JCHAT-Joint Tactical Chat,
- IGEOSIT-Interim Geo Spatial Intelligence Tool
- FueInfoSys SK- C2 System RC-N,
- LOGFAS (EVE/CORSOM),
- BICES-Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System,
- SharePoint RC-N, SharePoint IJC Portal,
- HQ ISAF AMN Enterprise Portal,
- Lotus Notes, Adobe Connect, Simultaneous Translation System.

The staff personnel are trained for utilization of the FASs at the user level. The JFTC possess only limited internal expertise to provide such training. Therefore it contracts trainers from the NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA) and receives training support from the NCIA Service Operations Squadron Bydgoszcz, which is collocated with the JFTC. The training is very practical, using real systems and tools. By the end of the FAST portion of the MST, all the personnel have to be competent in utilization of their assigned functional services applications and comfortable in working as branch members of the RC HQ. One thing is to master the requirements individually in the class environment. The other is practical demonstration of the expertise during the BST/MRE when the trainees are encountering nearly real situations and have to work under the duress of the situational development driven by the exercise scenario. It is common practice that even during the BST/MRE parts of the training the SMEs, contractors and facilitators have to provide additional assistance to the staff members.

Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14	Day 15	Day 16	Day 17	Day 18		
02/12 UE 13-1 COMMEX 03/12 UE 13-1 MINIEX				UE 13-1 INDIVIDUAL TRAINING				UE 13-1 BST		UE 13-1 MRX				PAUSE		UE 13-1 MRX			
26/11	27/11	28/11	29/11	30/11	01/12	02/12	03/12	04/12	05/12	06/12	07/12	08/12	09/12	10/12	11/12	12/12	13/12		
INPROCESSING and ADMINISTRATION		EXCON TRAVEL BRIEFINGS and TRAINING		KEY LEADERS + TRAINING AUDIENCE CIOC TRAVEL and ADMINISTRATION		KEY LEADERS PREPARATION TRAINING AUDIENCE and CIOC FAS TRAINING		KEY LEADERS TRAINING ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS		KEY LEADERS MEDIA TRAINING		FINAL SYSTEM CHECK (COM + MAIL + JEMM)		START OF THE EXERCISE		END OF THE EXERCISE		TRAVEL ALL	
				TRAINING AUDIENCE TRAVEL and ADMINISTRATION CIOC FAS TRAINING				MISSION SPECIFIC TRAINING PANEL DISCUSSIONS ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS ACADEMIC LECTURES FAST/FAT TRAINING				BATTLE STAFF TRAINING		MISSION REHEARSAL EXERCISE		INITIAL AAR			
								STARTEX BRIEFING						CSR					

Picture 2 Training Event Structure for ISAF RC-N TE 13-01, IJC TE 12-2, UE EX 13-1
 Acronyms: COMMEX – Communication Exercise, MINIEX – Mini Exercise, MRX – Mission Rehearsal Exercise, EXCON – Exercise Control, CIOC – Combined Joint Operation Center, FAST – Functional Area Service Training, FAT – Functional Area Training, COM – Communication, MAIL – E-mail, JEMM – Joint Exercise Management Module, AAR – After Action Review, CSR – Commander’s Summary Report.

The **Roundtable Discussion** is the main method for preparation of the commanders and other Key Leaders. The purpose of the roundtable discussions is to elevate the level of detail and depth of knowledge about specific topics, which have been identified as mission critical. Because the focus is on the specific part of the RC HQ, from methodological viewpoint, it could be also considered as a part of the FAT. Nevertheless, as I said earlier, the application of this method may not be limited just to the RC HQ command group. It is under designated commander’s discretion what part of his staff will be included in the discussions and for which topics. The commander can make individual roundtable discussions strictly focused on the particular functional area, or, on the other hand, make it almost common to all. For example, we had the case when the main topic was covering SOF. The commander decided to include in this roundtable discussion only the personnel involved in SOF operations. But another example, when the topic of the roundtable discussion was dedicated to CIVCAS, the commander required participation of almost the whole staff. The roundtable discussions represent controlled

discussion chaired by the designated future RC commander, who also determines the scope of participation from his staff. Usually they are the deputies, chief of staff, all key leaders down to the level of a branch head and those who are responsible for management of independent functional areas. The roundtable discussions are supported by a moderator, lecturers, SMEs, White Cell Members, representatives from the RC HQ currently deployed in Afghanistan and ANSF members. Also, each session is attended by a member of the analysis and lessons learned section to capture the main outcomes, observations and guidance from the RC commander. For the RC-N 13-01 training event the following topics have been discussed during the roundtable discussions:

- **Security.** Implementation of SFA Concept in RC-N AOR; Coordination and Integration of ANSF and RC-N HQ Planning Process; Utilization of Liaison and Advisory Structures – OCC-P/R, Military Advisory Team (MAT), Forward Planning and Liaison Team (FPLT), Force Protection Cell/Force Protection Team (FPC/FPT); Implementation of Situational

Awareness and Security Concept (SASC); Situational Awareness,

- **Governance.** Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) Responsibilities and Interaction; Key Leader Engagement – Prioritization, Responsibilities, Planning, Lessons Learned Cycle,
- **Intercultural Communication.** Bilateral Behavior; Crime; Local Power Brokers,
- **PSYOPS, INFOOPS, STRATCOM.** Planning and Coordination in RC-N AOR,
- **SOF Operations in RC-N AOR.** Composition of Forces, Procedures,
- **SFA Concept Transition.** Milestones, Retrograde, Concept of Redeployment,
- **Legal Framework.** Civilian and Military Interaction, Good Governance,
- **Reconstruction and Development.** ANA Trust Fund, Role of International Organizations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Governmental Organizations (GOs), USAID, UNAMA, Troops Contributing Nations, Prioritization and Procedures in RC-N HQ,
- **Redeployment.** Current Status, Milestones, Responsibilities, Procedures.

One of the responsibilities of the RC commanders is to prioritize the value of individual topics in terms of their importance for the mission. Based on their observations, they may decide during the exercise to put forward requirements to adjust the time allocated to individual topics. They may also require scheduling of additional round table discussions if they come to the conclusion that it is necessary for the proper preparation of their staff. Having more than two roundtable discussions per day is physically demanding for the facilitators and attendees. Therefore, the number of these discussions scheduled for one day should be kept within manageable limit.

The roundtable discussions usually start with the introduction of the topic by the moderator and presentation of the key themes for the discussion. Sometimes, several topics may be scheduled for one session. After the introduction, a lecture follows, which is given by an SME. It proved to be useful if, after the opening lecture, the RC commander presents his personal view on the subject, followed by the comments from his deputies, which in turn opens additional topics for discussion. The discussion should serve as a venue during which the staff gains deeper understanding of the subject matter, gets better understanding of the commander's intent, contributes to the orchestration of the staff and understanding of the mission, improves knowledge about the SOPs/TTPs and their application for that specific area, fosters internal communication and facilitates the flow of information among the members of the international RC HQ.

The **Academic Lectures** are designed for the whole training audience including the Key Leaders. They are more generic and academic in nature than the roundtable discussion. Overall purpose of the academic lectures is to increase the level of understanding of the mission context. For the RC-N 13-01 Training Event the following lectures have been prepared:

- SFA Concept and Liaison Structure of ANSF, ANSF Overview and Development,
- RC-N Overview, Geography, People, Insurgency, Main Operations,
- Operational Overview, Transition and Redeployment Concept, Unified Implementation Plan (UIP), SASC,

- Afghans in Lead, Police Training,
- Presentation by the ANSF Leader – Afghans in Lead, ANSF Role in Providing Security,
- Joint Personnel Recovery,
- CIMIC and Development, Cooperation with IOs/GOs/NGOs, Trust Funds, Projects in RC-N AOR,
- Intelligence Assets and Course of Action, Situational Awareness, Green Reporting,
- C-IED Situational Awareness, Attack the Network, TTPs, New Threats,
- JFIRES, Legal Aspects, TTPs, CIVCAS,
- Medical Support, Structure and Capabilities, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 9-Linear Medical Evacuation Coverage,
- SOF, Mission, Units, Structure, Capabilities, Tasks, Information Sharing, TTPs,
- COIN, Insider Threat, ANSF Development, Shift from Population Centric COIN to Time Based Transition,
- PSYOPS, INFOOPS, STRATCOM,
- Media Awareness, International Media, Afghan Media, ISAF Policy,
- Lead Nation Perspective.

Composition of the topics was driven by the situation in the theatre, evolution of the mission, recommendations from the currently deployed RC-N HQ in Afghanistan and requirements of the BwJFOPsCom. The content of the lectures was discussed with the briefers before the training event. During the EXCON preparation it is always necessary to align the content of the lectures and inform the briefers of the methodology, technical and material support which is available at the JFTC. The lecturers usually come from different institutions, or commands, and have a different level of practical experience with lecturing. Then, the MST manager from the JFTC has to ensure:

- An in-depth explanation and coordination with the SMEs and facilitators,
- There are no redundancies or overlaps between the content of the JADL and MST, which have to be validated by the BwJFOPsCOM,
- The content of the lectures supports the training objectives, avoids repetition and outdated topics,
- The briefings observe standard format

- slides, such as introduction, agenda, training objectives, classification, etc.,
- Each lecture, which will be introduced to the training audience, observe planned breaks and avoid that the lecture goes longer than the scheduled time,
- There is a logical flow of information in the lectures and no overlap or collision of the content.

These requirements apply to all the parts of the MST. Since many of the external EXCON members already have previous experience from training organized at the JFTC the quality of the presentations is steadily increasing as well as the ability of the briefers to deliver high quality lectures. The lecturers are responsible for the selection and application of the training methods and methodical turns which are the most suitable/effective for the topic and achievement of the specific training objectives.

The **Panel Discussions** is an additional type of venue which further expands the information obtained during the JADL and academic lectures. The focus of panel discussions is on the context by grouping individual topics into coherent themes which constitute the backbone of the current phase of the ISAF mission. Panel discussions help emphasize the complexity of the operational environment by showcasing multiple perspectives on different topics, such as the UN, IOs, GOs and NGOs programs in Afghanistan. For the RC-N 13-01 training event the BwJFOPsCom requested panel discussions about following themes:

- Reintegration, Transition, Strengthening the Leading role of the Afghans,
- IOs, NGOs, GOs Programs in Afghanistan in RC-N AOR – progress, challenges, outlook,
- Cultural Aspects of the Afghan Society – Tribal Structure, Factions, Structures, Religion, Crime, Corruption,
- Gender Issues, Role of Women in the Afghan Society, Crime against Women, Education and Women, Women Shuras, Female Engagement Teams.

The panel discussions are facilitated by the MST manager, designated moderator and necessary technical support. The panelists consist of the SMEs, White Cell members,

	THU 29/11/12	FRI 30/11/12	SAT 01/12/12		SUN 02/12/12		MON 03/12/12		TUE 04/12/12		
Topic of the Day	Key Leaders Induction Briefings and RC-N Overview	Key Leaders Training	Key Leaders Training	TA Induction Briefing and RC-N Overview	Key Leaders Training	TA Training	Key Leaders Training	TA Training	Key Leaders Training	TA Training	
		RTD and Media	RTD and Media		Intelligence and Operational Overview	Intelligence and Operational Overview	RTD, C-IED and Media	Campaign Design, Threats and Medical procedures	RTD and Media	Communication Development and issues	
0755 - 0800											
0800 - 0815	Induction Briefing	Round Table Discussion 4		Induction Briefing	Lecture 1 SFA Concept		Lecture 6 CIMIC		Lecture 11 Medical		
0815 - 0830						Lecture 2 RC-N Overview		Lecture 7 Intelligence		Lecture 12 C-IED Attack The Network	
0830 - 0845			Round Table Discussion 7			Lecture 3 RC-N Operational Overview				Lecture 13 COIN	
0845 - 0900											
0900-0915		Round Table Discussion 5				Lecture 4 Afghan Presentation		Round Table Discussion 8	Lecture 8 SOF	Round Table Discussion 9	Lecture 14 PSYOPS, INFOOPS, STRATCOM
0915 - 0930						Lecture 5 BwJFopsCom Lead Nation Perspective			Lecture 9 Joint Fires		Lecture 15 Media
0930 - 0945											
0945 - 1000											
1000-1015		Training Team Training FAT Case Studies BST Presentations									
1015-1030											
1030-1045											
1045-1100											
1100-1115											
1115-1130											
1130-1145											
1145-1200											
1200-1215											
1215-1230											
1230-1245											
1245-1300		Media Briefing	FAST Overview								
1300-1315			Split into cells								
1315-1330	Round Table Discussion 1										
1330-1345											
1345-1400		Media Training									
1400-1415											
1415-1430											
1430-1445											
1445-1500											
1500-1515			FAT/FAST		FAT/FAST		FAT/FAST		FAT/FAST		
1515-1530	Round Table Discussion 2	Round Table Discussion 6									
1530-1545											
1545-1600											
1600-1615											
1615-1630	Round Table Discussion 3										
1630-1645											
1645-1700											
1700-1715											
1715-1730			Panel Discussion 1								
1730-1745											
1745-1800					Panel Discussion 2		Panel Discussion 3		Panel Discussion 4		
1800-1815											
1815-1830											
1830-1845											
1845-1900											

Picture 3 Mission Specific Training Plan
 Acronyms: RTD – Roundtable Discussion, TA – Training Audience, FAST – Functional Area System Training, FAT – Functional Area Training, SFA – Security Force Assistance Concept, CIMIC – Civil Military Co-Ordination, SOF – Special Operations Forces, PSYOPS – Psychological Operations, INFOOPS – Information Operations, STRATCOM – Strategic Communication, COIN – Counterinsurgency, C-EID – Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices, JFIRES – Joint Fires.

and ANSF representatives, depending on the topic. When the panelists do not possess sufficient command of English, translation may be required. Panel discussions usually start with a brief introduction to the theme and the participating panelists, followed by presentations given by the panelists. The content of the panel discussions may be enriched by a wide range of instructional tools such as the documentary/training movie, video conference, practical demonstrations, visual materials etc., in order to attract the training audience’s attention to the topic and ensuring clarity of the information. The main part of the panel discussion is the Questions & Answers session (Q&A) for which the bulk of time should be allocated. Based on our experience, the duration of the sessions should not exceed one and a half hour. Panel experts or practitioners should have different opinions on the topic. Another important point also is to network with the personnel who will be on the panel several weeks in advance to synchronize materials and allow them to put their thoughts together

in order to produce coherent presentations. The purpose of the **Media Training** is to *inform* about the role of media and importance of strategic communications within the ISAF mission; to *teach* about NATO policies and SOPs directing the ISAF information operations, media relations and local media in Afghanistan; and to *train* the Key Leaders and the staff in skilful planning, coordination and execution of strategic communications and media related tasks. All in all, the purpose of media training is to train the RC HQ in how to turn the media from an obstacle to an advantage. Thus, the MST should create sufficient knowledge base for the staff and the Key Leaders to be able to practically solve the scenario situations which will be included in the BST and especially the MRE. During the MST, six and a half hours of media training have been devoted for the Key Leader Training and additional two hours for the whole training audience. All the Key Leaders were trained on the procedures for delivering appropriate interviews to the mass media (TV, radio broadcasting, print journalism and

the internet). Theoretical parts were covered during the roundtable discussions. The training audience received comprehensive overview in two lectures, followed by discussions with experts about the role and function of the international, national and local media in Afghanistan and the northern region. For the execution of media training the JFTC contracted the Crown Media Company which specializes in pre-deployment training of individual military personnel and the staffs. During the RC-N 13-01 training event the Crown Media was used to conduct lectures, roundtable discussions, practical training for Key Leaders in conduct of the interviews for various media, played the roles of international and local media (TV, radio, internet), filmed training movie for the RC-N HQ and provided its own technical support. Video-conferences with the ISAF IJC HQ and RC-N HQ were used during the MST for the update of the SMEs about the current development in the theatre and also for the Q&A sessions. Role playing and situational training were included especially

in the media training, but were also used during the lectures. Despite the fact that the MST training is to a large extent theoretical in nature, there is a need to include practical training in order to develop required knowledge, acquirements and habits among the members of the training audience. Role playing and situational training naturally extend to the BST/MRE when the content of the MST merges with the other parts of the RC HQ training in a holistic manner.

Precondition for success

The organization of the MST and the scope of its support are driven by several factors. The training objectives are the most important as they represent qualitative requirements that have to be met. Second is the exercise budget, which governs the quantitative confines within which the whole training event is organized. Remaining factors may vary and they are both: external - related to the mission, training audience and training requirements; and internal - referring to the capabilities of the training institution. The first may include the type of the exercise, size of the training audience, composition of the Staff/HQ which is trained (national/multinational), its level of experience, mission context, etc. The latter may reflect the level of experience of the staff, technical and material competence and others. The JFTC, over the years of systematic buildup and involvement in the pre-deployment training, has already accumulated a significant amount of experience, reputation and expertise which, combined with an impressive technical capabilities, make this place well suited for execution of the MST and meeting its both major prerequisites - quality of training for a favorable price.

Basic precondition for successful execution of the MST is availability of the right composition of personnel for the management and support of the MST. During the RC-N 13-01 Training Event the EXCON was running the MST through the Chief MST and his section (Picture 5). The Chief MST carries out complex duties, usually covering planning, preparation, coordination and execution of the MST. That includes development of the MST Training Plan, alignment of the content of the FAT, FAST, Academic

Lectures, Panel Discussions and Roundtable Discussions, arrangements for participation of the external experts, coordination of the material support, planning for availability of the training space and facilities, personnel support, establishment of the command and control structure and management plan and the development and management of the MST budget. He closely coordinates his tasks with the Chief SME section, who directs the SMEs' support during the course of the exercise. Besides the JFTC staff and the JFTC Support Unit components, the supporting elements for the MST consisted of the White Cell, ANSF personnel, U.S. Navy Reserve Support Unit and already mentioned SMEs, facilitators and the Crown Media.

The White Cell typically represents agencies, organizations, institutions and individuals outside of the NATO and opposing forces structure. The composition of the White Cell may include local governments at national, provincial and municipal levels, IOs, GOs, NGOs, international and local media, local civilians and country experts. For the RC-N 13-01 training event following organizations have been represented in the White Cell:

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
- German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ),
- German General Consul to Poland,
- United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA),
- United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
- Afghan Drugs & Justice Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
- United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime,
- United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA),
- Afghanistan Country Experts.

Their main role was to prepare and deliver the MST lectures for the training audience, but also to act as specialists and advisors to the training audience throughout the exercise. Also, members of the White Cell were involved in the MEL/MIL scripting and coordination of the BST/MRE with the event managers.

Participation of the ANSF personnel traditionally belongs to the highlights of the training organized by the JFTC. A lot has already been said about the value which the ANSF representatives bring to the exercises. The RC-N 13-01 Training Event was supported by 26 ANSF members. The group composed of 5 members of the Afghan National Army (ANA), 11 policemen from the Afghan National Police (ANP) and 10 interpreters. The ANA team was led by MG Sayed Sarwer Sejadi and the ANP by LtG Baba Jan Farhad. Participation of the ANSF flag level officers provided additional qualities that enriched the training. The possibility of personal interaction between the future RC-N commander and his deputies and the ANSF generals is the most obvious one. Over the years the JFTC managed to reach full coordination with the ANSF with regards to selection of the right personnel for training events in Bydgoszcz. The ANSF personnel are nominated from the same units (regions) with which the training audience will be cooperating after the deployment. That creates favorable conditions for establishment of personal contacts and reinforcement of mutual understanding between the ANSF and the RC-N HQ staff members. Both are the indispensable qualities for successful execution of the ISAF mission.

U.S. Navy Reserve Support Unit (Norfolk) is not a very visible element of the EXCON structure, but its support is highly valued by both the JFTC and the training audience. The unit is officially designated as a support unit for the ACT. As such, on request, it also may support the training events organized at the JFTC. Since the JFTC staff is fairly limited, the unit is an additional source of personnel for a variety of functions within the EXCON. They possess the expertise, organizational skills and are already familiar with the JFTC and its staff and capabilities. Therefore it is relatively easy to integrate them into the EXCON structure. Tasks performed by its members span across all the parts of the MST. They are involved in the preparation and organization of the sessions, assist the SMEs in the preparation of the lectures, act as the site managers, moderators and facilitators during the roundtable and panel discussions, organize technical support for the MST and participate in the lessons-learned process.

ACADEMIC TRAINING	KEY LEADERS TRAINING	COMMON TO ALL BRANCHES	BRANCH SPECIFIC TRAINING		MEDIA TRAINING																		
<p>Security. SFA Concept in RC-N AOR; Coordination of ANSF and RC-N HQ Planning Process; Utilization of Liaison and Advisory Structures – OCC-P/R, MAT, FPLT, FPC/FPT; Implementation of SASC; Situational Awareness;</p> <p>Governance. GIRoA; Responsibilities and Interaction; Key Leader Engagement ; Lessons Learned Cycle;</p> <p>Intercultural Communication. Bilateral Behavior; Crime; Local Power Brokers;</p> <p>PSYOPS, INFOOPS, STRATCOM. Planning & Coordination in RC-N AOR;</p> <p>SOF Operations in RC-N AOR. Composition of Forces; Procedures;</p> <p>SFA Concept Transition. Milestones, Retrograde, Concept of Redeployment;</p> <p>Legal Framework. Civilian and Military Interaction, Good Governance;</p> <p>Reconstruction and Development. ANA Trust Fund, Role of IOs, NGOs, GOs, USAID, UNAMA, Prioritization and Procedures in RC-N HQ;</p> <p>Redeployment. Status, Milestones, Responsibilities, Procedures.</p>	<p>SFA Concept and Liaison Structure of ANSF, ANSF Overview and Development, RC-N Overview, Geography, People, Insurgency, Main Operations, Operational Overview, Transition and Redeployment Concept, Unified Implementation Plan (UIP), SASC, Afghans in Lead, Police Presentation by the ANSF Leader – Afghans in Lead, ANSF Role in Providing Security, Intelligence Assets and Course of Action, Situational Awareness, Green Reporting, JFRES, Legal Aspects, TTPs, CIVCAS, Medical Support, Structure and Capabilities, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 3-Linear Medical Evacuation Coverage, SOF, Mission, Units, Structure, Capabilities, Tasks, Information Sharing, TTPs, COIN, Insider Threat, ANSF Development, Shift from Population Center COIN to Time Based Transition, Media Assets, International Media, Afghan Media, ISAF Policy, Lead Nation Perspective.</p>	<p>Religion, Transition, Strengthening the Leadership of the Afghans, IOs, NGOs, Civilian and Military Interaction, Cultural Aspects of the Afghan Society – Tribal Structure, Religion, Crime, Corruption, Gender Issues, Role of Women in the Afghan Society, Crime Against Women, Education and Women, Women Shuras, Female Engagement Teams.</p>	<table border="1"> <tr><td>CJ 1</td><td>CJ 2</td></tr> <tr><td>CJ 3</td><td>CJ 4</td></tr> <tr><td>CJ 5</td><td>CJ 6</td></tr> <tr><td>CJ 7</td><td>CJ 8</td></tr> <tr><td>CJ 9</td><td>CG Adv</td></tr> <tr><td>CIED/EODCC</td><td>RPSE</td></tr> <tr><td>CJ MED/ PECC</td><td>CJ ENG</td></tr> <tr><td>PATG</td><td>INFOOPS</td></tr> <tr><td>CJOC</td><td>.....</td></tr> </table>	CJ 1	CJ 2	CJ 3	CJ 4	CJ 5	CJ 6	CJ 7	CJ 8	CJ 9	CG Adv	CIED/EODCC	RPSE	CJ MED/ PECC	CJ ENG	PATG	INFOOPS	CJOC	<p>CJ 9 Example of Specific Training Requirements List:</p> <p>Campaign Assessment, CIMIC Activities, Civilian Counterparts, Integrated Planning, Operational Planning, Actor Analysis, Governance and Development, Comprehensive and Integrated Approach, and related doctrine, TTPs and SOPs.</p>	
			CJ 1	CJ 2																			
			CJ 3	CJ 4																			
CJ 5	CJ 6																						
CJ 7	CJ 8																						
CJ 9	CG Adv																						
CIED/EODCC	RPSE																						
CJ MED/ PECC	CJ ENG																						
PATG	INFOOPS																						
CJOC																						
FAT		FAST																					
Roundtable Discussions	Academic Lecture	Panel Discussion	Situational Training	Practical Training																			
	Individual Preparation		Instruction	Case Study	Vignette																		

Picture 4 RC-N 13-01 Mission Specific Training Matrix

The scope of the support, which is required for the execution of the MST, evokes the question about the cost involved. The overall budget for the RC-N 13-1 approved by the BwJFOpsCom was € 830.000, out of which around € 600.000 was allocated for the MST support itself (NCIA, SMEs, Crown Media, ANSF, US Navy Reserve Support Unit). It is evident that the MST is, from the customer’s point of view the most expensive part of the exercise. Therefore, it is the customer who has the final say about the content and scope of support of the MST and is the deciding authority as to the approval of the training objectives for this part of the exercise.

Offering responsive and relevant training

Every training event is flourishing and dying with the activity, dedication and involvement of the training audience. When the training audience and the EXCON establish, from the outset of the exercise,

a spirit of “common training team”, the success of the training is almost certain. Combined with an effective utilization of White Cell members, SMEs, facilitators and ANSF representatives, then the realism and depth of the exercise can be created and some of the artificialities, which objectively exist in synthetic CPX/CAX, mitigated.

The MST supports achievement of the majority of the specific training objectives. Our experience has shown that shortly after the first few academic sessions, there is a tendency from the training audience to ask for inclusion of additional sessions and topics. Such requirement is only natural since it is a unique opportunity for hearing about the ISAF mission and Afghanistan from various viewpoints. But at the same time it is necessary to keep in mind that the MST is only a portion of the overall training event. A delicate balance must be kept between all parts of the MST, especially between the academic portion and FAT/FAST. The clash between the demands and existing limitations need to be resolved through other means. In the

future training events rather than quantitative expansion of the topics and allotment of more time the solution rests in the adoption of more effective organizational measures. Among them, merging topics, more effective utilization of time, update of the JADL and better application of the training methods seems to be the right way forward.

CAX capabilities, infrastructure and organizational conditions existing at the JFTC are already well developed and the centre is a mature and competent institution. There will be a few additions to our technical capabilities in 2013, for example the Auditorium VTC Suit and substantial replacement of the CIS. Both will further improve the conditions for the exercises. We intend to use VTCs more intensively, namely for the roundtable discussions as the most effective means of interaction with the experts from the theatre. But otherwise, we do not expect major changes in the organization and support of the exercises. Nonetheless, in close cooperation with the future customers, we have to find the ways how to mitigate the cost of the

MST. A partial solution, which is within the JFTC's reach, is to develop limited internal FAST capability for the most commonly used FASs. The JFTC seeks to enhance the ability of the assigned military staff in order to deliver FAST in the area of J3 (JOCWATCH, JCHAT, IGESIT, ICC/Adobe Connect), J2 (NATO Intel Toolbox, Analyst Notebook, CIDNE/BICES) and J4 (LOGFAS). Once achieved, the JFTC will be ready to provide, at a limited scale and at the end-user level, NATO FAST as a part of the training support package without additional cost for the future customers. The JFTC intends to reach this capability by means of the Train the Trainer program which is already ongoing.

More attention needs to be given to the area of taxonomy of the specific training objectives. At present, the list of 45 specific training objectives for the ISAF RC HQ Pre-deployment Training is only a little more than a comprehensive training requirements check list. The training objectives are missing deeper structural classification of the required level of knowledge – know, be able to, be familiar with – and identification of what these training requirements constitute in terms of the quality standards for preparation of the personnel for the mission – knowledge, acquirements, habits. Obviously, experienced commanders and staffs know how to prepare for the future mission to the best of their abilities. The issue is the nature of the pre-deployment training which has three distinct phases – National, NATO Training, and In-theatre. Naturally, full coordination of the training effort between these phases is sometimes hard to achieve, especially when considering that the troop contributing nations have different roles. Some nations constitute the bulk of the future RC HQ, others have only a contributing role. That affects the content of the pre-deployment training at the national level. Eventually, when going through the MST at the JFTC, some members of the RC-N HQ complained about the overlap between the national training, JADL and NATO Training, while for others practically everything was new. One of the reasons why this situation occurs is that those who are in charge of the pre-deployment training at different phases may take from the list of specific training objectives whatever they feel is important, and


train it to the level of their choice. This is how the disparities occur. Therefore, one of the lessons learned from the training event was the need for a holistic review of the specific training objectives. The aim here is to increase precision of their content, align taxonomy and improve measurability (qualitative/quantitative). Then, the newly adopted specific training objectives could serve as a tool, which would assist the planners at the national level and NATO alike, to better align the content of the training at different phases of the preparation.

There is still room left for improvement in the area of terminology and structure of the MST. The terminology constitutes the basis for any field of science or, in broader terms, professional human activities. Terms usage varies across the disciplines. That is a known fact. But when used within the same context, the meaning, hierarchy and application need to be standardized and commonly observed, in order to align communication among different NATO and national bodies and even establishment of the elements of order and discipline within the system. Functional Area Training, Functional Area/Systems Training, Functional Services, Functional Services Training, Functional System Training, Functional Systems Training etc. those are just some examples of different titles currently in use and describing the same thing. Variety of other examples can be found across the NATO doctrine, but especially training documents. The same can be said about the hierarchy and structure of the terms which are commonly used in the NATO training environment. The NATO Pre-deployment Training, for example, is organized in three phases, each phase further divided into phases, and the training event also consists of several phases. The terms like “Crawl”, “Walk” and “Run” are, according to the NATO doctrine, also “phases” of the pre-deployment training events. Even though, despite being called phases, they are not meant as an addition to already existing structural parts of the training events. They rather express the expected level of competence the training audience is supposed to reach at a particular point of the exercise. There is an array of theoretical concepts offering more elegant solutions than resorting to unofficial expressions.

Semantics has never been our concern. The issue is more practical. When there is a task to create an official text, participate in an expert discussion or organize training, then one has to reconcile the dilemma whether to respect the common practice, military writing style or affiliated theories.

Terminology goes hand in hand with the correct utilization of “The Forms and Methods of Preparation of the Commanders, Staffs and Forces”. The right selection of adequate forms and methods optimizes the process of preparation and achievement of the training objectives. The outcome of their deliberate and thoughtful application leads to an attainment of the required knowledge, acquirements and habits. For better understanding of the meaning, let me use, as a small case study, the recent discussion about the usage of the terms “collective training” and “exercises”, and how they should be embraced in the NATO doctrine. All began with the concern that the term “collective training” is not fully capturing the NATO's “exercises”. Eventually, both terms were connected and used in the NATO conceptual documents in the phrase “collective training and exercises”. With the conjunction in between, presenting them as two separate organizational forms of training.

Military pedagogy offers comprehensive system of terms and definitions, as well as methodological guidance, enabling to create optimal structure of the forms and methods of the educational and training process. With the theory on the backdrop, I will attempt to streamline the link between the aforementioned terms, from generic to specific, to offer one of the possible ways of resolution for similar theoretical problems. The fundamental term from which everything stems is “preparation”. It encompasses three interrelated components which constitute the process: military upbringing, education, and military training. All listed in the order of importance (role) in the process of preparation of personnel. Discussions hereafter focus on the last component – training. Preparation of the commanders, staffs and forces is organized in two principal Forms of Preparation – Basic and Combined. The Basic Forms of Preparation include individual preparation, methodical preparation, commanders and staff preparation, field preparation. The Combined Forms of



Preparation are in principle courses, eventually various command and staff workshops, conferences, conventions, etc. The Forms of Preparation represent the structure of the training process and organization of the trainees. They are characterized by: (1) the object of the training effort, (2) facilitation of achievement of a particular segment (requirement) of the preparation of the commanders, staffs and forces, (3) a specific place in the training program (training cycle) in terms of time and space, (4) and by typical training methods. Depending on the composition and structure of the training process, the training may be organized as an individual training or collective training. For each the whole set of the training methods is developed. A training method represents a deliberate procedure aiming at the achievement of the training objective (objectives). Each training method incorporates two components. First are the ways of promoting knowledge, developing acquirements and instilling habits in order to achieve required level of preparation

of the personnel, commanders, staffs and units. Second are the ways of promoting and supporting motivation and initiative of trainees. The structure of the training methods consists of several categories. Among others, it includes categories for the individual training and collective training. The training methods which are typical for the collective training are for example CPX, BST, LIVEX, and many others. In summary, the term “exercises” is generic in nature and commonly used, without specific affiliation to any sectoral educational and training system/program. “Collective training” is an organizational form of training conducted with utilization of the selected training methods (MAPEX, CPX, BST, LIVEX, etc.), which are typical for collective training and optimally suited for achievement of the stated training objectives. It is, therefore, plausible to conclude that the addendum - “...and exercises” - is redundant, because the term “collective training” itself contains information about the “exercises”.

As it has been discussed earlier in this

article, similar analogy exists with the current definition of the MST in the JFCB training directive. The flat structure of coordinated training activities has worked and over the time it has been subject of step by step improvements. But the empirical approach is slowly depleting its potential and maybe now, when the ISAF mission is winding down, it is the right time for a more in-depth review. Following proposal for the future structure of the MST is only a small contribution to a much broader revision which may be needed. Our current practice can be easily further improved with only a marginal effort. Whether to make that step or not depends on our level of ambition. Comparative advantages of the JFTC, such as the central location and relatively affordable cost of training, may one day not be the prime consideration for the future customers. The common denominator of the recent intensive utilization of the JFTC was the urgent need for the pre-deployment training. In the future, the equation may change and instead of the need the future potential customers will con-



sider it a choice. Under such circumstances the JFTC will remain relevant only if it stays abreast of the future developments and remains to be attractive for the customers by its exceptional qualities (people, technology, training programs and innovative solutions).

the MAT/PAT mission will, for the foreseeable future, endure. Like in all the previous NATO pre-deployment training the MST will again constitute its crucial part in order to deliver mission specific training requirements. In the second half of 2013 the JFC

opment and be ready for their future roles.

The training for contingency operations implies flexible, collaborative and a highly adaptive approach. The training requirements, including those for the MST, may be changing frequently, more so than in the case of the ISAF mission, which has been around for a decade. NATO training institutions will need to have readily available mechanisms which will enable them to outreach for the required, often mission specific and diverse, expertise and knowledge. One of the potential ways forward is to move from a role playing, which currently drives the content and organization of the MST, to an institutional approach, represented by a long-term cooperation with formal institutions. Capitalizing on the institutional richness of the European environment is an obvious choice which is fully in line with the CFI.

The JFTC is already laying down foundations of a regional network of mutually supporting institutions. The JFTC has already established formal supporting/supported relationship with 16 organizations/institutions representing national HQs, COEs and NATO bodies, IOs and Academia. The supporting/supported relationship is best expressed by the following terms: training expertise, lessons learned, analytic capacities and expertise, comprehensive approach, EXCON, HICON, SIDECON, SME, information sharing, internal training and education support, development of training packages, international recognition, MEL/MIL scripting, role playing, naval expertise, etc. Advantage of the JFTC in this effort rests with its central location and an attractive program of work which attract the potential partners to interact with us.

Experience from the ISAF Pre-deployment Training proves that, in principle, the design of the MST, which is currently used in NATO, is well suited for training multinational HQs. The structure of the MST enables full integration of the partners and civilian actors into the training and effective/efficient utilization of the capabilities which exist in the NATO training institutions. It is also flexible enough to accommodate any specific future requirements which may arise from the NRF training. The focus of our work in the near future will be on the content and searching for innovative solutions with the aim to further elevate qualitative characteristics of the training provided at the JFTC. ■

	Training Forms	Training Audience	Training Methods	Training Objectives
Mission Specific Training (MST)	Key Leaders Training	Command group and selected personnel	Roundtable Discussion; Interaction with Senior Mentors, ANSF and White Cell Members;	Know
	Theoretical Preparation	Common to all branches	Lecture; Panel Discussion;	Be able to
	Functional Area Training (FAT)	Common to all branches	Lecture; Panel Discussion; Vignette Based Training;	Be familiar with
		Branch specific	Case Study; VTC;	
	Functional Area Services Training (FAST)	Common to all branches	Vignette Based Training;	Knowledge
		Branch specific	Instruction; Practical Training; Individual Preparation;	
Media Training	Command group	Roundtable Discussion; Practical and Situational Training;	Acquirements	
	Common to all branches	Lecture; Practical Demonstration;		

That leads me to another remark, which relates to the requirement for ensuring continuity, promoting institutional development and building credibility. All these require deliberate effort over a long period of time. With the adoption of the CFI NATO embarked on the challenging path and bold vision, full of complex requirements. It means that NATO training institutions would have to have an embedded expert capacity enabling conceptual and institutional development in order to assume the anticipated future roles. In an environment of permanently rotating staff it is hard to imagine that such a capacity would be build in a foreseeable future. The JFTC would definitely deserve a permanent position of a senior fellow with thorough expertise in the area of education and military training and significant military experience.

When looking into the post-ISAF period, NATO will shift its training effort from a campaign to a contingency posture. That will also change the context of NATO exercises. But still, there are strong indications that the requirement for the MST will remain and its role is not going to diminish. The assumption is based on several factors. The most important one is that NATO training for the current operations remains among its top priorities. The ISAF will be replaced by the ITAAM mission, for which the new training concept and specification for the NATO Pre-deployment Training will be required. The character of the ITAAM mission means that

Brunssum plans to publish the new training concept and requirements for the ITAAM mission. That would provide for clear training guidance and sufficient time for the training institutions and the future customers to properly prepare training for the new mission.

For the multinational HQs there will always be the need for the FAT/FAST in order to gain the required level of expertise in related doctrine, SOPs, TTPs and C2 supporting tools and services. That applies equally for the multinational HQ, which is going to be deployed in the current operation, as well as for the one trained for the NATO Response Force (NRF). Also, the comprehensive approach is becoming the common framework for the potential future contingency operations. In this context the participation of the partners in the future NATO exercises will become a norm. These predictions further reinforce the need for having the MST part included in the future NATO training concept. The content and scope of the MST in the future exercises may differ depending on the type, complexity and level of the exercise. For example, there will probably be the differences between the training organized for the HQs from the NATO Command Structure and NATO Force Structure. Each HQ may have different level of experience and may be functioning in different conditions. But still, the purpose of the MST will remain the same. That is why NATO training institutions will have to stay abreast of the devel-



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JFTC expands CAX expertise portfolio at SEESIM12

■ **Mr. Jacek Welz,**
CAX Modeling & Simulation Engineer
JFTC Training Support Division, Wargaming Branch

The JFTC constantly seeks opportunities to expand its expertise in multinational-training convergent with the Centre's mission. One of the expansion directions is through entering the area of relevant non-NATO led training events. A recent example was the South Eastern Europe Simulation Network Exercise in October 2012 (SEESIM12). The JFTC as a member of the combined NATO Allied Command Transformation team provided Federation Management, NATO Training Federation Integration and Synchronization as well as JCATS, JTLS and VBS2 simulation systems support in the distributed environment of the Exercise.

Introduction

The South Eastern Europe Simulation (SEESIM) is a multi-national (non-NATO led) crisis management/disaster response distributed Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX). SEESIM12 was the sixth in a series of exercises within the framework of the South Eastern Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) process. It was executed between 15 and 19 October 2012.

The aim of the SEESIM exercise is to promote cooperation, coordination and interoperability of civil-military operations and reinforce real world crisis response within and among the SEDM nations and the SEDM initiatives through effective use of computer modelling and simulation (M&S). The specific aim is to develop capabilities and procedures of national and regional coordination, cooperation, and mutual assistance in response to security concerns and risks related to a regional crisis.

SEESIM12 involved about 500 participants located in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia¹, Ukraine and the South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) Headquarters. The exercise was supported by the United States Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW), Sweden and NATO. The US provided executive assistance and technical support throughout the planning process and execution. Sweden provided tech and operational expertise in crisis management. In addition, several International Organizations assisted to provide a realistic training experience.

NATO participation was related to NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Distributed Training and Exercises (DTE) programme and involved the ACT, the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) and the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), supported by the United States Joint Staff J7, Joint and Coalition Warfighting (JCW).

NATO DTE Experiments during SEESIM 12

The Distributed Training and Exercises (DTE) Experiment was conducted concurrently with the SEESIM12 15-19 October 2012. The execution of this experiment culminated the nearly 18-month collaborative effort to align Bulgarian national and Allied Command Transformation DTE programme goals in the context of a non-NATO led multi-national exercise.

The aim of the DTE Experiment was to gain insights and help and determine

potential roles NATO could play in supporting collective exercises in multi-national settings. This includes information on the usefulness of tools that could contribute to expanding capabilities leveraged in computer assisted exercises. The way to achieve this has primarily been through the introduction of NATO CAX tools such as the Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM), the NATO Training Federation (NTF), and the Exercise Scenario Resource Portal (ESRP).

The experiment was done in conjunction with SEESIM12, but depending on the experiment objective, the relationship between the exercise and the experiment varied. Two primary capabilities were assessed during the execution – the Joint Exercise Management Module (JEMM) and the NATO Training Federation (NTF):

- JEMM is a NATO prototype CAX tool that currently serves as standard for NATO planning, design, and execution for operational exercises. JEMM is used extensively by the NATO Training Centres, but not commonly used in non-NATO led multi-national exercises such as SEESIM, and many of the participating nations lacked JEMM experience. The JWC provided support in all aspects of the JEMM including administration, training,





SEESIM12 NTF experiment Core Team, from the right: Jacek Welz, JFTC (Federation Management, JCATS and VBS2 support), Per-Philip Sollin, Pitch Technologies (HLA/RTI, federation and network support), Amy Grom, JCW (NTF Technical Lead), Andy Bowers, JCW (Federation Design), Gary Redenius, Rolands & Assoc. (JTLS support), Matt DeMaar, JCW (Federation Management, JCATS support)

and MEL-MIL management. The JFTC supported this part of the experiment by hosting and administering SEESIM12 JEMM server at the JFTC for six months, before the Main Planning Conference (MPC) in April 2012. The NTF CAX capability, as used in SEESIM12, created a modelling and simulation (M&S) federation between the Joint Theatre Level Simulation (JTLS) and the Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) systems. The “SEESIM12 NTF” represented a variant of the previous NTF federations and included specific enhancements. The technology to develop NTF for SEESIM12 leveraged previous NATO Modeling and Simulation Group (i.e. NMSG-068) activities and internationally recognized standards (i.e. HLA Evolved). The NTF was only available to the nations that chose to participate in this particular experimental area, and was

not explicitly associated with the Exercise. The JFTC participation in SEESIM12 and DTE Experiment focused on this.

Experiment preparation, execution and outcomes have been captured by Data Collectors, who used a series of surveys, interviews and observables to capture pertinent data in each respective area prior to and during the execution.

NTF Experiment details

The main simulation software used during SEESIM exercises was Joint Theatre Level Simulation (JTLS), however some South Eastern Europe nations (like Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia), that used Joint Combat and Tactical Simulation (JCATS) at their national simulation centers, preferred to use it during national and multi-national exercises in order to utilize their own resources and skills, as well as already developed

national databases and scenarios. The NATO Training Federation (NTF) served as the solution to connect different national simulation systems, like JTLS and JCATS, together.

The SEESIM12 NTF Experiment has been designed to federate three different national JCATS instances with one main JTLS, which covered the whole area of South Eastern Europe (SEE) nations. Numerous additional tools, supporting component interconnection, maintenance and monitoring of the federation have been involved. Simulation data was prepared in a special way to have coherent data in both simulation systems. The Experiment was distributed over the following locations:

- Bulgaria main site (Defense and Staff College in Sofia) with: NTF hub - all federation related software (HLA/RTI, monitoring and management tools); JTLS (complete SEESIM scenario and side forces from all nations not participated

- in the NTF Experiment); additional simulations as a part of the experiment, which included VBS2 provided and run by JFTC CAX and SWORD run by MASA company invited by Bulgaria
- Bulgaria remote site (collocated with the main) with: JCATS (Bulgarian forces only) and federation monitoring tools
- Croatia remote site (national simulation center in Zagreb) with: JCATS (Croatian forces only) and federation monitoring tools
- Serbia remote site (national training center in Belgrad) with: JCATS (Serbian forces only) and federation monitoring tools
- JFTC remote site (JFTC BatLab) with: NLVC suite and federation monitoring tools (listener federate only)
- JWC, JCW, Sweden remote sites: Federation monitoring tools (listener federate only)

Each of the sites implemented Pitch Booster software component, whose role was to improve network connection performance and optimize federation traffic between the sites. Additional functional elements like federation monitoring software, data loggers, filters, C2 interfaces and viewers were integrated part of the solution. Altogether, there were about 40 active federates (separate software instances connected to the federation) run during the NTF Experiment. The systems needed to process about one hundred federation traffic messages per second (average), with some peaks up to a few thousand messages per second.

The main goal of the DTE NTF Experiment and focus area for JFTC was to assess and evaluate “NATO viability” – specifically NATO’s resident capacity to:

- manage the federation and lead preparation for its use,
- run the federation during the execution phase

As a technical solution, the NTF and JTLS-JCATS federation is not a completely new concept and has been tested before, e.g. during MSG-068 final experiment hosted at the JFTC in November 2010. Results of that experiment and recommendations from MSG-068 Final Report have been used as a baseline for current federation software implementations.

During execution of the Experiment, a number of incidents from the SEESIM12 exercise scenario have been played, in order to test interaction between different sites



JFTC actively supported Federation Management and the technical platform of the SEESIM NTF experiment

and simulation systems like JTLS-JCATS and JCATS-JCATS in the following aspects:

- Technical aspects of the NTF, like: proper unit representation, correct interaction between different simulations, time of rejoin federation after losing connectivity, crash recovery, network monitoring, performance measurement etc.
- Operational aspects of distributed exercise with NTF use – scenario/incident coordination and management between remote sites, NTF Management in order to keep all the simulations federated and synchronized over various locations, while following the flow of MEL/MIL.


JFTC involvement during SEESIM 12 NTF Experiment

The JFTC CAX Branch representatives have been involved from the beginning of the SEESIM12 exercise and experiment preparation. That includes participation in exercise specification and planning conferences as well as regular teleconferences and VTCs. NTF Experiment preparation covers participation in NTF Integration Workshop in M&S CoE in Rome (June 2012), End To

End (E2E) Testing at Bulgaria Defense and Staff College in Sofia (September 2012), and finally SEESIM12 NTF Experiment setup and execution in Sofia (October 2012).

In order to support the main objectives of the NTF experiment, as well as the JFTC interests, the CAX team supported the following activities:

- Federation Manager Post – Participation in planning and preparation process, including some technical activities, like NTF integration, on-site setup and E2E testing as well as coordination, management and synchronization between remote sites during the experiment execution.
- Data Collection/Technical Advisor role – as a part of ACT Experiment Team, in areas that focused on:
 - What the associated skill sets are – those required to manage a federation and lead its preparation for use (i.e. NTF enhancements) and those to run the federation (i.e. specific competency).
 - What the technical requirements are to sustain, and/or enhance, the NTF in the future. This



Example of state of the art of CAX Tools – JCATS, VBS2 federated through Pitch RTI with other supporting applications

includes the software, hardware and network as well as the federation monitoring and management tools that must be utilized to maintain NTF.

- The JFTC CAX capability testing with connection to SEESIM12 NTF Experiment. The JFTC has been connected to Bulgaria NTF hub as one of the Experiment participants using JFTC local systems.

NTF Experiment execution and initial results

One of the benefits for the JFTC from participation in SEESIM12 NTF Experiment was to gain new knowledge and experience related to running distributed and federated exercises. The CAX team has been involved in both technical and managerial aspects of the Experiment, during preparation and execution. This involvement allowed getting a comprehensive picture of requirements, effort and skills needed to run exercise using NTF solution.

A number of incidents from the real SEESIM12 exercise have been played during the NTF experiment. The Situational Forces were represented in different simulation systems, federated with each other using a number of standardized interfaces and interconnection software. Not only JTLS-JCATS connectivity has been exercised, but also JCATS-JCATS and JCATS-VBS2 (VBS2 was provided and operated by JFTC) as well as other configurations and solutions, e.g. Google Earth as “EXCON Viewer”.

It was really exciting and interesting to have multiple national sites talking through the teleconference bridge and discussing ongoing scenario incidents played live in different simulations federated with each other, at the same time seeing simulations’ views from remote sites combined on one big screen. The nations participating in experiments provided very positive feedback about using NTF and NATO approach to exercise management.


An important step forward has been made in building a relationship with the SEE nations, especially Bulgaria, whose experts became known to the NATO community and vice versa, preparing the

way for future cooperation development.

There were not any major technical issues during the NTF Experiment execution. Main difficulties have been resolved prior to the execution, during workshops, testing events and setup (i.e. databases correlation, software issues). There were minor technical issues during the NTF experiment execution related to particular simulations, network connections and software/hardware performance, however they were expected and welcomed from an experiment perspective, in order to test management, support and recovery procedures, as well as to collect items could potentially be improved in the future.

The Distributed Training and Exercises (DTE) First Impressions Experiment Report (FIER) was released in December 2012. The FIER provided initial insight regarding the DTE experiment, which were very positive. Most of the aims of the experiment have been achieved. The Final Experiment Report with all experiment results and recommendations will be published in February 2013. ■

¹ Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia by its constitutional name.



Multinational Special Forces Exercise „Puma 12”

■ MAJ Krzysztof Plażuk,
Mr. Piotr Orłowski,
Polish Special Forces Command, Public Affairs Office

Special operation planning and execution as a part of a stabilization mission - that was the aim of the largest and most important exercise known as “Puma 12”. This multinational project, which was attended by more than 450 soldiers from 10 countries took place in Bydgoszcz between 9 and 16 November 2012 at the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC). The director of the exercise was the Commander of the Polish Special Forces, BG Piotr Patalong.

Preparations for the “Puma 12” started as early as 2010. The aim of those activities was to assess the level of readiness of the Special Operations Command (SOC) set up by Poles. The SOC directs the Special Operations Component Command (SOCC).

The exercise was held at the JFTC in Bydgoszcz because it has great capabilities to carry out such projects. “Right now it is the only place in Poland where we can execute multinational staff-command training for special forces on such scale and dimension” - general Patalong said.

The exercise scenario assumed participation of special forces in a NATO operation aimed at preventing the escalation of a political crisis and humanitarian

disaster in a fictional region of Europe. The SOCC personnel were commanded by the Special Forces Deputy Commander, Col. Jerzy Gut. The main part of the component (about 70%) was formed by the staff of the Polish Special Forces Command and its subordinate units. The remaining 30% were soldiers from commands and special units from: Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Lithuania, Germany, Slovakia, the United States and Hungary.

The exercise was a key element to check the level of readiness of Poland to become a “Leading State” in the area of NATO special operations. The final test of the Special Operations Component Command created by the SOC will be held in autumn 2013 during the “Cobra 13” exercise. At that time, Special Forces Combat Teams will gather in military training areas in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania to practically conduct operations planned by the SOCC. Passing this exam is a requirement Poland must fulfill to become one of the “Leading Countries” with capabilities to command the NATO and allied special operations. It is an ambition of the Polish Special Forces to join a small group of countries that possess such qualifications

in 2014. At the moment they are: France, Spain, Turkey, the USA, United Kingdom and Italy.

“Puma 12” was observed and evaluated by officers from the US and NATO commands: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). In their opinion as well as in opinion of BG Piotr Patalong, the exercise objectives were achieved. The command system and information flow were successfully tested. The exercise was also an excellent opportunity to rehearse procedures for planning and managing a variety of special operations. The experience gained should allow for successful conclusion of the certification process.

Besides the commandos there were also soldiers from other services of the Polish Armed Forces (Army, Navy, Air Force) and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense: Operational Command of the Armed Forces, National Defense Academy, the Military Police, Armed Forces Support Inspectorate, Inspectorate of the Military Health Service, Training and Doctrine Centre of the Armed Forces and the Air Force Institute of Technology. ■



PUMA 12 – Showcase of the Connected Forces Initiative

Interview with Brigadier General Piotr Patalong, the Commander of the Polish Special Forces

The Polish Special Operations Forces Command was responsible for preparation and execution of training for multinational special forces exercise “Puma 12”. As the Commander of the Special Operations Forces you were the director of the training. Can you say a few words about the training itself? What is the “Puma 12”? What are the goals of the training?

For the Special Operations Forces Command, “Puma 12” is a key phase on the way to become a, so called, framework nation

within the area of special operations. During the training we wanted to find out whether the Special Operations Forces Command is on the way of developing the capability to gain the status of Special Operations Forces Component Command exactly where we planned for it to be while preparing the schedule to gain this capability. The main idea of the training was to check the most important factor – people. Procedures can always be modified and adjusted to dynamic changes but it must be done by perfectly trained and quali-

fied personnel. We have such people in the Special Operations Forces Command... While we summarize the training, we have to remember that it is a stage leading to certification. It is important that we look at the whole process as a whole, not randomly.

Developing such a big training was something new for you and for your staff. How did you prepare for the exercise? Were there any challenges or problems that turned up during the preparation phase?



At Special Forces we never talk about problems. Even if they turn up, we treat them as challenges we must face. It always mobilizes us to even harder work and no doubt, preparing training like that was such a challenge. A number of conferences, dozens of agreements, hundreds of working meetings. Any time when we are involved in any action for the first time, we do our best to be ready not for 100 but for 200%. We have a number of very well qualified officers who completed courses in Poland and abroad and we all worked really hard. This is something that builds our relationships. You must remember that there were more than 450 soldiers from ten countries. These numbers show what the scale of difficulty to prepare such training is.

If I were to initially summarize the training, I think that we did a good job. After the training I received words of appreciation from our allies for professionalism the Special Operations Forces Command had presented during the preparation and execution of the training.

You have mentioned that „Puma 12” is the next step – a test of Poland’s readiness to become a leading country within the area of the NATO special operations. When will Poland gain this status and what other conditions it has to fulfill? What are other steps ahead for Poland in this process?

Yes, that’s true. ”Puma 12” was our last but one exam. It is like a trial final high school exam. Our real high school finals are scheduled for November 2013. I am pretty sure that both I and my soldiers will successfully pass their most important test – national verifica-

tion of the achieved capabilities to execute the lead nation tasks, and Poland, in accordance with national and NATO plans, will be identified as the first lead nation within the group of the, so called, new NATO members. We’ve been working on this for years and those efforts cannot be undermined.

In practice, what is the significance of being a lead nation for Poland? What impact will it have on the Alliance? How will NATO benefit from the fact that Poland achieves the status of a lead nation?

Special forces, even though the smallest in number, play a significant role in our country’s defense system. Achieving the status of a lead nation in the area of special operations is of great importance for Poland’s security system and for the whole Alliance. It must be remembered that the power of the Alliance is the sum of capabilities of its member states. This is why NATO encourages its members to develop their defense capabilities in new areas. What is especially important for NATO is asymmetric threat related to the existence of supranational terrorist organizations. More and more often security is defined not within the context of a state that is in control over its own territory but also within providing security and quality of life for its citizens. Therefore NATO actively supports aspirations of all the member states that aim at developing their special forces. NATO indicates that Polish way of development of special forces can be used as a model to follow by other states.

All that shows particular significance of

“Puma 12”. Coming back to the training: Do you think you managed to achieve the stated goals? How do you evaluate its execution?

Yes, definitely. All the goals on both operational and tactical level were achieved in 100% and the execution was excellent. It was another test for the staff, not only for the commanders. I can say with complete authority that all the parts of this machine are properly synchronized. Our allies from USSOCOM, US SECUR and NATO NSHQ evaluated the training as highly successful.

Of course there is always room for improvement. One of the aims of the training was to check where exactly we were. Now it is up to our wisdom to decide how we use the conclusions from the training. We are lucky to have another year and there are not too many things that require improvement. We are optimistic.

How do you evaluate the support you and the participants received from the Joint Force Training Centre during the preparation and execution of “Puma 12”?

The value of the support we received from the Joint Force Training Centre cannot be overestimated and the cooperation was great. I can say that the training preparation process and the course of it would have been much more difficult if not impossible if the JFTC had not been actively involved. Let me once again express words of appreciation and thanks. Cooperation with the JFTC was a real pleasure. ■

Questions asked by the JFTC PAO.

“Green on Blue”

Attacks Threaten ISAF Mission Success

■ LTC Krzysztof Danielewicz,
Polish Army

Because the ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces) operation is taking longer which results in increasing personnel and material costs, the final date of the mission has been established for 31 December 2014. To achieve this target, it is necessary to train Afghan Security Forces that will be able to take over the responsibility for security in Afghanistan after the ISAF forces have withdrawn.

Even though some of the Afghan districts and provinces have already been handed over to the Afghan forces, a problem has appeared recently that may delay or even paralyze those actions. The problem is the attacks committed by members of Afghan security forces against their ISAF partners. They happened before, however, recently their scale caused serious unrest among both ISAF representatives and the Afghans for whom ISAF assistance in training their security forces is of key importance.

This article is an attempt to present the problem of attacks which are often referred to as “Green on Blue” (GoB)¹ or “Inside the Wire Threat”. The author tries to define the problem, present its causes, consequences and countermeasures undertaken to neutralize it.

Definition

There is no one specific definition that could be used while describing the attacks. Most often they are referred to as “Green

on Blue” (GoB)², “Inside the Wire Threat” or “Insider Threat”. The term “GoB” is used to refer to attacks when representatives of Afghan security forces attack ISAF employees or soldiers. This name is used when we talk about the problem in general or when we talk about it without asking about details. However, the term “Inside the Wire Threat” or “Insider Threats” is more precise and is used when a given attack can fall into one of the four categories: Infiltration, Co-Option, Impersonation, and Personal Motivation³/Grievance.

To be more specific:

Infiltration – this term is used in situations when rebels, terrorists, or extremist group members plant their representative within the ISAF structure and area to collect information or commit an act of violence⁴.

Co-Opt – here we mean a situation of voluntary or non-voluntary recruitment of an active Afghan security forces member to commit acts of sabotage, violence or to collect information for an external organization. It may be achieved through corruption, intimidation, ideological recruitment or the use of personal reasons⁵.

Impersonation (pretending to be someone else) – such attacks happen when rebels try to get to an ISAF base in order to carry out an attack through using unauthorized uniforms or equipment normally used by Afghan forces or ISAF⁶.

Personal Motivation/Grievance – these attacks are often committed as a response to cases of mistreatment by ISAF soldiers. Such incidents are results of misunderstandings caused by cultural differences, humiliating and degrading treatment, sometimes it is a response to civilian casualties or Afghan losses resulting from ISAF actions, propaganda actions or public statements made by world leaders. Finally, they are caused by various provocative actions like Koran burning. The attacks, even though they are not usually committed by insurgents, are very often used by them for propaganda purposes⁷. This category is the most difficult to identify and neutralize because it is related to personal perception of certain facts or events by a given individual and may also result from taking drugs, stress or ideological activities⁸.

Statistics

Some statistics show how significant the problem is. According to NATO information, between May 2007 and May 2011 there were 26 incidents which resulted in death of 58 foreign troops (most of the attacks occurred after October 2009)⁹. From the beginning of 2011 the number of attacks increased by 75% which resulted in 102 deaths of ISAF soldiers between May 2007 and August 2012. 40% of them were killed in 2012. In 2011 it was 35 people. In 2012, all those who were killed as a result of GoB

accounted for 13% of casualties of the 306 killed in Afghanistan¹⁰.

Official statistics do not say too much about reasons of the attacks or their perpetrators. During a press conference held on 13 August 2012, the ISAF spokesman, BG Günter Katz, stated that contrary to the Taliban statements, the number of attacks against ISAF troops committed by people related to the Taliban is a single-digit number. He says that since the beginning of the year till the interview, the number of the GoB incidents was 27 and they resulted in 37 deaths.

He said i.a.: "Yes, we had 27 very tragic incidents. We take them very, very seriously. But we must not forget that on the other side we still got almost 500,000 soldiers and policemen who work together, as we speak right now actually, in order to crush the insurgency and fight for more stability and security here in this country"¹¹.

Despite those statements, representatives of the US administration are not certain for how many of those incidents the Taliban are responsible, and how many of them are individual cases, non-related to them. During a VTC with the Pentagon, commenting the GoB attacks in May, General John Allen stated: "It's important to note that in the analysis that we have done, less than 50% of the ones that have perpetrated these attacks were in fact Taliban infiltrators. Many of these folks are self-radicalized. So it's important to understand and be able to recognize the nature of that self-radicalization in the ranks"¹².

AP reporter Bob Burns, noticed that earlier the Pentagon had mentioned that the Taliban were responsible for 10% of casualties and asked General Allen why the difference was so huge. General John Allen replied: "Our view is it's about 25%...this still requires a lot of analysis. And so if it's just pure Taliban infiltration, that is one number. If you add to that impersonation, the potential that someone is pulling the trigger because the Taliban have coerced the family members, that's a different number. And so it's less about the precision of 25 versus 10 than it is acknowledging that the Taliban are seeking, ultimately, to have some impact in the formation. And Bob, I know you are aware that the Taliban try to take credit for every one of these attacks, whether it's a personal

grievance or whether it was a successful infiltration"¹³.

Definitely August 2012 was the worst as far as the number of attacks is concerned – nine ISAF soldiers were then killed in only eleven days¹⁴: on 7 August two Afghan soldiers killed a US soldier, they fled and joined the Taliban. On 9 August in Laghman province US soldiers killed an attacking Afghan soldier; on 10 August six US troops were killed in two GoB attacks in Garmsir and Sangin¹⁵ in Helmand province. On 13 August an Afghan policeman injured two US troops in Nangarhar province and on 17 August two US soldiers were killed by the Afghan Local Police in Farah province. On 17 August in Kandahar province, ISAF troops were attacked but luckily no one was injured¹⁶.

Reasons

Next to discussions concerning the number of attacks caused by the Taliban themselves there are disputes over the reasons behind the attacks. According to General Allen, only in case of 25% of the attacks the probable reasons are known¹⁷. Most analysts agree that majority of GoB attacks is committed by Afghans with no participation or inspiration from the Taliban¹⁸. If we assume it to be true, then the GoB problem is much more complex than it seems. Personal reasons for the attacks are difficult to identify because most of the attackers die during the assault or right after. The attacks may be triggered by unlimited number of reasons or personal conflicts. Very often they result from a culture shock that Afghans, coming from small villages, experience meeting ISAF soldiers¹⁹. There are also cases of difficult relationships among ISAF soldiers that result from cultural differences. Some ISAF soldiers are unable to establish partner relations with Afghans, who being people of very high self-dignity, are extremely sensitive about this.

Because of the adopted agenda for withdrawing ISAF troops from Afghanistan, the mass "production" of soldiers is surely one of the sources of problems. Due to huge needs and very rapid rate, a thorough verification of every candidate is not possible²⁰. Before the dates of ISAF forces withdrawal from Afghanistan were specified, the process

was slow. Now it is much faster and as a result, needs for competent ISAF instructors and mentors increase. Within the recent years the manpower of the Afghan Army has increased from 30,000 to 170,000. That situation significantly affected the number of contacts with Afghan partners. Calculations say that a company of 150 mentors is necessary to properly supervise and train a brigade of 4,000 so there is a huge amount of potential contacts between people. The lower level of contact, the higher risk of attack. The situation is better in case of officers of higher ranks as they have been better verified and trained so their credibility is higher²¹.

Of course there are other reasons behind the attacks like radicalism and positions of soldiers who return after leaves spent at their homes with families. Their behavior may be influenced by the Taliban actions who try to sway the recruits' mindsets. It is possible that those soldiers blame ISAF forces for the state of security or the need to stay away from their families for a long time. These reactions are important because the GoB attacks are meant to paralyze the process of training of the Afghan army and police²².

NATO informs that out of 22 attacks committed in the last six years, 38% are cases caused by mental or emotional problems or stress resulting in permanent participation in fights. Many recruits are unable to fight as they are not emotionally mature or lose their mental stability due to use of drugs. Many Afghan soldiers have problems with discipline and are illiterate which makes the training process very difficult or even impossible. Very often they are under the influence of drugs also during battle missions, operations or patrols. UN Office on Drugs and Crime statistics from 2010 say that around 1 million of Afghans are addicted to drugs, this is 8% of the adult population (14 million) of this country, and is twice as high as the world average. According to the US data between 12 to 41% of all the police recruits tested positive for use of one of drugs and in most cases it was hashish. Therefore, Afghan authorities must tolerate drugs like marijuana or hashish in the army and police, otherwise the security forces would number only 20-25% of the current personnel²³.

GoB attacks are especially important for the Taliban due to the propagan-

da reasons. On 7 August 2012 the Taliban published two pieces of video footage that show ANA soldiers attacking ISAF troops in Kunar and Uruzgan. In jihad forum, Mullah Omar revealed the information that infiltration of the Afghan security forces is the result of his guidance and plans that were published last year. He also informed that Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration department had been created. Its task is to persuade members of the Afghan security services to commit attacks against ISAF forces. Among others, this department deals with convincing Afghan soldiers and policemen to join the Taliban, treating it as their religious obligation. The Taliban claim that the department has got its cells all over Afghanistan. Most probably it also tries to plant its people in the Afghan security services in order to later carry out attacks²⁴.

Mullah Omar's statement published in "The Voice of Jihad" forum has been translated by the SITE Intelligence Group. In his statement, on seven pages of text and video footage, Omar presented 33 points and informed that the department had been established.

Here are three points that may help understand the Taliban's intentions:

"3. Mujahedeen have cleverly infiltrated in the ranks of the enemy according to the plan given to them last year. Many conscious Afghans in the rank and files of the enemy have shown willingness to help the Mujahedeen in a shrewd and astute manner after having come around to know the reality. As a result, the foreign invaders and their allies in their military centers and bases do come under crushing blows of these heroic soldiers. We appreciate these brave and historical heroes and the entire nation pays them great tributes. We expect others to display the same boldness and spirit. Thanks to the infiltration of the Mujahedeen, they are able to (safely) enter bases, offices and intelligence centers of the enemy. Then, they easily carry out decisive and coordinated attacks, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy both in life and equipment. Furthermore, a great number of soldiers join the ranks of Mujahedeen, carrying their heavy and light weapons and ammunition, after leaving the ranks of the enemy. The Mujahedeen honor them and provide them protection. In the recent days, you and we were witness of such

frequent incidents.

29. I invite all personnel of the Kabul Administration, particularly, the personnel of police and army, their officers and the employees of the intelligence department to abandon support of the invaders against your religion and country; join the ranks of Mujahedeen like your heroic colleagues-- those who deal crushing blows at the invaders from time to time. Join the current struggle aimed at liberating your country and ousting the foreign usurpers-- a struggle which is on the verge of victory, if God willing. This will give you a successful and proud life here and in the Hereafter, you will be among the pious men of the Creator and the Master (of all Beings).

*30. It is more proper for you to take advantage of this opportunity because the day is not far away that the invading enemy will flee Afghanistan. The Islamic Emirate has added in its organizational charter a department by the name of Call and Guidance, Luring and Integration. Its branches are now operational all over the country so that, in addition to other services, they may provide you facilities to leave the ranks of the enemy and join the Mujahedeen"*²⁵.

During a press conference organized on 22 August 2012, Hamid Karzai accused foreign secret services of most of the GoB attacks. A day later, in his comment, General Allen stated that there was no information that would confirm that statement and informed that the situation was still being analyzed in order to find reasons of the recent increase of such attacks. Karzai's advisor for security, Aimal Faizi, informed that each case of a GoB attack is thoroughly analyzed by the Afghan side. Information comes from interrogations, intercepted letters and recordings of talks. Based upon this information, the Afghan side assesses that foreign secret services are behind the attacks but fails to provide their names. It is, however, common knowledge that the Afghan government blames Pakistan and Iran for the attacks²⁶.

With reference to the increase of GoB attacks in August 2012, General John Allen, the former commander of the US troops in Afghanistan, says that there is more than one reason of the increase. He listed the following as the most important: Taliban operations, personal reasons of the attackers and Ramadan (fatigue of fasting). Additionally,

Ramadan overlapped with the period of fighting which led to accumulation of negative energy and fatigue of soldiers and policemen. In such circumstances it is much easier to take a desperate decision to attack ISAF troops²⁷. The fact that the US forces are reduced and instead smaller mentoring teams are introduced is also important. Small ISAF teams remain within big Afghan units and therefore decisions to attack them become easier²⁸.

Consequences

It has already been mentioned that victims of the GoB attacks account for 13% of all victims on the ISAF side in 2012 in Afghanistan. The scale and significance of such attacks is unprecedented in the history of the US armed forces and did not even happen during the conflicts in Iraq or Vietnam. A similar situation occurred, also in Afghanistan, but it was in 19th century and referred to British army.

The growing problem of attacks against ISAF troops has its political consequences in Afghanistan and ISAF states and also military consequences for the mission itself. If the situation remains unchanged for longer, it will generate greater pressure in some states to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan, even before 2014. It happened to e.g. New Zealand which decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan as soon as possible after its three soldiers had been killed by their Afghan friends²⁹. Australia behaved differently after an Australian soldier was killed in Uruzgan province in May 2012. This incident, along with another one from November 2011, made the opposition green party demand immediate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was rejected by Julia Gillard, the Prime Minister, who announced that Australia would abide by the earlier decisions and commitments³⁰.

The case of France was similar. During a visit that the French minister of foreign affairs paid to Afghanistan in January 2012 after the attack in which four French troops had died and several others were injured, he warned that France would withdraw its 3,600 soldiers. There was a risk that if France started withdrawing its forces earlier, other countries would follow. So the real problem

was not the withdrawal of French troops but taking an action that other countries would follow³¹.

Unfortunately, the problem of attacks could not be open to a wide public debate in 2012 due to the running presidential campaign. Any wider discussion about the topic could put Barack Obama's next election in jeopardy. The attacks could additionally threaten the US plans of withdrawal from Afghanistan and transferring the responsibility for security to the hands of the Afghan security forces. This requires a proper number of well prepared security personnel, well prepared security personnel requires well organized training effort which is impossible if there is no trust between the trainers and trainees³².

It has already been mentioned that next to political consequences there are also military consequences. After the incident of 17 August 2012, when US Special Forces troops were killed in western Afghanistan by Afghan recruits, the whole process was suspended until all the Afghan Local Police (ALP) members (16,000 members) again undergo the vetting process³³. The ALP³⁴, that will be the first to undergo another vetting process, is trained by the US Special Forces, responsible also for training Afghan Special Forces and commando units. The suspended training will affect around 1,000 people³⁵.

Higher number of GoB attacks also had its repercussions among the Afghan decision makers. A few weeks after the minister of internal affairs, Bismullah Khan Mohammadi and the minister of defense, Abdul Rahim Wardak stepped down because they had failed to receive a vote of confidence from the parliament, Rahmatullah Nabil, the head of the Afghan special forces (National Directorate of Security) was removed from his position³⁶. The ministers lost their positions despite good relations with ISAF due to allegations of corruption and lack of effectiveness in maintaining security in Afghanistan³⁷.

Ways of neutralizing threat

The problem lies not only in defining the threat, but above all, in finding efficient counter or neutralizing measures. Because there is a threat of GoB attacks, a number of

such actions have been taken by both ISAF and Afghans themselves. Due to the increasing number of attacks against ISAF forces, the ISAF Commander, General John R. Allen scheduled an urgent briefing with more than 40 of his subordinate commanders for 15 August 2012. During the briefing he emphasized the need to stop this alarming trend that badly influenced the morale of soldiers serving in Afghanistan. One of the recommendations aiming at protection of soldiers is carrying a loaded magazine in their weapons in order to shorten the time to open fire in case it was necessary³⁸.

The threat related to GoB attacks has been noted and commented also by the US President, Barack Obama, who during a press conference held in August 2012 said: *„Obviously we've been watching with deep concern these so-called green-on-blue attacks. We are already doing a range of things, and we're seeing some success when it comes to better counterintelligence, making sure that the vetting process for Afghan troops is stronger. And we've got what's called the Guardian Angel program, to make sure that our troops aren't in isolated situations that might make them more vulnerable. But obviously we're going to have to do more, because over the last 12 months on this"*³⁹.

Mr. Obama's response clearly shows that there are three most important steps that should lead to neutralizing the threat: improving the counterintelligence's efficiency, raising vetting effectiveness and the program known as "Guardian Angel". There is also a need for a continuous analysis of the problem itself and its sources because the counterintelligence and other intelligence units will take care of identification of people. Talking about the "Guardian Angel" program we mean a soldier or a group of soldiers who are not engaged in contacts with the Afghan party. Their most important task is to stay behind, on a side or in another place in such a way that without being noticed they have a full view of the situation. In critical situation they must be ready to open fire and immediately eliminate a potential attacker⁴⁰.

Leon Panetta claims that the eight-level vetting process should be verified again with a wider use of biometric data. Now every recruit has to produce two reference letters prepared by the elders from his place of origin. A reference letter is a kind of

warranty that the person it belongs to will behave properly and will follow the rules. L. Panetta and General Allen met with the elders to discuss their role in fighting the problem⁴¹. The current situation is also influenced by the quick increase of the number of the Afghan forces within the last three years, from 100,000 to 352,000 troops. Such a quick growth and imperfect vetting system make the penetration easier for unwanted elements. Additionally, even if there were a good verification system, lack of databases providing information on family background, finances or employment makes elimination of potential attackers impossible⁴².

Leon Panetta, the US Secretary of Defense, also emphasized the need to intensify counterintelligence activities which should quickly identify the GoB threat⁴³. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, during one of the press conferences (14 August 2012) informed that the USA planned to send more counterintelligence experts at the battalion level⁴⁴ or below and 80 counterintelligence agents were to be sent to Afghanistan. Fighting the mentioned threat was meant to be their main task, mainly through intensifying the vetting process for new recruits and review and deep analysis of the profiles of the already serving individuals. Also procedures, that earlier applied to identify recruits who were prone to the Taliban recruitment, will be improved⁴⁵.

Another way to reduce the threat is informing the ISAF troops about the threats and the ways to fight them. Special emphasis should be put on the need to observing cultural differences and Afghan customs. According to one of the researchers who examined 600 Afghan soldiers and policemen, most of them have a negative attitude to western forces. Some of them justified their views mentioning ISAF attacks on civilians or urinating on dead Afghan bodies⁴⁶. During one of the incidents, a newly sworn policeman opened fire at US soldiers (his trainers), immediately after he had received weapon, and killed two of them. After six marines had been killed in two other attacks, General Allen ordered all his soldiers to carry guns with magazines in them inside compounds, where normally the magazine is carried separately⁴⁷.

Unfortunately, the implemented actions, aiming at protecting soldiers who

train the Afghan army, may even deepen mutual differences and lack of trust which in the future may result in a higher number of the GoB attacks. This is what the Taliban desire. Colonel Thomas Collins, the NATO spokesman in Kabul said: “We have to have a balancing act between protecting our soldiers and not offending the Afghans we are partnering with”⁴⁸. A number of actions have been initiated by the Afghans themselves for whom breaking the training process of their security forces is a tragedy.

According to Mr. Obama, there currently is a higher number of the GoB attacks because the contacts between ISAF forces and the Afghans are intensive and joint operations are executed. In the future, however, as the responsibility for the security is gradually handed over to the Afghans, the number of attacks should quickly decrease⁴⁹.

Because the number of the attacks is growing, actions were taken aiming at another verification of the background and contacts of the members of the Afghan security services. As a result more than 60 soldiers were removed and in case of 600 others proper explanatory procedures were applied. Recruitment procedures to Afghan special forces underwent another review⁵⁰. As a result of actions taken by the Afghan side hundreds of people susceptible to radicalization of their views and attitudes were removed from the army. The removed had often travelled to and from Pakistan, actively studied propaganda materials published by the Taliban or other terrorist groups⁵¹.

In order to neutralize the threat, the Afghan party organized a wide agent recruitment action among security forces. Earlier actions, aiming at minimizing the level of infiltration of the security forces by the Taliban, turned out to be ineffective. The basic preventive means implemented by the Afghans covered: placing intelligence, counterintelligence, or reconnaissance officers within the security forces’ ranks, monitoring telephone connections made by soldiers or policemen with their families and young recruits were banned from using mobile phones⁵².

General Sher Mohammad Karimi, the Chief of Army Staff, stated that all those political and military actions should make every soldier feel under constant surveillance⁵³. He is obviously aware that it may

have a negative impact on the troops’ morale but some necessary actions must be implemented. Therefore, among others, 176 intelligence officers were placed in the ranks. Their task will be, together with other elements, early detection and identification of people who could plan next GoB attacks. In his statements, Karimi emphasized that despite having theoretically perfect regulations concerning vetting of the new recruits, bringing them into effect was impossible due to huge recruitment needs of the army – 12,000 people a month⁵⁴.

Another important element is monitoring and supervision of soldiers going on leaves – their contacts and potential to pose a threat after they return to their units. Also, in 2012 some soldiers were forced to bring their families from Pakistan to Afghanistan and if they failed to do that they would have to leave the army. The Afghan side requested ISAF forces, mainly American, for technical support, especially for delivery of different devices – lie detectors, mobile phone monitoring systems or biometric instruments. The listed devices would definitely improve the Afghans’ capability to monitor and vet the recruits’ past⁵⁵.

Everyday contacts between Afghans and ISAF refer to almost 500,000 soldiers and policemen. The Afghans are planning to collect biometric data and verify them against people suspected of contacts with the Taliban. The system of verification of young recruits and verification letters issued by the elders will be improved too⁵⁶. Zahir Azimi, the spokesman for the Afghan National Army (ANA) says that as a result of the actions taken hundreds of soldiers were removed from the ANA and many of them were arrested. The reasons behind were very different – some of the soldiers had incomplete or forged papers, some others were engaged in infiltration activities within ISAF, etc⁵⁷.

Summary

After 11 years of American presence in Afghanistan the following details strike: around 2,000 US troops killed, 16,000 injured, 12,000 Afghan civilians killed and 400 billion dollars have been spent since 2007. The worst thing is that after all that, the mission cannot be considered a success and

the Americans are withdrawing⁵⁸.

Despite Barack Obama’s assurance the number of attacks in the future does not have to decrease. It is related to the fact that the planned transfer of responsibility for the security in Afghanistan to the Afghans makes the whole process of training Afghan Security Forces go faster. This requires a higher number of mentors which creates better conditions for attacking the ISAF troops. In practice, in 9 out of 10 cases the operations are executed jointly which only increases the number of potential contacts and conflicts and what follows – attacks on ISAF forces.

In the future, lack of mutual trust and some taken actions that separate soldiers will definitely lead to other attacks. Afghan partners are losing the confidence of ISAF soldiers who treat them in a very suspicious way, show them no trust which in Afghan culture is considered to be a real insult.

Despite numerous attempts to isolate ISAF soldiers from their Afghan counterparts General John Allen says that the closer contacts with the Afghans are, the better relations can be built, and in consequence the level of security of the ISAF troops is increasing.

It is really hard to state whether the increase of the number of attacks is related to the worsening of the security situation, increase of effectiveness of the Taliban actions or simply more intensive mutual contacts, which increases the risk of the GoB attacks⁵⁹. Since many Afghans die in those attacks too, we may assume that killing ISAF troops is not the aim of the attacks; it is rather paralyzing the training process of the Afghan security forces. ■

¹ The name “Green on Blue” derives from colors used to mark: own forces with “blue”, the enemy’s with “red” and Afghan allies with “green”.

² In some cases there is a tendency to avoid using the term „GoB” because very often Afghans are also victim of the attacks. In such cases we talk about “Green on Green” attacks. Many attacks are aimed at the Afghans but very often they are not reported or recorded. J. Reed, Guardian Angels in Afghanistan, „Foreign Policy”, 14.08.2012, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com>

³ Inside the Wire Threat, „TOP TIP SHEET”,

<http://ijcportal.ijhq.ms.isaf.nato.int>

⁴ “Insider Threats in Partnering Environments”, The Tactical Reference Guide for Military Leaders, June 2011, <http://www.wired.com>

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Inside the Wire..., op.cit.

⁷ “Insider Threats...”, op.cit.

⁸ Inside the Wire..., op.cit.

⁹ One of the biggest attacks in 2012 was aimed at French forces deployed in Kapisa province. An Afghan soldier shot at French troops and as a result 4 French were killed and 15 were injured, L. JACINTO, French tolerance dwindles over Afghan 'insider threat', „France24”, 21.01.2012, <http://www.france24.com>

¹⁰ L. Lundquist, Another ISAF soldier killed in green-on-blue attack in Afghanistan, „Long War Journal”, 19.08.2012, <http://www.longwarjournal.org>

¹¹ A. Gul, NATO: Most 'Green on Blue' Attacks Due to Grievances, Stress, „Voice of America”, 13.08.2012, <http://www.voanews.com>

¹² M. Thompson, Goldilocking the „Insider Threat”, „Nation Time”, 24.08.2012, <http://nation.time.com>

¹³ Later, commenting on Allen's statement, NATO informed that 25% refers to all attacks committed since May 2007, whereas 10% referred to 2012 only. Ibid. Probably this data is not precise either because other sources say that NATO was supposed to state that between 2005-2011 the Taliban could be responsible for 19% of all attacks. L. JACINTO, French tolerance..., op.cit.

¹⁴ R. Taylor, A. Ferris-Rotman, Another Afghan insider shooting as U.S. talks to Karzai, „Reuters”, 19.08.2012, <http://www.reuters.com>

¹⁵ The source says that one of the Afghan Police commanders invited US soldiers for a meal at a check point and then opened fire killing three. Having done that he run away and joined the Taliban. It is interesting that famous Afghan hospitality was used there. The soldiers hosted and protected by the Afghan were killed by him. “6 US Troops Killed by Afghan Counterparts”, „Voice of America”, 11.08.2012, <http://www.voanews.com>

¹⁶ L. Lundquist, Another ISAF..., op.cit.

¹⁷ He said among others: “We don't have enough data from those who have partici-

pated in the attacks to be able to make any kind of a definitive conclusion. We think the reasons for these attacks are complex. Some of them, we do believe, are about infiltration, impersonation, coercion. But some of them — and we think that's about 25% or so”. M. Thompson, Goldilocking..., op.cit.

¹⁸ During an investigation after the attack of 11 April 2011 during which 8 US officers, who were mentors for the Afghan Air Force, were killed, it turned out that the Afghan attacker, Col Ahmed Gul was not related to the Taliban and was driven by anti-western emotions. It was the bloodiest single attack in history. L. Jacinto, French tolerance..., op.cit.

¹⁹ L. King, Afghanistan 'insider' attacks pose threat to West's exit strategy, „Los Angeles Times”, 20.08.2012, <http://www.latimes.com>

²⁰ Here, reactions of the witnesses to attacks, soldiers or policemen, to the attacks committed by their colleagues. Most of them are sad and demonstrate disapproval for the attacks. Others worry that western forces will withdraw earlier than planned and they will be left alone without proper training. Negative reactions of soldiers of higher ranks are more straightforward as they are aware of the situation and possible consequences of the ISAF forces' withdrawal. Ibid.

²¹ The question of quick creation of the army is not a problem. In 1941 the US Army was developed from the level of 1,400,000 troops to 8,300,000 within four years. In case of Afghanistan such a scenario will not be possible, mainly because of missing human resources. L. Jacinto, French tolerance..., op.cit.

²² N. Hopkins, Afghanistan: NATO strategy at risk from 'insider threat', „The Guardian”, 16.09.2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>

²³ L. Jacinto, French tolerance..., op.cit.

²⁴ L. Lundquist, Another ISAF..., op.cit.

²⁵ B. Roggio, Mullah Omar addresses green-on-blue attacks, „Long War Journal”, 16.08.2012, <http://www.longwarjournal.org>

²⁶ T. Shanker, General Notes Taliban Coercion in Some Attacks on Troops, „New York Times”, 23.08.2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>

²⁷ T. Bowman, D. Filkins, s'Green-On-Blue' Attacks Challenge Afghan Security, „The New Yorker”, 23.08.2012, <http://www.npr.org>

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ SAPA, Afghans ready to counter insider

threat, „Iol News”, 20.08.2012, <http://www.iol.co.za>

³⁰ J. Grubel, Ch. Kearney, Afghan soldier turns gun on Australian troops, wounds three, „Reuters”, 9.11.2011, <http://www.reuters.com>

³¹ L. Jacinto, French tolerance..., op.cit.

³² J. Hersh, Afghanistan 'Green-On-Blue' Attacks Get High-Level Attention, „Huff Post World”, 20.8.2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com>

³³ Depending on the country where the operation is executed, monitoring activities are done through verification of: police records, papers related to earlier employment, publicly available data, debt related data, databases of international antiterrorist organizations or medical data. The main purpose of the process is determining whether the members have any contact with the Taliban or other opposition groups. Physical Security, FM 3-19.30, 8.01.2011, p. C5

³⁴ The ALP project is considered to be one of the most effective programs for fighting armed opposition in the countryside where regular police or armed forces are not successful, their presence is not sufficient or they are not there at all. The Americans are planning to double the ALP forces even though some critics think that the ALP forces commit abuses against civilian population such as tortures, beating or extortion. The ALP are trained by small groups of special forces and after the certification process is completed they are forced to work in separation, without support from ISAF and often in the most dangerous regions. L. King, Afghan police recruits to be rescreened; U.S. suspends training, „Los Angeles Times”, 2.09.2012, <http://www.latimes.com>

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ The head of the NDS lost his position after two years in office which, according to Karzai, will be a standard procedure in the future. The NDS head is expected to become an Afghan ambassador. Contrary to the both dismissed ministers, the NDS head enjoyed the confidence of both western states and the Afghan parliament. One of MPs, Hajji M. Daoud Kalkani of Kabul after a meeting with Nabil, announced that Nabil could pride himself on being successful fights with foreign intelligence. M. Abi-Habib, Z. Sultani, Karzai Fires Afghan Intelligence Chief, „Wall Street Journal”, 29.08.2012,

THE PEOPLE



Kamila Sierzputowska

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Kamila Sierzputowska, PhD, is a lecturer in the Political Science Institute, a member of the Institute for the History of Polish Diaspora and Migration in the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz. She graduated with honors from the Bydgoszcz Academy in the Department of Political Science. She took part in a number of trainings devoted to local and international politics and in workshops on organizing election campaigns run by, among others, by the National Democratic Institute (NDI). From 1994 to 1997 she cooperated with a regional branch of the Polish TV as a producer and co-author of programs for the youth.

Being a winner of a prize organized by the “Gazeta Wyborcza” daily, she completed a training in the newspaper’s editorial office which resulted in a long-lasting cooperation. In 2003 she started working as a lecturer at the University of the Common Knowledge Association. Kamila Sierzputowska has been working at the Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz since 2004. In 2011 she defended her doctoral dissertation on “Political Determinants of Polish Emigration of the 80s of the 20th to West Berlin”.

For a number of years she is an active member of the Polish Association of the Political Science (PTNP) and the Bydgoszcz Science Association (BTN). She is a co-organizer of many scientific initiatives organized by the University and in the past she was the secretary of the Political Science Institute Scientific Council, a member of the Program Council during the Days of Science, a coordinator of the Socrates-Erasmus program, a co-organizer of the Knowledge of Poland and Contemporary World Contest. In 2008, being the Coordinator of the Festival of Science, she received the President of the University Award for her outstanding organization activities.

In her research, Kamila Sierzputowska focuses mainly on issues related to Polish-German bilateral relations, migration of Poles to Germany, Polish Diaspora in Germany, international relations and many others. Her works and analyses were published by the university publishing house and in different periodicals. In her teaching she specializes in international relations, Polish foreign policy, international security and national and ethnic minorities in Europe.

Kamila Sierzputowska is a regular participant to conferences and meetings. At the moment she is the secretary of the conference entitled “Conflict-Crisis-War. Security in Global, Regional and Local Perspective” that will be held in April 2013.

<http://online.wsj.com>

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ R.A. Oppel Jr., G. Bowley, Afghan Attacks on Allied Troops Prompt NATO to Shift Policy, „The New York Times”, 18.08.2012, <http://www.nytimes.com>

³⁹ J. Hersh, Afghanistan..., op.cit.

⁴⁰ J. Sterling, Coalition steps up fight against Afghan 'green-on-blue' attacks, „CNN”, 17.08.2012, <http://edition.cnn.com>

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² N. Hopkins, Afghanistan: Nato..., op.cit.

⁴³ J. Sterling, Coalition steps..., op.cit.

⁴⁴ „US to boost spy presence in Afghanistan”, „Hurriyet Daily News”, 16.08.2012, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com>

⁴⁵ U.S. Sending Counterintelligence Agents to Afghanistan: Report, „Agence France-Presse”, 11.06.2011, <http://www.defense-news.com>

⁴⁶ J. Sterling, Coalition steps..., op.cit.

⁴⁷ R. Taylor, A. Ferris-Rotman, Another Afghan insider shooting as U.S. talks to Karzai, „Reuters”, 19.08.2012, <http://www.reuters.com>

⁴⁸ R.A. Oppel Jr., G. Bowley, Afghan Attacks..., op.cit.

⁴⁹ J. Tapper, Green on Blue Attacks in Afghanistan and Action on the Jobs Front — Today’s Q’s for O — 8/20-2012, „ABC News”, 20.08.2012, <http://abcnews.go.com>

⁵⁰ N. Hopkins, Afghanistan..., op.cit.

⁵¹ J. Reed, Guardian..., op.cit.

⁵² K. Sieff, Afghans to spy on own troops to stop 'insider' attacks, „Washington Post”, 21.08.2012, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>

⁵³ In order to detect a potential threat as soon as possible Afghan special services try to place their agents in the army as early as during the basic training. B. Starr, M. Popalzai, Ch. J. Carter, All coalition troops at Afghan bases now armed around the clock, „CNN”, 18.08.2012, <http://edition.cnn.com>

⁵⁴ K. Sieff, Afghans to spy..., op.cit.

⁵⁵ Ibidem

⁵⁶ L. King, Afghanistan 'insider' attacks pose threat to West's exit strategy, „Los Angeles Times”, 20.08.2012, <http://www.latimes.com>

⁵⁷ 'Hundreds' of Afghan troops disciplined after rogue attacks, „BBC News”, 5.09.2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk>

⁵⁸ T. Bowman, D. Filkins, s'Green-On-Blue'..., op.cit.

⁵⁹ L. Lundquist, Another ISAF..., op.cit.

The French Training Centres Command

■ **Col Emmanuel R. Poucet,**
Deputy Commander CCPF

In 1997, a Specialized Training Centres Command (CCPF) was set up in MAILLY-le-CAMP (1). Collocated with several training areas it is continuously re-tailored according to operational requirements. Under the command of the Land Forces Command based in LILLE (CFT) covering a wide scope of activities, and facilities spread all over France.

The CCPF mission is to give standardized generic training according to temporary needs - perform pre-deployment trainings. Rotations last 2 or 3 weeks with a comprehensive evaluations of know-how and skills as well as evaluations of key leaders are conducted by permanent observer-controller teams at the centres (Coy and platoon leaders level mainly). Pedagogy is paramount to our activities. After action reviews and mission rehearsals are the core of the building-up process. The key focus is to improve the global ability of the units, and help them improve their combined arms manoeuvres. The CCPF offers permanent trainers and equipment together with various simulation systems.

Since its appearance in the late 90s, the CP training facility (CEPC – MAILLY (1)), has operated various simulation systems - BBS at the beginning, and now SCIPIO a THALES product. The target units are task forces (TF) and brigade command posts for which Generic training and pre-deployment exercises are organized. In

2012, during FLANDRES, the key subject was interoperability tests between the British Desert Rats and a French brigade. ROCHAMBEAU 2014 is the next key international activity in that field.

In the meantime, following a trial in Hohenfels, an open field training facility (CENTAC – MAILLY (1)) began testing two and later three reinforced companies every two weeks. The key is a professional permanent armoured OPFOR and a tracking system linked with individual and main armament weapons simulation devices. Army Aviation, Air Force aircrafts and UAVS are involved for almost every rotation.


Later, referring mainly to the second Gulf War lessons learned, an urban terrain training facility has been designed (CENZUB – SISSONNE (2)) and was opened 4 years ago. A modern city with several storey buildings, an old city centre, underground car park, sewage network, a station, a river, modern small suburban houses and a commercial area have been quickly built and are fully operational. This facility can house up to a battalion. In the same training field, there is also a village, big enough for a company or more. The rotations last for two weeks. The first phase is dedicated to learning and drill activities and the professional OPFOR has a dual role, as trainers and opposing manpower.

In the same region (150 east of Paris),

several training fields have been upgraded and are now under the same command (CEB-MOURMELON and SUIPPES (3)). The old time artillery and air-to-ground activities are still ongoing and some areas have been shaped for combat training with obstacles, small compounds and a C-IED trail. A 400 strong fleet of armoured or engineer vehicles and guns is available for training purposes. The building of a new live fire range for armoured infantry is currently on the way to be ready for spring 2014. This range will allow MBT firing on the move. A training facility for convoys is on its way too.

The 2008 major reorganization of the French Army brought other facilities under the command of the CCPF. These units are in southern France. Namely, from West to East, a ground-to-air small arms firing range, along the Atlantic Ocean coastline in Biscarrosse (4) (17th ARTY Group) with low-cost home made remote flying targets, and some machine gun ranges overlooking the open sea. Further to the east, an infantry live fire range in Le Larzac (5) (CEITO), where companies are tested, and individual small arms, machine guns, anti-tank weapons and infantry mortars firing skills are evaluated.

In the Alps (7), close to Italy, the CCPF monitors a mountain training facility for infantry, except for the Mountain Brigade. The aim is to give some basic mountaineering skills to non specialized



units.

In the south of France, near Toulon, the biggest French training area is now under the CCPF's command: Canjuers field training area (6) (1er RCA). There we can find an FOB similar to Afghanistan for last minute pre-deployment training, Artillery ranges, tanks and armoured vehicles basic driving and crew training areas or simulators, firing

ranges and platoon or company level firing ranges, etc. The rugged Mediterranean terrain and high-grounds fit very well to light or dismounted infantry training. A second fleet of 350 vehicles, light wheeled armoured vehicles, MBTs, MCV, scout cars and guns are deployed there.

In most every CCPF facility, parachute landing and Army Aviation skills can

be practised.

Following the directives of the Land Forces Command (CFT) in Lille, CCPF lies in the heart of operational training matters, and is keen to update its methods or organization and maintains links with other foreign countries. A permanent UK liaison officer is inserted in CCPF's staff. The planning and training cycle requirements of the French Army allows training windows for foreign units. The basic package is a 2 or 3 week company level training rotation.

OPFOR: CENTAC and CENZUB both have OPFOR companies (blue guys). Genuinely combined arms in their composition, these OPFOR companies are charged with playing many roles during training exercises; they can represent regular military forces, militias, insurgents, civilian population or any combination of all these, as required.

Flandres: exercise Flandres in command post training centre in 2012 between the British Desert Rats and a French brigade.

CEITO: validation of live firing standards in CEITO. Validation of live firing standards can be realised night and day in 1st RCA or in CEITO. ■

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Jackals and Drones

Al Qaeda's Chrysalis & the Metamorphosis of Terrorism Research

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Introduction

In short, the issues surrounding contemporary terrorism research are argued to be too controversial and too contested upon which to base policy. Even with qualitative attempts to give psychological insights to the underlying motives for terrorist behaviour, the research is partisan and an obstacle to those having to make value judgments based upon them. Furthermore, when compounded with the debate as to whether or not Al Qaeda will employ drones, the arguments can be seen to have spiralled into little other than cyclical discussions that lack the substance of any new subject based content. Simply put, academics that have strayed into the field of terrorism studies have rarely gone beyond the semantics of terrorism and have had little conception of either the history of terrorism, contemporary warfare at the strategic level or the workings of the modern battlefield. This paper examines the controversy through an overview of the arguments as advanced in recent literature with a primary focus on two groups, Al Qaeda and the Militants of Irish Republicanism (MIR).

The first part introduces the types of drones and the types of actors most likely to use them. It draws parallels between the

two through an assessment of the impact of terrorist ideologies on their choice of targets. By profiling the motivational influences on terrorists and focusing on their origins, structure and strategies, specific types of drones are matched to specific types of targets and (by a process of elimination) the targets to the terrorists most likely to attack them. This section shows the United Kingdom to be particularly vulnerable (within its borders) to attacks from both groups profiled and Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, the Balkans and Greece) to attacks from North Africa. Prime targets are key-personnel, moving cars, crowds, congested motorways, shipping, aircraft, centres of culture, infrastructure and high-speed commuter trains running across open countryside. The threat to the United States abroad is attacks on its embassies, warships, key personnel and citizenry. On the home-front, such cities as Dallas, Houston, Phoenix, Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, New York and Washington are vulnerable to attack by drones launched from inside Mexican and Canadian controlled territory.

The drones are likely to fall, initially, into five categories: off-the-shelf long-range (1000 km) hunter-killer drones (HKDs) with heavy payloads of up to 50 kg; short-range

(100 km) suicide drones (SSDs) able to carry incendiary, fragmentary and fuel-air explosive devices of up to 1 kg or the weight of two modern hand grenades (the RPO-M, for illustration, has a TNT equivalence of 5.5kg of TNT and similar characteristics to a 40kg high explosive artillery shell); purpose built surveillance drones (PSDs) with a flight-time of days and capable of relaying real-time intelligence; intelligent surface-borne sea mines and, the most feared drones of all, *The Jackals* (one-offs, tailored to target). Tactics will follow the lessons learned from having been on the receiving end of several thousand drone strikes over the last decade, including the deadly double-tap. Single attacks will rapidly develop into multiple attacks and up to squadron level. It is worth noting, at this point, that the static attacks on Bishopsgate, London (1996) and Mumbai, India (2008) cost the UK and India billions of dollars. In the case of the former, new tactics brought the state to the negotiating table. The attacks in Madrid (2004) collapsed the Spanish government and 9/11 (2001) changed the world. A sustained drone attack could bring a country to its knees politically, economically and socially.

The second part deals with the metamorphosis of terrorism research and

its strengths and weaknesses as a result of the issues faced in defining terrorism. Consideration is also given to the difficulties of terrorism research as an inter-disciplinary and politically controversial research area, the politicization of the term and the downsides of recent studies that have isolated the phenomenon from its social milieu. This part also raises the implications of confronting terrorism with terrorism - how drones epitomize the face of 4th generation warfare, challenge the values of once hitherto passive, tolerant liberal democracies and have brought legitimacy to issues hitherto considered *extra jus ad bellum*, *extra jus in bello et extra jus post bellum*.

The paper concludes with an overview of drones in the context of 'new terrorism' and several neglected areas of research that have clouded the arguments and have as yet to be adequately addressed. In summary, this paper is a systematic viewpoint on where terrorism research stands today and in which direction it should be heading to address the question of conflict shaped by drones, globalization and the fundamental shift in moral and ethical norms that has taken place since 9/11. It is neither a quantitative or qualitative analysis of any existential drone threat nor a risk analysis of the threat posed by Al Qaeda or the MIR.

Part 1

Franz Kafka and the Clash of Civilizations

The Kafkaesque main and subtitles (Kafka, 1917) to this paper are no accident, but an allusion to the nature of the cyclical violence that terrorism and the relationships between civilizations epitomize and the '*umma*' of national liberation movements that epitomize Al Qaeda. It is menacingly complex. In short though, as drones home in on their 3475th (The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013) victim in Pakistan alone, they are unravelling the remnants of what was once a delicate web of economic, social and cultural relationships that had existed for centuries and fuelling, not only Huntington's flames of an era characterized by cultural conflict (as caricatured in Kafka's 1917 analogical parable) but the transformation

of terrorism itself; with drones, the messianic figure of Kafka's story is no longer the mediating European. The reason for this is that Kafka's work is not just a parallel between the oppression of those living under colonial powers and the Jews in Europe at the time, but of the relations between civilizations and the elasticity of the cultures between them. Were Kafka to rewrite the story today, the allegories would have to be reversed and *the Jackals* loosed upon not the camel in the story, but the European.

The Return of the Jackal is an Inductive Argument and a Statistical Syllogism

Throughout the history of modern terrorism, from the MIR's radical advances in mortar technology during the 1990s to the use of mobile phones as remote detonators in the Iraq war, the adoption of military technology by civilians has been rapid. From the first Western drone attack to take place in November 2001 against Mohammed Atef, in Afghanistan, it took barely five years before Israel became the target of a similar attack by Hezbollah, with each model used carrying a payload of up to 30 kg of explosives. Scarcely two years later, it was Lashkar-e-Taiba that showed the world how just ten men could bring a city of 20 million to a standstill through its execution of one of the most technologically advanced terrorist attacks in history. What hit Mumbai was not ten gunmen intent on slaughter, but ten armed microprocessors supported by an operations centre over 500 miles from the killing fields. Through coordinating the attacks in real-time, using BlackBerrys, satellite phones, GSM handsets, search engines and social networking sites, the terrorists were able to sustain a kill ratio of 18:1.

Although technology and terrorism have always marched in pace with modernity, what is different today is how technology has opened up the battlefield; for the state, the corporal has become strategic in that his decisions may now directly influence tactical, operational and strategic levels of command to the degree that they affect political change on a national scale; for the terrorists, it has enabled their corporals to affect political change on a global scale and not only exploit the gaping power vacuums left in the wake of

failed revolutions, but build their chrysalides across the decaying nation-states of the world.

Unfortunately, the question is not about whether Villasenor (UCLA, 2012) or any of the other advocates for counter-drone measures have as yet to come up with any real evidence of a drone threat, as disparaged by the editor of OpEdNews.com last year. Nor is it about whether terrorists are more likely to employ suicide bombers than suicide drones or snipers for assassinations (the MIR, for example, have no record of suicide bombing). It is about breaking through the rhetoric that obscures the propriety of researching, building and implementing counter-drone measures. The question is simple:

In the light of what we know about the modi operandi and sententiae of various terrorist groups and given that a commuter train with a thousand passengers on it could be destroyed in Israel by Hezbollah today, would it not make sense to at least look into offsetting the odds of this happening tomorrow in Europe?

The argument here is that the West (Israel) has already experienced attacks by *Jackals* and, irrespective of whether or not the threat to Europe or the States can ever be quantified, the history of terrorism demonstrates that it is unlikely that the technology will remain untapped. It is simply, therefore, '*sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of the situation*' (Merriam-Webster, 2003), that the *Return of the Jackal* to Europe is an obsolete debate. The conundrum is whether the risks of following an intuitive path of *sensus communis* are worth taking against such a lack of empirical evidence.

As can be seen, however, the risk is small. For where both Villasenor and Gosztola fall down, is in their failure through partisan agendas to define what types of drones actually exist today and what types of drones are likely to be developed, what types of targets are vulnerable to these and to which state actors and non-state actors these capabilities would prove attractive. It is only through such research that thought can then be given as to whether or not legislation or further counter-terrorism measures need to be emplaced. Without it, the word 'drone' is as meaningless as the word 'terrorist' and discussion on their validity little other than an insight to the issues that Kafka's allegories brought to light way back in 1917.

Drones, Terrorists & Targets

Air and sea drones basically consist of little other than a fuselage, an autopilot navigating system and a power source. Short range drones (30km) with a duration of several hours, First Person Visual controls (FPV), waypoint inputs with GPS and either a weapons or surveillance system can be built for less than \$2000. Technology has come a long way since Maynard Hill's model aeroplane spluttered 3000 km across the Atlantic. Today's 'toys' have autonomous capabilities and can fly themselves in excess of 400mph. They can also be controlled or launched from abroad. For \$10,000, a drone with a payload of 50kg could be placed outside Paris, 'wake up' in six months, take off for London in the middle of the night and destroy Big Ben - live on the internet with a running commentary. This is the price that the terrorist has to pay today. The price tomorrow will be significantly less. So why has it not been done? The reason is that there is as yet no real precedent. As the younger generation move up the ranks of the terror networks, however, and as the propaganda coup to avenge America's *Reapers* gains more credence, the chances of it not happening are diminishing by the day. Moreover, following tests at the University of Texas (2012), it has been shown that the ability to 'hijack drones' by 'spoofing' GPS receivers could put the far more technologically advanced drones of the state into the hands of the terrorists. Ironically, whilst the GPS receivers are advanced, the infrastructure in which they operate was designed in the 1970s and is easily hacked. There are many other unknown quantities. One flaw, for example (in state controlled drones), enabled Iraqi insurgents to tap into the live feeds of the *Reapers* with equipment ordered off the internet for just \$40.

Proliferation is also a concern: the director of the national security studies program at the New America Foundation, Peter Bergen stated, "The explosion in drone technology promises to *change the way nations conduct war and threatens to begin a new arms race as governments scramble to counterbalance their adversaries.*" In fact, over 70 countries have drones today, including China and the Republic of Iran and the technology has already filtered down. Furthermore, the proliferation and affordability of drone and

counter-drone technology, much of which is commercially available or found in dual-use components, means that the dissemination of military technology to civilian use is today measured in months. Sadly, the air defence systems designed to counter Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles will not stop a swarm of drones. Our only defence lies in grass-roots intelligence.

one crude paradigm of where to start would be to group terrorists into one of four 'fighting' categories, such as: Military Terrorists (MT), Para-Military Terrorists (PT), Civilian Terrorists (CT) & International Terrorists (IT). Known attacks could then be keyed into the third column and tactics to the fourth. The threat to countries would then identify the type of drone we are likely to face. See Below:

Type	Group	Attacks	Tactics	Threat to UK
MT	Tamil Tigers	National Military & Civilian Targets e.g. 2001 Airport attack	Con. & Asym. Attacks including the use of Suicide Bombers	Zero Threat
PT	HAMAS	Regional Military & Civilian Targets e.g. 2002 Park Hotel	Indiscriminate Attacks using Suicide Bombers	Low Threat from Hijacking / Hostages
CT	The IRA	Regional Military & Civilian Targets e.g. M62 Coach Bombing	Mostly Discriminatory attacks using Car Bombs & IEDs	High Threat to Key-Personnel, Cars, Crowds, Motorways, Shipping, Aircraft, Culture, Infrastructure & Trains
IT	Al Qaeda	International Military & Civilian Targets e.g. 1998 Embassy Bombings	Indiscriminate Mass Casualty Attacks	High Threat to Key-Personnel, Cars, Crowds, Motorways, Shipping, Aircraft, Culture, Infrastructure & Trains

There is also little of substance in the argument that drones are unlikely to replace suicide bombers and car bombs, the hallmarks of the modern terrorist. The reason for this is that, in certain scenarios, a well-directed explosive of several kilos flying at two hundred miles per hour would have far more of a devastating effect than a 500kg car bomb at ground level. The fact is that drones open up areas that were hitherto off limits with existing weapons. Furthermore, whilst a suicide bomber may well, for example, have as equally a devastating effect on a stadium crowd as a small suicide drone, the drone could fly in fast from hundreds of miles away, with dozens of friends, take in targets of opportunity on the route and home in on secondary targets i.e. search and rescue teams. In short, their means to terrorize and the means to which they can be applied are infinite. It is merely question today of fuel and payload calculations: Max Payload = MTOW - (OEW + Fuel Capacity).

In order to illustrate the possibilities of drones, and their likely uses for terrorism,

Scenarios could then be posed and deliberated with explosives engineers, construction engineers and security forces to discuss the true threat and the implications. For example: Would an SSD be capable of destroying a moving car at night crossing Tower Bridge? How many SSDs would be needed to destroy Big Ben or put the Humber Bridge beyond economical repair? What would be the effect of a mid-air-fuel explosion in a crowded stadium? How many phosphorous grenades would it take to set the National Art Gallery ablaze? Would an SSD travelling at 200MPH with a 5kg warhead derail a fast moving commuter train? What would be the effect of an HKD hitting the Houses of Parliament? Would the UK's air defences be able to cope with a simultaneous swarm-attack on London and Birmingham? What is the likelihood of tracking and shooting down a fast moving drone the size of a football flying through the populated streets of a city?

Brainstorming how military technology that has crossed over to the civilian world

(e.g. GPS) could be reapplied saves lives. Moreover, whilst an attack on the Houses of Parliament one November the 5th may never happen, Britain is an open country and the weight of evidence available points to the fact that it could happen, that it is desired and that it could be this year. As the United States is more likely to be attacked abroad and from abroad, so too (given its proximity to North Africa) is Southern Europe.

Drone Type
PSDs
HKDs SSDs PSDs Jackals
HKDs SSDs PSDs Jackals

Al Qaeda's Chrysalis

To fully gauge why drones will be a feature of Al Qaeda and the MIR in the future it is necessary, however, to go beyond the technological aspects and look at the two groups in greater depth. Whilst Bin Laden, for example, was fundamental to the birth of Al Qaeda the roles of two other men, Qutb and Al Zawahiri, are as equally instrumental to understanding the motivation behind the origins of the group. Qutb, a key ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed in 1966 for his role in Sadat's assassination,

wrote extensively on the conflict between man's nature and his needs, especially with regard to the Jahili World (he was also an avid reader of Kafka). Qutb was also an advocate of Jihad as a perpetual, global war against the internal and external enemies of Islam: "*Jihad is an unending state of war*" because "*truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth.*" (Qutb, 1964). His writings and their promotion by his brother, the academic Mohammed Qutb, have influenced the intellectual foundations behind three generations of Salafi Jihadists. By the late 1990's a combination of Bin Laden's financial resources, the remnants of Abdullah Azzam's *Maktab al-Khadamat* and Al Zawahiri's intellectual leadership had transformed Al Qaeda from a regional organization with global ambitions, to an international association with strong, regional interests and a global reach.

Al Qaeda hence has strategic long term and short-term objectives, all of which could be supported by drones. An example of the first would be to incite Islamic movements across the world to unite in their

Jihad against the United States. This, however, would not be possible without the short term objective of, for instance, winning the hearts and minds of the '*Umma*'. What is clear is that Al Qaeda's strategic objectives are global and revolve around four central tenets: the expulsion of Western powers from the Middle East; the unification of Muslim movements; the destruction of the State of Israel and, through the liberation of the Al-Asqua Mosque and Mecca, the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate.

In order to implement this strategy, Al Qaeda's fundamental objectives lie primarily in the area of increasing recruitment through the internet and the media and reinforcing their position as the most significant threat to the West (through terrorism, killing large numbers of people and "*bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy.*" Bin Laden, 2004). Al Qaeda's short-term objectives (Keeney, 2009) can be divided into six categories: 1. Establishing an Islamic Caliphate; 2. The future of Al Qaeda; 3. Winning the hearts and minds of the '*Umma*'; 4. Military preparedness; 5. Cyber Warfare and technology and 6, Propaganda. Insights to the short-term objectives are vital to counter-terrorism practices as they characterize operations and enable security forces to build profiles, predict targets and future weapons systems and put counter-terrorism measures into effect.

The motives behind Al Qaeda's initial attacks were clear; "*to radicalize and mobilize the Islamic world*" (Jason Burke, 2005) and promote an ideology that united and motivated Jihadist groups. As Al Qaeda has matured, its ranks have continued this theme and the group today is reflective of an international, academically qualified and younger generation. Furthermore, a decade of repressive legislation and war has fragmented and decentralized the hierarchy to the degree that their affiliates have become increasingly autonomous and their motivations for alliance more varied (Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzz, 2008). It this aspect of Al Qaeda that is important with regard to the question of drone use; unlike other terrorist groups where innovation is often stifled, Al Qaeda has become creative and technologically oriented.

Moreover, whilst Al Qaeda's original leadership inspired a generation of terrorist attacks, the motivational influences on the group's members have differed enormously

over the years. Bin Laden's and Al Zawahiri's generation, for example, pre-date the several thousand jihadists that have fought over the last decade as a direct result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And, despite Al Qaeda's initial tactical successes, recent influences have actually led to a decline in motivations to join or even passively support or sympathize with the group. In fact, across the Middle East, the strategy of global Jihad was out rightly rejected in the spring of 2011 in favour of strategic decisions being based on national and democratic interests. That the group however has maintained sufficient enough support to continue to wage its war and, more importantly, the capability to project its terror on a global scale suggests the key attribute to its resurgence and entrenchment across North Africa and the Middle East has been its history, continuity and modernity.

One reason for this is that, despite the 'Arab Spring Revolutions' and the changes in Al Qaeda's leadership, new recruits, with strong, family connections to the first generation have long been filling the gaps in the leadership. Whilst they do not have the network from fighting the Soviets that Bin Laden's generation relied on, what they have in common is a shared experience and a shared ideology. Their motivational influences stem from the battlefields of Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq and an increasingly globalised world.

The leadership of Al-Qaeda today hence oversees a multi-layered network of cells, affiliations and alliances. It also has a global pool of thousands of radicals from which to recruit for specific purposes, such as those who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. Its physical structure is therefore decentralized with each branch operating on an independent basis as a franchise with financial, technological and logistical support from the parent organization. This structure has proved appropriate to the goals of the organization in that it has enabled Al Qaeda to not only survive the onslaught of a superpower but maintain its position at the forefront of the Salafist movement.

Like all terrorists, Al Qaeda's ideology is reflected in both the targets it selects and the tactics and weapons it uses to attack them; massive casualties in an international context. By reversing the equation intelligence can determine their weapons of choice

and how to counter them. In the following case (the Al Khobar compound attack of 2003, Saudi Arabia), it was car-bombs and the use of blast-walls. It was also this case where the counter-measures failed to hold the terrorists and, after separating the hostages into Muslims and non-Muslims, they proceeded to slit the throats of the latter (Abdul Hameed Bakier, 2006); over a thousand Western families left the country in the following three months. Long term reconnaissance, high quality explosives and a coordinated, highly daring attack (that included suicide bombers to breach the car-bomb proof walls and head sets for communications) set the standard for what was to become the hallmark for the terrorism that is Al Qaeda. The attack not only terrorised, but demonstrated to the world that they had the technology and capability to strike at both the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemy at will.

The impact of Al Qaeda’s ideology on their tactics between 9/11 and the ‘Arab Spring Uprisings’ of 2011 is significant as, over the decade, the tactics they employed to achieve their long term objectives had sufficient enough support to sustain a continued campaign of violence. The situation now, however, is similar to that of Al Qaeda’s beginnings in the 1990s in that they have returned to having to persuade Jihadist fighters to take a global perspective – to strike once again at the West directly. What unfolds from this chrysalis as a direct result of the recent changes across North Africa, the Yemen and Syria, however, is what will determine Al Qaeda’s tactics for the future. One fear is that the exodus of refugees created by the revolutions and the acquisition of new technology may in fact provide a rich hunting ground for Al Qaeda in both Europe and the United States.

The MIR’s Chrysalis

This profile looks at the MIR from a historical perspective. The reasons for this, as Martha Crenshaw argues (1981), are the: *“Social myths, traditions, and habits [that] permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom.”* As she points out, the MIR is an excellent example of this and its history is fundamental to understanding any present or future capability. Furthermore, perhaps unlike any other mod-

ern terrorist groups, the MIR have become synonymous with such tradition and, like Al Qaeda’s roots, this is likely its singular most dangerous characteristic and the reason for its longevity. A grasp of the historical context in which the MIR emerged is therefore essential to determining and countering its drones.

“...it is then that we shall see the rising of the moon.”

(Final diary entry, R. Sands, 1981)

Although written during the Uprising of 1867, the excerpt from Casey’s 150 year old ballad above actually refers to the insurrection of 1798. Its use in 1981 by the hunger striker Robert Sands, is hence a classic example of the perceived continuity of this ‘tradition’ that Crenshaw argues is characteristic of Irish Republicans. For *The Rising of the Moon* represents not just a vision, but a cause and one that has dominated politics in Ireland for the last 150 years. That cause is the unification and independence of the island of Ireland and, as a consequence, the MIR’s origins can be traced back to the beginning of the last century and indeed the ideology in which they are ensconced, to the French Revolution of 1789 and beyond.

However, although the central tenets of the republican cause have remained essentially the same, the actual origins and aims of each manifestation of the IRA have been very different over its history. For example: the IRA of the 1860s was largely driven by local politics; the IRA of the 1920s by nationalism and the IRA of the 1950s by unemployment. As for the de-facto IRA of today, the Provisional IRA, their origins are firmly embedded in the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s.

The different environments in which each of the above originated also impacted directly upon their aims and the means with which they individually set out to achieve them. Unlike the IRA of the 1920s, for example, the Provisional IRA’s initial aim was to defend the community it represented as opposed to launching an offensive from it. It was only after the ‘Battle of the Bogside’ and ‘Bloody Sunday’ that this was reversed. Furthermore, the strategy they adopted to achieve this was not the fielding of a standing army like that of Collins, but asymmetrical urban warfare, technological innovation and political agitation. This policy

developed into what became known as the ‘Long War’ and the means with which to wage it, ‘the Armalite and the Ballot Box’.

The variants also have different origins from an ideological perspective. That of the 1920s revolved around the nationalism of the anti-treatyists and, in that its history was forged from the deeds of nationalist heroes such as Wolfe Tone, was as representative of the Protestant working class as much as that of the Catholic. Its origins stemmed from what was essentially an internecine and military orientated conflict that had spawned from the politics of post-World War I Britain, namely the growing assertiveness of national pride amongst Commonwealth nations.

Since the emergence of the Provisional IRA, however, the leadership has been dominated by the same characters at the strategic and political level, a trait that has marginalized both the more militant and younger members of the MIR over the years (Continuity IRA in 1986 and the Real IRA in 1997). In contrast, there are no British officers today of the rank of Major, that have seen active service in Northern Ireland. Dated and having not moved beyond the arguments of the early 1970s, the Provisional IRA were hence never able to take the war beyond the insurgency level. Two other reasons for this were the initial scale of the actual conflict (it was not unusual for the British Army to have up to 10,000 soldiers on the streets – brigade to divisional strength - in the early 1970s) and the number of years that senior MIR members spent imprisoned. What they were able to do, however, was to maintain a far more successful propaganda campaign than that of the pro-state organizations to continue the struggle politically.

With much of the history of Ireland, the fear is its tendency to repeat itself and, as with the ratification of the Treaty in 1922, that the leading dissidents of the ‘Good Friday’ equivalent will breathe life into a new and more militant MIR. It is this body of the movement, the dissident Republicans of the 32CSM (32 County Sovereignty Movement), the serving members of the Real and Continuity IRA and the disaffected youth of today that have no recollection of the troubles that are, by default, the leaders of today’s and tomorrow’s MIR, not the aging commanders of what was the Provisional Irish Republican Army. And this

is the key to their likely use of drones over the years to come. Moreover, in 1977, the old Northern and Southern structure of Brigades and Companies was replaced with a new system of small, squad sized Active Service Units. Like Al Qaeda it was effective militarily, enhanced creativity and, perhaps more importantly for the future, left the structure of the MIR intact at the operational level.

Despite the fact that the MIR has never been able to engage in a conventional conflict, both the 1920s and 1970s saw guerrilla type warfare that effectively put the country beyond the control of the police. A major difference between the two however is that, in the 1970s, the MIR moved their offensive almost entirely from the countryside to the cities. In fact it was this strategy that led not only to the birth of the Provisional IRA but an escalation in sectarianism, asymmetrical warfare, bombings and “ballot box politics” that were aimed at attacking not just the occupation and the administration, but the economy. Indeed, in its infancy, it was almost successful in that it brought about the ceasefires and negotiations of 1972, 1975 and 1976.

The IRA’s ‘Long War’, however, was not a success. British policy of the 1980s was not to negotiate and, by the early 1990s, the MIR was in a hopeless situation, militarily, financially and politically. What led to Sinn Féin’s invitation to the negotiating table was the fall of Thatcher’s government and a last, desperate and dramatic change in strategy. This was the bombing campaign of the early 1990s which caused close to a billion pounds worth of damage to the UK’s economy.

The MIR’s military sophistication must not be underestimated. In 1972, for example, there were 1,853 bomb attacks, 10,564 shootings, 1,264 weapons confiscated along with more than 27 tonnes of explosives and 130 British Army soldiers killed as a direct result of the terrorism. Over the course of the conflict, 1123 security services were killed (more than the combined total of casualties from the Falkland’s campaign of 1982, both conflicts in Iraq and the ISAF campaign in Afghanistan today). Most of these deaths were the result of highly sophisticated IEDs and it would be disingenuous to say that had the MIR of the time the technology to make them fly, hover or swim, that they would not have used the technology.

On the 28th July 2005, the IRA

announced an end to its armed campaign. This is not to say, however, that the threat is over, in fact quite the reverse. Although, the social, political, economic and cultural circumstances which brought about the beginning of the Troubles are no longer present, the Provisional Irish Republican Army has left not just a power vacuum, but a bitter sense of betrayal. Indeed, that the rebel songs of the MIR have stood the test of time is indicative of the path to come.

Part 2

The Metamorphosis of Terrorism Research

“Ten years of debates on typologies and definitions have not enhanced our knowledge of the subject to a significant degree.”

Walter Laquer

Despite this paper’s conclusion, recent research into terrorism has helped enormously to put the subject into an historical and philosophical context that has aided an understanding as to what has been happening over huge swathes of the world. In short, whilst this paper stands by the immeasurable contribution of pre 911 research (and its value today) and seriously questions the methodologies of post 911 research and agenda, it is believed that the recent demand for knowledge in the field would have been severely compromised had the latter not come about; research into terrorism before the advent of globalization simply lacked the mandate of a contemporary understanding of the kinds of institutions and research that are now needed to counter it. This is not to say, however, that terrorism studies is maturing into an authority upon which academia and the state can rest assured, with the methods, research and scholars of a recognized discipline. In fact, the explosion of interest and literature in terrorism studies over the last decade has unbalanced what was hitherto a self-imposed equilibrium of restraint by academics from different disciplines on the strengths and weaknesses of, not just their research, but the field. The reason for this is that as the very concept of the term defies any real inference through research on its nature or future, the temptation to

revolutionize it since the attacks on New York and categorize it into chronological and quantitative formats has been intense. With the surge in terrorism literature post 911, most research took this route and pre 911 research, that defined the mission, was largely replaced by literature where the mission quickly began to define the research.

Even before the attacks of 2001, Crenshaw (2000) saw the dangers in isolating terrorism from its context, side-lining the previous thirty years of research on what terrorism constituted and relying on the assumption that the world was witnessing the advent of a ‘new terrorism’. In her ‘Agenda for the 21st Century’, she drew attention to the problems of not only defining terrorism and distinguishing it from other forms of violence but researching it in an events driven world. The question was not so much the analytical usefulness of such a pejorative and subjective term, but the increasingly diverse and fluctuating nature of its usage. In summary, her argument was for more studies based on pragmatic, developmental models of primary research that analysed individuals and groups within their political and social environments as opposed to the application of personality theories and studies of the psychology of terrorism that “bound rationality”.

Others, however, like Jackson, see the definitional problem as crucial to terrorism research. Although not an advocate of eschewing the term altogether, he does accuse the mainstream of researchers of misinterpreting its characteristics. In comparison with Crenshaw’s ‘Agenda for the 21st Century’, Jackson’s focus is radically different and based on: the innocence of victims of terrorism; the selection of victims of terrorism; the innate differences between publicity and communication and the term’s common definition as being a form of illegitimate political violence.

If the object of terrorism research is indeed to accumulate enough knowledge to trace the causes of the emergence of terrorism and, on the basis of this, predict patterns in which it is likely to re-emerge and the weapons it is likely to use, the field has failed to take our understanding of the phenomenon beyond the exploratory stage of research (Silke, 2001). Silke’s arguments rested on finding that little headway had been made since a review on terrorism

research by Schmid and Jongman in 1988. Through an examination of the literature published in the two leading journals of the time (*Terrorism and Political Violence* and *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* from 1995 to 2000), he came to the conclusion that terrorism studies existed on little other than, “a diet of fast food research: quick, cheap, ready to hand and nutritionally dubious.”

A decade on again and with further increased political interests, whilst the literature on terrorism has increased dramatically, the research that it is based on has not. Researching terrorism is still compounded by a lack of primary material together with a mountain of secondary and re-worked resources that are of limited value – especially given the changing nature of terrorism, technology and state agendas. That the research methods employed often reflect the different camps within the field of terrorism studies is no mystery. What has emerged, particularly over the last decade, is little other than different perspectives of the same material. Be they descriptive, quantitative or experimental, their value is hence limited in that the range of methodologies, especially those employed in gathering data beyond open sourced materials, has been weak.

The fact is, since 9/11, terrorism research has taken on a new relevance. It is no longer just a field of research but a war-fighting asset; an abstract, inflective, prosody of communication in which the research has ceased to belong solely to the world of academia. With ‘new terrorism’ came ‘new’ research. To attain a field with the analytical skills capable of responding to 21st century asymmetrical warfare, the values and limitations of such research from a tactical, operational, and strategic perspective need to be understood. The academic tension between ideology and evidence, whilst difficult to discern a cohesive academic approach, is unlikely to be an obstacle for the market in dictating where the research or the terrorism goes from here.

Unfortunately, as with the major turning points in the history of the world, terrorism is often portrayed today as having a lineage that stretches back undisturbed, almost tranquil like across a succession of readily traceable events. In this way it can be seen as a tapestry as such that depicts what is, for example, ‘new terrorism’ or

‘old terrorism’. But terrorism is an abstract term and the dangers of such tapestries lie in the implications of seeking knowledge from events so imprecise in their meanings and so remote from each other in time and place that they have, in fact, very few common denominators and anything is possible.

On the other hand, to ignore the lineage of a subject is to fail to recognize that research into people’s lives, their personalities and their characters, however contradictory the results, is nevertheless a worthwhile accumulation of knowledge. It is only, for example by researching such contexts that we can identify something that is indeed truly new. In researching terrorism therefore, with its myriad of lineages and histories, it is only under the light of sustained research and scholarship and a commitment to understanding what is woven into the very tapestry of the subject that we can begin to understand the threads of it and where its fabric has either faded or been patched. Contemporary understandings of the past are otherwise little other than subjective interpretations and their value as to the knowledge that can be accumulated from such research with terrorism is reduced even further, especially given the limited primary resources available. The following pieces of literature on terrorism research illustrate some of the key strengths and weaknesses of its ability to anatomize this tapestry.

Pape (2009) is one of the few researchers in the field of terrorism studies that is profoundly positive as to the direction in which it is heading. He sees not just the “*marriage of social science and the study of terrorism*” and the recent application of new methodologies as leading to new questions, but the entire “*new wave*” of terrorism research (as he terms it) as having had a far more rational approach than pre-9/11 research (the “*old wave*”). Dolnik (2011), however, is less convinced. Whilst he also commends the enthusiasm that Pape’s ‘second wave’ has brought to the field, like Silke (2004), he doubts the quality. The greatest weakness for Dolnik, is the commitment to fieldwork in terrorism research as a whole; a long acknowledged problem within terrorism studies (Crenshaw, 2000).

As with Silke (2004) and Dolnik (2011), Hemmingsen’s (2011) work on Salafi Jihadism, is equally a call for more research; research that engages with the

actors and for a move beyond the realms of the “*extraordinary*” and “*spectacular*” and into the ordinary and normal worlds of the terrorists. Saying this, she equally acknowledged the weaknesses of such isolated studies and also found not just the definitional question a limitation on her field work, but indeed much of the vernacular that is employed to converse on terrorism.

Weinberg does, however, see weaknesses in relying too much on the case study approach advocated by Dolnik, namely that there are simply too many variables in comparison to the number of studies likely to ever be undertaken and caveats his critique with a call for substantiating such works with “*...conventional statistical procedures.*” Lum, Kennedy and Sherley’s (2006) review of evaluation research on counter-terrorism strategies (CTS) is a clear demonstration of just how important it is to look at what has as yet to be researched i.e. *Jackals and Drones*. The sheer cost of defending a state against terrorism puts this into perspective (more than trebling in the US from 2000 to the publication of their research in 2006). Their argument is hence for evidence based policies assessed on the effectiveness of CT strategies.

The Politicization of the Term ‘Terrorism’

The main problem is that as a political, derogatory term with no real, inherently meaningful definition and, with the war being waged against it in its tenth year, ‘terrorism’ has divided the world. One reason for the division stems not from the nature of its ambiguity or any fundamental change in its manifestation, but in the West’s difficulty in conceptualizing the motivations behind its many faces. ‘Terrorism’ does not define the motives behind an act of terror. It characterizes them, and this is what has led to its increasing use as a political term, particularly since 9/11.

Indeed, since the coinage of the term ‘terrorism’, its characteristics have always been synonymous with organized violence and a political end-goal. The difference is that its usage had always been more of a vernacular convenience than a political expression. Over the last decade though, the social impact of terrorism has been out of

all proportion to anything hitherto seen and this has led to its increasing application in advancing not just political objectives but political strategies. Indeed, since the 2001 attacks on New York, it has evolved from what was essentially a relatively subjective epithet (with no intrinsic meaning), to a highly charged, political synonym, for the enemy; a synonym that has put paid to any rational negotiation and one that has effectively been employed to both legitimize acts of terror and terrorize acts of legitimacy

Although the characteristics of terrorism are static, how they are perceived and applied is dynamic and the definition of its nature is therefore fluid and dependent on contemporary events. An example of this phenomenon is the heavy politicization of the term that took place after the attacks of September 11th, 2001 and the subsequent misconception that 'terrorism' had actually undergone a series of fundamental changes, namely that it had manifested its 'true self' and declared 'war' on the United States. As the cause for the war intensified, so too did the concept of terrorism across the political spectrum. In fact, over the last decade, there has been such a shift in the definition of terrorism academically, that there are now over a hundred schools of thought on what it actually means. Some say that it has de-centralized and de-politicized, others that it has moved on from preaching violence (as a means to a political end) to the phenomenon of using violence as a tactical end in itself. Several concur that it has moved from the shadows to open-combat on the field and to have rooted its agendas in theology, as opposed to any known ideology. One concurrent theme, however, is that the drama of traditional terrorism has become but a dated irrelevance and superseded by a modern, 9/11 type of warfare.

However, without the commonality of the Cold War, the subsequent attempts to demonize it resulted in little other than bringing to light the gulfs of entrenched differences between hitherto solid allies. Further failures were initiated by the writing off of the fundamental differences that terrorism has with legitimate uprisings (including, ironically, those between 1775 and 1783) and attempting to re-classify it through the dismissing of guerrilla groups such as FARC. This renaissance period for the terrorists, therefore, was

the result not just of the world's tolerance of it, but its politicization of it. In fact, the demonization and classification of terrorists has since undermined not just the West's future positions in any mediatory roles or future peacekeeping capacity, but their hitherto, unquestioned, sense of righteousness. There are three lessons to learn from this and each are crucial to the issue of drones: the terrorists', the victims' and the general public's. The first is a lesson in legitimacy, the second, a lesson in innocence and the third, a lesson in culpability and the antithetical nature of terrorism that has, unequivocally, led to this state of affairs. The reason for this is that what we are talking about here are the implications of confronting terrorism with terrorism – and the challenges faced by liberal democracies with regards to drone strikes.

Conclusion - The Historicity of New Terrorism

This paper has sought to show that whilst terrorism has changed, it has not changed beyond recognition and a look into its history is all that is required to confirm whether or not drones will be used against us. It was argued that what is often portrayed to be 'new' is often little other than a contemporary learning curve in an historic line of development, with established precedents and a clear lineage - that terrorism is primarily a political phenomenon, deeply reflective of modern society, with unmistakable connections to the past and a history that is of fundamental importance to understanding and countering the drone-threat it poses today.

Unfortunately, it is all too often inferred that today's terrorism involves different characteristics, such as aims and motivations and that all manner of traditional approaches to countering it need to be re-evaluated. Laqueur is not alone in this analysis (see: Lesser et al. 1999, Neumann 2009, Juergensmeyer 2000, Hoffman 2002 and Kegley 2002). With the Cold War usurped by '*contending images of world politics*' (G. Fry, 2001), terrorism of the 1990s is often seen today as evidence for what Fukuyama called the '*End of History*' and Huntington, the '*Clash of Civilizations*'. After the attack of 9/11, 'New-Terrorism' hence became the fresh genus to which many 'species' of terrorist were assigned. It was deemed to be

unlike anything hitherto witnessed and, of such lethality and complexity, that nothing past compared to it. Its goals, as Hoffman states, are "*almost transcendental.*" In short, however, there is little 'new' about 'new-terrorism'. 'Old-Terrorism' is simply too riddled with accounts of mass casualties (RIRA, Omagh, 1998), the indiscriminate targeting of civilians (IRA, London, 1939), utopian dreams (Red Brigades), apocalyptic or divinely inspired goals (Zealots and Thuggees), indeed all the traits that are the hallmarks of 'new-terrorism'.

Indeed, a simple look at the past, present and future aspirations of the communities that support terrorism give us a clearer perspective of the nature of the terrorism that we face than much of the post-9/11 literature. For the essence of terrorism, research is needed in its historical context as opposed to the recent milieu of categories and denominations in which the distinctions are largely artificial and politically charged. If, for example, Al Qaeda does indeed represent a 'new' terrorism, it is not because, "*it is amateurish and networked but because its personnel are more professional and better organized, not to mention better financed, than many of its predecessors.*" (Tucker, 2001). History enables us to put terrorism into better perspective, to evaluate its characteristics in the context of the time and develop strategy to countering it with as little cost to the state as possible.

When looked at in this light, terrorism can in fact be seen to have been seeded alongside the development of nation-states and that it has germinated in line with their social and political economies: in the late 19th Century, it was anarchism, a reaction to the nationalist uprisings of the 1840s and 1850s; in the early 20th Century, the beginnings of anti-colonial terrorism and, in the wake of the Fascists and the State Terrorism of the 1940s, the rise of the 'Far Left' in the 1960s. As the wars of the 1990s in Bosnia could be argued to have been the last battles of the Second World War, Al Qaeda could be argued to have its roots firmly embedded in nationalism (Juergensmeyer, 2006).

Ironically, the case for 'new-terrorism' is actually built upon three, historical events: 1) As a result of the demise of the Ottoman Empire and 70 years of repressive, Western backed, dictatorial regimes - the rise in religious extremism; 2) The rise in ethno-nation-

alist terrorism and separatist violence as a result of the Soviet Empire's collapse and 3) the subsequent political, economic and social ramifications of globalization. That the end of the Cold War reignited colonial, tribal and nationalist conflicts that had hitherto been contained by Soviet proxy wars was ironically argued as early as 1996 by Laqueur. In effect, as the wall came down across Eastern Europe and globalization began to encroach upon the power of the nation-state, much of the world effectively had to return to dealing with what their grandparents had inherited from the outcome of the Great War, 1914 - 1918. In fact, even the religious rhetoric of 'new terrorists' is influenced more by the politics of historical agendas than the strategic objectives of a religious ideology.

The argument for a 'new-terrorism', therefore, is not just blighted by historical precedents, artificial parameters, and premature judgements but the X-factor of the unknown – namely, how the youth of today will respond to Jihad in 20 years. As motivational influences change and 'new-terrorism' becomes more reactive than proactive at the operational and national level, it is likely to become increasingly distanced from its strategic, international objectives and apocalyptic ideology. To summarize, the main reason for the argument over 'new-terrorism' stems not from the nature of its ambiguity or any fundamental change in the manifestation of terrorism post 9/11, but in 'new-terrorism' characterizing as opposed to defining the motives behind acts of terror. The argument for terrorism as a political, modern phenomenon is equally salient to the understanding of recent terrorism and one from which lessons past can be applied to the question of drones. Furthermore, as recent terrorism is rooted in the history of the Middle East, the Cold War and its aftermath, it needs to be studied in not just the context of 'old-terrorism' but in line with the existing threat of this mostly, dormant monster. Additionally, casual or perceptual uses of 'new-terrorism' theory to castigate legitimate revolts against oppression, justify acts of repressive legislation that are out of all proportion to the threat or ignore / discard existing working practices, should be countered. Hence, although 'new-terrorism' is a very different creature to 'old-terrorism', it is very much of the same species and its capacity to use drones lies in its blood. ■

Transformation in Light of Knowledge Develop

Introduction

Republic of Slovenia (RS) and Slovenian Armed Forces (SAF) are, as the state and a military organisation, facing major challenges. In addition to the challenges arising from the environment the most noticeable effects are limited financial resources.

Reduction of financial and other resources is a major challenge for the SAF. If it wants to "survive" and continue to perform legal duties, it must respond changes in the environment in an appropriate way. This process as a part of adaptation to changes in the environment in the SAF is mentioned as *transformation*. Adaptation is nothing new, also explained in Systems Theory as the essence of survival- existing of a system. It is constant adaptation to the environment and the challenges it brings. Officials within the SAF are aware that we need to adapt and change, so that we can deliver our commitments to the Alliance and we are also ready to defend our homeland. Transformation should not be treated as an external constraint, but as a conscious desire for something better, more efficient and, last but not least, as a basic "survival" of the organization. Transformation in a rapidly changing and dynamic international environment promotes need for innovations and the development of modern technologies for the future.

Generally, two ideas have appeared within NATO and the EU recently. The first is so-called concept *Pooling & Sharing*. This has been developed within NATO and EU military structures and promotes an idea of pooling and sharing some of the national military capabilities that fulfil the conditions

of deployability and interoperability. The concept is based on a voluntary approach to find ways to reduce costs and to avoid duplication of facilities or fill their critical deficits. The second is so-called *Smart Defence*, for the first time publicly presented by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen after the Chicago Summit 2012¹.

As a consequence of shrinking defense budgets NATO leaders agreed to share costs of weapons and equipment as part of a so-called "Smart Defence Initiative". "Together, we will keep NATO capable of responding to the security challenges of tomorrow, because no country, no continent can deal with them alone," NATO Secretary General told the leaders ahead of the discussion about budget cuts. "We can find common solutions to common problems." Rasmussen explained the reason behind the "Smart Defence" initiative is that the military must do more with less in a time of budget cuts due to NATO members need to save money in the time of Great Recession (A Project of the George C. Marshall Institute, www.dw.de, 2012). Smart Defence is intended to make Europe more responsible for European security and the European periphery as the United States military withdraws from the continent.

Both ideas are making it through the transformation processes in the SAF. The RS and the SAF must be able to defend the homeland and continue to remain a credible partner for the Alliance.

The Resolution on the General Long-Term Development and Equipping Programme of the Slovenian Armed Forces up to 2025 (2010, p. 7) states that:

FROM MOUNTAIN BATTALION TO MOUNTAIN REGIMENT

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“... the likelihood of an interstate armed conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region has diminished significantly. Military threats will mainly emerge as local and regional instabilities which can easily spill over. Moreover, contemporary threats are increasingly becoming hybrid in their form, and multi-layered and international in nature under the influence of strong globalisation effects. In addition to land, sea and air, the theatre of the future will also include cyberspace and space.”

The authors thus believe that the future security environment will become even more complex due to a combination of different elements: greater lethality of modern weapons, development of means for a more rapid deployment of military forces, international terrorism², proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, easier access to information, presence of the media etc. Military structures and methods³ suitable for resolving international conflicts will not be able to manage complex 21st century security situations.

NATO has learned from its operational experience that military means, although essential, are not enough to meet the many complex challenges to the Alliance security. Both within and outside the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO must work with other actors to contribute to a Comprehensive Approach (CA) effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments. Its effective implementation requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, and taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well their decision-making

autonomy. A military operation may be successful in tactical terms, but its performance might be counterproductive at the operational level. This means loss of trust, and failure to achieve centres of gravity⁴.

This is often the case in counter-insurgency (COIN), in which the enemy's operation primarily depends on local support (see Celeski, 2005). Thus, military operations⁵ that have otherwise been successful at the tactical level might shift the focus of sympathy to the enemy. This is due to side effects among the civilian population and on civilian infrastructure, or due to disapproval of local communities, which, at the operational level, demand much more effort and time to create a secure environment.

The Mid-Term Defence Programme (hereinafter: SOPR) for 2007–2012 (2006) indicates that the future strategic security environment shall be significantly affected by: globalisation, sophisticated lethal weapons and various forms of asymmetric warfare, rapidly changing security situations, demographic and political factors and the lack of resources that cause mass migrations, spread of radical ideologies, unresolved international and internal conflicts and major natural disasters. The SOPR for 2007–2012 also anticipates that globalization will make the Western democracies, in particular their economies, even more sensitive to stability in different parts of the world, which will directly or indirectly affect their economic interest and open market operations.

The threats will be posed by unstable states, poor management of resources and constant competition for them. Unresolved

conflicts as well as groups and countries supporting radical ideologies will represent threats which could become global. Thus, some severe forms of the threats in question might shake foundations of global stability (Rode, 2007, p. 5).

In the case of a Mountain Battalion through different ideas, studies, examples and processes we tried to find a proposal for a new organizational unit that will be more capable, presenting an important part in SAF and the national security system. A Mountain battalion has a long tradition and high reputation within SAF, provides specialized capabilities - understanding multi-dimension philosophy - will be as a part of transformation re-organized as *Mountain Regiment*.

Theoretical background

Theory of System

Mulej (Mulej et al, 1996, p. 1) states that "the Theory of Systems" is distinguished by at least two criteria. That distinction is hard-systems/soft-systems and phenomenological/methodological criteria's for distinguishing theories of systems. The system was analyzed by phenomenological perspective, where we restrict ourselves to the description of the phenomenon from our point of view and comparing it with the system. Methodological aspects and systemic thinking was used as a tool to achieve comprehensive understanding, resolving and managing armed forces (in our case the SAF and Mountain Regiment).

Defence, or more widely, national security is a complex and difficult task for the provision of a modern state formed national security systems. It consists of complex social subsystems, which are different in different countries, resulting from a specific social situation and needs. A common feature of all, is, that they their aim is to protect and defend the country against all types of threats and provide citizens with security in the broadest sense of the word, and thus provide the conditions for socio-economic development of the society and well-being of people (Hostnik, 1997 p. 2).

Defence System, understood as organization of all services and resources for the provision of defence and security functions of a society that in this context is synonymous for national security system, can be understood in a broadest sense as a part of public administration. The main role in the defence system in most of the countries belongs to the national military organization or armed forces.

To summarize, we can see some strong links in systems behaviour using the Theory of Systems, which originate from a variety of links between elements of the system (internal reasons) and environmental influences (external reasons) (Kljajić, 2002, p.5). The Theory of Systems, Analysis, and Organizational Theory has been used in our research, since the SAF and NATO are seen as a system and organization.

Specific knowledge about the system, in our case SAF's Mountain Regiment/armed forces, cannot be replaced with a general Theory of Systems, since it has specific features. The general Theory of Systems offers only the basic framework for the study. Examining the system, Kljajić (2002, p. 10) sees a total theoretical - methodological basis: existence of the system in the environment, existence of the system management, system "production" and direction of the effects of the selected "modus operandi".

Applying Theory of Systems we are trying to explain behaviour and structure of the system. Ideally, to achieve integrity, we would capture all of the characteristic and their links/relations/relationships. The concept of "the system" for its formal definition (Mulej et al, 1996, p. 19), put as systems theory in general says, that "the system consists of two multiplicities, namely:

- set of components, parts, components;
- set of connections, relationships, interactions and relations between them".

"Mulej (Mulej et al, 1996, p. 19) thinks that it is not possible to consider all the possibilities and the actual characteristics of the system, even if we want to research it systematically. Specialization of knowledge and experiences, as well as emotions or other orientations are the unforeseen hindrance that can hamper objectivity. All this has to be determined while we are examining the system.

Being aware of the fact that it is not possible to consider all the characteristics of the actual system, we have used the same approach dealing with the Mountain Regiment. We have included three selected factors:

- the environment in which the system works,
- goals or requirements arising from the environment,
- the organization/system from which it arises.

According to Mulej (Mulej et al, 1996, p.17) system means a very complex phenomenon. With this Mulej believes that "the phenomenon is emergence of everything that occurs objectively and subjectively, that is realistic in thinking and feeling by human/people." The "System" helps to realize while bringing transparency that does not diminish the reality in too many simple individual events, but rather than that sees them as a single unit, or at least part of a whole.

Mulej (Mulej et al, 1996, p.17) talking about the Theory of Systems also believes that "the actual complexity of the world should not be oversimplified, but rather reasonable instead. Complexity is something we cannot completely lose from sight, nor lose ourselves within its boundlessness or even in its excessive simplification".

To avoid excessive simplification on our Mountain Regiment system/model, we used some kind of technical approach to study the system. Technical model of an open and closed system, as shown by Kljajić (2002, p. 19-20), facilitates the study, as just studying of processes inside Mountain Regiment is very difficult (complexity and secrecy). It is much easier to study the inputs to the system (tasks and mission, normative

regulations, threats to the environment, etc.) and outputs from the system (e.g. functioning in operations, protection and rescue system, etc.). In engineering, the system is often described as a "black box" where we do not care for what happened inside. What we do, is follow only the inputs (x/t) into the system and outputs (s/t) from the system. When we have feedback, information (s/t), we can correct input (x/t) and change output (y/t) from the system in the way they are more favourable to us. This is the advantage of an open system. Without feedback, which could affect the outputs (y/t), we can't affect the outputs from the system which is a weakness of a closed system (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Close and Open System Model

The open system, which the Mountain Regiment undoubtedly is, should be responsive to the environment to survive - it needs resources from the environment (and gives them back). An open system must constantly change and adapt to the environment (see Daft, 2001, p. 14).


The Theory of Systems is based on studies of issues and experiences tailored to specific problems. It is especially important that "the social system with a certain structure has to fulfil certain requirements with functional results which must be followed in order to keep the system alive" (see Luhmann, 1981, p. 329). Mali (1994, p. 87) believes that "the system must actively interfere with its environment and, in the given framework, to

manage environmental conditions, which are the basic reason for its existence."

In our opinion, a Mountain Regiment must therefore comply with the requirements of the environment and be successful. It must actively interfere with the environment (prevention, active defence) and manage the threats that will justify its existence before the public.

Organizational Theory

When examining the environment, Organizational Theory might also apply. A Mountain Regiment functioning is an organized activity which can be analysed through



this approach. The organizational theory, when considering learning organization, puts great emphasis on the environment, because it affects goals and means – instruments, those ones resulting from the environment and must comply with its requirements. We must therefore take into account the environment in the first place, especially as the "edge conditions" over which we have no control (Rode, 2007, p. 15). As already mentioned, the Mountain Regiment depends on the environment, as changes in the environment required the change of behaviour. At the same time, changes in the political environment must also bring changes in the security environment, as each political system in order to ensure its development and

existence, organize and institutionalize an appropriate security mechanisms and content.

Achieving goals by Organizational Theory requires coordination, planning and control. It is necessary to systematically introduce the criteria of rationality, reason and consequences, costs and benefits. Tendency to achieve the objectives encourages the structure to reduce uncertainty.

All this affects the establishment of the organization, resources and growth of bureaucracy and characteristic organizational forms. The specificity of the bureaucracy is reflected in its objectives; research and development or security require a different structure than, for example steel production (see Šmidovnik, 1985, p. 40-75 and Bučar, 1981, p. 100-130).

Objectives and interests of individual countries are different and differently defined. The ruling elite, being a dictator or a democratically chosen government still, sets national targets and claims to act in the "national interest". Politicians have no doubt that survival of the nation and preservation of national sovereignty is a primary goal, followed by prosperity, development and maintenance of social values - and later the remaining objectives which are different. In many Western countries, for example, democratic values and democracy are the key elements of national identity, which is reflected in the structure and functioning of the political system. In some Islamic countries, this definition, and emphasis on materialism and sexual freedom pose a threat to the basic moral and religious values (see Rode, 2001, p. 25).

To achieve the objectives of organizations, the Organizational Theory requires resources and tools that are a big source of uncertainty. While the goal requires rationality, means and instruments may not be able to provide that and it is very rarely to reach full rationalization. People are present everywhere (the human factor) and are not content with a simple refund. They want more - power, authority, prestige, respect, common socializing. All this affects operation of instruments and resources; but human factor remains the main factor in the armed forces (in our research in the Mountain Regiment). Nevertheless, the achievement of rationality, necessary to achieve the goal, remains a problem (see Šmidovnik, 1985, p. 45).

Transformation

Reduction of financial and other resources is a major challenge for the SAF. If it wants to "survive" and continue to perform statutory duties it must be re-organized in such a way that it can respond to the challenges and changes in the environment. This process of adapting to such changes in the SAF is referred to as transformation. Also Alberts (2003) indicates the challenges of the information society and the associated changes in the new millennium with the transformation, known as transformational period.

We have realized that the armed forces and the entire defence system will be a part of the future political, technological and organizational solutions. Šteiner (2011, p. 46) points out that the transformation is based on a non-violent, sophisticated and knowledge-based information society relying on changing the defence and military structures, organization and functions, and the role of the military in society. In the Alliance and national environments, in security and also in the armed forces, the transformation process brings high expectations and equally high doubts. These can be seen as a fear of the disappearance of national or even conventional soldiers. In a period of transformation, countries are setting the objective of forming an army, whose scope is smaller, but more efficient, more professional and modern, interoperable and capable of performing the mission of various national and transnational tasks.

Transformation is a continuous process also mentioned in the NATO Handbook (NATO Handbook, 2006, p. 20-21), where this new approach is referred to as a transformative process, actively displacing and replacing the paradigm revolution in military affairs. Transformation within NATO is a proactive and innovative process of development and integration of new concepts, doctrine and capabilities and structures in order to improve interoperability.

Šteiner (2011, p. 46-47) notes that "The Strategic Concept from 1999 emphasized the transformation primarily as global and transnational, and a guide for further development of military in society. The 2010 Concept continues and expands this to the

national level. Having a new NATO strategic concept means that we are facing a new period of transformation.”

The argument is built on the fact, that through changing the direction of transformation, from the bottom up, so that the overall effort coming from the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT), should allow for the direction from the top to the bottom. In other words, it is a collection and integration of theoretical models and best practices, and facilitating their exchange and upgrades. This allows the Alliance to enforce the national transformation processes in environments with varying speed and intensity depending on the level of development and its integration in the overall transformation process. When speaking about entering the transformation process, it is also important in what situations it is possible to successfully make changes, especially if we know that the transformation should not implement any radical or violent changes. All this is happening at times of global economic crisis and recession, which affected both large and small countries. As the national defence and military systems are closely related from the technological view, if not correlated with science and industry, the speed depends on the relationship and the ability to track changes, and mutual adjustment.

After the Lisbon summit the New NATO Strategic Concept request overhaul of the Alliance to be prepared for the security challenges of the 21st century. The concept emphasizes the strengthening of both: national and Allied defence and preservation of military identity and also somehow turn back to the Members. The new NATO strategic concept is primarily incentive and inclusive (Abrial, 2011). It promotes and directs member states to effective and efficient defence. It also highlights that NATO and concept mission is to set strategic direction and identify possible areas for cooperation and action (clearing house approach) and to facilitate exchange of best practices.

Effects Based Concept and Comprehensive Approach

The concept of the *Effects-Based Operations* (EBO) was introduced in the US Air Forces at the tactical level during

the First Gulf War. It refers to planning and conducting combat operations by combining military and non-military methods to achieve effects. The concept was developed to take advantage of the significant progress in military technology and tactics, whereby the commander's aims could be achieved causing minimal collateral damage and posing minimal risk to their own forces (Batschlet, 2002).

NATO, through the Experimentation program of the ACT, is conducting experiments with doctrine and tools for EBO. Although all good commanders have probably always conducted effect-based operations it is equally clear that the current development and formalization of EBO concepts extends the traditional framework for the planning and conduct of military operations. This is directly represented by extending the operational space to include all the dimensions of the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, and Information (PMESII) environment. The increase in dimensionality necessarily increases complexity of the planning and execution with the associated need for extended expertise in all PMESII dimensions and analytical support to tie the strands together into coherent operational design (Thuve, 2006. p. 2)

It is worth mentioning the EBO and the last CA Doctrine are conceived as a process intended not only to the assets (forces, combat, equipment, logistic and economic structure), but also to the adversary's behaviour (Midan, 2009).

The concept was later tested at the strategic and operational levels, but was officially dropped from common usage due to different interpretations and owing to the belief that it gives the commanders a false sense of predictability (Mattis, 2008). It was replaced by the *Comprehensive Approach Concept*. According to many critics (Vego, 2006; Mattis, 2008; Riper, 2009; see also Smolej, 2011), the concept is useful especially in terms of targeting at the tactical level. Despite being no longer used at the higher levels of command, the concept still presents a useful tool for goal achievement at the tactical level. On the basis intelligence, specialized units, such as mountain units, have more leeway in target identification processes, especially where the EBO concept is used to guide their operations in terms of

achieving specific effects.

NATO and EU learned from operational experiences that purely military acts are not enough to meet many complex challenges to the international security. They have to work with other actors to contribute to a CA – effectively combines political, civilian and military crisis management instruments.

At the Bucharest (2008)⁶ and Strasbourg-Kehl (2009)⁷ summits, NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed a set of pragmatic proposals, which aim at developing and implementing NATO's contribution to a CA.

Experience in Afghanistan and Kosovo demonstrates that today's challenges require a CA by the international community, involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments, while fully respecting mandates and autonomy of decisions of all actors and provides precedents of this approach. To this end, while recognising that NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, the NATO Heads of States and Governments tasked the Council to develop pragmatic proposals to improve the coherent application of NATO's own crisis management instrument, as well as practical co-operation at all levels with partners, the UN and other relevant International organisations (IO), non-governmental organisations (NGO) and local factors in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future operations wherever appropriate⁸.

Developing pragmatic proposals, the engagement of NATO at all levels of command is of importance. NATO HQ should focus on building confidence and mutual understanding between international actors including developing modalities for better cooperation. At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate with other international actors in the overall planning for complex operations in which a large degree of civil-military interaction will be required. At the theatre level NATO force commanders must be empowered to undertake effective cooperation and coordination with indigenous local authorities and in-theatre principals from other international actors in the execution of operations.

The key thing to achieve this is an appropriate organizational structure where a key element is Knowledge and its Knowledge

Development (KD) and Systems of Systems to identify operationally relevant elements within the PMESII dimensions and the relationship between elements both within and among the PMESII domains.

Knowledge Development

Knowledge is created by people and reflects their know-how and involves their education, experience, thinking, decision making and all other capacities for creating choices and taking action.

People exchange and share knowledge within formal and informal networks: participating in collaborating networks augments the level of knowledge in the organisation. Organized organisation will systematically, as all available knowledge is retrieved, stored and processed by using standardized methods and informational systems, create an organizational knowledge base that will be of great help in the operational planning process. We have to develop a much broader and more comprehensive understanding of the operational environment – we have to move a bi-dimensional approach and start to think multi-dimensional (Henigman et al, 2012, p. 37, 38).

KD is an evolution, not a revolution in thinking. Processes and information already exist, in many cases they support the decision-making processes. The problem is that this “information” or isolated pockets of knowledge reside in the heads and offices of subject matter experts across (and external too) the organization; it is not fused, de-conflicted or shared, at least not in a formal, well-established manner. Often, the end user, usually a commander, is left to integrate or search for applicable knowledge in order to make a decision.

Therefore there is a need to “connect” or fuse existing information, knowledge, and the processes that develop it so the decision-maker is presented, as early as possible in the decision process, with a “holistic understanding.” This not only addresses the above problems because a proper KD also reduces the decision cycle and helps the commander’s attention focus on a complex operating environment on the most important components.

Additionally, because of the Comprehensive nature of modern conflict,

there is also a requirement to “connect” with sources of information outside the traditional military sphere or organization (i.e. IOs, NGOs, academia, etc) to broaden the understanding of the environment/engagement space.

KD, as outlined in the BI-SC concept is a process where information is collected, fused and analyzed to create “actionable” knowledge and then it is made accessible across the staff, coalition, Alliance. In order to better understand the definition and meaning of the KD it has to be understood as an interactive process that covers collection, analysis, electronic storage and distribution of information. It utilises a variety of military as well as non-military information gathering assets to identify and collect data from a wide variety of sources, and uses this to produce a common operational picture (COP), to provide shared situation awareness (SITAWARE).

KD supports planning, execution, and assessment by providing a holistic understanding of a focus area or “engagement space” with the stated aim of presenting knowledge to a decision maker whereby he can take action e.g. make a decision, select a course of action, etc. The KD does not replace well-established decision-supporting processes and mechanisms but rather, the KD ultimately looks to leverage those processes to create a baseline of “knowledge” from which actions/ decisions derive.

A key element of the KD, or a tool in the KD tool box, is Systems Analysis. Systems Analysis is an analytical process that holistically examines adversarial, potentially adversarial, neutral, and friendly nations or entities, plus their environments, as complex adaptive systems to identify behaviors and structures, and to assess strengths, vulnerabilities, weaknesses and inter-relationships. It views an area of interest or engagement space as a system, for example the nation of Afghanistan, and recognizes that most systems are complex. To understand a complex system, systems analysis methodology aims to present a holistic understanding of a system by dividing the environment into manageable sections—as a starting point, it is helpful to divide most systems into PMESII sections. With an understanding of each part of the system, it is then possible to re-construct or model the environment to

understand key links, strengths, and vulnerabilities of the systems which ultimately aides in determining where and how best take action.

By understanding these basic components, it is possible to begin to understand the importance of factors often not considered in a traditional military analysis such as political, social, and economic aspects.

The KD approach uses subjects matter experts to analyze the different actors and system in several relevant domains, as well as the specific aspects of the region and operational environment. It is from the continuous analysis of this ever changing COP that knowledge can be developed. This knowledge helps us understand the operational environment and assists civilian officials and military leaders in the decision making process. The KD is therefore a staff-wide process and involves all members of headquarters (HQ) staff. It is continuous, adaptive and networked activity which seeks to provide commanders and their staff a comprehensive understanding of complex operational environment that seeks for changing the present way of thinking supporting more proactive and interactive approach to collection of Information, Intelligence and Knowledge, it combines information from across the entire organization and fuses this with inputs from a large number of external actors.

Mountain Battalion vs. Mountain Regiment

Mountain Battalion is a tactical combat unit, with mission of the combined warfare in the mountains and participate in the Protection and Rescue (P&R). Since we are talking about fighting capacity of the joint combined forces, we must take into account air support, fire, intelligence and other support that are necessary (also very expensive) and we should be able to use it. Especially limited resources, gave the maximum encouragement for thinking outside the established frameworks. They provoke thinking, what we urgently need for ourselves and what can be offered from other units or the Alliance. At the same time, we should take into account the capacities of the unit and its functions and principles on which tactical units operate. The goal was to find a solution

with the help of the Knowledge Development (KD) and recognition from the Theory of Systems what we need to change and adapt to the incoming changes from the contemporary world. Our solution presents a new form of organization units. We're talking about a Mountain Regiment, a light infantry tactical unit, with capabilities and mission of the joint combined fighting in the mountains. The unit is the core capacity for building battalion battle group, where the concept of Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing are coming into practical reality on tactical level. Of course, there is the dilemma what is essential to national defence and what the priority for the Alliance is and how to coordinate, when resources are limited.

between home and Alliance's priorities.

Conclusions – summary

Today's adversary is a dynamic, adaptive foe who operates within a complex interconnected (PMESII) environment. Ahead of the Alliance there is a challenge to adapt from looking at a two-dimensional time and space problem to understand the implications of a full PMESII environment. This is not a small challenge. Changes are also necessary in thoughts and in the organisational part. This involves understanding how various systems relate to one another and how some overlaps are nested in each other.

Information, Intelligence and Knowledge sharing, and finally it focuses on making information and knowledge available to multiple customers.

In reality the KD is currently little more than just a concept struggling to be implemented across the organization. The required structures, manning and expertise are not in place and the doctrine on how to operate this process is not fully developed. In practice, what we currently have in the case of the Mountain Battalion is an enhanced info/ intelligence gathering capability. This is in danger of competing with the existing intelligence and staff function instead of complementing them and is not what was envisaged in the KD Concept.

'Alis grave nil' (lat.) - Nothing is heavy to those who have wings

In the turbulent environment the organizations must have courage to cope with challenges. When there is willingness, motivation and proactive action, there is a way how to cope with the existing situation.

The motto of the Mountain Regiment in combat operations still is: "Think operationally, act tactically". The EBO and CA concepts are important for the Mountain Regiment as they dictate the contents of the training process with regard to other SAF units. This training process has to refer both to the individuals and the unit. The units must have greater generic capabilities for obtaining intelligence, and more robust analytical processing capabilities to operate in accordance with the EBAO concept (Henigman et al, 2012, p. 37, 38).

Moreover, they have to be adaptive, since units (being small in terms of personnel and light in term of equipment) may have a wider spectrum of capabilities, even in comparison with larger conventional units (see Spulak, 2007, p. 20).

Dilemma about Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing was first solved within own armed forces; seeking support for operations within Alliance first looking in the local and national environment. As an example of new and innovative solutions a single fleet of combat vehicles, the concept of rotating units in the single set of equipment has been established.

"What is optimal for us is also perfect for the Alliance" - This motto solves the dilemma

EBO and latest CA Concept adopted by NATO are designed to influence the will of an adversary, on our own forces through the coordinated application of military capabilities to achieve the desired strategic objectives. It focuses on actions and their influence on behaviour, rather than attrition and targets. The EBO is the coherent and comprehensive application of various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state.

KD is a headquarters wide activity designed to improve our level of SITAWARE and understanding. It is a continuous process that supports planners and decision makers and is run from the initial stages of an operation till its end. The KD is understood as a concept/process that collects and analyses information, integrates isolated data into a useable body of information based on an understanding of systems, and makes it available so it can be shared. It enhances our current analytical capabilities by adding Systems Analysis methodology to our existing toolbox, re-examines the organization's approach to Information and Knowledge Management creating a foundation for

Despite these challenges, the original requirement for enhanced situation awareness and a better understanding of the complex operational environment still remains and we believe that the KD can provide an important part of the SAF organizational solution.

Our proposal for a new form of organization units follows Theory of Systems and the EBO as well as the CA philosophy that complements other philosophies such as the indirect approach and mission command. It focuses on the end-state and on determining the effects that must be created in order to influence the behaviour and capabilities of key actors to achieve that. According to its philosophy we have to consider the engagement space as a System in which all actors and entities interact to create effects and require an analysis of Systems and Systems of Systems to understand the relationship between actions and effects.

After studying and analyses we are proposing establishing a new model of mountain unit - Mountain Regiment, light infantry tactical unit, with capabilities and mission of the joint combined fighting in the mountains. The unit is the core capacity for building battalion battle group, where the concepts of Smart Defence and Pooling & Sharing are

coming into practical reality on tactical level.

The RS has committed itself to have developed and prepared forces, where light infantry units could be represented by Mountain Regiment in accordance with the SAF's development plans within force goals. ■

¹ Chicago Summit Declaration, 20MAY 2012

² Terrorism epitomizes contemporary asymmetrical threats. In this context, Prezelj states (2007, p. 67) that "asymmetry refers to the disproportionality of the entity which threatens (non-state actors against the state) the resources it uses, and the consequences (minimum input – maximum output outcome) which, for example, exceed the direct consequences of a bomb explosion".

³ Naturally, the Mountain battalion is but a segment of a comprehensive response to terrorism by modern countries (Prezelj, 2007, p. 68) which enhances joint activity and the country's response (the overall picture).

⁴ Terrorists/insurgents/enemies attack people who are the point of focus (POF), whereby their tactical operation creates a strategic impact. The Centres of Gravity (COG) are defined as features, capabilities or sites, from which a country, alliance, military force or other group draw from the freedom of their actions, physical strength or the will to fight. These points exist at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and represent the centre of power or operation, on which everything depends. They are also the point where all the energy is focused to achieve the objective. From this point arises the enemy forces' ability, power, and will. Their destruction or neutralisation brings a decisive advantage and victory.

⁵ Successful in terms of linear battlefields, whereby the main goal is to cause damage to the enemy.

⁶ Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3APR 2008

⁷ Strasbourg-Kehl Summit Declaration, 4APR 2009

⁸ Riga Summit Declaration, 29NOV 2006

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Security Challenges in South Eastern Europe

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During the two last decades parts of Southern Europe have been considered by many as the most insecure spots of our continent. The recent worldwide financial crisis, with its initial epicentre in USA, has provoked particularly deep economic and social troubles in several Mediterranean EU members and threatened the Euro, a highly visible and weighty symbol of the European integration. Political crises, social unrest, violence and wars in Northern Africa and the Middle East added to the long lasting tensions and conflicts in the Mediterranean vicinity of Southern Europe. These events resulted in an increased inflow of refugees and job seekers from Northern Africa which had a negative impact on social stability and political climate in Southern European states. The ensuing political tensions among EU members endangered in turn the working of the Schengen system, another emblematic achievement of European integration.

The already precarious economic and political stability in the eastern part of Southern Europe were particularly strongly affected casting a shadow on the achievements of the last decade. According to the statistics concerning armed conflicts around the world, recently compiled by the Uppsala Peace and Conflict Research Project, Europe, among all the continents has experienced their deepest drop since the last peak in the early 1990s. The real value of this positive finding should not be, however, overestimated. Similarly as elsewhere, although less intensively than in Asia and Africa, a consid-

erable potential for conflicts still exists on or close to our continent. This is particularly true of South Eastern Europe and also of the adjacent regions across the Mediterranean, in Northern and Southern Caucasus and in the Middle East. In addition to power politics, unresolved interstate territorial and political disputes, domestic religiously-colored extremism, competition for energy, water and other scarce natural resources, external meddling etc. the conflict potential in Europe's neighbourhood has been enhanced by several aspects of globalization, including its mass information effects, and by, in the long-run inevitable progress of individual and collective emancipation internally destabilizing established authoritarian political orders, particularly in multiethnic and multireligious societies.

Security background of South Eastern Europe

There has been a tangible interconnection between geopolitical developments in the Euro-Atlantic area and regional security in South Eastern Europe (SEE). On one hand the shifts in power relations among major extra-regional powers have influenced the (in)balance between conflict and cooperation among and within in the region. Some real or potential threats to the SEE security endanger also other parts of Europe as well as. In addition, during the last two decades the SEE itself has been a notable source of insecurity

spilling over to other parts of the continent. Two features of the SEE treated as region stand out – its extraordinary multifaceted heterogeneity and its high sensitivity of the elites to external influences and to the shifts in relations among major continental powers. In these respects SEE has differed very appreciably from other European regions, particularly to Scandinavia. Not incidentally Z. Brzezinski branded the geopolitical fault line stretching from SEE eastward, all the way to the Pacific the “Euroasian Balkans”¹.

The geopolitical instability in SEE has deep historical roots. SEE overlaps partly with the Eastern Mediterranean, with Central East Europe and the Black Sea regions. Per square mile, the central part of SEE, the Balkans, has represented a unique and culturally, linguistically and religiously the most heterogeneous mixture of peoples and ethnic minorities in Europe². Consequently SEE has never become a coherent region in cultural, political or economic sense, clearly lacking its centre of gravity.

The Balkans have for long been considered the most volatile part of the European continent. Throughout 19th and the 20th centuries, wider social upheavals and wars between continental powers stimulated local rebellions, revolutions, *coups d'état*, state breakdowns, warfare within the region, terrorism and other forms of violence. The latest bouts of armed violence and wars in the Balkans took place in 1991 – 1995 and in 1998-2003³. The former upsurge was largely triggered by other positive developments

in the Euro-Atlantic area – the end of the “Cold War”, breakdown of Eastern European and of the Soviet regimes, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the ensuing transition towards democracy and to market economies.

Social instability, economic difficulties and political unrest very significantly contributed to an explosion of interethnic conflicts. Their severity was further magnified by modern mass media and exploited by ruthless politicians. Since 1970s political instability accompanied by violence had led to fragmentation of Cyprus, Moldova and Yugoslavia. The process of “balkanization” doubled the number of *de facto* existing states in SEE from 8 to 16. The Balkan wars produced up to 130 thousand deaths and about two to three million refugees and displaced persons, with the most tragic results in Bosnia & Herzegovina (B & H), Croatia and Kosovo. Other destructive remains of the wars are illegal caches of small arms and ammunition which supply the Europe-wide black market controlled by organized crime. Additionally, there were roughly at least a million anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines planted. Although de-mining activities, supported financially by USA and several EU member states, have been quite successful there are still about 2.100 sq. km of suspect areas in B&H and Croatia with possibly 400.000 planted mines. There are also thousands of mortally dangerous remains of cluster bombs in rural Serbia, the results of NATO bombings in 1999.

SEE has won the distinction of the only region in Europe that was the theatre of several UN peace-keeping missions and of the first NATO’s “out-of-area” military intervention. In 1995, following unsuccessful attempts by UN, CSCE/OSCE and EEC/EU⁴ and only after considerable hesitation the Western powers led by the USA decided to impose peace on the Western Balkans by force. The end of armed hostilities was finally achieved in 2003 in Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.

Political fragmentation and armed conflicts as well as the failure of the communist policies of industrialization in SEE caused huge economic dislocation and damage to the region’s economies and infrastructure⁵. As a result, most former communist-ruled states in SEE still have not reached

the pre-1991 levels of industrial and agricultural production. In some parts of the Western Balkans war losses, dislocation of human and natural resources, breakdown of previously integrated transportation and energy systems, economic fragmentation and loss of export markets elsewhere in Europe and on other continents wiped out most positive results of the preceding economic progress. The very unevenly distributed damage has greatly increased the intraregional differentials in GNP p. c.⁶ and the levels of unemployment. In the poorest SEE states the latter have become the highest on the continent. The Balkan wars led to a big increase in the governments’ sponsored or tolerated trafficking in war materials. The wars also contributed to a spill-over of organized crime into Western Europe. High unemployment and poverty in parts of the region stimulated corruption, organized crime, illegal migration and numerous kinds of illegal trafficking, particularly of narcotics and small arms.

The geopolitical shifts in the early 1990s and the crisis of neutralism and non-alignment led to a radical political and military realignment in SEE. With the greatly reduced Soviet/Russian influence practically the entire region has become politically and economically oriented towards the West. The end of the NATO/Warsaw Pact confrontation and the lack of large-scale mineral, energy or other natural resources led to a very considerable decline of the region’s geopolitical importance. SEE has ceased to be an object of overt contests for political and military domination by superpowers. The extra-regional sources of conflict in, over or about SEE have been therefore reduced to a minimum. The Western Balkans are not Europe’s powder keg any more as they were in 1914. The era of wars of religion, of ideology and of redrawing state borders in the Balkans seems to be over. Unfortunately the region gained international notoriety as a source of troubles and a costly nuisance.

The current security situation

The “European Security Strategy”, adopted by the European Council in 2003, posited the following as the main global threats to the EU members: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states,

terrorism and organized crime, cyber security, energy security and climate change⁷. Other EU documents also mention, as real or potential problems, unresolved conflicts among and within neighbouring states and securing the EU external borders. The actual situation in SEE and even more so the public perception of security threats differ very substantially from these official EU assessments. Respondents in public opinion surveys in most European states have been generally more concerned with other aspects of human insecurity, such as unemployment, crime, corruption, natural disasters (floods, fires) etc.

Once imposed from outside, the superficial tranquillity in the region has been maintained in the Western Balkans by international protectorates - in B & H and Kosovo. In B & H the NATO-led SFOR has been replaced by the much smaller 2000-strong EUFOR (supported by a small NATO special unit and rapid intervention capability). In Kosovo, NATO maintains about 6.000 soldiers in the multinational KFOR, while EU runs the 2.300-strong mission EULEX with international police, prosecutors, prison officials, administrative overseers etc. The latter mission is likely to be reduced in numbers by 2013. Since 1975 the line of demarcation between two parts of Cyprus has been guarded by the UN mission UNFICYP, today with about 600 peace-keepers. Two decades after a local mini-war today there are about 335 Russian “peace-keepers” in Moldova.

Although much less intense than during the Cold War, the rivalry for influence in SEE between the USA and the Russian Federation has been observed. The Russians have been using energy exports and sizeable parastate investments as their main tools, particularly in the energy sectors in Serbia and Republic *Srpska* in B & H and mostly in real estate in Montenegro. There are some US and Russian operational tactical nuclear weapons still present in or close to SEE. A brigade-size military outpost in Moldova, a large naval and air base on the Ukrainian territory in the Crimea, the Russian Navy in the Black Sea and a rotating squadron in the Eastern Mediterranean mark the decreased Russian military muscle in SEE and its immediate vicinity, compared with the Soviet pre-1990 levels. The US military presence in SEE has, on the other hand, moderately

increased mainly due to the volatility in the Middle East. In addition to the USN Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the US Air Force's presence in Italy, Greece and Turkey, the USA has built up a substantial land base Bondsteel in Kosovo and acquired the rights to use military training and transit facilities in Romania and Bulgaria. In July 2011 the USA concluded an agreement with Romania on placing on its territory a battery of antiballistic missiles. These activities presage SEE's future role in the declared US and NATO Theatre Missile Defense against potential threats from Iran (while the Russians view this development very differently and as a threat to them).

One important aspect of security in SEE since the end of the Cold War has been a very considerable change in the levels of defense spending, military manpower, stock of conventional weapons, arms production and export. These movements are reflected in the holdings of heavy conventional weapons prior and soon after the implementation of the CFE Treaty (signed in 1990) and in 2011 (see Table 1).

	Tanks			Artillery			Aircraft		
Romania	2960	1375	345	3928	1475	870	505	430	103
Bulgaria	2209	1475	301	2085	1750	738	335	234	91
Greece	2276	1735	1590	2149	1878	3156	458	650	303
Turkey	3234	2795	4503	3210	3529	7450	355	750	694

Table 1.

Source: *The Military Balance 2011*; Routledge, London: 2011, pp.93-94, 114-116, 138-140, 151-154. Goldblat, J. *Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute: London: Thousand Oaks: New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994. pp. 176-177.

The table shows that the former Communist-ruled states reduced drastically their defense outlays, both for political and economic reasons. This applies not only to the two former WTO members (Romania and Bulgaria) but also to the former non-WTO states not included into CFE - to Albania and to seven ex-Yugoslav states. The present levels in seven states existing today on the territory of the former SFR of Yugoslavia are as presented in Table 2. In this group of states the reductions took place after the termination of Balkan wars

	Active	Reserve	MBTs
Serbia	28.184	50.171	212
Croatia	18.600	21.000	261
Bosnia & Herzegovina	10.577	-	334
Slovenia	7.600	1.700	45
Macedonia	8.000	4.850	31
Montenegro	2.984	-	-
Kosovo	2.500	800	-
Total	78.445	78.521	883

Table 2.

Source: *The Military Balance 2012*; International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 2012, pp. 149, 100, 97, 134, 137, 150.

in 1995 and by 1999 produced much lower totals of military manpower and heavy conventional weapons compared with those in the 1980s in the now defunct SFRY. Active armed forces were reduced roughly by a half while those of the reserves and heavy con-

There are only five operating nuclear power stations in the region and a small number of nuclear research reactors. Although all SEE states adhere to the NPT regime, the problem of nuclear safety (including the disposal of nuclear materials) exists. Its acuteness has been reduced by shutting down, under the EU pressure of four out of six older Soviet-built reactors at Kozluduy in Bulgaria.

The suppression of armed violence did not add up to long-term stability in the Balkans, as has been manifested since 2001 by outbursts of violence in Kosovo, Serbia and Macedonia, by the paralyzed central government in Bosnia & Herzegovina, by destruction of a border station, by road barricades close to the Kosovo – Serbia border, armed clashes of Serbs with KFOR soldiers and violent incidents in Macedonia in 2011-2012.

In the region there are three *de facto* existing states whose legal status has been contested – the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Republic of Transdnistria and Republic of Kosovo. In the adjacent region of Transcaucasia there are additionally three flashpoints of sharp interstate tensions which in 2008 resulted in serious armed conflicts with the use of heavy conventional weapons and in 2012 in deadly border shootings. They have involved directly not only three secessionist and internationally practically unrecognized parastates – Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh but also the Russian Federation, Georgia, Armenia and

ventional weapons by, at least, two thirds. On the other hand, the two older NATO members (Turkey and Greece) have continued with unabated high defense spending due, i. a., to the unresolved disputes over Cyprus and the airspace over the Aegean Sea. This policy in Greece has contributed significantly to almost state bankruptcy. Due to disagreements between NATO and Moscow the CFE treaty, adapted in 1999 has not been fully implemented.

Another aspect of regional security relates to the existing nuclear installations.

Azerbaijan. All the three “frozen conflicts” remain on Europe’s security and political agenda⁸. Kosovo – the latest addition to the list – has contributed to political tensions between USA and major West European states, on one hand, and the Russian Federation, on the other, Kosovo’s proclamation of independence in 2008 has also divided the members of EU and NATO. Despite official termination by the International Steering Group on 10 September 2012 of the international supervision of Kosovo’s independence, these divisions still remain as well as the only partly implemented Ahtisaari proposal of the Kosovo status settlement. Although its existence has been secured, Kosovo *de facto* remains an international protectorate and an internally very weak state, additionally lacking the control over its entire territory and population.

The unsettled situation of the three secessionist states provides ample grounds for new potential conflicts. Moreover, there have recently been public threats by and accusations of secessionist intentions against some prominent politicians and public figures in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Serbia. So, the potential for sharp interethnic conflicts (also in Macedonia) and for further fragmentation in the ex-Yugoslav space has not yet been fully exhausted. Moreover, among the six internationally recognized ex-Yugoslav states there is still a number of unresolved touchy issues of succession, including contested segments of interstate borders on land, on the Danube and in the Adriatic Sea.

Among other political issues in the Balkans, the situation of underprivileged ethnic minorities (e. g. the Romas) and of, at least, a half million refugees and displaced persons must be mentioned. SEE has recently witnessed mass unrest, violent demonstrations and vandalism provoked by economic troubles, high unemployment and political dissatisfaction in Albania, Serbia, Croatia and Greece. Even worse social and political conditions exist, however, elsewhere in the Balkans. Greece has been also under strong pressure of illegal migration, principally from the Middle East. From among up to 120.000-150.000 estimated irregular migrants p.a. across the Mediterranean at least a third reaches EU via South Eastern Europe. The increased flow has led to trou-

bles and subsequent militarization along the short EU external border between Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, the newest EU member states - Romania and to a lesser extent Bulgaria “exported” part of their own social insecurity when a large number of Romas migrated to and overstayed in illegal encampments in Italy, Spain and France. Harsh police countermeasures produced political ripples in EU institutions while the flood of other Romanian job seekers in Spain posed additional problems for the freedom of movement of persons within EU.

SEE has been exposed to a number of other non-military threats to security. Some of these have originated in SEE itself, while some have been imported from or linked to similar phenomena in states outside the region. Prominent among non-military threats are organized crime and corruption. According to some analysts they have the potential of becoming the most dangerous threat to regional security⁹. Organized crime from the Balkans, often in cooperation with Italian and other extraregional criminal organizations has been active in bank and post office robberies, in various forms of smuggling and illegal trafficking, including humans, human organs, drugs, arms, counterfeit goods, tobacco products etc. It has been estimated that about three quarters of heroin (mostly from Afghanistan) and a considerable part of cocaine (from Latin America) enters Western Europe via SEE. The single biggest source of light weapons illegally exported from SEE has been reportedly the Russian-protected and internationally unrecognized Republic of Transnistria in Moldova.

Since the termination of last wars, the Balkans – previously a hotbed of political terrorism – have lost a good deal of this notoriety and become mainly a transit or hiding area. Among real or potential non-military security threats which affect SEE (and other parts of Europe) one should mention also natural and ecological disasters, climate change and energy security. Parts of the region have recently suffered from devastating floods and forest fires. The Russian-Ukrainian squabbles over gas transit have exposed the fragility of energy security in SEE. The interruption of gas supply in winter 2008/2009 hit worst the city dwellers in B & H. The already high dependence of SEE on imports of carbon fuels is likely to increase soon. Several

competing projects of transregional gas pipelines, notably the EU-supported Nabucco and the Russian-promoted Southern Stream, envision crossing SEE. If and when implemented, these very demanding undertakings will strongly impact energy security not only of SEE but also of the EU at large¹⁰.

South Eastern Europe and the wider international community

The “frozen” political conflicts in Cyprus and in Moldova, as well as those between Serbia and Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece have testified to the Balkan elites’ inability to find pragmatic solutions through compromise and mutual accommodation and to assure regional stability. So far none of the regionally generated initiatives of enhanced cooperation has proven viable. The efforts to infuse from outside cooperation with and among the region’s states seem to be more promising¹¹. Since 1990s these efforts have resulted in a web of international organizations, almost exclusively Western in origin. This web has included the “Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe”, CEFTA, SECI, NATO’s “Partnership for Peace”, “South East Europe Initiative”, etc.

The international record of dealing with the sources of instability and insecurity in SEE has highlighted the complexity of its problems which defy quick unidimensional solutions and the underestimated links between the region’s security and the security in other parts of Europe. There is a need for a robust international action to improve the economic and social situation in most of the Balkans while avoiding the vicious circle of the region’s external dependency. Foreign military and police presence will still be needed probably for many years to come. The international community’s ability to help manage numerous problems could be best enhanced by further strengthening EU’s and NATO’s role and influence in SEE. The NATO Strategic Concept of 2011 stresses the aim of “facilitating Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans ... [in order] ... to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations”¹².

In spite of numerous hurdles the EU and NATO have actively fostered multifacet-

ed regional cooperation, particularly among the ex-Yugoslav states¹³. Since 2008 the net of the EU stabilization and association agreements has been extended to cover the entire region, except Kosovo. These agreements have served as steps in bringing closer to and eventually admitting all remaining Balkan states into the ranks of EU members. In 2011 the pre-accession negotiations have been concluded with Croatia and after very long waiting Turkey obtained the status of an official candidate but negotiations have been stalled mainly due to the Cyprus problem. Serbia and Montenegro entered the rank of candidates in 2012, Macedonia's candidacy (both to EU and NATO) remains in limbo due to Greece's ridiculous veto over Macedonia's name. Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and also Kosovo (within the context of UN Security Council Resolution no. 1244/99) remain potential future candidates. The admission of Croatia and Albania into NATO in 2009 also contributed to stabilization in the region. The NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 reconfirmed Macedonia's candidacy, welcomed Montenegro's progress towards NATO membership, praised Bosnia & Herzegovina's membership aspirations, expressed support for Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration and for the EU-facilitated Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue as well as for further consolidation of peace and stability in Kosovo. In the decades to come, the process of EU and NATO enlargement indeed provides a hope for progress of SEE regional security.

However, a note of caution would be in order. The foreseen inclusion of the entire region into the Euro-Atlantic integration would be clearly insufficient. The record shows that despite simultaneous belonging of both states to the European Union it took Great Britain and Ireland more than three decades to reach a symbolic reconciliation and conclude the compromise Good Friday Agreement on Ulster. After a similarly long simultaneous membership in EU and NATO the conflict between Great Britain and Spain over Gibraltar still remains unresolved. Sixty years of two countries' membership in NATO have not stopped the arms race between Greece and Turkey and brought a resolution of the Cyprus problem closer. The admission of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU did not advance its resolution either and perhaps

made it even more difficult. Today, more than 60 years since the country's joining NATO and the European Communities the relations between the two main national communities in Belgium are worse than they have ever been. Etc, etc.

The historic record also shows that in the 1860s, late 1870s-early 1880s, in 1908-1913, 1914-1921, 1937-1945, 1947-1949, mid-1970s, late 1980s, in 1991-1995 and 1999-2003 the flare-ups of violence have almost regularly punctured the periods of relative peace in the Balkans. The last time peace did not come from within the region but was imposed by the Western military intervention. The underbrush of nationalism, intolerance and intercommunal hatred unfortunately still survives in the Balkans. This is why in order to break with the negative pattern of the last 150 years the Balkan elites need to show much wiser and responsible behaviour.

Most countries in the region have undergone radical transformation of their political orders. Instead of authoritarian and, among them also totalitarian regimes in the late 1980s the region is composed today of, in various degrees, democratic political systems. And democracies almost never fight wars among themselves. Moreover the considerable demilitarization in most Balkan states has greatly reduced their warfighting capabilities. The Balkan elites have hopefully also learned from the negative experience of the last two decades and of its consequences. Unlike in 1990-1991 the hottest potential trouble spots in the Western Balkans are today under international surveillance in the form, i. a., of presence of foreign troops, civilian controllers and two *de facto* protectorates. In addition the countries of the region are recipients of considerable financial assistance and developmental loans. There is also a web of the above-mentioned regional cooperation schemes, including those in security and defense matters. All this provides good reasons for moderately optimistic expectation that the Balkans will one day become a region of democracy, prosperity and stability enhancing and not diminishing the security on and around the European continent. ■

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⁸ Clement, Sophia. 1997. *The International Community Response in Conflict Prevention in the Balkans*. (Chaillot Paper no. 30. Paris: Institute for Security Studies. p.p. 46-74.

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
NATO EOD Demonstrations & Trials 2012

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On 18 – 20 September 2012 in Trencin, SLOVAKIA, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Centre of Excellence organized the NATO EOD Demonstrations & Trials 2012 (D&T 12). The purpose of this event was to facilitate interaction between the industry, operational community and academia in order to improve knowledge and to share experience among EOD/IEDD society associated with the conflict in Afghanistan and emerging terrorist threat.

During the last few years threat of terrorist attacks directed at the military and civilian population has considerably increased. In response, a number of measures have been taken to counter those threats. The D&T 12 was an event sponsored by the NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division and supported by the Slovak Ministry of Defense. It is a perfect example of a concerted effort to take on new challenges.

Organizing biennial events for experts from industry and military such as EOD/CIED conferences, demonstrations and trials has become an excellent tradition, which helps the entire EOD related entity under-

stand each other by exchanging information. Bringing together the operational, armament and technological EOD related entities from NATO/PfP/MD nations is considered a regular basic need for future work. Equally important issue was to open space for discussions at the conference and subsequent seminars to analyze the existing gaps in the EOD area with focus on Urgent Military Requirements and to propose possible way ahead. The umbrella topic of all events within D&T12 was “Detection”. These supplementary meetings gave excellent opportunities for discussions not only on particular themes, but they gave a chance to share and explain perspectives from academic, military and producers’ points of view.

D&T 12, primarily a NATO event was opened to all partner frameworks and likewise to the NATO structures. The Joint Force Training Command delegation, led by MG Pavol MACKO, the JFTC Commander took an active part at the event, proving very close cooperation with the NATO EOD COE, not only in the ISAF pre-deployment training, but at all levels, to emphasize the exchange


of information and knowledge through a mutual participation in major projects.

During a three day event, with live demonstrations of recent technologies, supplemented by static exhibitions and meetings, more than 200 experts (SMEs, guests) from 25 NATO and PfP countries took part, and at least 1200 visitors saw static exhibitions and live demonstrations. More than 50 world leading companies in the EOD domain from 18 countries contributed to the success of this NATO EOD event.

During the live demonstrations, producers and vendors took the opportunity to present their products in real field conditions. The capabilities of presented equipment were demonstrated by the producers and vendors in the following categories:

- ROVs expected to conduct tasks in difficult ground conditions;
- Identification of hazardous materials using X-ray devices and hand detectors;
- Other devices/machines and EOD tools.

Very important and interesting was the demonstration of ROVs capabilities. This



kind of tests demonstrated usefulness of various categories of equipment to perform specific tasks. One of the future solutions is to develop one basic platform and with additional tools delivering improved tactical

flexibility and better sustainability. A perfect robot would be small, powerful and manoeuvrable with all tools and detectors executing tasks independently. Manufacturers put a lot of emphasis on safety measures while

increasing technical equipment specifically in CBRN area. Moreover, even single tools like hook and line set reported the development progress of some details, but crucial for operators.

A result of live demonstrations could be summarized in this well known fact:

“Without really precise individual training with new technologies and equipment it is very challenging to do any excellent job“.

Conference and the Seminar gave a space to brief and discuss visions and challenges within the EOD dimension between academics, industry and military SMEs.

Many challenges were identified pertinent to EOD training, EOD operations and verification of the EOD Equipment, but the one presented below related to the technology is of the utmost importance:

The long-lasting challenge is **universality versus specialization** as there is all the time a fight between universal broad scaled equipment with lower sensitivity and specialized narrow scaled equipment with higher sensitivity. If we add perspectives of multi-functionality, modularity, and mobility then demands become never-ending. From the military point of view, the equipment integration into a mobile system, composite structures, demountable, exchangeable are essential for its mobility. D&T12 proved that companies are focusing on universality and multi-functionality of their products, but the challenge to reach compatibility among products, made by different companies still remains.

The summary of challenges resulted from briefings and discussions within D&T12 reflects also our understanding and





thinking about current challenges and future trends and tendencies in the EOD area.

Understanding this message and applying it to the present, it is believed that the way ahead in the EOD area will be a combination of progress and effort in following areas:

- New alternative methods of detecting will be invented
- Focus on equipment producers will move closer to universal ones with broad detection scale
- Further development of verification process will be achieved

- Well developed and mission tailored training will be in place
- A mechanism for quick implementation of progress into practice will be implemented
- Decreasing of technology dependence (incl. maintenance dependency) will be considered as a way to eliminate own weakness

Summary

Sufficient EOD and especially IEDD technologies already exist and majority of

them are integrated into national armed forces. The success of individual technologies, in most cases, is directly associated with the final users' expertise and their TTPs applied. The availability of certain EOD equipment on the worldwide market scene provides military EOD/IEDD SMEs with a choice, which should be shaped by a search, focused on comparison and verifying of parameters specified by individual companies. Area of explosives detection remains the most challenging for further research. New methods and technical thought have to be developed in order to be beneficial for all. ■



Political Effects of Global Warming in the Mediterranean Sea

– is the weather the only factor behind
the eastern Mediterranean heat?

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For many people the Island of Cyprus and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) are tourist and holiday destinations but for local Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (from the so called “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, TRNC) it is a basic source of dispute: two different communities living together or rather, next to each other, with different opinions on how the Cyprus peace process should unfold. In between the RoC and the TRNC there is a Buffer Zone – the area between two cease fire lines (1974) manned by UN blue helmets since 1964. But what is the situation surrounding the island itself and affecting the temperature of the bathing waters of the Aphrodite’s island?

There are many more than just internal issues affecting Cyprus and its connections to other eastern Mediterranean countries. Financially, although Cyprus has found rich supplies of natural gas in its Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), economically it is still tightly dependent and connected to Greek banks and their solvency problems. Greece as the main supporter and strategic partner of Cyprus has significant financial troubles and questions remain about a change of its currency regime. Cyprus as the main holder of Greek public and private bonds was also hit by the Greek financial restructuring. The two biggest banks, Bank of Cyprus and Laiki Bank, are believed to need at least 5 billion Euros to recapitalize themselves in accordance with Basel III rule. The

Troika (representatives of EU Commission, European Central Bank and IMF), is present on the island trying to define how much EU bailout money Cyprus needs. Markets are speculating that it might even 10 billion Euros but Standard and Poor's Rating agency announced in July that the bailout bill could reach up to 15 billion Euros. Taking into account the existing and future financing needs it is over 80% of GDP. Surprisingly, Cyprus also played the Russian card making mighty Russian financial players even richer. The way Cyprus thinks and weighs financial options created gave rise to discussion and discontent within the EU as Cyprus is a fully-fledged member of the Eurozone.

However, what makes summer heat in the Mediterranean even hotter is the situation around the island and external relationships with other states. Cyprus is an EU and Eurozone member but not a member of NATO. On the other hand, its main supporter, Greece, is also in the EU and Eurozone as well in NATO. Its rival for influence over northern Cyprus is Turkey, also a NATO member state, and a disappointed candidate for EU membership faced with frozen accession chapters. Turkey acts as a powerful informal leader of the Arab spring and serves as an influential role model as a secular state in the Islamic world.

Drilling and separation of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) in the eastern Mediterranean Sea – RoC refers to

Turkish threats as unacceptable. Change in Israeli - Turkish relations herald “new era” friendship.

The government of the Republic of Cyprus has signed an agreement to delineate its Exclusive Economic Zone with Israel and Egypt with a view to exploit any possible natural gas and oil reserves in its EEZ giving Cyprus hope for huge future income. A similar agreement has been signed with Lebanon but the Lebanese Parliament has not yet ratified it because of larger demands of the sea bed. The first round of licensing resulted in granting rights for Houston-based Noble Energy for exploratory drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ block 12 (south of Cyprus – roughly 120 km from Limassol). Noble Energy started drilling in September 2011 and the initial data that emerged from the exploratory drilling and the evaluation checks carried out, indicated the existence of a natural gas reservoir ranging from 5 to 8 trillion cubic feet. In the second round of licensing this year, bids were submitted for 9 of the 12 offshore blocks, comprising the Cypriot EEZ. Turkey says an offshore gas search by the Greek Cypriot government flouts the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and in April 2012 began exploratory drilling of its own. Last year, it sent a warship-escorted research vessel south of Cyprus, while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned that his government would “retaliate even more strongly” to any further search for mineral deposits around

the island. Turkey has continuously put in doubt Cyprus' sovereign right to carry out exploratory drilling in its EEZ claiming that the wealth from natural gas belongs to both communities on the island.

Turkey and Israel relations – new Israel and Cyprus “gas friendship”

Turkey and Israel once allies, are now diplomatically estranged. This was achieved gradually but reached its peak on 31 May 2010 when an Israeli naval commando conducted a deadly raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship, the Mavi Marmara, killing nine activists and injuring many others. Turkey repeatedly requested a formal apology but officials from Israel called the Mavi Marmara mission a clear provocation stating that Israel has a right to protect the lives of its soldiers and has no reason to apologize. This change in relationship together with the “new” friendship of Cyprus with Israel with regards to its EEZ in the Mediterranean heightened tensions with Turkey. According to media reports, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with the Prime Minister of Cyprus, Demetris Christofias, in February 2012 and offered to assume all construction expenses for a gas extraction plant. In exchange, Israelis would be contracted for all 10,000 positions necessary to man the facility. The employees' families would also live on the Greek part of the island. There was some speculation that they would be accompanied by 20,000 Israeli soldiers to safeguard the civilian workforce and family members, according to a source close to the Greek Cypriot government. Israel later denied these reports. Christofias reportedly also asked Netanyahu to convince Israeli business leaders to halt all Israeli investment in Turkish Cyprus. Relations between Cyprus and Israel seem to generally be inversely related to those between Israel and Turkey. Turkey continues to officially insist that Israel should apologize for its raid on the Mavi Marmara ship, pay financial compensation and lift the Gaza blockade.



Israel – Iran relationships

To picture how complicated the regional relationships are there is no better example than traditional friendship between Cyprus and Syria that Cyprus wants to keep. On the opposite site there is a relation between Syria and Iran that is enemy of Cyprus' new ally, Israel. What makes the Cyprus position on the political map even more complicated are relations between Israel and Iran. The new friendship era with Israel could easily make it target for Hezbollah fighters. The historical relationship between Israel and Iran has never been ideal following calls by Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to eradicate Israel from the world map. In light of Iranian nuclear research which is a subject of interest for the UN nuclear watchdog IAEA, (International Atomic Energy Agency) Iran is still claiming that its nuclear research is purely for civilian purposes and for energy production. Given that recent checks of Iranian nuclear facilities in Parchin revealed the presence of enriched radioactive material to 27%, there is a serious possibility that it is just a question of time before Iran produces enough enriched uranium to produce an atomic weapon using old technology of uranium purification in centrifuges. Iran has suffered from EU embargoes on its crude oil exports and significant setbacks in its foreign policy.

Israel doesn't want to stay out of the security game and with the big brother behind its back, it tries to stay informed and strategically at least one step ahead of its potential rivals. As recently as June 2012 there was a report that Russia-based internet security company, Kaspersky, had found a brand new virus named Flame attacking machines in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East. Its origin has not been identified, but Israel's vice premier fueled speculation that his country, known for its technological innovation and tireless campaign against Iran's suspect nuclear program, unleashed it. The virus stole large quantities of information from various Iranian government agencies, but apparently also disrupted its oil exports by shutting down oil terminals. The situation is unclear at the moment and the newest IAEA reports and satellite pictures prove that Iran has cleared an area at the Parchin nuclear site. Agency inspectors found everything suspiciously clear with no signs of previous buildings or other former nuclear facilities.

Israel stays on alert testing the world's and its own citizens' reaction on a possible preventive attack on Iran bearing in mind the inevitable consequences following an air strike. Nuclear action has not been mentioned yet but there is speculation of preventive action and this possibility is treated as a possible solution – no matter the consequences.

The Iran - Israel issue earned the men-

tion by Israeli president Shimon Peres as an "open war" with Israel, pointing the finger at Iran and Hezbollah for the last bomb attack in Bulgaria that killed five Israelis. Cyprus is also in the game as a 24-year old Lebanese suspect with Swedish passport was arrested and suspected of planning attacks on Israeli interests in Cyprus mirroring the behavior of a man detained for a terrorist attack in the Bulgarian city of Burgas this month.

Civil war in Syria

With intensive fights in the Syrian cities of Aleppo, Homs and subsequently Damascus, the UN and other world organizations report a full scale civil war in President Bashar al Assad's Syria. Syria has the fourth largest stockpile of chemical weapons such as mustard gas, Sarin gas and VX nerve gas in the world. US President Barack Obama warned Assad that he would be "held accountable by the international community" if his government made the "tragic mistake" of using its chemical weapons. Assad's regime claims that Syria will only use its chemical weapons if it faces "external aggression", but will never use them against its civilians.

The rebel Free Syrian Army (FSA) launched a new offensive to gain control over the area and big international players such as the United States, France and other European countries continue to oppose Assad's regime. Russia, pursuing its own interests, remains the main supporter of the Assad government protecting its arms trade and the only Mediterranean naval base in Tartus for the Black Sea fleet. This month, for the first time in history, Russian military ships refueled in the Cypriot port of Limassol. This gave rise to rumors about Cyprus and Russia naval cooperation in light of a possible change of political regime in Syria and ensuing loss of the naval base there.

Generally, what the situation will be like in the days to come in Syria is not clear yet but Assad's regime eventually lost its main supporters and for the main players the fall of the regime is only a question of time. Cyprus is getting ready for admitting up to 200,000 refugees and already requested the EU for financial support.

Turkish – EU relationships during Cyprus EU Presidency

Turkish and EU relations are tainted by the firm stance of Turkey towards the RoC on the exploration of its EEZ creating negative tensions between Turkey and the EU as well. So far no one from the EU has officially criticized Turkey's constant negative stance towards Cyprus but voices are requesting a more cooperative approach and less "saber-rattling" especially in today's environment and given its EU candidacy. The opening of new chapters in the EU accession talks could be one of a few incentives. There are voices from Turkey commenting on Cyprus' EU Presidency as a banana peel of the EU or using other adjectives to describe a reality that they do not like. Turkey currently has about 30,000 troops on the island, a presence that provokes particular unease in the Greek south. In May, the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, scrapped plans for an international conference on Cyprus, saying the two sides had failed to make adequate progress on proposals to bring them together under a federal power-sharing umbrella. Despite the fact that Turkey has threatened to freeze its relationship with the EU during Cyprus' presidency no negative results have been registered yet but any hope of easing tensions is low. The Cyprus peace process is pretty much similar. The process is frozen while waiting for the end of the Cyprus EU Presidency and new presidential elections in Cyprus.

Conclusion

Cyprus as the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea has a very strategic location and is still considered to be the largest unsinkable aircraft carrier close to the Middle East. Politically it has a delicate position and many international players are trying to gain or keep influence on this Mediterranean region. For consideration, Turkey is just 70 km north, Syria about 100 km east, Lebanon 120 km east, Israel roughly 150 km south east and Egypt 170 km south. The nearest Greek island of Rhodes is 250 km away and the mainland Greek capital of Athens is 420 km away. Cyprus is near all of these countries with complicated internal issues

and interrelations. A basic question could be about the need for the UNFICYP mission but considering the current political situation (Cyprus' EU presidency and the presidential elections in February 2013) there are many other challenges before the reunification of the island and a peaceful solution. Perhaps there is not enough of political and popular will to reunite the island leading to the eventual creation of two different states – a solution often called Turkey's "Plan B". Turkish media have suggested northern Cyprus might allow Greek Cypriots to reclaim property in Varosha (a military enclave of Famagusta town), a seafront town seized by Turkish troops in 1974. But is this the end state that local Cypriots have on their mind?

Cyprus has always had many internal and external issues and this also continues nowadays. It is a very specific environment in a fast changing world where the financial crisis is just a symptom rather than a cause of those problems but makes the position of Cyprus in the hot Mediterranean waters even more delicate. After the Arab spring and following the fall of long term dictatorships, it is obvious that the region has new dynamics and Cyprus has to keep track of it as a player.

It has been 53 years since the island of Cyprus gained its independence from the UK in 1960. Due to ethnic clashes and a political crisis in 1963 between the two communities of Greeks and Turks, the UN established a peacekeeping mission called UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) in 1964. The UNFICYP has a mandate to prevent the recurrence of fighting and contribute to maintenance and restoration of law and order as well as a return to "normal conditions". Hostilities continued until 1974 when a Greek military junta seized power by force. A Turkish "peace operation" called Attila led to a military invasion of North Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the establishment of the Buffer Zone. Nowadays there are 860 military peacekeepers with some 69 police element.

Notice: All views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. ■

THE PEOPLE

Jacek Cieniuch

Staff Officer, Fiscal and Treasury at the Joint Force Training Centre



Jacek Cieniuch is a Staff Officer, Fiscal and Treasury at the Joint Force Training Centre.

Previously employed in the BRE Bank S.A. (Comerzbank Group), he specialized in corporate banking and performed a full range of responsibilities. Those included acquiring new corporate clients, conduct of credit analyses, acting as a foreign exchange and deposits dealer, closing currency exchange and deposit transactions and many more.

In 2004 he became a member of the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) Implementation Team and was assigned to create and develop the Budget & Finance Branch within the JFTC structure. During the early days of the JFTC he was solely responsible for execution of all the JFTC financial activities performing the entire spectrum of fiscal, contracting and budgetary duties.

As the JFTC Budget & Finance Branch developed, he was recruited to the permanent NATO staff as a NATO civilian, A2 grade, Staff Officer Fiscal & Treasury. He is also a Deputy Branch Head and acts as a local consultant for the the JFTC staff with regard to Centralized NATO Automated Financial System (CNAFS). The system was implemented at the JFTC in 2009 and Jacek Cieniuch was in charge of the local implementation project.

Jacek Cieniuch graduated from the University of Szczecin, Poland, Department of Economic Science and Management with master's degree and honourable mention. His major was foreign trade. A few other selected achievements include:

In 2004 he was formally examined and certified by the Polish Ministry of National Treasury to sit in the supervisory boards of state owned companies.

In 2005 he completed the International Defense Management Course (IDMC) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, USA. The programme focused on resources management issues and system analysis and models development in support of the decision making process.

In 2008 he passed with honors the advanced International Public Sector Accountancy Standards (IPSAS) programme.

He also completed numerous internal courses sponsored by NATO including wide range of courses on the Centralized NATO Automated Financial System (CNAFS) and Resource Management.

In 2011 Jacek Cieniuch was qualified to the elite yearly NATO Executive Development Programme (NEDP) and completed it in 2012.

NATO Executive Development Programme (NEDP)

is a prestigious nine-month programme designed for NATO civilians at mid to upper management levels (A2-A5). Through rigorous 2 stage selection process, the group of 20-24 participants is chosen from large number of applicants.

The programme helps the participants in their personal development and development of their management skills. It also vastly enhances their knowledge of NATO as well as gives an insight into a rapidly changing world. Another aim of the programme is to build and develop a network of international civilians with talent and potential from across the Alliance.

The NEDP consists of 5 residential modules run at the European School of Management in London, NATO Defence College (NDC) in Rome, NATO School Oberammergau (NSO), Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT) in Norfolk and NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The programme also includes 4 distant learning modules and lasts for 9 months in total.

The NEDP is sponsored by the Assistant Secretary General for Executive Management. The academic partner of the programme is The European School of Management (ESCP – Europe). With support of numerous recognized external academics and NATO subject matter experts involved in the programme, ESCP ensures highest content quality and facilitates the learning process for the participants.

In the course of the programme, the participants are split into project groups of six. Each group is assigned the project to work on. The projects are focused on specific real life challenges experienced across various NATO areas of activity. Each project group is expected to develop an implementable solution package to the problem given, describe it in the comprehensive report and provide the public presentation followed by questions and answer session. The presentations are given in NATO HQ and attract large audiences that includes high level NATO leaders.

English Studies in the Territory of the Czech Republic and the Heritage of the Defense Language Institute



■ **Col. Ladislav Chaloupský,
Ph.D., Christopher McKeating,
Helena Rýlichová,
MSc. Jaroslav Gorčák,**

The authors are associated with the Defense Language Institute of the Czech Armed Forces

Through international acknowledgment of its academic record and the individual achievements of its alumni, from the battlefields of Afghanistan to the corridors of Brussels and Norfolk, the Czech Defense Language Institute (DLI) has clearly demonstrated that, within just ten years of its foundation, it has matured into an adaptable and thoroughly modern institution of which the country can be proud. In fact, it stands today as a key component to the requirements of not just NATO's English Language Force Goals, but the national requirements of both the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the country's Armed Forces. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it is also the direct continuation of a tradition set in motion by Professor Vilém Mathesius, in Czechoslovakia, some one hundred years ago.

To elucidate, the birth of English Studies across the lands of the Czechs took

place as far back as the year 1912, when Mathesius, the linguist, philologist and anglo-ophile, was appointed Extraordinary Professor to the newly established Department of English Studies at Charles University in Prague. As his students and protégées quickly began to dominate the English Studies Departments of other Czech and Slovak universities, a revolution was secured and the foundations of the academic heritage that we enjoy today in this field were laid.

Indeed, by 1926, together with his colleagues (Bohumil Trnka, Bohuslav Havránek, Jan Mukařovský), Mathesius had already founded what we today consider our parentage - the Prague Linguistic Circle (Cercle Linguistique de Prague) or what later also became known as the Prague School. Indeed, just prior to World War II, as an example of the impact this 'circle' made, it could be said that they had as strong an influence on the development of English Studies and the general attitude towards teaching foreign languages in Europe and the United States as Virginia Woolf's notorious Bloomsbury set had on the literary world. As with the latter, foreign contributors, such as Roman Jakobson, N. S. Trubetzkoy, S. Karcevskij,

H. Becker, K. Bühler were as of equal importance and significantly enriched the study of linguistics.

The reason for this is that the Circle had come together with nothing other than the common goal of striving for excellence; of casting a critical light on the accepted linguistics of the time. Furthermore, the members dealt with the vernacular (at a time when this was virgin territory) and published prolifically on their synchronous attitude towards it. They also pursued pragmatic goals, namely: 1) structural position (i.e. that no language component can be fully understood if studied separately and sans relation to other parts of the language system) and 2) functional position (that language is not an auto-telic system but one with significant functions, e.g. communicative ones). As a result, these activities gave rise to what is today referred to as the development of functional structuralism.

Departmental (MoD) Language Education

Like today, the period from 1948 on saw the concept of language education affect-

*“If we spoke a different language,
we would perceive a somewhat different world.”*

Ludwig Wittgenstein

ed by an overbearing and dominating political situation - the international situation and the national sidelining of academics. A curtain had descended across the country's hitherto international performance on the stage of linguistics and the State had begun to dictate the languages to be mastered. Both career soldiers and civilian employees alike hence began to study languages within the framework of set curricula at the military and civilian schools led by the Antonín Zápotocký Military Academy in Brno.

Very quickly, however, as a result of the criticism that this process of language education was too focused on practicing language components regardless of the fact as to how far the students were able to apply this knowledge in real communications, the end of the 1950s saw a fundamental about-turn and a move towards the practical aspects of language in use. As witnessed by the readapted contents of curricula, schedules, teaching methods, testing of language proficiency and teaching materials, the new concept had a considerable and lasting effect on departmental language education.

Departmental (MoD) Language Education during the 1990s

It was not until 1989, however, that this concept was aligned with mainstream continental English Studies and the plethora of changes and research from which the country had absented itself were faced. In terms of language education, the moment of cardinal importance came with NATO BILC (Bureau for International Language Coordination) membership and the implementation of NATO STANAG 6001 (standardization agreement on language proficiency levels).

The new political arrangement in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain enabled the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic to develop extensively within the framework of the US IMET (International Military Education and Training) program and, by virtue of this program, many offi-

cers and civilian employees had a unique opportunity to study at various US Military Schools and facilities where they completed

courses based on curricula designed for the improvement of language skills, the study of American values and political-military concepts.

On account of the fact that the list of graduates from the above-mentioned courses also included a high number of personnel from departmental educational institutes, the process of language education experienced a qualitative leap forward and a rapid improvement in results. A US investment also provided material assistance, specifically in a number of first-rate textbooks with other didactic media (both acoustic and visual) and modern equipment such as language laboratories, projectors and computers, etc.

In turn, the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic started hiring linguistic experts, au fait teachers and methodologists, who worked as mobile teams operating within the overall framework of the IMET program.

As early as 1995, the Language Training Institute (the Military Academy in Brno) had introduced a testing system in accordance with STANAG 6001 and the Czech Republic's Armed Forces had sent their first representative to participate at the heart of what makes NATO work from a linguistic perspective – the NATO BILC conferences.

On 12 March 1999, when the Czech Republic became a full member of NATO, the remnants of the curtain that had fallen on Mathesius' dream of the country as a force in the world of linguistics and international reason had been swept away.

The next milestone was 2003 when the system of language education underwent a further significant transformation. On September 1st, in order to meet the specific demands placed on military personnel in terms of language education, the Defense Language Institute came into existence as an autonomous cost center, and was incorporated into the organizational structure of the Training and Doctrine Directorate, subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. The main reason for disbanding the Language

Training Institute of the Military Academy in Brno, its predecessor, lay in the fact that its capacity could simply not satisfy the needs of a 21st century military force; providing soldiers and the Air Force with the language that they needed to do their jobs in an international environment had become a specialized military field.

This decision has since proven to have been one of incredible foresight and courage; not only has the DLI enabled the Czech Republic to stand alongside her allies in Afghanistan, Iraq and across the world as an interoperable, English speaking troop contributing nation but, through education and language, provided our officers and soldiers with the skills and interests to re-establish the friendships and relationships made at such cost by those of previous generations.

The reason for this is that, over the last decade, English has changed beyond all recognition for NATO – it is no longer just a means of communication but a war fighting skill and the key component to *interoperability*, – the foundation upon which the entire alliance and relative peace that we enjoy today rests. For Masaryk, the genius behind our First Republic, the way ahead lay with our Legions, the young men and women who stood, fought and died alongside our English speaking allies. For those of the Second World War, the way ahead lay with men like Frantisek Fajtl who piloted England's Spitfires at a time when this country had fallen and the United Kingdom stood alone; men who were forced not just to fly in English, in English machines, in English formations, with English Manuals and English Commanders - in a world in which the English ruled the seas, but lived in exile, far from home, in England. The DLI is hence not just a direct descendant of the Prague Circle, a continuation of Mathesius' dream or an academic institution, but very much this generation's way ahead, their Legion and their Spitfire.

What must be remembered is that NATO is not just about pirates off the coast of Somalia or the insurgents of Afghanistan, nor is it about the language, values and interests of the United States, Canada or the United Kingdom. What NATO is about and the DLI is an integral part of, is avoiding the next war – and being strong enough and prepared enough to win it if it comes. A war in which

deployments could consist of not hundreds, but hundreds of thousands, a war in which the casualties could number too many to think about, a war in which entire cities and countries may cease to exist if the West fails to stand together. Indeed, a war such as the First World War. What is often forgotten, given the relative peace of the last sixty or so years, is that, at some place or another, the threat of war is permanent and hence, the DLI's interpretation of itself as being at the forefront of these preparations.

The beginnings of our vocation, however, were far from easy. In fact, the DLI was established, for want of a better phrase, 'from scratch' - there were no textbooks for example, the classrooms were thirty years out of date and the teachers' offices were furnished with little other than a few old wooden chairs from the 1950s and 23 steel desks. In all honesty, all that we had (and that raised our spirits) were a couple of archaic computers that we had salvaged from an adjacent building and the dream of Mathesius. Within the first week though, the current director of the DLI, Colonel Ladislav Chaloupsky, PhD, was able to hire more than sixty teachers and start the language training the week after. In fact, within just six months, with the help of Ms. Sally Fenstermacher from the United States, the Training and Doctrine Command and the General Staff, we were able to start tackling the very core of NATO's challenges. Looking back at its history, the Defense Language Institute has notched up a long line of achievements. Indeed, we have come a long way; not just in terms of the fact that we now have the systems, materials and curricula to match the best of Europe but that we have returned to the country what was so very nearly lost - an academic tradition of excellence.

In hindsight, so much was achieved by striving for just this: almost immediately after its inception, for example, the new DLI faculty launched significant changes: the number of students in classes was lowered from twenty odd to eight for SLP 3, and to 10 for SLP 2; the duration of intensive courses was extended from four to six months, two or three ninety minute classes a day were modified into six fifty minute classes a day. Students were also pre-tested before being admitted to a course and then divided into homogeneous groups. Comprehensive rules

for testing were also issued and even took into account the very small number of people who suffer from dyslexia. Furthermore, bi-level testing was introduced along with re-testing of single language skills and, thanks to Col. Petr Špička (chief of General Staff Educational Department at that time), plus levels to meet not just the needs of the students but the reality of 21st century warfare.

Within the DLI itself, all of this was due to dedicated employees such as Sonia Šamalíková and Helena Rýlichová, the assistance of colleagues from DLI-ELC in Texas, colleagues from the Partner Language Training Center Europe (PLTCE), the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and colleagues from the Bureau for International Language Co-ordination (BILC). To quote Winston Churchill, never in this field has so much been owed, by so many, to so few: Dr. F. Cartwright, S. Fenstermacher, K. Sacre, K. Wert, P. Garza, Dr. R. Monaghan, J. Dubeau and J. V. Begovic.

Today, as the central language education facility of the Czech Republic's Armed Forces, the institution is engaged in draw-

personnel. Just last October, for example, at the last conference, the Czech Republic was one of the few countries in NATO not only to publically voice the current pitfalls in interoperability with regards to language (as has so often been espoused by the Americans), but to address how they should be tackled.

But these examples, however admirable, fail to portray its real success and that lies in its preparations for the reality of 21st century warfare. To give just one example, the DLI has directly trained many soldiers for service in Afghanistan, a mission area which consists of 36 different nationalities operating in real time intelligence, of which only 6 speak English as a native language and just a handful that are members of NATO. It does not need to be said, therefore, that interoperability is a vital milestone and that the DLI and English Studies are critical to sustaining it. Nor does it need to be said that to pursue stability and conduct multi-national missions, post-conflict operations, maritime security, humanitarian, nation-building and stability operations, that the ACR is dependent on it.

To achieve all this, the Defense



DLI Staff Meeting

ing up concept-setting materials for running language education, coordinating its implementation, and proposing methodical and organizational measures to increase its efficiency. At NATO-BILC annual conferences, the director submits regular reports on the activities run by the institute and the level of language proficiency achieved by the Army's

Language Institute rests, as a whole, on three main pillars and the institute's effectiveness is based on the joint cooperation of all these three segments: the Language Education Department, the Methodology and Testing Department, and the Organization and Planning Section.



DLI Teacher's Office

Methodology and Testing Department (MTD)

In the process of testing language proficiency for key military personnel (in accordance with STANAG 6001), the Methodology and Testing Department applies the latest knowledge and lessons learned, and thus promotes the reputation of the country in the framework of accomplishing NATO Force Goals (G 0356/ E 1101 – English language requirements for personnel of NATO earmarked units).

As is the case with all sciences, the field of language testing is rapidly advancing as evidenced by emerging new methods and principles and the department is committed to applying the latest in these information and communication technologies. These trends are monitored and analyzed by the institute, piloted and introduced where appropriate into the language courses and testing activities.

Undoubtedly, one of the most advanced methods in the area of testing is computer-adaptive testing (CAT), a process which the DLI, specifically the Methodology and Testing Department, is introducing into practice. In doing so, the MTD also established a successful relationship with the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic in 2009. The CAT is a form of computer-based testing that adapts to the examinee's ability level. The test is based on software that selects questions

from a voluminous databank as a response to the test taker's previous answer(s). If answered correctly, they receive a more difficult task and vice-versa after a wrong answer. By choosing difficulty grades the testing software is then able to gauge the candidate's proficiency level.

Language Education Department (LED)

The LED coordinates and implements the language education of an admirable num-

ber of AFRCR personnel. Over 4000 students have hitherto graduated from different types of its courses. They run intensive, refresher, combined and specialized courses designed for teaching English, Russian, French, German and Arabic. Besides standard courses, in great demand are English Military Terminology courses and classes for the medical personnel of the Military Hospital in Olomouc.

With regard to the increasing requests from the AFRCR branches / MoD sector and the necessity to accomplish Force Goals (G 0356/ E 1101), the Institute has always striven, depending on its available resources, to meet these requests. For example, in recent years the Institute has run the CONAMS courses, Air Force Terminology courses, classes for the 5th OMLT¹, the 153rd Engineer Battalion, terminology courses for the Military Police and Czech language classes for the Austrian Armed Forces and Police. In the framework of cooperation among the departmental language institutes, the DLI has also held seminars on military terminology for the UoD Language Training Center.

In addition to meeting departmental requests, the Institute has also been committed to raising the effectiveness and quality of the teaching process across its language courses. Besides modern equipment such as smart boards, listening laboratories, computer classrooms, and the Self-Access Center for individual learning and consultations, stu-



Computer Adaptive Testing



Dr. Tomas Radej and his Popular Lecture on Islam and its Relevance to the AFCR²

dents can now appreciate lectures on Islam for example and have access to native speaking staff, many of which have military backgrounds.

The Language Education Department is equally engaged in the field of translation and interpreting services. The long list of activities includes, for example, the translation of Col Ernst's³ book *The History of Czech language teaching and Czech military terminology in the Austrian Armed Forces, EALTA⁴: Coordinators and Translators of the EALTA Guidelines for Good Practice in*

Language Testing and Assessment, and interpreting at international conferences and military exercises, e.g. the Prague AKTE Conference in August 2012 and the Dingo Fighting Vehicles Mechanics Course that took place in Germany in October 2012. Teachers also contribute to the A-report magazine with English texts on military topics; the articles published herein, for example, have been adapted for the upcoming book publication titled Military English.

A matter of more importance is the DLI's cooperation with foreign institutes.

The LED has developed an intensive relationship with the Marshall Center (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany) which, based on mutual agreements, trained 10 students in military terminology in 2011 / 2012 (completely free of charge). Close relationships have also been established across staff and management with other countries such as The United States, Great Britain, New Zealand and Slovenia.

Many experts, both military and civilians, are teaching and lecturing military students on many different types of courses. To mention just a handful of them: Col. Clement Machacek (ret), an ex pilot and IT expert from the USA, Maj. John Welch – a Doctor of Medicine for the NZ Air Force and his wife and Mr. Christopher McKeating, an ex officer and Post Grad. A researcher from St Andrews in the U.K., specializing in terrorism.


As already mentioned above, a highly significant partner is the DLIELC (Defense Language Institute English Language Center, Lackland AFB, Texas) which, in addition to providing key materials for running English courses arranges, upon the request from DLI Vyškov and in coordination with the ODC (Office of Defense Cooperation, Prague), sending of mobile teams to give workshops and presentations (e.g. on the methodology of teaching). Furthermore, worth praising are teachers from the Landesverteidigungsakademie in Vienna who




Christopher McKeating explaining British military tactics and strategy



Colonel Machacek (retired USAF) lecturing students on special military terminology and ICAO⁵ terms.



NATO Joint Advanced Distributed Learning (JADL)



DLI e-learning environment ADL⁶ (LMS – Ilias)



Annual DLI Language Conference with guests from the USA, Austria, Slovakia.

assist (both directly or via Skype) in teaching the DLI students in German. In return, the DLI lecturers participate in teaching Czech language courses run by the Sprachinstitut des Bundesheeres.

Another trend in modern teaching methods and approaches is undoubtedly the so-called learning management system (LMS), i.e. a software application that provides assistance in the management of language education through e-learning. Most LMS applications are furnished with a rich array of different educational modules ranging from those designed for the administration of classes, through to various communication instruments to testing tools.

In consultation with experts from the Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, the Institute has started, in the framework of the NATO e-learning system, developing its own educational courses. In addition, the DLI now intends, based on effective agreements, to access the courses that have already been developed by NATO experts. A great advantage of this e-learning platform lies in using a system that has not only been certified, as the first open LMS, by SCORM 1.2 and SCORM 2004 standards, but that is compatible with NATO's secure intranet (see http://www.ilias.de/docu/goto_docu_cat_580.html).

In conclusion, the heritage of English Studies in the territory of the Czech Republic is in good hands. What was founded a century ago continues to be built upon by the DLI and what was dreamed of so long ago continues to be lived and experienced. Indeed, as with Mathesius' Circle, it remains international in scope, ensclosed in the contemporary and, with the DLI at its heart, in tune with the challenges of tomorrow. ■

¹ Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
² Armed Forces of the Czech Republic
³ Col. Josef Ernst, Ph.D. is the deputy chief of the Military Language Institute in Austria – Sprachinstitut des Bundesheeres
⁴ European Association for Language Testing and Assessment
⁵ International Civil Aviation Organization
⁶ Advanced Distributed Learning



Bulgarian CHOD Discovers the JFTC for the Second Time

It was a very special day for General Simeonov, the Bulgarian Chief of Defence. After 8 years he came back to Bydgoszcz to re-discover the Joint Force Training Centre. In 2004 and 2005 Brigadier General Simeonov served as the JFTC Chief of Staff. He was the first COS of the newly established centre. On 13 February 2013 General Simeonov, who is now responsible for the whole Bulgarian Armed Forces, paid a visit to the Bydgoszcz NATO training centre and observed how the JFTC has evolved.

“I am glad that the traditions established in 2004 have been affirmed and cultivated” – the Bulgarian CHOD wrote in the JFTC guestbook at the end of his visit. Before, he was briefed on the centre’s current main activities and challenges. For the

first time he could also see the JFTC facilities – the construction started in 2005, when General Simeonov worked in Bydgoszcz, but the centre’s staff moved to the new compound from its temporary seat in 2009.

Apart from discussing the evolution the centre went through during past few years, the JFTC guest talked to the centre’s Commander, Major General Pavel Macko, also about the future of the NATO training in Bydgoszcz. The Generals discussed participation of Bulgarian Military Advisory Teams in training events provided by the JFTC as well as possible cooperation between the Bydgoszcz NATO training centre and the Bulgarian Armed Forces in exercises organized under the Connected Forces Initiative

(CFI) umbrella. After the last NATO Summit in Chicago, where the heads of states approved this NATO’s Secretary General’s latest initiative, the JFTC proved that the centre would play a crucial role in implementing the CFI - the initiative focusing on education, training and close cooperation of NATO forces. Now the centre is working on developing this type of training and remains open for different NATO nations which would like to train their soldiers at the JFTC.

“My sincere wishes of successful endeavours and brightest future in the system of NATO training institutions go to all JFTC personnel and the Command Group” – General Simeonov expressed his wishes for the JFTC before the end of his visit. ■

General Simeon Hristov Simeonov

General Simeon Hristov Simeonov was born in 1955 in the town of Plovdiv.

He is a graduate of the Air Force Academy, Dolna Metropoliya, Y. A. Gagarin Air Force Command and Staff College, Russia and the General Staff Faculty - Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Hamburg, Germany.

He joined the Armed Forces in 1979 as a pilot in a fighter aviation regiment

During his military career he has occupied consecutively various command positions in the Air Force hierarchical structure – commander of: aviation squadron, aviation regiment, air base and aviation corps.

In 2004 he was nominated the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Bydgoszcz, Poland. Thus he became the first Bulgarian General appointed at a NATO position. In the following period: the summer of 2005 – the summer of 2009 he was the Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force.

He became the Chief of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria in July 2009.

Fighter pilot I-class, instructor in all types of conditions – night and day, in fair and bad weather.

He has flown L-29; MiG-15; MiG-17; MiG-21; MiG-29



The Duty Tour in a NATO Centre

■ **General Simeon Simeonov,**
Chief of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria



I had the honor to work in NATO Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC), Bydgoszcz, Poland during the first rotation of command staff which comprised Major General Peter Kühnel from Denmark, Director of the JFTC; Brigadier General Bronisław Kwiatkowski from Poland, Deputy Director and me, at that time – Brigadier General Simeon Simeonov from Bulgaria, Chief of Staff (COS).

In practice we started from scratch and the Centre gradually grew up in terms of personnel strength. We started with working out all documents and gradually introducing and recognizing the NATO standard operational procedures in the process of work. In this way the Centre had the opportunity to start its work properly from the

very beginning, to the best of its capabilities and to achieve initial operational capabilities (IOC) envisaged by the Allied Command Transformation to which we were directly subordinate in the indicated period in 2005. Simultaneously, we were solving all everyday problems and communications problems in the Centre because it was necessary to equip all working places in the temporary Centre located in Dwernickiego Street in Bydgoszcz. In parallel with that, strenuous work and discussions with various NATO teams started regarding the construction and establishment of all facilities required for the future permanent stationing of the JFTC in Szubińska Street.

Six months after the establishment of the JFTC, officers from the JFTC partici-

pated in exercises conducted by other NATO centres and we started in our exercises for training at tactical level (up to brigade level) in accordance with the ACT – Norfolk direction, and JWC – Stavanger focused on training at operational/tactical and operational levels.

The People and the Team with Whom We Worked

Although the process of filling all the JFTC positions by the respective endorsed nations was relatively slow during the first months, the available staff worked with great enthusiasm and diligence. We were all aware that we were the pioneers in



that endeavour and had to establish a very good foundation for work and operation of the JFTC which would guarantee it a proper place among all other NATO centres.

At this point I would like to particularly mention Colonel Leo Hirschmann, the former Head of the Training Division. In addition to his duties he was also implementing part of the duties of the Director of Management and Training Support Division



whose positions were not filled at that time. We had very good collaboration with Lieutenant Colonel Steve Hartov, the military assistant to Major General Kühnel and with my assistant LTC Yuliy Ferdinandov. We had very beneficial cooperation and very good understanding with the Deputy Director of the JFTC, Brigadier General Bronisław Kwiatkowski.

I think that the team with which we worked in the period 2004-2005 provided the

required basis that was a precondition for the subsequent development and successes of the JFTC.

The Host Nation

One of the most important reasons for the JFTC success is the unreserved support provided by the Government and Ministry of Defence of Poland, local authorities of the City of Bydgoszcz and last but not least – warm hospitality of our Polish colleagues. I am glad that in that period I had the opportunity to meet and work together with Lieutenant General Mieczysław Cieniuch, at that time – the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (now – the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces), Major General Zbigniew Głowienka – the Commander of the Pomeranian Military District (now the Commander of the Land Forces), Brigadier General Bronisław Kwiatkowski with whom we were bound together by true friendship that ended because of his untimely death in the Smolensk plane crash. Other Polish colleagues with whom we worked and lived together were also very open-hearted men.

My duty tour at the JFTC broadened my knowledge and understanding of the national traditions and mentality of Polish people. My everyday contacts and communication added a lot to both my professional and personal experience and this makes all my memories about the time I spent in Bydgoszcz very emotional.

My Personal Contribution and Experience Gained during the Duty Tour.

The Director of the JFTC Major General Kühnel, the Deputy Director Brigadier General Kwiatkowski and me in my COS capacity made every effort, we did our best, to ensure the successful start of this training centre and its establishment as a NATO training facility at tactical level. Of course, every beginning is difficult, especially if you have to start from scratch, but I would also like to acknowledge the contribution of all our successors. Today's outlook, prestige and credibility of the JFTC in Bydgoszcz are a result of our joint efforts throughout the years.

Another proof of the high quality training provided by the JFTC is the fact that the JFTC in Bydgoszcz was entrusted with training our units before deploying them to ISAF – Afghanistan.

My duty tour at the JFTC is of special importance for me. It happened in the same year, 2004, when Bulgaria joined NATO. This job has allowed me to expand my horizons about NATO workflows, to improve and consolidate my knowledge about the SOPs (Standard Operational Procedures), required for a particular job. My experience as the JFTC COS has helped me a lot during my following senior assignments: in 2005 – the Commander of the Bulgarian Air Force and in 2009 till present – the Chief of Defence, the highest military position in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. ■

3rd NATO Signal Battalion

3rd NATO Signal Battalion (3NSB) was created in February 2010 as a response to increasing demand for Deployable Communications and Information Systems (DCIS) and specialists able to operate high technology, which DCIS represents.

3NSB is a part of the recently (1.7.2012) created NATO CIS Group which is a successor of NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency (NCSA) deployable structure. It is a part of the Allied Command Operations (ACO).

Mission

"3NSB is responsible for providing flexible, robust and reliable strategic communications to all NATO deployed HQ in support Article V and Non-Article V operations and exercises, in order to allow the deployed commander to successfully prosecute his mission."

Structure

3NSB consists of HQ, six deployable communications modules (DCMs) and maintenance and support company (M&S Coy).

The battalion's subordinate units are distributed across a large part of Europe. HQ, DCM A and M&S Coy is located in Bydgoszcz, Poland, the DCM B in Lipnik nad Bécvou, Czech Republic, the DCM C in Ruzomberok, Slovakia, the DCM D in Vilnius, Lithuania, the DCM E in Szekesfehervar, Hungary and DCM F in Izmir, Turkey. The DCM D and DCM E are national DCMs which means that their personnel can be used for national purposes after receiving NATO approval. Besides this, all the DCMs are similar in terms of structure, duties, responsibilities and services provided.





Lieutenant Colonel Zbysek Weiss, Commander 3NSB says: "It is nice to have subordinated units placed all over Europe, but it also brings some challenges to perform command and control, preventive maintenance inspections, transportation for people and shipment of all kind of equipment".

Working Conditions

Since March 2010, when the first personnel were assigned to the battalion, till now the battalion has been growing constantly not only in terms of manning, but also in terms of improving its capability to carry out its mission. To be able to do so, its personnel have completed a number of courses and exercises, that draw it forward to the stage





when its superior HQ can count on them and be sure that the task given to the 3NSB will be fulfilled.

In order to improve and ensure quality of training and the accumulation of experience 3NSB has created internal training and mentor teams where DCMs have been combined according to their level of training, where the better trained, more skilled tutor the others. This allows for continuous increase of knowledge and application of theoretical knowledge gained by studying into practical training with DCIS.

In 2011 and 2012 3NSB provided CIS support to many NATO exercises including Steadfast Juncture, Steadfast Cobalt, Steadfast Illusion, Ramstein Rover, ISAF POMLT and others. A perfect opportunity to train 3NSB Soldiers is also support for the

closest NATO unit, the JFTC Bydgoszcz. This support is beneficial for both sides - the JFTC receives CIS support and 3NSB personnel receive hands-on training with CIS.

High-quality training connected with top-quality exercises support provided the battalion a foundation for the ability to support operations. 3NSB supported Operation Unified Protector and from the beginning of 2012 the battalion's soldiers had been deployed to ISAF and KFOR. From the very beginning, the battalion and its members have been performing their duties in the most exemplary manner, meeting all the requirements and expectations. Many units and soldiers have been awarded for their excellent job, which has made a commitment of all 3NSB members to continue in their job on the same high level and work on their

improvement in order to support the battalion's mission.

Future and its challenges

The very near future will bring a lot of challenges for the battalion. In 2013 3NSB is a secondary battalion for the NRF but is planned to become its main one in 2014. In order to fulfill the tasks, 3NSB personnel have to complete a lot of courses, exercises, integrate new DCIS and improve infrastructure in all DCMs locations, which means increased cost for NATO and each nation participating in 3NSB. LTC Weiss says: "I know that the incoming days will be difficult, but I am optimistic, I trust my soldiers and I am sure, that, they will always do their best". ■



Life at the JFTC

2012 in Retrospect

JFTC Staff Ride to Austerlitz Battlefield

At the “Old Post Office”, one of the most famous historical sights on the Austerlitz Battlefield, members of the JFTC saw in the demonstration of the battle drill of the French troops performed by the members of the local Napoleonic Club. During the staff ride the participants visited the Monument of Peace and the Museum, the Old Post Office, Austerlitz Castle, Zuran and Lednice Castle. In all the locations they received guided tours and lectures about the battle and its impact on the history of Europe. The staff ride was organized by Brigadier General Jaromir Zuna and hosted by the National Defence University in Brno, Czech Republic.



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Brigadier General Jaromir ZUNA welcomes the General Staff Course from the National Defence University in Brno, Czech Republic on October 24, 2012

The visit was organized as a part of the field trip to Poland, during which the attendees of the course also visited the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, National Defence University in Warsaw and 3rd NATO Signal Battalion in Bydgoszcz. The aim of the JFTC visit was to inform the students about the JFTC's mission, its capabilities and training for current operations organized at the JFTC.



Festival of French culture and cuisine

Beaujolais Nouveau traditionally belongs to the most appreciated cultural events organized at the JFTC. Again, Col Francis Marec and his team prepared for the people serving and working at the JFTC a splendid event, with abundance of traditional French food, wine and music. Thank you very much!





Brigadier General Jaromir ZUNA awards Col Francis MAREC on the occasion of the celebration of the Independent Czechoslovak State Day

28 October 1918 is considered to be one of the key historical moments, which has formed the Czech Nation. In recognition of its importance the celebration of the Independent Czechoslovak State Day is accompanied with official events organized across the country, dedicated to recognition of the people for their achievements and contribution to the Czech Statehood in various fields of human activities, including the security and defense. For the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic the celebration of the Independent Czechoslovak State Day is traditionally the occasion for promotions to the highest military ranks, decoration of soldiers with military awards, and, besides many others, also recognition of military cooperation with our Allies.



Col Marec assumed his duties at the JFTC in 2010. His performance as Mission Training Branch Head has been exceptional and in accordance with the best tradition of the French Armed Forces. Besides assigned NATO duties Col Marec is also the French Senior National Representative to the JFTC and other NATO units located in Bydgoszcz. In this capacity, he has always been promoting the spirit of friendship, collegiality and cohesion among the people serving and working in NATO units in Bydgoszcz. It

is broadly recognized and appreciated, that under the leadership of Col Marec the French Contingent has made significant contribution to the quality and cultural richness of lives of the servicemen from NATO countries serving in Bydgoszcz and their family dependants.

There is also a great deal of symbolism in recognition of Col Marec on the occasion of the Independent Czechoslovak State Day. The birth of the new state, Czechoslovakia, in 1918 also marked the beginning of buildup of its armed forces. The Czech Republic never forgets invaluable support which was then provided by the Republic of France. A statue of the first Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces, French Division General Maurice César Joseph Pellé, stands today in the office of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic. It is a lasting reminder of the contribution of the French Military Mission in Czechoslovakia to the development of our Armed Forces.

Col Francis Marec, in recognition of all your achievements and appreciation of your personal contribution to the cooperation among the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and the Armed Forces of the Republic of France, I am honored to decorate you with the "Commemorative medal of the Czech Republic National Military Representative to NATO".





Polish and German Military Orchestras' Concert

For 8 years German and Polish soldiers have been working hand in hand in the NATO Joint Force Training Centre. The German soldiers feel very well received by their Polish colleagues as well as by the city and the population of Bydgoszcz. Initiated by the German and the Polish Senior National Representatives and generously supported by


the Mayor of Bydgoszcz, Mr. Rafal Bruski, the German and Polish soldiers of the JFTC invited all citizens of Bydgoszcz to a military orchestras' concert. On 27 September the German Wehrbereichsmusikkorps I from Neubrandenburg and the Military Orchestra of the Polish Armed Forces Support Inspectorate took the audience on an entertaining musical journey performing marches and popular music. The event took place at the Bydgoszcz Old Market Square.



Oktoberfest

It has already become an annual tradition that one autumn evening at the JFTC is reserved for Oktoberfest. Also last year the German JFTC community invited the whole centre's staff with their families to celebrate this most famous Bavarian festival. On 27 September more than 200 people, including important guests such as Dr. Jarosław Kuropatwiński, the Honorary Consul of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bydgoszcz and Mr. Henryk Maciejewski, the Honorary Consul of the Republic of Croatia in Bydgoszcz, gathered at the JFTC compound to taste German beer, food, beverages and to listen to German music performed live.





The Ball in the Opera

It was the fourth time when the Joint Force Training Centre invited the whole Bydgoszcz NATO family for the ball. On 17 November almost 300 members from the JFTC, NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz, JFTC Support Unit, the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion as well as other guests gathered in Opera Nova House in Bydgoszcz to enjoy a splendid evening, which traditionally represents the summit of the annual cultural activities organized by the JFTC.

The ball was full of attractions performed by more than 100 artists and musicians. At the beginning the guests were invited for a concert, performed by the Military Band from Toruń conducted by Captain Dominik Sierzputowski, the band commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Paweł Lewandowski. There was also a performance presented by the Choir of the University of Technology and Life Sciences and the 'Copernicus' Male Voice Choir. Also performances of a Cuban singer, Maria Rodriguez, a Ballet Group from the Opera Nova and the Vocal Band of the "Riwiera" Navy Club enchanted the audi-

ence. They entertained the guests with pieces of good music, such as "Danse Diabolique", "The Pirates of the Caribbean", "The Blue Moon" and many others.

Also the JFTC Ball Charity Lottery already became a tradition. Every year before the ball, the whole Bydgoszcz NATO Community collects money for people in need. The lottery tickets were available for approximately a month before the ball. Together with a ticket people bought a chance to win one of 17 baskets full of national products. They were provided by respective nations, the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion and the JFTC Commander. Lucky winners enjoy the contents of baskets and the NATO family can be proud of collecting approximately 5000 PLN.

This was the biggest ball in the JFTC's history. Almost 150 couples enjoyed the evening, some of them stayed on the dance floor till early morning. It would not have been possible without the support of kind and friendly people, including the Marshal of the Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province, the Director of the Opera Nova and many others. The JFTC thanks all of them for their tremendous support.



Slovak Armed Forces Academy Discovers NATO Training

Five Slovak Colonels participating in the National Security Course, led by Professor Pavel Bučka, arrived in Bydgoszcz to learn more about NATO training and to see how the requirements of the Alliance are fulfilled in practice. How the Joint Force Training Centre prepares soldiers for future missions and how the Centre conducts more and more challenging exercises – these were the main topics of briefings and discussions during the visit that took place on 10 October 2012.



Polish and French Military Bands Musical Union

Two months after the joint musical forces of the German and Polish military bands performed at the Bydgoszcz Old Market Square, a similar concert, this time with French and Polish musicians, took place in the concert hall of the Feliks Nowowiejski Music Academy, also in Bydgoszcz.

On 22 November the French Infantry Band from Lyon, invited by Colonel Francis Marec, the French Senior National Representative at the JFTC, together with the Military Orchestra of the Polish Armed Forces Support Inspectorate played some well known pieces of music for the NATO family in Bydgoszcz gathered at the Academy.

On the next day the French Infantry Band met also with pupils of the International School of Bydgoszcz. After a short concert, the children, under the professional guidance of the musicians, could try their skills in playing a few instruments, including trumpet, clarinet, trombone and drums.

Both concerts were received very well.





Sport Events

Short breaks between training events, exercises, workshops and conferences conducted by the Joint Force Training Centre created a few opportunities to examine the Bydgoszcz NATO's staff physical condition. Numerous military and civilian representatives of the JFTC, the JFTC Support Unit, the NATO Communication and Information Systems Services Agency Squadron Bydgoszcz and the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion responded to sport invitations and eagerly participated in various sport events organized for the Bydgoszcz NATO family.




Life at the JFTC 2012 in Retrospect



Prime example of unity, friendship and cultural enrichment

Like in many other NATO commands and institutions, the JFTC, in close cooperation with the Senior National Representatives, organized annual International Day. Over the years, the event has become a true reflection of multinational character of the JFTC. National contingents prepared a vast array of samples of traditional national dishes, drinks, and promotional materials about their countries. Since the NATO community in Bydgoszcz is steadily growing, and the number of dependants with it, the main focus this year was on children. Playgrounds, entertainment, competitions, and many other things were prepared for them by the Host Nation Poland.



Slovak National Holidays at the JFTC

For the second year in a row the Slovak NATO community in Bydgoszcz celebrated their two national holidays – the Constitution Day and the Slovak Armed Forces Day. The event, led by Major General Pavel Macko, took place on 20 September 2012 and gathered members of the JFTC, representatives of the JFTC Support Unit, the NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz and the 3rd NATO Signal Battalion as well as invited guests, including HE Mr. Vasil Grivna, Slovak Ambassador to Poland accompanied by Colonel Vasil Kuzmiak, the Slovak Military Attaché to Poland. The JFTC commemorated the Slovak national holidays with a unit parade, a flag raising ceremony and an occasional address given by General Macko introducing the historic background of both events and their significance

for the Slovak Nation. „Velvet Revolution“, the end of Communism in Czechoslovakia in 1989 was followed by dissolution of the country. In July 1992, Slovakia declared sovereignty, on 1 September 1992 the country adopted its constitution and on 1 January 1993 the Slovak Republic and Czech Republic became independent states. Slovaks commemorate adoption of their constitution annually on 1 September. In 2012 they celebrated its 20th anniversary. The Slovak Armed Forces Day Republic is celebrated annually since 1997 on 22 September. The date commemorates the first victory of Slovak volunteers at Brezova pod Bradlom in the revolutionary year 1848, when the suppressed Slovak Nation stood up against the power of Austro-Hungarian Empire in the fight for freedom and independence.





Brigadier General Grzegorz Buszka Opens Polish Independence Day Run

It was the third time when the Polish community at the JFTC organized the Polish Independence Day Run to commemorate the most important national holiday of the JFTC's Host Nation. There was also an official ceremony attended by local authorities, a concert with patriotic music and a reception with pea soup and Polish "bigos".



The day was opened by a 1-kilometer run for women and a 3-kilometer run for men. Approximately 30 participants representing the JFTC, the JFTC Support Unit (JFTC SU) and the NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz (NCBY) entered the competition. After a very tough rivalry Katarzyna Terebus (JFTC SU) and Major Stéphane Boucharin (NCBY) received congratulations for the best performance. Together with second and third place winners from both competitions they were awarded during the official ceremony which took place in the second part of the day.

In the presence of Mr. Zbigniew Ostrowski, the Deputy Voivode of Kujawsko-Pomorskie Province and Mr. Jan Szopiński, the Deputy Mayor of Bydgoszcz, the JFTC family listened to a short occasional lecture given by Brigadier General Grzegorz Buszka, the JFTC Deputy Commander and a very interesting presentation about Polish-Italian relations over the past few centuries, prepared by an Italian JFTC officer, Lieutenant Colonel Attilio Burdi. The ceremony also created a perfect opportunity to decorate Chief Petty Officer Willem de Best, who was awarded the Bronze Medal of the Polish Armed Forces for his contribution to Polish-Dutch military cooperation. The Deputy Voivode decorated CPO de Best on behalf of the Polish Minister of Defence.

Polish Armed Forces Logistics Day

On 7 March 2012 soldiers from various countries who currently serve in Bydgoszcz had an unusual opportunity to learn more about Polish logistic equipment and facilities which were presented at the JFTC compound.

Command Post Mobile Module, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Unit, a Field Hospital Module and a Field Bakery were shown to the visitors. As temperatures in March in Poland are rather low, the organizers presented everybody with a bowl of warm Polish traditional military pea soup as well as a loaf of fresh bread baked in the Field Bakery.




Another Successful Year for the NATO Spouse Club in Bydgoszcz

It has been another successful and for sure the most fruitful year for the members of the NATO Spouse Club in Bydgoszcz. More than twenty cultural, social, educational and charity events were organized in 2012. In addition, the members were engaged in French, English and Polish language courses, which helped to reinforce the friendship and mutual understanding among the ladies coming from various countries. Besides all these activities the NATO Spouse Club in Bydgoszcz actively supported variety of events organized by NATO units located in Bydgoszcz such as International Day.



Life at the JFTC

2012 in Retrospect



Christmas Tree Lighting

Around 100 JFTC and NCIA Squadron Bydgoszcz families, altogether 250 people, met at the JFTC compound to celebrate the Christmas Tree Lighting. It has already become a tradition for the JFTC members to spend a day before Christmas in the company of the Bydgoszcz NATO family. Last year, the event took place on 14 December and was full of good spirit, children's laughter, joy and magic.



PUBLICATION GUIDELINES

1. The articles should be submitted in English;
2. The articles should be 1000-5000 words long;
3. The articles should be delivered as electronic files on a CD/DVD to the following address:
Joint Force Training Centre
ul. Szubińska 2
85-915 Bydgoszcz
Poland
or sent via an e-mail to the following address:
pao@jftc.nato.int;
4. The articles should be written in Microsoft Word format, single-spaced, Times New Roman font, 12 size, A4 paper size;
5. Photos sent as an illustration for the articles should be sent in JPEG files, minimum 500KB;
6. The author of the article should provide the editor with a short information about his profession, academic title, professional affiliation and contact details.



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